/*
- * Copyright 2006 Internet2
+ * Copyright 2001-2010 Internet2
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
*/
#include "internal.h"
+#include "logging.h"
#include "security/AbstractPKIXTrustEngine.h"
#include "signature/KeyInfo.h"
+#include "signature/Signature.h"
-#include <log4cpp/Category.hh>
#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <xmltooling/security/CredentialCriteria.h>
+#include <xmltooling/security/CredentialResolver.h>
+#include <xmltooling/security/KeyInfoResolver.h>
#include <xmltooling/security/OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL.h>
+#include <xmltooling/security/X509Credential.h>
#include <xmltooling/signature/SignatureValidator.h>
#include <xmltooling/util/NDC.h>
+#include <xercesc/util/XMLUniDefs.hpp>
#include <xsec/enc/OpenSSL/OpenSSLCryptoX509.hpp>
using namespace xmlsignature;
+using namespace xmltooling::logging;
using namespace xmltooling;
-using namespace log4cpp;
using namespace std;
-AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::AbstractPKIXTrustEngine(const DOMElement* e) : OpenSSLTrustEngine(e), m_inlineResolver(NULL)
-{
- m_inlineResolver = XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().KeyResolverManager.newPlugin(INLINE_KEY_RESOLVER,NULL);
-}
-
-AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::~AbstractPKIXTrustEngine()
-{
- delete m_inlineResolver;
-}
namespace {
static int XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL error_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX* ctx)
}
static bool XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL validate(
- X509* EE, STACK_OF(X509)* untrusted, AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::PKIXValidationInfoIterator* pkixInfo
+ X509* EE,
+ STACK_OF(X509)* untrusted,
+ AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::PKIXValidationInfoIterator* pkixInfo,
+ bool fullCRLChain,
+ const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>* inlineCRLs=nullptr
)
{
Category& log=Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine");
// First we build a stack of CA certs. These objects are all referenced in place.
- log.debug("building CA list from PKIX Validation information");
+ log.debug("supplying PKIX Validation information");
// We need this for CRL support.
X509_STORE* store=X509_STORE_new();
log_openssl();
return false;
}
- #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
- X509_STORE_set_flags(store,X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
- #endif
STACK_OF(X509)* CAstack = sk_X509_new_null();
// This contains the state of the validate operation.
+ int count=0;
X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
const vector<XSECCryptoX509*>& CAcerts = pkixInfo->getTrustAnchors();
for (vector<XSECCryptoX509*>::const_iterator i=CAcerts.begin(); i!=CAcerts.end(); ++i) {
if ((*i)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL) {
sk_X509_push(CAstack,static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509*>(*i)->getOpenSSLX509());
+ ++count;
}
}
+ log.debug("supplied (%d) CA certificate(s)", count);
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
+ count=0;
+ if (inlineCRLs) {
+ for (vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>::const_iterator j=inlineCRLs->begin(); j!=inlineCRLs->end(); ++j) {
+ if ((*j)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL) {
+ // owned by store
+ X509_STORE_add_crl(store, X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()));
+ ++count;
+ }
+ }
+ }
const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>& crls = pkixInfo->getCRLs();
for (vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>::const_iterator j=crls.begin(); j!=crls.end(); ++j) {
if ((*j)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL) {
// owned by store
- X509_STORE_add_crl(
- store,
- X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL())
- );
+ X509_STORE_add_crl(store, X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()));
+ ++count;
}
}
-
+ log.debug("supplied (%d) CRL(s)", count);
+ if (count > 0)
+ X509_STORE_set_flags(store, fullCRLChain ? (X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) : (X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK));
+#else
+ if ((inlineCRLs && !inlineCRLs->empty()) || !pkixInfo->getCRLs().empty()) {
+ log.warn("OpenSSL versions < 0.9.7 do not support CRL checking");
+ }
+#endif
+
// AFAICT, EE and untrusted are passed in but not owned by the ctx.
