#include "security/CredentialResolver.h"
#include "security/KeyInfoResolver.h"
#include "security/OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL.h"
+#include "security/OpenSSLPathValidator.h"
+#include "security/PKIXPathValidatorParams.h"
#include "security/SecurityHelper.h"
#include "security/X509Credential.h"
#include "signature/SignatureValidator.h"
#include "util/PathResolver.h"
#include <fstream>
-#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <xercesc/util/XMLUniDefs.hpp>
#include <xsec/enc/OpenSSL/OpenSSLCryptoX509.hpp>
using namespace std;
-namespace {
- static int XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL error_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX* ctx)
+namespace xmltooling {
+ // Adapter between TrustEngine and PathValidator
+ class XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL PKIXParams : public PKIXPathValidatorParams
{
- if (!ok)
- Category::getInstance("OpenSSL").error("path validation failure: %s", X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx->error));
- return ok;
- }
-
- static string XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL X509_NAME_to_string(X509_NAME* n)
- {
- string s;
- BIO* b = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- X509_NAME_print_ex(b,n,0,XN_FLAG_RFC2253);
- BIO_flush(b);
- BUF_MEM* bptr=nullptr;
- BIO_get_mem_ptr(b, &bptr);
- if (bptr && bptr->length > 0) {
- s.append(bptr->data, bptr->length);
- }
- BIO_free(b);
- return s;
- }
-
- static time_t XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL getCRLTime(const ASN1_TIME *a)
- {
- struct tm t;
- memset(&t, 0, sizeof(t));
- // RFC 5280, sections 5.1.2.4 and 5.1.2.5 require thisUpdate and nextUpdate
- // to be encoded as UTCTime until 2049, and RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.5.1
- // further restricts the format to "YYMMDDHHMMSSZ" ("even where the number
- // of seconds is zero").
- // As long as OpenSSL doesn't provide any API to convert ASN1_TIME values
- // time_t, we therefore have to parse it ourselves, unfortunately.
- if (sscanf((const char*)a->data, "%2d%2d%2d%2d%2d%2dZ",
- &t.tm_year, &t.tm_mon, &t.tm_mday,
- &t.tm_hour, &t.tm_min, &t.tm_sec) == 6) {
- if (t.tm_year <= 50) {
- // RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.5.1
- t.tm_year += 100;
- }
- t.tm_mon--;
-#if defined(HAVE_TIMEGM)
- return timegm(&t);
-#else
- // Windows, and hopefully most others...?
- return mktime(&t) - timezone;
-#endif
- }
- return (time_t)-1;
- }
-
- static bool XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL isFreshCRL(XSECCryptoX509CRL *c, Category* log=nullptr)
- {
- // eventually, these should be made configurable
- #define MIN_SECS_REMAINING 86400
- #define MIN_PERCENT_REMAINING 10
- if (c) {
- const X509_CRL* crl = static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(c)->getOpenSSLX509CRL();
- time_t thisUpdate = getCRLTime(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl));
- time_t nextUpdate = getCRLTime(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl));
- time_t now = time(nullptr);
-
- if (thisUpdate < 0 || nextUpdate < 0) {
- // we failed to parse at least one of the fields (they were not encoded
- // as required by RFC 5280, actually)
- time_t exp = now + MIN_SECS_REMAINING;
- if (log) {
- log->warn("isFreshCRL (issuer '%s'): improperly encoded thisUpdate or nextUpdate field - falling back to simple time comparison",
- (X509_NAME_to_string(X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))).c_str());
- }
- return (X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), &exp) > 0) ? true : false;
- }
- else {
- if (log && log->isDebugEnabled()) {
- log->debug("isFreshCRL (issuer '%s'): %.0f seconds until nextUpdate (%3.2f%% elapsed since thisUpdate)",
- (X509_NAME_to_string(X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))).c_str(),
- difftime(nextUpdate, now), (difftime(now, thisUpdate) * 100) / difftime(nextUpdate, thisUpdate));
- }
-
- // consider it recent enough if there are at least MIN_SECS_REMAINING
- // to the nextUpdate, and at least MIN_PERCENT_REMAINING of its
- // overall "validity" are remaining to the nextUpdate
- return (now + MIN_SECS_REMAINING < nextUpdate) &&
- ((difftime(nextUpdate, now) * 100) / difftime(nextUpdate, thisUpdate) > MIN_PERCENT_REMAINING);
- }
- }
- return false;
- }
-
- static XSECCryptoX509CRL* XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL getRemoteCRLs(const char* cdpuri, Category& log) {
- // This is a temporary CRL cache implementation to avoid breaking binary compatibility
- // for the library. Caching can't rely on any member objects within the TrustEngine,
- // including locks, so we're using the global library lock for the time being.
