-/*
- * Copyright 2001-2010 Internet2
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+/**
+ * Licensed to the University Corporation for Advanced Internet
+ * Development, Inc. (UCAID) under one or more contributor license
+ * agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with this work for
+ * additional information regarding copyright ownership.
*
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ * UCAID licenses this file to you under the Apache License,
+ * Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may not use this file except
+ * in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of the
+ * License at
*
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
+ * software distributed under the License is distributed on an
+ * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND,
+ * either express or implied. See the License for the specific
+ * language governing permissions and limitations under the License.
*/
/**
#include "security/CredentialResolver.h"
#include "security/KeyInfoResolver.h"
#include "security/OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL.h"
+#include "security/OpenSSLPathValidator.h"
+#include "security/PKIXPathValidatorParams.h"
#include "security/SecurityHelper.h"
#include "security/X509Credential.h"
#include "signature/SignatureValidator.h"
#include "util/PathResolver.h"
#include <fstream>
-#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <xercesc/util/XMLUniDefs.hpp>
#include <xsec/enc/OpenSSL/OpenSSLCryptoX509.hpp>
using namespace xmltooling::logging;
using namespace xmltooling;
using namespace std;
+using boost::ptr_vector;
-
-namespace {
- static int XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL error_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX* ctx)
- {
- if (!ok)
- Category::getInstance("OpenSSL").error("path validation failure: %s", X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx->error));
- return ok;
- }
-
- static string XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL X509_NAME_to_string(X509_NAME* n)
+namespace xmltooling {
+ // Adapter between TrustEngine and PathValidator
+ class XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL PKIXParams : public PKIXPathValidatorParams
{
- string s;
- BIO* b = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- X509_NAME_print_ex(b,n,0,XN_FLAG_RFC2253);
- BIO_flush(b);
- BUF_MEM* bptr=nullptr;
- BIO_get_mem_ptr(b, &bptr);
- if (bptr && bptr->length > 0) {
- s.append(bptr->data, bptr->length);
- }
- BIO_free(b);
- return s;
- }
-
- static void XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL getRemoteCRLs(vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>& crls, const char* cdpuri, Category& log) {
- // This is a temporary CRL cache implementation to avoid breaking binary compatibility
- // for the library. Caching can't rely on any member objects within the TrustEngine,
- // including locks, so we're using the global library lock for the time being.
- // All other state is kept in the file system.
-
- // The filenames for the CRL cache are based on a hash of the CRL location.
- string cdpfile = SecurityHelper::doHash("SHA1", cdpuri, strlen(cdpuri)) + ".crl";
- XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().getPathResolver()->resolve(cdpfile, PathResolver::XMLTOOLING_RUN_FILE);
- string cdpstaging = cdpfile + ".bak";
- string counterfile = cdpfile + ".cnt";
-
- // Need to move this to a configurable parameter once we can break binary compatibility.
- // Ideally this would be based on a percentage of the original CRL window, but OpenSSL
- // doesn't provide much in the way of ASN1_TIME parsing functions. It does support adding
- // a fixed time value and comparing against known times.
- #define MIN_SECS_REMAINING 86400;
- long counter = 0;
- try {
- // While holding the lock, check for a cached copy of the CRL, and check its validity.
- Locker glock(&XMLToolingConfig::getConfig());
-#ifdef WIN32
- struct _stat stat_buf;
- if (_stat(cdpfile.c_str(), &stat_buf) == 0) {
-#else
- struct stat stat_buf;
- if (stat(cdpfile.c_str(), &stat_buf) == 0) {
-#endif
- SecurityHelper::loadCRLsFromFile(crls, cdpfile.c_str());
- if (crls.empty() || crls.front()->getProviderName() != DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL ||
- X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(crls.front())->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), nullptr) < 0) {
- for_each(crls.begin(), crls.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<XSECCryptoX509CRL>());
- crls.clear();
- remove(cdpfile.c_str()); // may as well delete the local copy
- remove(counterfile.c_str());
- log.info("cached CRL(s) from (%s) have expired", cdpuri);
- }
- else {
- // Look for a file containing the allowable time remaining on the CRL.
