-/*
- * Copyright 2001-2007 Internet2
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+/**
+ * Licensed to the University Corporation for Advanced Internet
+ * Development, Inc. (UCAID) under one or more contributor license
+ * agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with this work for
+ * additional information regarding copyright ownership.
+ *
+ * UCAID licenses this file to you under the Apache License,
+ * Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may not use this file except
+ * in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of the
+ * License at
*
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
+ * software distributed under the License is distributed on an
+ * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND,
+ * either express or implied. See the License for the specific
+ * language governing permissions and limitations under the License.
*/
/**
#include "logging.h"
#include "security/AbstractPKIXTrustEngine.h"
#include "signature/KeyInfo.h"
-
+#include "signature/Signature.h"
+#include "security/CredentialCriteria.h"
+#include "security/CredentialResolver.h"
+#include "security/KeyInfoResolver.h"
+#include "security/OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL.h"
+#include "security/SecurityHelper.h"
+#include "security/X509Credential.h"
+#include "signature/SignatureValidator.h"
+#include "util/NDC.h"
+#include "util/PathResolver.h"
+
+#include <fstream>
#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include <xmltooling/security/CredentialCriteria.h>
-#include <xmltooling/security/CredentialResolver.h>
-#include <xmltooling/security/KeyInfoResolver.h>
-#include <xmltooling/security/OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL.h>
-#include <xmltooling/security/X509Credential.h>
-#include <xmltooling/signature/SignatureValidator.h>
-#include <xmltooling/util/NDC.h>
+#include <xercesc/util/XMLUniDefs.hpp>
#include <xsec/enc/OpenSSL/OpenSSLCryptoX509.hpp>
using namespace xmlsignature;
return ok;
}
+ static string XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL X509_NAME_to_string(X509_NAME* n)
+ {
+ string s;
+ BIO* b = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(b,n,0,XN_FLAG_RFC2253);
+ BIO_flush(b);
+ BUF_MEM* bptr=nullptr;
+ BIO_get_mem_ptr(b, &bptr);
+ if (bptr && bptr->length > 0) {
+ s.append(bptr->data, bptr->length);
+ }
+ BIO_free(b);
+ return s;
+ }
+
+ static time_t XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL getCRLTime(const ASN1_TIME *a)
+ {
+ struct tm t;
+ memset(&t, 0, sizeof(t));
+ // RFC 5280, sections 5.1.2.4 and 5.1.2.5 require thisUpdate and nextUpdate
+ // to be encoded as UTCTime until 2049, and RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.5.1
+ // further restricts the format to "YYMMDDHHMMSSZ" ("even where the number
+ // of seconds is zero").
+ // As long as OpenSSL doesn't provide any API to convert ASN1_TIME values
+ // time_t, we therefore have to parse it ourselves, unfortunately.
+ if (sscanf((const char*)a->data, "%2d%2d%2d%2d%2d%2dZ",
+ &t.tm_year, &t.tm_mon, &t.tm_mday,
+ &t.tm_hour, &t.tm_min, &t.tm_sec) == 6) {
+ if (t.tm_year <= 50) {
+ // RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.5.1
+ t.tm_year += 100;
+ }
+ t.tm_mon--;
+#if defined(HAVE_TIMEGM)
+ return timegm(&t);
+#else
+ // Windows, and hopefully most others...?