- // All other state is kept in the file system.
-
- // minimum number of seconds between re-attempting a download from one particular CRLDP
- #define MIN_RETRY_WAIT 60
-
- // The filenames for the CRL cache are based on a hash of the CRL location.
- string cdpfile = SecurityHelper::doHash("SHA1", cdpuri, strlen(cdpuri)) + ".crl";
- XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().getPathResolver()->resolve(cdpfile, PathResolver::XMLTOOLING_RUN_FILE);
- string cdpstaging = cdpfile + ".tmp";
- string tsfile = cdpfile + ".ts";
-
- time_t now = time(nullptr);
- vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*> crls;
-
- try {
- // While holding the lock, check for a cached copy of the CRL, and remove "expired" ones.
- Locker glock(&XMLToolingConfig::getConfig());
-#ifdef WIN32
- struct _stat stat_buf;
- if (_stat(cdpfile.c_str(), &stat_buf) == 0) {
-#else
- struct stat stat_buf;
- if (stat(cdpfile.c_str(), &stat_buf) == 0) {
-#endif
- SecurityHelper::loadCRLsFromFile(crls, cdpfile.c_str());
- if (crls.empty() || crls.front()->getProviderName() != DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL ||
- X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(crls.front())->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), &now) < 0) {
- for_each(crls.begin(), crls.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<XSECCryptoX509CRL>());
- crls.clear();
- remove(cdpfile.c_str()); // may as well delete the local copy
- remove(tsfile.c_str());
- log.info("deleting cached CRL from %s with nextUpdate field in the past", cdpuri);
- }
+ const AbstractPKIXTrustEngine& m_trust;
+ const AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::PKIXValidationInfoIterator& m_pkixInfo;
+ vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*> m_crls;
+ public:
+ PKIXParams(
+ const AbstractPKIXTrustEngine& t,
+ const AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::PKIXValidationInfoIterator& pkixInfo,
+ const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>* inlineCRLs
+ ) : m_trust(t), m_pkixInfo(pkixInfo) {
+ if (inlineCRLs && !inlineCRLs->empty()) {
+ m_crls = *inlineCRLs;
+ m_crls.insert(m_crls.end(), pkixInfo.getCRLs().begin(), pkixInfo.getCRLs().end());
}
}
- catch (exception& ex) {
- log.error("exception loading cached copy of CRL from %s: %s", cdpuri, ex.what());
- }
- if (crls.empty() || !isFreshCRL(crls.front(), &log)) {
- bool updateTimestamp = true;
- try {
- // If we get here, the cached copy didn't exist yet, or it's time to refresh.
- // To limit the rate of unsuccessful attempts when a CRLDP is unreachable,
- // we remember the timestamp of the last attempt (both successful/unsuccessful).
- // We store this in the file system because of the binary compatibility issue.
- time_t ts = 0;
- try {
- Locker glock(&XMLToolingConfig::getConfig());
- ifstream tssrc(tsfile.c_str());
- if (tssrc)
- tssrc >> ts;
- }
- catch (exception&) {
- ts = 0;
- }
+ virtual ~PKIXParams() {}
- if (difftime(now, ts) > MIN_RETRY_WAIT) {
- SOAPTransport::Address addr("AbstractPKIXTrustEngine", cdpuri, cdpuri);
- string scheme(addr.m_endpoint, strchr(addr.m_endpoint,':') - addr.m_endpoint);
- auto_ptr<SOAPTransport> soap(XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().SOAPTransportManager.newPlugin(scheme.c_str(), addr));
- soap->send();
- istream& msg = soap->receive();
- Locker glock(&XMLToolingConfig::getConfig());
- ofstream out(cdpstaging.c_str(), fstream::trunc|fstream::binary);
- out << msg.rdbuf();
- out.close();
- SecurityHelper::loadCRLsFromFile(crls, cdpstaging.c_str());
- if (crls.empty() || crls.front()->getProviderName() != DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL ||
- X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(crls.front())->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), &now) < 0) {
- // The "new" CRL wasn't usable, so get rid of it.