- // We store this counter in the file system because of the binary compatibility issue.
- try {
- ifstream countersrc(counterfile.c_str());
- if (countersrc)
- countersrc >> counter;
- }
- catch (exception&) {
- counter = 0;
- }
- if (counter == 0)
- counter = MIN_SECS_REMAINING;
-
- // See if the time left is under the counter threshold.
- time_t exp = time(nullptr) + counter;
- if (X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(crls.front())->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), &exp) < 0) {
- for_each(crls.begin(), crls.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<XSECCryptoX509CRL>());
- crls.clear();
- log.info("cached CRL(s) from (%s) will expire within %ld seconds, attempting to update them", cdpuri, counter);
- }
- }
+ const AbstractPKIXTrustEngine& m_trust;
+ const AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::PKIXValidationInfoIterator& m_pkixInfo;
+ vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*> m_crls;
+ public:
+ PKIXParams(
+ const AbstractPKIXTrustEngine& t,
+ const AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::PKIXValidationInfoIterator& pkixInfo,
+ const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>* inlineCRLs
+ ) : m_trust(t), m_pkixInfo(pkixInfo) {
+ if (inlineCRLs && !inlineCRLs->empty()) {
+ m_crls = *inlineCRLs;
+ m_crls.insert(m_crls.end(), pkixInfo.getCRLs().begin(), pkixInfo.getCRLs().end());
}
}
- catch (exception& ex) {
- log.error("exception loading cached copy of CRL at (%s): %s", cdpuri, ex.what());
- }
- if (crls.empty()) {
- try {
- // If we get here, the cached copy didn't exist yet, or it's time to refresh.
- SOAPTransport::Address addr("AbstractPKIXTrustEngine", cdpuri, cdpuri);
- string scheme(addr.m_endpoint, strchr(addr.m_endpoint,':') - addr.m_endpoint);
- auto_ptr<SOAPTransport> soap(XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().SOAPTransportManager.newPlugin(scheme.c_str(), addr));
- soap->send();
- istream& msg = soap->receive();
- Locker glock(&XMLToolingConfig::getConfig());
- ofstream out(cdpstaging.c_str(), fstream::trunc|fstream::binary);
- out << msg.rdbuf();
- out.close();
- SecurityHelper::loadCRLsFromFile(crls, cdpstaging.c_str());
- if (crls.empty() || crls.front()->getProviderName() != DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL ||
- X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(crls.front())->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), nullptr) < 0) {
- // The "new" CRLs weren't usable, so get rid of them.
- for_each(crls.begin(), crls.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<XSECCryptoX509CRL>());
- crls.clear();
- remove(cdpstaging.c_str());
- log.error("updated CRL(s) from (%s) have already expired", cdpuri);
-
- // If counter isn't 0, then we were attempting an update of still-valid CRLs, so reload the old ones
- // and cut the counter in half for next time.
- if (counter > 0) {
- SecurityHelper::loadCRLsFromFile(crls, cdpfile.c_str());
- ofstream countersink(counterfile.c_str(), fstream::trunc);
- counter /= 2;
- countersink << counter;
- log.info("failed CRL update attempt, reducing threshold to %ld seconds", counter);
- }
- }
- else {
- // If counter isn't zero, we reloaded; see if the new CRLs are "more" valid than before.
- if (counter > 0) {
- time_t exp = time(nullptr) + counter;
- if (X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(crls.front())->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), &exp) < 0) {
- // Still invalid past the acceptable interval, so they're the same as what we had.
- // Remove the extra copy, and cut the counter in half for next time.