+ return mktime(&t) - timezone;
+#endif
+ }
+ return (time_t)-1;
+ }
+
+ static bool XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL isFreshCRL(XSECCryptoX509CRL *c, Category* log=nullptr)
+ {
+ // eventually, these should be made configurable
+ #define MIN_SECS_REMAINING 86400
+ #define MIN_PERCENT_REMAINING 10
+ if (c) {
+ const X509_CRL* crl = static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(c)->getOpenSSLX509CRL();
+ time_t thisUpdate = getCRLTime(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl));
+ time_t nextUpdate = getCRLTime(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl));
+ time_t now = time(nullptr);
+
+ if (thisUpdate < 0 || nextUpdate < 0) {
+ // we failed to parse at least one of the fields (they were not encoded
+ // as required by RFC 5280, actually)
+ time_t exp = now + MIN_SECS_REMAINING;
+ if (log) {
+ log->warn("isFreshCRL (issuer '%s'): improperly encoded thisUpdate or nextUpdate field - falling back to simple time comparison",
+ (X509_NAME_to_string(X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))).c_str());
+ }
+ return (X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), &exp) > 0) ? true : false;
+ }
+ else {
+ if (log && log->isDebugEnabled()) {
+ log->debug("isFreshCRL (issuer '%s'): %.0f seconds until nextUpdate (%3.2f%% elapsed since thisUpdate)",
+ (X509_NAME_to_string(X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))).c_str(),
+ difftime(nextUpdate, now), (difftime(now, thisUpdate) * 100) / difftime(nextUpdate, thisUpdate));
+ }
+
+ // consider it recent enough if there are at least MIN_SECS_REMAINING
+ // to the nextUpdate, and at least MIN_PERCENT_REMAINING of its
+ // overall "validity" are remaining to the nextUpdate
+ return (now + MIN_SECS_REMAINING < nextUpdate) &&
+ ((difftime(nextUpdate, now) * 100) / difftime(nextUpdate, thisUpdate) > MIN_PERCENT_REMAINING);
+ }
+ }
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ static XSECCryptoX509CRL* XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL getRemoteCRLs(const char* cdpuri, Category& log) {
+ // This is a temporary CRL cache implementation to avoid breaking binary compatibility
+ // for the library. Caching can't rely on any member objects within the TrustEngine,
+ // including locks, so we're using the global library lock for the time being.
+ // All other state is kept in the file system.
+
+ // minimum number of seconds between re-attempting a download from one particular CRLDP
+ #define MIN_RETRY_WAIT 60
+
+ // The filenames for the CRL cache are based on a hash of the CRL location.
+ string cdpfile = SecurityHelper::doHash("SHA1", cdpuri, strlen(cdpuri)) + ".crl";
+ XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().getPathResolver()->resolve(cdpfile, PathResolver::XMLTOOLING_RUN_FILE);
+ string cdpstaging = cdpfile + ".tmp";
+ string tsfile = cdpfile + ".ts";
+
+ time_t now = time(nullptr);
+ vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*> crls;
+
+ try {
+ // While holding the lock, check for a cached copy of the CRL, and remove "expired" ones.
+ Locker glock(&XMLToolingConfig::getConfig());
+#ifdef WIN32
+ struct _stat stat_buf;
+ if (_stat(cdpfile.c_str(), &stat_buf) == 0) {
+#else
+ struct stat stat_buf;
+ if (stat(cdpfile.c_str(), &stat_buf) == 0) {
+#endif
+ SecurityHelper::loadCRLsFromFile(crls, cdpfile.c_str());
+ if (crls.empty() || crls.front()->getProviderName() != DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL ||
+ X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(crls.front())->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), &now) < 0) {
+ for_each(crls.begin(), crls.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<XSECCryptoX509CRL>());
+ crls.clear();
+ remove(cdpfile.c_str()); // may as well delete the local copy
+ remove(tsfile.c_str());
+ log.info("deleting cached CRL from %s with nextUpdate field in the past", cdpuri);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ catch (exception& ex) {
+ log.error("exception loading cached copy of CRL from %s: %s", cdpuri, ex.what());
+ }
+
+ if (crls.empty() || !isFreshCRL(crls.front(), &log)) {
+ bool updateTimestamp = true;
+ try {
+ // If we get here, the cached copy didn't exist yet, or it's time to refresh.
+ // To limit the rate of unsuccessful attempts when a CRLDP is unreachable,
+ // we remember the timestamp of the last attempt (both successful/unsuccessful).
+ // We store this in the file system because of the binary compatibility issue.
+ time_t ts = 0;
+ try {
+ Locker glock(&XMLToolingConfig::getConfig());
+ ifstream tssrc(tsfile.c_str());
+ if (tssrc)
+ tssrc >> ts;
+ }
+ catch (exception&) {
+ ts = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (difftime(now, ts) > MIN_RETRY_WAIT) {
+ SOAPTransport::Address addr("AbstractPKIXTrustEngine", cdpuri, cdpuri);
+ string scheme(addr.m_endpoint, strchr(addr.m_endpoint,':') - addr.m_endpoint);
+ auto_ptr<SOAPTransport> soap(XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().SOAPTransportManager.newPlugin(scheme.c_str(), addr));
+ soap->send();
+ istream& msg = soap->receive();
+ Locker glock(&XMLToolingConfig::getConfig());
+ ofstream out(cdpstaging.c_str(), fstream::trunc|fstream::binary);
+ out << msg.rdbuf();
+ out.close();
+ SecurityHelper::loadCRLsFromFile(crls, cdpstaging.c_str());
+ if (crls.empty() || crls.front()->getProviderName() != DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL ||
+ X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(crls.front())->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), &now) < 0) {
+ // The "new" CRL wasn't usable, so get rid of it.