- #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
if (X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,store,EE,untrusted)!=1) {
log_openssl();
log.error("unable to initialize X509_STORE_CTX");
X509_STORE_free(store);
return false;
}
- #else
+#else
X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,store,EE,untrusted);
- #endif
+#endif
// Seems to be most efficient to just pass in the CA stack.
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&ctx,CAstack);
sk_X509_free(CAstack);
if (ret==1) {
- log.info("successfully validated certificate chain");
+ log.debug("successfully validated certificate chain");
return true;
}
}
};
-bool AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::checkEntityNames(X509* certEE, const KeyInfoSource& keyInfoSource) const
+AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::PKIXValidationInfoIterator::PKIXValidationInfoIterator()
{
- Category& log=Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine");
-
- // Build a list of acceptable names. Transcode the possible key "names" to UTF-8.
- // For some simple cases, this should handle UTF-8 encoded DNs in certificates.
- vector<string> keynames;
- auto_ptr<KeyInfoIterator> keyInfoIter(keyInfoSource.getKeyInfoIterator());
- while (keyInfoIter->hasNext()) {
- const KeyInfo* keyInfo = keyInfoIter->next();
- const vector<KeyName*>& knames=keyInfo->getKeyNames();
- for (vector<KeyName*>::const_iterator kn_i=knames.begin(); kn_i!=knames.end(); ++kn_i) {
- const XMLCh* n=(*kn_i)->getName();
- if (n && *n) {
- char* kn=toUTF8(n);
- keynames.push_back(kn);
- delete[] kn;
- }
- }
- }
+}
+
+AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::PKIXValidationInfoIterator::~PKIXValidationInfoIterator()
+{
+}
+
+AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::AbstractPKIXTrustEngine(const xercesc::DOMElement* e) : TrustEngine(e), m_fullCRLChain(false)
+{
+ static XMLCh fullCRLChain[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_12(f,u,l,l,C,R,L,C,h,a,i,n);
+ const XMLCh* flag = e ? e->getAttributeNS(nullptr, fullCRLChain) : nullptr;
+ m_fullCRLChain = (flag && (*flag == xercesc::chLatin_t || *flag == xercesc::chDigit_1));
+}
+
+AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::~AbstractPKIXTrustEngine()
+{
+}
+
+bool AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::checkEntityNames(
+ X509* certEE, const CredentialResolver& credResolver, const CredentialCriteria& criteria
+ ) const
+{
+ Category& log=Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine.PKIX");
+
+ // We resolve to a set of trusted credentials.
+ vector<const Credential*> creds;
+ credResolver.resolve(creds,&criteria);
+
+ // Build a list of acceptable names.
+ set<string> trustednames;
+ trustednames.insert(criteria.getPeerName());
+ for (vector<const Credential*>::const_iterator cred = creds.begin(); cred!=creds.end(); ++cred)
+ trustednames.insert((*cred)->getKeyNames().begin(), (*cred)->getKeyNames().end());
- string peername = keyInfoSource.getName();
- if (!peername.empty())
- keynames.push_back(peername);
-
- char buf[256];
X509_NAME* subject=X509_get_subject_name(certEE);
if (subject) {
// One way is a direct match to the subject DN.
// Seems that the way to do the compare is to write the X509_NAME into a BIO.
BIO* b = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
BIO* b2 = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- BIO_set_mem_eof_return(b, 0);
- BIO_set_mem_eof_return(b2, 0);
// The flags give us LDAP order instead of X.500, with a comma separator.
- int len=X509_NAME_print_ex(b,subject,0,XN_FLAG_RFC2253);
- string subjectstr,subjectstr2;
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(b,subject,0,XN_FLAG_RFC2253);
BIO_flush(b);
- while ((len = BIO_read(b, buf, 255)) > 0) {
- buf[len] = '\0';
- subjectstr+=buf;
- }
- log.infoStream() << "certificate subject: " << subjectstr << CategoryStream::ENDLINE;
// The flags give us LDAP order instead of X.500, with a comma plus space separator.