- remove(cdpstaging.c_str());
- ofstream countersink(counterfile.c_str(), fstream::trunc);
- counter /= 2;
- countersink << counter;
- log.info("remote CRL(s) unchanged, reducing threshold to %ld seconds", counter);
- }
- else {
- counter = 0;
- log.info("remote CRL(s) updated");
- }
- }
+ virtual ~PKIXParams() {}
- if (counter == 0) {
- // "Commit" the new CRLs.
- remove(cdpfile.c_str());
- remove(counterfile.c_str());
- if (rename(cdpstaging.c_str(), cdpfile.c_str()) != 0)
- log.error("unable to rename CRL staging file");
- }
- }
- }
- catch (exception& ex) {
- log.error("exception downloading/caching CRL at (%s): %s", cdpuri, ex.what());
- }
+ int getVerificationDepth() const {
+ return m_pkixInfo.getVerificationDepth();
}
- }
-
- static bool XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL validate(
- X509* EE,
- STACK_OF(X509)* untrusted,
- AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::PKIXValidationInfoIterator* pkixInfo,
- bool useCRL,
- bool fullCRLChain,
- const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>* inlineCRLs=nullptr
- )
- {
- Category& log=Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine");
-
- // First we build a stack of CA certs. These objects are all referenced in place.
- log.debug("supplying PKIX Validation information");
-
- // We need this for CRL support.
- X509_STORE* store=X509_STORE_new();
- if (!store) {
- log_openssl();
- return false;
+ bool isAnyPolicyInhibited() const {
+ return m_trust.m_anyPolicyInhibit;
}
-
- // This contains the state of the validate operation.
- int count=0;
- X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
-
- // AFAICT, EE and untrusted are passed in but not owned by the ctx.
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
- if (X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,store,EE,untrusted)!=1) {
- log_openssl();
- log.error("unable to initialize X509_STORE_CTX");
- X509_STORE_free(store);
- return false;
+ bool isPolicyMappingInhibited() const {
+ return m_trust.m_policyMappingInhibit;
}
-#else
- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,store,EE,untrusted);
-#endif
-
- STACK_OF(X509)* CAstack = sk_X509_new_null();
- const vector<XSECCryptoX509*>& CAcerts = pkixInfo->getTrustAnchors();
- for (vector<XSECCryptoX509*>::const_iterator i=CAcerts.begin(); i!=CAcerts.end(); ++i) {
- if ((*i)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL) {
- sk_X509_push(CAstack,static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509*>(*i)->getOpenSSLX509());
- ++count;
- }
+ const set<string>& getPolicies() const {
+ return m_trust.m_policyOIDs;
}
- log.debug("supplied (%d) CA certificate(s)", count);
-
- // Seems to be most efficient to just pass in the CA stack.
- X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&ctx,CAstack);
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx,100); // we check the depth down below
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx,error_callback);
-
- // Do a first pass verify. If CRLs aren't used, this is the only pass.
- int ret=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
- if (ret==1) {
- // Now see if the depth was acceptable by counting the number of intermediates.
- int depth=sk_X509_num(ctx.chain)-2;
- if (pkixInfo->getVerificationDepth() < depth) {
- log.error(
- "certificate chain was too long (%d intermediates, only %d allowed)",
- (depth==-1) ? 0 : depth,
- pkixInfo->getVerificationDepth()
- );
- ret=0;
- }
+ const vector<XSECCryptoX509*>& getTrustAnchors() const {
+ return m_pkixInfo.getTrustAnchors();
}
-
- if (useCRL) {
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
- // When we add CRLs, we have to be sure the nextUpdate hasn't passed, because OpenSSL won't accept
- // the CRL in that case. If we end up not adding a CRL for a particular link in the chain, the
- // validation will fail (if the fullChain option was set).