+ for_each(crls.begin(), crls.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<XSECCryptoX509CRL>());
+ crls.clear();
+ remove(cdpstaging.c_str());
+ log.error("ignoring CRL retrieved from %s with nextUpdate field in the past", cdpuri);
+ }
+ else {
+ // "Commit" the new CRL. Note that we might add a CRL which doesn't pass
+ // isFreshCRL, but that's preferrable over adding none at all.
+ log.info("CRL refreshed from %s", cdpuri);
+ remove(cdpfile.c_str());
+ if (rename(cdpstaging.c_str(), cdpfile.c_str()) != 0)
+ log.error("unable to rename CRL staging file");
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ updateTimestamp = false; // don't update if we're within the backoff window
+ }
+ }
+ catch (exception& ex) {
+ log.error("exception downloading/caching CRL from %s: %s", cdpuri, ex.what());
+ }
+
+ if (updateTimestamp) {
+ // update the timestamp file
+ Locker glock(&XMLToolingConfig::getConfig());
+ ofstream tssink(tsfile.c_str(), fstream::trunc);
+ tssink << now;
+ tssink.close();
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (crls.empty())
+ return nullptr;
+ for_each(crls.begin() + 1, crls.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<XSECCryptoX509CRL>());
+ return crls.front();
+ }
+
static bool XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL validate(
- X509* EE, STACK_OF(X509)* untrusted, AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::PKIXValidationInfoIterator* pkixInfo
+ X509* EE,
+ STACK_OF(X509)* untrusted,
+ AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::PKIXValidationInfoIterator* pkixInfo,
+ bool useCRL,
+ bool fullCRLChain,
+ const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>* inlineCRLs=nullptr
)
{
Category& log=Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine");
// First we build a stack of CA certs. These objects are all referenced in place.
- log.debug("building CA list from PKIX Validation information");
+ log.debug("supplying PKIX Validation information");
// We need this for CRL support.
X509_STORE* store=X509_STORE_new();
log_openssl();
return false;
}
- #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
- X509_STORE_set_flags(store,X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
- #endif
- STACK_OF(X509)* CAstack = sk_X509_new_null();
-
// This contains the state of the validate operation.
+ int count=0;
X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
-
- const vector<XSECCryptoX509*>& CAcerts = pkixInfo->getTrustAnchors();
- for (vector<XSECCryptoX509*>::const_iterator i=CAcerts.begin(); i!=CAcerts.end(); ++i) {
- if ((*i)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL) {
- sk_X509_push(CAstack,static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509*>(*i)->getOpenSSLX509());
- }
- }
- const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>& crls = pkixInfo->getCRLs();
- for (vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>::const_iterator j=crls.begin(); j!=crls.end(); ++j) {
- if ((*j)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL) {
- // owned by store
- X509_STORE_add_crl(store, X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()));
- }
- }
-
// AFAICT, EE and untrusted are passed in but not owned by the ctx.
- #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
if (X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,store,EE,untrusted)!=1) {
log_openssl();
log.error("unable to initialize X509_STORE_CTX");
- sk_X509_free(CAstack);
X509_STORE_free(store);
return false;
}
- #else
+#else
X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,store,EE,untrusted);
- #endif
-
+#endif
+
+ STACK_OF(X509)* CAstack = sk_X509_new_null();
+ const vector<XSECCryptoX509*>& CAcerts = pkixInfo->getTrustAnchors();
+ for (vector<XSECCryptoX509*>::const_iterator i=CAcerts.begin(); i!=CAcerts.end(); ++i) {
+ if ((*i)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL) {
+ sk_X509_push(CAstack,static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509*>(*i)->getOpenSSLX509());
+ ++count;
+ }
+ }
+ log.debug("supplied (%d) CA certificate(s)", count);
+
// Seems to be most efficient to just pass in the CA stack.