- len=X509_NAME_print_ex(b2,subject,0,XN_FLAG_RFC2253 + XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC - XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS);
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(b2,subject,0,XN_FLAG_RFC2253 + XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC - XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS);
BIO_flush(b2);
- while ((len = BIO_read(b2, buf, 255)) > 0) {
- buf[len] = '\0';
- subjectstr2+=buf;
+
+ BUF_MEM* bptr=nullptr;
+ BUF_MEM* bptr2=nullptr;
+ BIO_get_mem_ptr(b, &bptr);
+ BIO_get_mem_ptr(b2, &bptr2);
+
+ if (bptr && bptr->length > 0 && log.isDebugEnabled()) {
+ string subjectstr(bptr->data, bptr->length);
+ log.debug("certificate subject: %s", subjectstr.c_str());
}
// Check each keyname.
- for (vector<string>::const_iterator n=keynames.begin(); n!=keynames.end(); n++) {
+ for (set<string>::const_iterator n=trustednames.begin(); bptr && bptr2 && n!=trustednames.end(); n++) {
#ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
- if (!strcasecmp(n->c_str(),subjectstr.c_str()) || !strcasecmp(n->c_str(),subjectstr2.c_str())) {
+ if ((n->length() == bptr->length && !strncasecmp(n->c_str(), bptr->data, bptr->length)) ||
+ (n->length() == bptr2->length && !strncasecmp(n->c_str(), bptr2->data, bptr2->length))) {
#else
- if (!stricmp(n->c_str(),subjectstr.c_str()) || !stricmp(n->c_str(),subjectstr2.c_str())) {
+ if ((n->length() == bptr->length && !strnicmp(n->c_str(), bptr->data, bptr->length)) ||
+ (n->length() == bptr2->length && !strnicmp(n->c_str(), bptr2->data, bptr2->length))) {
#endif
- log.info("matched full subject DN to a key name (%s)", n->c_str());
+ log.debug("matched full subject DN to a key name (%s)", n->c_str());
BIO_free(b);
BIO_free(b2);
return true;
BIO_free(b2);
log.debug("unable to match DN, trying TLS subjectAltName match");
- STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME)* altnames=(STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME)*)X509_get_ext_d2i(certEE, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+ STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME)* altnames=(STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME)*)X509_get_ext_d2i(certEE, NID_subject_alt_name, nullptr, nullptr);
if (altnames) {
int numalts = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames);
for (int an=0; an<numalts; an++) {
if (check->type==GEN_DNS || check->type==GEN_URI) {
const char* altptr = (char*)ASN1_STRING_data(check->d.ia5);
const int altlen = ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
-
- for (vector<string>::const_iterator n=keynames.begin(); n!=keynames.end(); n++) {
+ for (set<string>::const_iterator n=trustednames.begin(); n!=trustednames.end(); n++) {
#ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
- if ((check->type==GEN_DNS && !strncasecmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen))
+ if ((check->type==GEN_DNS && n->length()==altlen && !strncasecmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen))
#else
- if ((check->type==GEN_DNS && !strnicmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen))
+ if ((check->type==GEN_DNS && n->length()==altlen && !strnicmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen))
#endif
- || (check->type==GEN_URI && !strncmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen))) {
- log.info("matched DNS/URI subjectAltName to a key name (%s)", n->c_str());
+ || (check->type==GEN_URI && n->length()==altlen && !strncmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen))) {
+ log.debug("matched DNS/URI subjectAltName to a key name (%s)", n->c_str());
GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
return true;
}
GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
log.debug("unable to match subjectAltName, trying TLS CN match");
- memset(buf,0,sizeof(buf));
- if (X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subject,NID_commonName,buf,255)>0) {
- for (vector<string>::const_iterator n=keynames.begin(); n!=keynames.end(); n++) {
+
+ // Fetch the last CN RDN.
+ char* peer_CN = nullptr;
+ int j,i = -1;
+ while ((j=X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(subject, NID_commonName, i)) >= 0)
+ i = j;
+ if (i >= 0) {
+ ASN1_STRING* tmp = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(subject, i));
+ // Copied in from libcurl.
