/*
- * Copyright 2001-2007 Internet2
+ * Copyright 2001-2010 Internet2
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
#include "logging.h"
#include "security/AbstractPKIXTrustEngine.h"
#include "signature/KeyInfo.h"
+#include "signature/Signature.h"
#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
STACK_OF(X509)* untrusted,
AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::PKIXValidationInfoIterator* pkixInfo,
bool fullCRLChain,
- const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>* inlineCRLs=NULL
+ const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>* inlineCRLs=nullptr
)
{
Category& log=Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine");
}
};
-AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::AbstractPKIXTrustEngine(const DOMElement* e) : TrustEngine(e), m_fullCRLChain(false)
+AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::PKIXValidationInfoIterator::PKIXValidationInfoIterator()
+{
+}
+
+AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::PKIXValidationInfoIterator::~PKIXValidationInfoIterator()
+{
+}
+
+AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::AbstractPKIXTrustEngine(const xercesc::DOMElement* e) : TrustEngine(e), m_fullCRLChain(false)
{
static XMLCh fullCRLChain[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_12(f,u,l,l,C,R,L,C,h,a,i,n);
- const XMLCh* flag = e ? e->getAttributeNS(NULL, fullCRLChain) : NULL;
- m_fullCRLChain = (flag && (*flag == chLatin_t || *flag == chDigit_1));
+ const XMLCh* flag = e ? e->getAttributeNS(nullptr, fullCRLChain) : nullptr;
+ m_fullCRLChain = (flag && (*flag == xercesc::chLatin_t || *flag == xercesc::chDigit_1));
+}
+
+AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::~AbstractPKIXTrustEngine()
+{
}
bool AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::checkEntityNames(
for (vector<const Credential*>::const_iterator cred = creds.begin(); cred!=creds.end(); ++cred)
trustednames.insert((*cred)->getKeyNames().begin(), (*cred)->getKeyNames().end());
- char buf[256];
X509_NAME* subject=X509_get_subject_name(certEE);
if (subject) {
// One way is a direct match to the subject DN.
// Seems that the way to do the compare is to write the X509_NAME into a BIO.
BIO* b = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
BIO* b2 = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- BIO_set_mem_eof_return(b, 0);
- BIO_set_mem_eof_return(b2, 0);
// The flags give us LDAP order instead of X.500, with a comma separator.
- int len=X509_NAME_print_ex(b,subject,0,XN_FLAG_RFC2253);
- string subjectstr,subjectstr2;
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(b,subject,0,XN_FLAG_RFC2253);
BIO_flush(b);
- while ((len = BIO_read(b, buf, 255)) > 0) {
- buf[len] = '\0';
- subjectstr+=buf;
- }
- log.debugStream() << "certificate subject: " << subjectstr << logging::eol;
// The flags give us LDAP order instead of X.500, with a comma plus space separator.
- len=X509_NAME_print_ex(b2,subject,0,XN_FLAG_RFC2253 + XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC - XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS);
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(b2,subject,0,XN_FLAG_RFC2253 + XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC - XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS);
BIO_flush(b2);
- while ((len = BIO_read(b2, buf, 255)) > 0) {
- buf[len] = '\0';
- subjectstr2+=buf;
+
+ BUF_MEM* bptr=nullptr;
+ BUF_MEM* bptr2=nullptr;
+ BIO_get_mem_ptr(b, &bptr);
+ BIO_get_mem_ptr(b2, &bptr2);
+
+ if (bptr && bptr->length > 0 && log.isDebugEnabled()) {
+ string subjectstr(bptr->data, bptr->length);
+ log.debug("certificate subject: %s", subjectstr.c_str());
}
// Check each keyname.