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&ctx,CAstack);
X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx,100); // we check the depth down below
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx,error_callback);
-
+
+ // Do a first pass verify. If CRLs aren't used, this is the only pass.
int ret=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
if (ret==1) {
// Now see if the depth was acceptable by counting the number of intermediates.
ret=0;
}
}
-
+
+ if (useCRL) {
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
+ // When we add CRLs, we have to be sure the nextUpdate hasn't passed, because OpenSSL won't accept
+ // the CRL in that case. If we end up not adding a CRL for a particular link in the chain, the
+ // validation will fail (if the fullChain option was set).
+ set<string> crlissuers;
+ time_t now = time(nullptr);
+ if (inlineCRLs) {
+ for (vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>::const_iterator j=inlineCRLs->begin(); j!=inlineCRLs->end(); ++j) {
+ if ((*j)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL &&
+ (X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), &now) > 0)) {
+ // owned by store
+ X509_STORE_add_crl(store, X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()));
+ string crlissuer(X509_NAME_to_string(X509_CRL_get_issuer(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL())));
+ if (!crlissuer.empty()) {
+ log.debug("added inline CRL issued by (%s)", crlissuer.c_str());
+ crlissuers.insert(crlissuer);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>& crls = pkixInfo->getCRLs();
+ for (vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>::const_iterator j=crls.begin(); j!=crls.end(); ++j) {
+ if ((*j)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL &&
+ (X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), &now) > 0)) {
+ // owned by store
+ X509_STORE_add_crl(store, X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()));
+ string crlissuer(X509_NAME_to_string(X509_CRL_get_issuer(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL())));
+ if (!crlissuer.empty()) {
+ log.debug("added CRL issued by (%s)", crlissuer.c_str());
+ crlissuers.insert(crlissuer);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(untrusted); ++i) {
+ X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(untrusted, i);
+ string crlissuer(X509_NAME_to_string(X509_get_issuer_name(cert)));
+ if (crlissuers.count(crlissuer)) {
+ // We already have a CRL for this cert, so skip CRLDP processing for this one.
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ bool foundUsableCDP = false;
+ STACK_OF(DIST_POINT)* dps = (STACK_OF(DIST_POINT)*)X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_crl_distribution_points, nullptr, nullptr);
+ for (int ii = 0; !foundUsableCDP && ii < sk_DIST_POINT_num(dps); ++ii) {
+ DIST_POINT* dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(dps, ii);
+ if (!dp->distpoint || dp->distpoint->type != 0)
+ continue;
+ for (int iii = 0; !foundUsableCDP && iii < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->distpoint->name.fullname); ++iii) {
+ GENERAL_NAME* gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->distpoint->name.fullname, iii);
+ // Only consider HTTP URIs, and stop after the first one we find.
+#ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
+ if (gen->type == GEN_URI && (!strncasecmp((const char*)gen->d.ia5->data, "http:", 5))) {
+#else
+ if (gen->type == GEN_URI && (!strnicmp((const char*)gen->d.ia5->data, "http:", 5))) {
+#endif
+ const char* cdpuri = (const char*)gen->d.ia5->data;
+ auto_ptr<XSECCryptoX509CRL> crl(getRemoteCRLs(cdpuri, log));
+ if (crl.get() && crl->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL &&
+ (isFreshCRL(crl.get()) || (ii == sk_DIST_POINT_num(dps)-1 && iii == sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->distpoint->name.fullname)-1))) {
+ // owned by store
+ X509_STORE_add_crl(store, X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(crl.get())->getOpenSSLX509CRL()));
+ log.debug("added CRL issued by (%s)", crlissuer.c_str());
+ crlissuers.insert(crlissuer);
+ foundUsableCDP = true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ sk_DIST_POINT_free(dps);
+ }
+
+ // Do a second pass verify with CRLs in place.
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, fullCRLChain ? (X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) : (X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK));
+ ret=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
+#else
+ log.warn("CRL checking is enabled, but OpenSSL version is too old");
+ ret = 0;
+#endif
+ }
+
// Clean up...