+ /* In OpenSSL 0.9.7d and earlier, ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 fails if the input
+ is already UTF-8 encoded. We check for this case and copy the raw
+ string manually to avoid the problem. */
+ if(tmp && ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
+ j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp);
+ if(j >= 0) {
+ peer_CN = (char*)OPENSSL_malloc(j + 1);
+ memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_data(tmp), j);
+ peer_CN[j] = '\0';
+ }
+ }
+ else /* not a UTF8 name */ {
+ j = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(reinterpret_cast<unsigned char**>(&peer_CN), tmp);
+ }
+
+ for (set<string>::const_iterator n=trustednames.begin(); n!=trustednames.end(); n++) {
#ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
- if (!strcasecmp(buf,n->c_str())) {
+ if (n->length() == j && !strncasecmp(peer_CN, n->c_str(), j)) {
#else
- if (!stricmp(buf,n->c_str())) {
+ if (n->length() == j && !strnicmp(peer_CN, n->c_str(), j)) {
#endif
- log.info("matched subject CN to a key name (%s)", n->c_str());
+ log.debug("matched subject CN to a key name (%s)", n->c_str());
+ if(peer_CN)
+ OPENSSL_free(peer_CN);
return true;
}
}
+ if(peer_CN)
+ OPENSSL_free(peer_CN);
}
- else
+ else {
log.warn("no common name in certificate subject");
+ }
}
- else
+ else {
log.error("certificate has no subject?!");
+ }
return false;
}
-bool AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::validate(
+bool AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::validateWithCRLs(
X509* certEE,
STACK_OF(X509)* certChain,
- const KeyInfoSource& keyInfoSource,
- bool checkName,
- const KeyResolver* keyResolver
+ const CredentialResolver& credResolver,
+ CredentialCriteria* criteria,
+ const std::vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>* inlineCRLs
) const
{
#ifdef _DEBUG
- NDC ndc("validate");
+ NDC ndc("validateWithCRLs");
#endif
- Category& log=Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine");
+ Category& log=Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine.PKIX");
if (!certEE) {
log.error("X.509 credential was NULL, unable to perform validation");
return false;
}
- if (checkName) {
+ if (criteria && criteria->getPeerName() && *(criteria->getPeerName())) {
log.debug("checking that the certificate name is acceptable");
- if (!checkEntityNames(certEE,keyInfoSource)) {
+ if (criteria->getUsage()==Credential::UNSPECIFIED_CREDENTIAL)
+ criteria->setUsage(Credential::SIGNING_CREDENTIAL);
+ if (!checkEntityNames(certEE,credResolver,*criteria)) {
log.error("certificate name was not acceptable");
return false;
}
log.debug("performing certificate path validation...");
- auto_ptr<PKIXValidationInfoIterator> pkix(
- getPKIXValidationInfoIterator(keyInfoSource, *(keyResolver ? keyResolver : m_inlineResolver))
- );
+ auto_ptr<PKIXValidationInfoIterator> pkix(getPKIXValidationInfoIterator(credResolver, criteria));
while (pkix->next()) {
- if (::validate(certEE,certChain,pkix.get())) {
+ if (::validate(certEE,certChain,pkix.get(),m_fullCRLChain,inlineCRLs)) {
return true;
}
}
- log.error("failed to validate certificate chain using supplied PKIX information");
+ log.debug("failed to validate certificate chain using supplied PKIX information");
return false;
}
bool AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::validate(
+ X509* certEE,
+ STACK_OF(X509)* certChain,
+ const CredentialResolver& credResolver,
+ CredentialCriteria* criteria
+ ) const
+{