- for_each(crls.begin(), crls.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<XSECCryptoX509CRL>());
- crls.clear();
- remove(cdpstaging.c_str());
- log.error("ignoring CRL retrieved from %s with nextUpdate field in the past", cdpuri);
- }
- else {
- // "Commit" the new CRL. Note that we might add a CRL which doesn't pass
- // isFreshCRL, but that's preferrable over adding none at all.
- log.info("CRL refreshed from %s", cdpuri);
- remove(cdpfile.c_str());
- if (rename(cdpstaging.c_str(), cdpfile.c_str()) != 0)
- log.error("unable to rename CRL staging file");
- }
- }
- else {
- updateTimestamp = false; // don't update if we're within the backoff window
- }
- }
- catch (exception& ex) {
- log.error("exception downloading/caching CRL from %s: %s", cdpuri, ex.what());
- }
-
- if (updateTimestamp) {
- // update the timestamp file
- Locker glock(&XMLToolingConfig::getConfig());
- ofstream tssink(tsfile.c_str(), fstream::trunc);
- tssink << now;
- tssink.close();
- }
+ int getVerificationDepth() const {
+ return m_pkixInfo.getVerificationDepth();
}
-
- if (crls.empty())
- return nullptr;
- for_each(crls.begin() + 1, crls.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<XSECCryptoX509CRL>());
- return crls.front();
- }
-
- static bool XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL validate(
- X509* EE,
- STACK_OF(X509)* untrusted,
- AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::PKIXValidationInfoIterator* pkixInfo,
- bool useCRL,
- bool fullCRLChain,
- const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>* inlineCRLs=nullptr,
- bool policyMappingInhibit=false,
- bool anyPolicyInhibit=false,
- const set<string>* policyOIDs=nullptr
- )
- {
- Category& log=Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine");
-
- // First we build a stack of CA certs. These objects are all referenced in place.
- log.debug("supplying PKIX Validation information");
-
- // We need this for CRL support.
- X509_STORE* store=X509_STORE_new();
- if (!store) {
- log_openssl();
- return false;
+ bool isAnyPolicyInhibited() const {
+ return m_trust.m_anyPolicyInhibit;
}
-
- // PKIX policy checking (cf. RFCs 3280/5280 section 6)
- if (policyMappingInhibit || anyPolicyInhibit || (policyOIDs && !policyOIDs->empty())) {
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00908000L)
- log.error("PKIX policy checking option is configured, but OpenSSL version is less than 0.9.8");
- X509_STORE_free(store);
- return false;
-#else
- unsigned long pflags = 0;
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
- if (!vpm) {
- log_openssl();
- X509_STORE_free(store);
- return false;
- }
-
- // populate the "user-initial-policy-set" input variable
- if (policyOIDs && !policyOIDs->empty()) {
- for (set<string>::const_iterator o=policyOIDs->begin(); o!=policyOIDs->end(); o++) {
- ASN1_OBJECT *oid = OBJ_txt2obj(o->c_str(), 1);
- if (oid && X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(vpm, oid)) {
- log.debug("OID (%s) added to set of acceptable policies", o->c_str());
- }
- else {
- log_openssl();
- log.error("unable to parse/configure policy OID value (%s)", o->c_str());
- if (oid)
- ASN1_OBJECT_free(oid);
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
- X509_STORE_free(store);
- return false;
- }
- }
- // when the user has supplied at least one policy OID, he obviously wants to check
- // for an explicit policy ("initial-explicit-policy")
- pflags |= X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
- }
-
- // "initial-policy-mapping-inhibit" input variable
- if (policyMappingInhibit)
- pflags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
- // "initial-any-policy-inhibit" input variable
- if (anyPolicyInhibit)
- pflags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
-
- if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, pflags) || !X509_STORE_set1_param(store, vpm)) {
- log_openssl();
- log.error("unable to set PKIX policy checking parameters");
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
- X509_STORE_free(store);
- return false;
- }
-
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
-#endif
+ bool isPolicyMappingInhibited() const {
+ return m_trust.m_policyMappingInhibit;
}
-
- // This contains the state of the validate operation.