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
X509_STORE_free(store);
return false;
}
+
+ static XMLCh fullCRLChain[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_12(f,u,l,l,C,R,L,C,h,a,i,n);
+ static XMLCh checkRevocation[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_15(c,h,e,c,k,R,e,v,o,c,a,t,i,o,n);
};
+AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::PKIXValidationInfoIterator::PKIXValidationInfoIterator()
+{
+}
+
+AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::PKIXValidationInfoIterator::~PKIXValidationInfoIterator()
+{
+}
+
+AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::AbstractPKIXTrustEngine(const xercesc::DOMElement* e)
+ : TrustEngine(e),
+ m_fullCRLChain(XMLHelper::getAttrBool(e, false, fullCRLChain)),
+ m_checkRevocation(XMLHelper::getAttrString(e, nullptr, checkRevocation))
+{
+ if (m_fullCRLChain) {
+ Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine.PKIX").warn(
+ "fullCRLChain option is deprecated, setting checkRevocation to \"fullChain\""
+ );
+ m_checkRevocation = "fullChain";
+ }
+ else if (m_checkRevocation == "fullChain") {
+ m_fullCRLChain = true; // in case anything's using this
+ }
+}
+
+AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::~AbstractPKIXTrustEngine()
+{
+}
+
bool AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::checkEntityNames(
X509* certEE, const CredentialResolver& credResolver, const CredentialCriteria& criteria
) const
for (vector<const Credential*>::const_iterator cred = creds.begin(); cred!=creds.end(); ++cred)
trustednames.insert((*cred)->getKeyNames().begin(), (*cred)->getKeyNames().end());
- char buf[256];
X509_NAME* subject=X509_get_subject_name(certEE);
if (subject) {
// One way is a direct match to the subject DN.
// Seems that the way to do the compare is to write the X509_NAME into a BIO.
BIO* b = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
BIO* b2 = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- BIO_set_mem_eof_return(b, 0);
- BIO_set_mem_eof_return(b2, 0);
// The flags give us LDAP order instead of X.500, with a comma separator.
- int len=X509_NAME_print_ex(b,subject,0,XN_FLAG_RFC2253);
- string subjectstr,subjectstr2;
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(b,subject,0,XN_FLAG_RFC2253);
BIO_flush(b);
- while ((len = BIO_read(b, buf, 255)) > 0) {
- buf[len] = '\0';
- subjectstr+=buf;
- }
- log.debugStream() << "certificate subject: " << subjectstr << logging::eol;
// The flags give us LDAP order instead of X.500, with a comma plus space separator.
- len=X509_NAME_print_ex(b2,subject,0,XN_FLAG_RFC2253 + XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC - XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS);
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(b2,subject,0,XN_FLAG_RFC2253 + XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC - XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS);
BIO_flush(b2);
- while ((len = BIO_read(b2, buf, 255)) > 0) {
- buf[len] = '\0';
- subjectstr2+=buf;
+
+ BUF_MEM* bptr=nullptr;
+ BUF_MEM* bptr2=nullptr;
+ BIO_get_mem_ptr(b, &bptr);
+ BIO_get_mem_ptr(b2, &bptr2);
+
+ if (bptr && bptr->length > 0 && log.isDebugEnabled()) {
+ string subjectstr(bptr->data, bptr->length);
+ log.debug("certificate subject: %s", subjectstr.c_str());
}
// Check each keyname.