+ return validateWithCRLs(certEE,certChain,credResolver,criteria);
+}
+
+bool AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::validate(
XSECCryptoX509* certEE,
const vector<XSECCryptoX509*>& certChain,
- const KeyInfoSource& keyInfoSource,
- bool checkName,
- const KeyResolver* keyResolver
+ const CredentialResolver& credResolver,
+ CredentialCriteria* criteria
) const
{
- if (!certEE) {
#ifdef _DEBUG
NDC ndc("validate");
#endif
- Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine").error("X.509 credential was NULL, unable to perform validation");
+ if (!certEE) {
+ Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine.PKIX").error("X.509 credential was NULL, unable to perform validation");
return false;
}
else if (certEE->getProviderName()!=DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL) {
-#ifdef _DEBUG
- NDC ndc("validate");
-#endif
- Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine").error("only the OpenSSL XSEC provider is supported");
+ Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine.PKIX").error("only the OpenSSL XSEC provider is supported");
return false;
}
STACK_OF(X509)* untrusted=sk_X509_new_null();
- for (vector<XSECCryptoX509*>::const_iterator i=certChain.begin(); i!=certChain.end(); ++i) {
+ for (vector<XSECCryptoX509*>::const_iterator i=certChain.begin(); i!=certChain.end(); ++i)
sk_X509_push(untrusted,static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509*>(*i)->getOpenSSLX509());
- }
- bool ret = validate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509*>(certEE)->getOpenSSLX509(),untrusted,keyInfoSource,checkName,keyResolver);
+ bool ret = validate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509*>(certEE)->getOpenSSLX509(), untrusted, credResolver, criteria);
sk_X509_free(untrusted);
return ret;
}
bool AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::validate(
Signature& sig,
- const KeyInfoSource& keyInfoSource,
- const KeyResolver* keyResolver
+ const CredentialResolver& credResolver,
+ CredentialCriteria* criteria
) const
{
#ifdef _DEBUG
NDC ndc("validate");
#endif
- Category& log=Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine");
+ Category& log=Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine.PKIX");
+
+ const KeyInfoResolver* inlineResolver = m_keyInfoResolver;
+ if (!inlineResolver)
+ inlineResolver = XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().getKeyInfoResolver();
+ if (!inlineResolver) {
+ log.error("unable to perform PKIX validation, no KeyInfoResolver available");
+ return false;
+ }
- // Pull the certificate chain out of the signature using an inline KeyResolver.
- KeyResolver::ResolvedCertificates certs;
- if (0==m_inlineResolver->resolveCertificates(&sig, certs)) {
+ // Pull the certificate chain out of the signature.
+ X509Credential* x509cred;
+ auto_ptr<Credential> cred(inlineResolver->resolve(&sig,X509Credential::RESOLVE_CERTS|X509Credential::RESOLVE_CRLS));
+ if (!cred.get() || !(x509cred=dynamic_cast<X509Credential*>(cred.get()))) {
+ log.error("unable to perform PKIX validation, signature does not contain any certificates");
+ return false;
+ }
+ const vector<XSECCryptoX509*>& certs = x509cred->getEntityCertificateChain();
+ if (certs.empty()) {
log.error("unable to perform PKIX validation, signature does not contain any certificates");
return false;
}
// Find and save off a pointer to the certificate that unlocks the object.
// Most of the time, this will be the first one anyway.