- int count=0;
- X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
-
- // AFAICT, EE and untrusted are passed in but not owned by the ctx.
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
- if (X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,store,EE,untrusted)!=1) {
- log_openssl();
- log.error("unable to initialize X509_STORE_CTX");
- X509_STORE_free(store);
- return false;
+ const set<string>& getPolicies() const {
+ return m_trust.m_policyOIDs;
}
-#else
- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,store,EE,untrusted);
-#endif
-
- STACK_OF(X509)* CAstack = sk_X509_new_null();
- const vector<XSECCryptoX509*>& CAcerts = pkixInfo->getTrustAnchors();
- for (vector<XSECCryptoX509*>::const_iterator i=CAcerts.begin(); i!=CAcerts.end(); ++i) {
- if ((*i)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL) {
- sk_X509_push(CAstack,static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509*>(*i)->getOpenSSLX509());
- ++count;
- }
+ const vector<XSECCryptoX509*>& getTrustAnchors() const {
+ return m_pkixInfo.getTrustAnchors();
}
- log.debug("supplied (%d) CA certificate(s)", count);
-
- // Seems to be most efficient to just pass in the CA stack.
- X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&ctx,CAstack);
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx,100); // we check the depth down below
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx,error_callback);
-
- // Do a first pass verify. If CRLs aren't used, this is the only pass.
- int ret=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
- if (ret==1) {
- // Now see if the depth was acceptable by counting the number of intermediates.
- int depth=sk_X509_num(ctx.chain)-2;
- if (pkixInfo->getVerificationDepth() < depth) {
- log.error(
- "certificate chain was too long (%d intermediates, only %d allowed)",
- (depth==-1) ? 0 : depth,
- pkixInfo->getVerificationDepth()
- );
- ret=0;
- }
+ PKIXPathValidatorParams::revocation_t getRevocationChecking() const {
+ if (m_trust.m_checkRevocation.empty() || m_trust.m_checkRevocation == "off")
+ return PKIXPathValidatorParams::REVOCATION_OFF;
+ else if (m_trust.m_checkRevocation == "entityOnly")
+ return PKIXPathValidatorParams::REVOCATION_ENTITYONLY;
+ else if (m_trust.m_checkRevocation == "fullChain")
+ return PKIXPathValidatorParams::REVOCATION_FULLCHAIN;
+ return PKIXPathValidatorParams::REVOCATION_OFF;
}
-
- if (useCRL) {
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
- // When we add CRLs, we have to be sure the nextUpdate hasn't passed, because OpenSSL won't accept
- // the CRL in that case. If we end up not adding a CRL for a particular link in the chain, the
- // validation will fail (if the fullChain option was set).
- set<string> crlissuers;
- time_t now = time(nullptr);
- if (inlineCRLs) {
- for (vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>::const_iterator j=inlineCRLs->begin(); j!=inlineCRLs->end(); ++j) {
- if ((*j)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL &&
- (X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), &now) > 0)) {
- // owned by store
- X509_STORE_add_crl(store, X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()));
- string crlissuer(X509_NAME_to_string(X509_CRL_get_issuer(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL())));
- if (!crlissuer.empty()) {
- log.debug("added inline CRL issued by (%s)", crlissuer.c_str());
- crlissuers.insert(crlissuer);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>& crls = pkixInfo->getCRLs();
- for (vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>::const_iterator j=crls.begin(); j!=crls.end(); ++j) {
- if ((*j)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL &&
- (X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), &now) > 0)) {
- // owned by store
- X509_STORE_add_crl(store, X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()));
- string crlissuer(X509_NAME_to_string(X509_CRL_get_issuer(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL())));
- if (!crlissuer.empty()) {
- log.debug("added CRL issued by (%s)", crlissuer.c_str());
- crlissuers.insert(crlissuer);
- }
- }
- }
-
- for (int i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(untrusted); ++i) {
- X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(untrusted, i);
- string crlissuer(X509_NAME_to_string(X509_get_issuer_name(cert)));
- if (crlissuers.count(crlissuer)) {
- // We already have a CRL for this cert, so skip CRLDP processing for this one.