- for (set<string>::const_iterator n=trustednames.begin(); n!=trustednames.end(); n++) {
+ for (set<string>::const_iterator n=trustednames.begin(); bptr && bptr2 && n!=trustednames.end(); n++) {
#ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
- if (!strcasecmp(n->c_str(),subjectstr.c_str()) || !strcasecmp(n->c_str(),subjectstr2.c_str())) {
+ if ((n->length() == bptr->length && !strncasecmp(n->c_str(), bptr->data, bptr->length)) ||
+ (n->length() == bptr2->length && !strncasecmp(n->c_str(), bptr2->data, bptr2->length))) {
#else
- if (!stricmp(n->c_str(),subjectstr.c_str()) || !stricmp(n->c_str(),subjectstr2.c_str())) {
+ if ((n->length() == bptr->length && !strnicmp(n->c_str(), bptr->data, bptr->length)) ||
+ (n->length() == bptr2->length && !strnicmp(n->c_str(), bptr2->data, bptr2->length))) {
#endif
log.debug("matched full subject DN to a key name (%s)", n->c_str());
BIO_free(b);
BIO_free(b2);
log.debug("unable to match DN, trying TLS subjectAltName match");
- STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME)* altnames=(STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME)*)X509_get_ext_d2i(certEE, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+ STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME)* altnames=(STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME)*)X509_get_ext_d2i(certEE, NID_subject_alt_name, nullptr, nullptr);
if (altnames) {
int numalts = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames);
for (int an=0; an<numalts; an++) {
const int altlen = ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
for (set<string>::const_iterator n=trustednames.begin(); n!=trustednames.end(); n++) {
#ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
- if ((check->type==GEN_DNS && !strncasecmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen))
+ if ((check->type==GEN_DNS && n->length()==altlen && !strncasecmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen))
#else
- if ((check->type==GEN_DNS && !strnicmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen))
+ if ((check->type==GEN_DNS && n->length()==altlen && !strnicmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen))
#endif
- || (check->type==GEN_URI && !strncmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen))) {
+ || (check->type==GEN_URI && n->length()==altlen && !strncmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen))) {
log.debug("matched DNS/URI subjectAltName to a key name (%s)", n->c_str());
GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
return true;
GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
log.debug("unable to match subjectAltName, trying TLS CN match");
- memset(buf,0,sizeof(buf));
- if (X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subject,NID_commonName,buf,255)>0) {
+
+ // Fetch the last CN RDN.
+ char* peer_CN = nullptr;
+ int j,i = -1;
+ while ((j=X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(subject, NID_commonName, i)) >= 0)
+ i = j;
+ if (i >= 0) {
+ ASN1_STRING* tmp = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(subject, i));
+ // Copied in from libcurl.
+ /* In OpenSSL 0.9.7d and earlier, ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 fails if the input
+ is already UTF-8 encoded. We check for this case and copy the raw
+ string manually to avoid the problem. */
+ if(tmp && ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
+ j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp);
+ if(j >= 0) {
+ peer_CN = (char*)OPENSSL_malloc(j + 1);
+ memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_data(tmp), j);
+ peer_CN[j] = '\0';
+ }
+ }
+ else /* not a UTF8 name */ {
+ j = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(reinterpret_cast<unsigned char**>(&peer_CN), tmp);
+ }
+
for (set<string>::const_iterator n=trustednames.begin(); n!=trustednames.end(); n++) {
#ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
- if (!strcasecmp(buf,n->c_str())) {
+ if (n->length() == j && !strncasecmp(peer_CN, n->c_str(), j)) {
#else
- if (!stricmp(buf,n->c_str())) {
+ if (n->length() == j && !strnicmp(peer_CN, n->c_str(), j)) {
#endif
log.debug("matched subject CN to a key name (%s)", n->c_str());
+ if(peer_CN)
+ OPENSSL_free(peer_CN);
return true;
}
}
+ if(peer_CN)
+ OPENSSL_free(peer_CN);
}
- else
+ else {
log.warn("no common name in certificate subject");
+ }
}
- else
+ else {
log.error("certificate has no subject?!");
+ }
return false;
}
-bool AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::validate(
+bool AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::validateWithCRLs(
X509* certEE,
STACK_OF(X509)* certChain,
const CredentialResolver& credResolver,
- CredentialCriteria* criteria
+ CredentialCriteria* criteria,
+ const std::vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>* inlineCRLs
) const
{
#ifdef _DEBUG
- NDC ndc("validate");
+ NDC ndc("validateWithCRLs");
#endif
Category& log=Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine.PKIX");
if (criteria && criteria->getPeerName() && *(criteria->getPeerName())) {
log.debug("checking that the certificate name is acceptable");
- if (criteria->getUsage()==CredentialCriteria::UNSPECIFIED_CREDENTIAL)
- criteria->setUsage(CredentialCriteria::SIGNING_CREDENTIAL);
+ if (criteria->getUsage()==Credential::UNSPECIFIED_CREDENTIAL)
+ criteria->setUsage(Credential::SIGNING_CREDENTIAL);
if (!checkEntityNames(certEE,credResolver,*criteria)) {
log.error("certificate name was not acceptable");
return false;
auto_ptr<PKIXValidationInfoIterator> pkix(getPKIXValidationInfoIterator(credResolver, criteria));
while (pkix->next()) {
- if (::validate(certEE,certChain,pkix.get())) {
+ if (::validate(
+ certEE,
+ certChain,
+ pkix.get(),
+ (m_checkRevocation=="entityOnly" || m_checkRevocation=="fullChain"),
+ (m_checkRevocation=="fullChain"),
+ (m_checkRevocation=="entityOnly" || m_checkRevocation=="fullChain") ? inlineCRLs : nullptr
+ )) {
return true;
}
}
}
bool AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::validate(
+ X509* certEE,
+ STACK_OF(X509)* certChain,
+ const CredentialResolver& credResolver,
+ CredentialCriteria* criteria
+ ) const
+{
+ return validateWithCRLs(certEE,certChain,credResolver,criteria);
+}
+
+bool AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::validate(
XSECCryptoX509* certEE,
const vector<XSECCryptoX509*>& certChain,
const CredentialResolver& credResolver,
// Pull the certificate chain out of the signature.