- set<string> crlissuers;
- if (inlineCRLs) {
- for (vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>::const_iterator j=inlineCRLs->begin(); j!=inlineCRLs->end(); ++j) {
- if ((*j)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL &&
- (X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), nullptr)==1)) {
- // owned by store
- X509_STORE_add_crl(store, X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()));
- string crlissuer(X509_NAME_to_string(X509_CRL_get_issuer(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL())));
- if (!crlissuer.empty()) {
- log.debug("added CRL issued by (%s)", crlissuer.c_str());
- crlissuers.insert(crlissuer);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>& crls = pkixInfo->getCRLs();
- for (vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>::const_iterator j=crls.begin(); j!=crls.end(); ++j) {
- if ((*j)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL &&
- (X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), nullptr)==1)) {
- // owned by store
- X509_STORE_add_crl(store, X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()));
- string crlissuer(X509_NAME_to_string(X509_CRL_get_issuer(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL())));
- if (!crlissuer.empty()) {
- log.debug("added CRL issued by (%s)", crlissuer.c_str());
- crlissuers.insert(crlissuer);
- }
- }
- }
-
- for (int i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(untrusted); ++i) {
- X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(untrusted, i);
- string crlissuer(X509_NAME_to_string(X509_get_issuer_name(cert)));
- if (crlissuers.count(crlissuer)) {
- // We already have a CRL for this cert, so skip it.
- continue;
- }
-
- bool foundUsableCDP = false;
- STACK_OF(DIST_POINT)* dps = (STACK_OF(DIST_POINT)*)X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_crl_distribution_points, nullptr, nullptr);
- for (int ii = 0; !foundUsableCDP && ii < sk_DIST_POINT_num(dps); ++ii) {
- DIST_POINT* dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(dps, ii);
- if (!dp->distpoint || dp->distpoint->type != 0)
- continue;
- for (int iii = 0; !foundUsableCDP && iii < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->distpoint->name.fullname); ++iii) {
- GENERAL_NAME* gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->distpoint->name.fullname, iii);
- // Only consider HTTP URIs, and stop after the first one we find.
-#ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
- if (gen->type == GEN_URI && (!strncasecmp((const char*)gen->d.ia5->data, "http:", 5) ||
- !strncasecmp((const char*)gen->d.ia5->data, "https:", 6))) {
-#else
- if (gen->type == GEN_URI && (!strnicmp((const char*)gen->d.ia5->data, "http:", 5) ||
- !strnicmp((const char*)gen->d.ia5->data, "https:", 6))) {
-#endif
- const char* cdpuri = (const char*)gen->d.ia5->data;
- vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*> crls;
- getRemoteCRLs(crls, cdpuri, log);
- for (vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>::const_iterator j = crls.begin(); j != crls.end(); ++j) {
- if ((*j)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL &&
- X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), nullptr) > 0) {
- // owned by store
- X509_STORE_add_crl(store, X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()));
- log.debug("added CRL issued by (%s)", crlissuer.c_str());
- crlissuers.insert(crlissuer);
- foundUsableCDP = true;
- }
- }
- for_each(crls.begin(), crls.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<XSECCryptoX509CRL>());
- }
- }
- }
- sk_DIST_POINT_free(dps);
- }
-
- if (count > 0) {
- X509_STORE_set_flags(store, fullCRLChain ? (X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) : (X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK));
- }
- else {
- log.warn("CRL checking is enabled, but none were supplied");
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- X509_STORE_free(store);
- sk_X509_free(CAstack);
- return false;
- }
-#else
- log.warn("CRL checking is enabled, but OpenSSL version is too old");
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- X509_STORE_free(store);
- sk_X509_free(CAstack);
- return false;
-#endif
- // Do a second pass verify with CRLs in place.
- ret=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
+ PKIXPathValidatorParams::revocation_t getRevocationChecking() const {
+ if (m_trust.m_checkRevocation.empty() || m_trust.m_checkRevocation == "off")
+ return PKIXPathValidatorParams::REVOCATION_OFF;
+ else if (m_trust.m_checkRevocation == "entityOnly")
+ return PKIXPathValidatorParams::REVOCATION_ENTITYONLY;
+ else if (m_trust.m_checkRevocation == "fullChain")
+ return PKIXPathValidatorParams::REVOCATION_FULLCHAIN;
+ return PKIXPathValidatorParams::REVOCATION_OFF;
}
-
- // Clean up...