- XSECCryptoX509* certEE=NULL;
+ XSECCryptoX509* certEE=nullptr;
SignatureValidator keyValidator;
- for (vector<XSECCryptoX509*>::const_iterator i=certs.v().begin(); !certEE && i!=certs.v().end(); ++i) {
+ for (vector<XSECCryptoX509*>::const_iterator i=certs.begin(); !certEE && i!=certs.end(); ++i) {
try {
- keyValidator.setKey((*i)->clonePublicKey());
+ auto_ptr<XSECCryptoKey> key((*i)->clonePublicKey());
+ keyValidator.setKey(key.get());
keyValidator.validate(&sig);
- log.info("signature verified with key inside signature, attempting certificate validation...");
+ log.debug("signature verified with key inside signature, attempting certificate validation...");
certEE=(*i);
}
- catch (ValidationException&) {
- // trap failures
+ catch (ValidationException& ex) {
+ log.debug(ex.what());
}
}
- if (certEE)
- return validate(certEE,certs.v(),keyInfoSource,true,keyResolver);
-
- log.error("failed to verify signature with embedded certificates");
- return false;
+ if (!certEE) {
+ log.debug("failed to verify signature with embedded certificates");
+ return false;
+ }
+ else if (certEE->getProviderName()!=DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL) {
+ log.error("only the OpenSSL XSEC provider is supported");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ STACK_OF(X509)* untrusted=sk_X509_new_null();
+ for (vector<XSECCryptoX509*>::const_iterator i=certs.begin(); i!=certs.end(); ++i)
+ sk_X509_push(untrusted,static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509*>(*i)->getOpenSSLX509());
+ const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>& crls = x509cred->getCRLs();
+ bool ret = validateWithCRLs(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509*>(certEE)->getOpenSSLX509(), untrusted, credResolver, criteria, &crls);
+ sk_X509_free(untrusted);
+ return ret;
}
bool AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::validate(
KeyInfo* keyInfo,
const char* in,
unsigned int in_len,
- const KeyInfoSource& keyInfoSource,
- const KeyResolver* keyResolver
+ const CredentialResolver& credResolver,
+ CredentialCriteria* criteria
) const
{
#ifdef _DEBUG
NDC ndc("validate");
#endif
- Category& log=Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine");
+ Category& log=Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine.PKIX");
+
+ if (!keyInfo) {
+ log.error("unable to perform PKIX validation, KeyInfo not present");
+ return false;
+ }
- // Pull the certificate chain out of the KeyInfo using an inline KeyResolver.
- KeyResolver::ResolvedCertificates certs;
- if (!keyInfo || 0==m_inlineResolver->resolveCertificates(keyInfo, certs)) {
+ const KeyInfoResolver* inlineResolver = m_keyInfoResolver;
+ if (!inlineResolver)
+ inlineResolver = XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().getKeyInfoResolver();
+ if (!inlineResolver) {
+ log.error("unable to perform PKIX validation, no KeyInfoResolver available");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // Pull the certificate chain out of the signature.
+ X509Credential* x509cred;
+ auto_ptr<Credential> cred(inlineResolver->resolve(keyInfo,X509Credential::RESOLVE_CERTS));
+ if (!cred.get() || !(x509cred=dynamic_cast<X509Credential*>(cred.get()))) {
+ log.error("unable to perform PKIX validation, KeyInfo does not contain any certificates");
+ return false;
+ }
+ const vector<XSECCryptoX509*>& certs = x509cred->getEntityCertificateChain();
+ if (certs.empty()) {
log.error("unable to perform PKIX validation, KeyInfo does not contain any certificates");
return false;
}
// Find and save off a pointer to the certificate that unlocks the object.
// Most of the time, this will be the first one anyway.
- XSECCryptoX509* certEE=NULL;
- SignatureValidator keyValidator;
- for (vector<XSECCryptoX509*>::const_iterator i=certs.v().begin(); !certEE && i!=certs.v().end(); ++i) {
+ XSECCryptoX509* certEE=nullptr;
+ for (vector<XSECCryptoX509*>::const_iterator i=certs.begin(); !certEE && i!=certs.end(); ++i) {
try {
auto_ptr<XSECCryptoKey> key((*i)->clonePublicKey());
if (Signature::verifyRawSignature(key.get(), sigAlgorithm, sig, in, in_len)) {
- log.info("signature verified with key inside signature, attempting certificate validation...");
+ log.debug("signature verified with key inside signature, attempting certificate validation...");
certEE=(*i);
}
}
- catch (SignatureException&) {
- // trap failures
+ catch (SignatureException& ex) {
+ log.debug(ex.what());
}
}
if (certEE)
- return validate(certEE,certs.v(),keyInfoSource,true,keyResolver);
+ return validate(certEE,certs,credResolver,criteria);
- log.error("failed to verify signature with embedded certificates");
+ log.debug("failed to verify signature with embedded certificates");
return false;
}
projects / shibboleth / cpp-xmltooling.git / blobdiff