X509Credential* x509cred;
- auto_ptr<Credential> cred(inlineResolver->resolve(&sig,X509Credential::RESOLVE_CERTS));
+ auto_ptr<Credential> cred(inlineResolver->resolve(&sig,X509Credential::RESOLVE_CERTS|X509Credential::RESOLVE_CRLS));
if (!cred.get() || !(x509cred=dynamic_cast<X509Credential*>(cred.get()))) {
log.error("unable to perform PKIX validation, signature does not contain any certificates");
return false;
// Find and save off a pointer to the certificate that unlocks the object.
// Most of the time, this will be the first one anyway.
- XSECCryptoX509* certEE=NULL;
+ XSECCryptoX509* certEE=nullptr;
SignatureValidator keyValidator;
for (vector<XSECCryptoX509*>::const_iterator i=certs.begin(); !certEE && i!=certs.end(); ++i) {
try {
}
}
- if (certEE)
- return validate(certEE,certs,credResolver,criteria);
-
- log.debug("failed to verify signature with embedded certificates");
- return false;
+ if (!certEE) {
+ log.debug("failed to verify signature with embedded certificates");
+ return false;
+ }
+ else if (certEE->getProviderName()!=DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL) {
+ log.error("only the OpenSSL XSEC provider is supported");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ STACK_OF(X509)* untrusted=sk_X509_new_null();
+ for (vector<XSECCryptoX509*>::const_iterator i=certs.begin(); i!=certs.end(); ++i)
+ sk_X509_push(untrusted,static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509*>(*i)->getOpenSSLX509());
+ const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>& crls = x509cred->getCRLs();
+ bool ret = validateWithCRLs(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509*>(certEE)->getOpenSSLX509(), untrusted, credResolver, criteria, &crls);
+ sk_X509_free(untrusted);
+ return ret;
}
bool AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::validate(
// Find and save off a pointer to the certificate that unlocks the object.
// Most of the time, this will be the first one anyway.
- XSECCryptoX509* certEE=NULL;
+ XSECCryptoX509* certEE=nullptr;
for (vector<XSECCryptoX509*>::const_iterator i=certs.begin(); !certEE && i!=certs.end(); ++i) {
try {
auto_ptr<XSECCryptoKey> key((*i)->clonePublicKey());
log.debug(ex.what());
}
}
-
- if (certEE)
- return validate(certEE,certs,credResolver,criteria);
-
- log.debug("failed to verify signature with embedded certificates");
- return false;
+
+ if (!certEE) {
+ log.debug("failed to verify signature with embedded certificates");
+ return false;
+ }
+ else if (certEE->getProviderName()!=DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL) {
+ log.error("only the OpenSSL XSEC provider is supported");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ STACK_OF(X509)* untrusted=sk_X509_new_null();
+ for (vector<XSECCryptoX509*>::const_iterator i=certs.begin(); i!=certs.end(); ++i)
+ sk_X509_push(untrusted,static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509*>(*i)->getOpenSSLX509());
+ const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>& crls = x509cred->getCRLs();
+ bool ret = validateWithCRLs(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509*>(certEE)->getOpenSSLX509(), untrusted, credResolver, criteria, &crls);
+ sk_X509_free(untrusted);
+ return ret;
}
projects / shibboleth / cpp-xmltooling.git / blobdiff