- for (set<string>::const_iterator n=trustednames.begin(); n!=trustednames.end(); n++) {
+ for (set<string>::const_iterator n=trustednames.begin(); bptr && bptr2 && n!=trustednames.end(); n++) {
#ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
- if (!strcasecmp(n->c_str(),subjectstr.c_str()) || !strcasecmp(n->c_str(),subjectstr2.c_str())) {
+ if ((n->length() == bptr->length && !strncasecmp(n->c_str(), bptr->data, bptr->length)) ||
+ (n->length() == bptr2->length && !strncasecmp(n->c_str(), bptr2->data, bptr2->length))) {
#else
- if (!stricmp(n->c_str(),subjectstr.c_str()) || !stricmp(n->c_str(),subjectstr2.c_str())) {
+ if ((n->length() == bptr->length && !strnicmp(n->c_str(), bptr->data, bptr->length)) ||
+ (n->length() == bptr2->length && !strnicmp(n->c_str(), bptr2->data, bptr2->length))) {
#endif
log.debug("matched full subject DN to a key name (%s)", n->c_str());
BIO_free(b);
BIO_free(b2);
log.debug("unable to match DN, trying TLS subjectAltName match");
- STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME)* altnames=(STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME)*)X509_get_ext_d2i(certEE, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+ STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME)* altnames=(STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME)*)X509_get_ext_d2i(certEE, NID_subject_alt_name, nullptr, nullptr);
if (altnames) {
int numalts = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames);
for (int an=0; an<numalts; an++) {
const int altlen = ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
for (set<string>::const_iterator n=trustednames.begin(); n!=trustednames.end(); n++) {
#ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
- if ((check->type==GEN_DNS && !strncasecmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen))
+ if ((check->type==GEN_DNS && n->length()==altlen && !strncasecmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen))
#else
- if ((check->type==GEN_DNS && !strnicmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen))
+ if ((check->type==GEN_DNS && n->length()==altlen && !strnicmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen))
#endif
- || (check->type==GEN_URI && !strncmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen))) {
+ || (check->type==GEN_URI && n->length()==altlen && !strncmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen))) {
log.debug("matched DNS/URI subjectAltName to a key name (%s)", n->c_str());
GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
return true;
GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
log.debug("unable to match subjectAltName, trying TLS CN match");
- memset(buf,0,sizeof(buf));
- if (X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subject,NID_commonName,buf,255)>0) {
+
+ // Fetch the last CN RDN.
+ char* peer_CN = nullptr;
+ int j,i = -1;
+ while ((j=X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(subject, NID_commonName, i)) >= 0)
+ i = j;
+ if (i >= 0) {
+ ASN1_STRING* tmp = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(subject, i));
+ // Copied in from libcurl.
+ /* In OpenSSL 0.9.7d and earlier, ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 fails if the input
+ is already UTF-8 encoded. We check for this case and copy the raw
+ string manually to avoid the problem. */
+ if(tmp && ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
+ j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp);
+ if(j >= 0) {
+ peer_CN = (char*)OPENSSL_malloc(j + 1);
+ memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_data(tmp), j);
+ peer_CN[j] = '\0';
+ }
+ }
+ else /* not a UTF8 name */ {
+ j = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(reinterpret_cast<unsigned char**>(&peer_CN), tmp);
+ }
+
for (set<string>::const_iterator n=trustednames.begin(); n!=trustednames.end(); n++) {
#ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
- if (!strcasecmp(buf,n->c_str())) {
+ if (n->length() == j && !strncasecmp(peer_CN, n->c_str(), j)) {
#else
- if (!stricmp(buf,n->c_str())) {
+ if (n->length() == j && !strnicmp(peer_CN, n->c_str(), j)) {
#endif
log.debug("matched subject CN to a key name (%s)", n->c_str());
+ if(peer_CN)
+ OPENSSL_free(peer_CN);
return true;
}
}
+ if(peer_CN)
+ OPENSSL_free(peer_CN);
}
- else
+ else {
log.warn("no common name in certificate subject");
+ }
}
- else
+ else {
log.error("certificate has no subject?!");
+ }
return false;
}
// Find and save off a pointer to the certificate that unlocks the object.
// Most of the time, this will be the first one anyway.
- XSECCryptoX509* certEE=NULL;
+ XSECCryptoX509* certEE=nullptr;
SignatureValidator keyValidator;
for (vector<XSECCryptoX509*>::const_iterator i=certs.begin(); !certEE && i!=certs.end(); ++i) {
try {
// Find and save off a pointer to the certificate that unlocks the object.
// Most of the time, this will be the first one anyway.
- XSECCryptoX509* certEE=NULL;
+ XSECCryptoX509* certEE=nullptr;
for (vector<XSECCryptoX509*>::const_iterator i=certs.begin(); !certEE && i!=certs.end(); ++i) {
try {
auto_ptr<XSECCryptoKey> key((*i)->clonePublicKey());