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- X509_STORE_free(store);
- sk_X509_free(CAstack);
-
- if (ret==1) {
- log.debug("successfully validated certificate chain");
- return true;
+ const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>& getCRLs() const {
+ return m_crls.empty() ? m_pkixInfo.getCRLs() : m_crls;
}
-
- return false;
- }
+ };
- static XMLCh fullCRLChain[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_12(f,u,l,l,C,R,L,C,h,a,i,n);
- static XMLCh checkRevocation[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_15(c,h,e,c,k,R,e,v,o,c,a,t,i,o,n);
+
+ static XMLCh fullCRLChain[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_12(f,u,l,l,C,R,L,C,h,a,i,n);
+ static XMLCh checkRevocation[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_15(c,h,e,c,k,R,e,v,o,c,a,t,i,o,n);
+ static XMLCh policyMappingInhibit[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_20(p,o,l,i,c,y,M,a,p,p,i,n,g,I,n,h,i,b,i,t);
+ static XMLCh anyPolicyInhibit[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_16(a,n,y,P,o,l,i,c,y,I,n,h,i,b,i,t);
+ static XMLCh _PathValidator[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_13(P,a,t,h,V,a,l,i,d,a,t,o,r);
+ static XMLCh PolicyOID[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_9(P,o,l,i,c,y,O,I,D);
+ static XMLCh TrustedName[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_11(T,r,u,s,t,e,d,N,a,m,e);
+ static XMLCh type[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_4(t,y,p,e);
};
AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::PKIXValidationInfoIterator::PKIXValidationInfoIterator()
AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::AbstractPKIXTrustEngine(const xercesc::DOMElement* e)
: TrustEngine(e),
+ m_checkRevocation(XMLHelper::getAttrString(e, nullptr, checkRevocation)),
m_fullCRLChain(XMLHelper::getAttrBool(e, false, fullCRLChain)),
- m_checkRevocation(XMLHelper::getAttrString(e, nullptr, checkRevocation))
+ m_policyMappingInhibit(XMLHelper::getAttrBool(e, false, policyMappingInhibit)),
+ m_anyPolicyInhibit(XMLHelper::getAttrBool(e, false, anyPolicyInhibit))
{
if (m_fullCRLChain) {
Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine.PKIX").warn(
else if (m_checkRevocation == "fullChain") {
m_fullCRLChain = true; // in case anything's using this
}
+
+ xercesc::DOMElement* c = XMLHelper::getFirstChildElement(e);
+ while (c) {
+ if (c->hasChildNodes()) {
+ auto_ptr_char v(c->getTextContent());
+ if (v.get() && *v.get()) {
+ if (XMLString::equals(c->getLocalName(), PolicyOID))
+ m_policyOIDs.insert(v.get());
+ else if (XMLString::equals(c->getLocalName(), TrustedName))
+ m_trustedNames.insert(v.get());
+ }
+ }
+ else if (XMLString::equals(c->getLocalName(), _PathValidator)) {
+ try {
+ string t = XMLHelper::getAttrString(c, nullptr, type);
+ if (!t.empty()) {
+ Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine.PKIX").info(
+ "building PathValidator of type %s", t.c_str()
+ );
+ PathValidator* pv = XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().PathValidatorManager.newPlugin(t.c_str(), c);
+ OpenSSLPathValidator* ospv = dynamic_cast<OpenSSLPathValidator*>(pv);
+ if (!ospv) {
+ delete pv;
+ throw XMLSecurityException("PathValidator doesn't support OpenSSL interface.");
+ }
+ m_pathValidators.push_back(ospv);
+ }
+ }
+ catch (exception& ex) {
+ Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine.PKIX").error(
+ "error building PathValidator: %s", ex.what()
+ );
+ }
+ }
+ c = XMLHelper::getNextSiblingElement(c);
+ }
+
+ if (m_pathValidators.empty()) {
+ m_pathValidators.push_back(
+ dynamic_cast<OpenSSLPathValidator*>(
+ XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().PathValidatorManager.newPlugin(PKIX_PATHVALIDATOR, e)
+ )
+ );
+ }
}
AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::~AbstractPKIXTrustEngine()
credResolver.resolve(creds,&criteria);
// Build a list of acceptable names.
- set<string> trustednames;
- trustednames.insert(criteria.getPeerName());
- for (vector<const Credential*>::const_iterator cred = creds.begin(); cred!=creds.end(); ++cred)
+ set<string> trustednames = m_trustedNames;
+ if (log.isDebugEnabled()) {
+ for (set<string>::const_iterator n=m_trustedNames.begin(); n!=m_trustedNames.end(); n++) {
+ log.debug("adding to list of trusted names (%s)", n->c_str());
+ }
+ }
+ if (criteria.getPeerName()) {
+ trustednames.insert(criteria.getPeerName());
+ log.debug("adding to list of trusted names (%s)", criteria.getPeerName());
+ }
+ for (vector<const Credential*>::const_iterator cred = creds.begin(); cred!=creds.end(); ++cred) {
trustednames.insert((*cred)->getKeyNames().begin(), (*cred)->getKeyNames().end());
+ if (log.isDebugEnabled()) {
+ for (set<string>::const_iterator n=(*cred)->getKeyNames().begin(); n!=(*cred)->getKeyNames().end(); n++) {
+ log.debug("adding to list of trusted names (%s)", n->c_str());
+ }
+ }
+ }
X509_NAME* subject=X509_get_subject_name(certEE);
if (subject) {
STACK_OF(X509)* certChain,
const CredentialResolver& credResolver,
CredentialCriteria* criteria,
- const std::vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>* inlineCRLs
+ const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>* inlineCRLs
) const
{
#ifdef _DEBUG
if (criteria && criteria->getPeerName() && *(criteria->getPeerName())) {
log.debug("checking that the certificate name is acceptable");
- if (criteria->getUsage()==Credential::UNSPECIFIED_CREDENTIAL)
+ if (criteria && criteria->getUsage()==Credential::UNSPECIFIED_CREDENTIAL)
criteria->setUsage(Credential::SIGNING_CREDENTIAL);
if (!checkEntityNames(certEE,credResolver,*criteria)) {
log.error("certificate name was not acceptable");
return false;
}
}
+ else if (!m_trustedNames.empty()) {
+ log.debug("checking that the certificate name is acceptable");
+ CredentialCriteria cc;
+ cc.setUsage(Credential::SIGNING_CREDENTIAL);
+ if (!checkEntityNames(certEE,credResolver,cc)) {
+ log.error("certificate name was not acceptable");
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
log.debug("performing certificate path validation...");
auto_ptr<PKIXValidationInfoIterator> pkix(getPKIXValidationInfoIterator(credResolver, criteria));
while (pkix->next()) {
- if (::validate(
- certEE,
- certChain,
- pkix.get(),
- (m_checkRevocation=="entityOnly" || m_checkRevocation=="fullChain"),
- (m_checkRevocation=="fullChain"),
- (m_checkRevocation=="entityOnly" || m_checkRevocation=="fullChain") ? inlineCRLs : nullptr
- )) {
- return true;
+ PKIXParams params(*this, *pkix.get(), inlineCRLs);
+ for (ptr_vector<OpenSSLPathValidator>::const_iterator v = m_pathValidators.begin(); v != m_pathValidators.end(); ++v) {
+ if (v->validate(certEE, certChain, params)) {
+ return true;
+ }
}
}
projects / shibboleth / cpp-xmltooling.git / blobdiff