- continue;
- }
-
- bool foundUsableCDP = false;
- STACK_OF(DIST_POINT)* dps = (STACK_OF(DIST_POINT)*)X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_crl_distribution_points, nullptr, nullptr);
- for (int ii = 0; !foundUsableCDP && ii < sk_DIST_POINT_num(dps); ++ii) {
- DIST_POINT* dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(dps, ii);
- if (!dp->distpoint || dp->distpoint->type != 0)
- continue;
- for (int iii = 0; !foundUsableCDP && iii < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->distpoint->name.fullname); ++iii) {
- GENERAL_NAME* gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->distpoint->name.fullname, iii);
- // Only consider HTTP URIs, and stop after the first one we find.
-#ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
- if (gen->type == GEN_URI && (!strncasecmp((const char*)gen->d.ia5->data, "http:", 5))) {
-#else
- if (gen->type == GEN_URI && (!strnicmp((const char*)gen->d.ia5->data, "http:", 5))) {
-#endif
- const char* cdpuri = (const char*)gen->d.ia5->data;
- auto_ptr<XSECCryptoX509CRL> crl(getRemoteCRLs(cdpuri, log));
- if (crl.get() && crl->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL &&
- (isFreshCRL(crl.get()) || (ii == sk_DIST_POINT_num(dps)-1 && iii == sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->distpoint->name.fullname)-1))) {
- // owned by store
- X509_STORE_add_crl(store, X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(crl.get())->getOpenSSLX509CRL()));
- log.debug("added CRL issued by (%s)", crlissuer.c_str());
- crlissuers.insert(crlissuer);
- foundUsableCDP = true;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- sk_DIST_POINT_free(dps);
- }
-
- // Do a second pass verify with CRLs in place.
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, fullCRLChain ? (X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) : (X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK));
- ret=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
-#else
- log.warn("CRL checking is enabled, but OpenSSL version is too old");
- ret = 0;
-#endif
+ const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>& getCRLs() const {
+ return m_crls.empty() ? m_pkixInfo.getCRLs() : m_crls;
}
+ };
- // Clean up...
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- X509_STORE_free(store);
- sk_X509_free(CAstack);
-
- if (ret==1) {
- log.debug("successfully validated certificate chain");
- return true;
- }
-
- return false;
- }
static XMLCh fullCRLChain[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_12(f,u,l,l,C,R,L,C,h,a,i,n);
static XMLCh checkRevocation[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_15(c,h,e,c,k,R,e,v,o,c,a,t,i,o,n);
static XMLCh policyMappingInhibit[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_20(p,o,l,i,c,y,M,a,p,p,i,n,g,I,n,h,i,b,i,t);
static XMLCh anyPolicyInhibit[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_16(a,n,y,P,o,l,i,c,y,I,n,h,i,b,i,t);
+ static XMLCh _PathValidator[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_13(P,a,t,h,V,a,l,i,d,a,t,o,r);
static XMLCh PolicyOID[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_9(P,o,l,i,c,y,O,I,D);
static XMLCh TrustedName[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_11(T,r,u,s,t,e,d,N,a,m,e);
+ static XMLCh type[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_4(t,y,p,e);
};
AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::PKIXValidationInfoIterator::PKIXValidationInfoIterator()
m_trustedNames.insert(v.get());
}
}
+ else if (XMLString::equals(c->getLocalName(), _PathValidator)) {
+ try {
+ string t = XMLHelper::getAttrString(c, nullptr, type);
+ if (!t.empty()) {
+ Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine.PKIX").info(
+ "building PathValidator of type %s", t.c_str()
+ );
+ PathValidator* pv = XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().PathValidatorManager.newPlugin(t.c_str(), c);
+ OpenSSLPathValidator* ospv = dynamic_cast<OpenSSLPathValidator*>(pv);
+ if (!ospv) {
+ delete pv;
+ throw XMLSecurityException("PathValidator doesn't support OpenSSL interface.");
+ }
+ m_pathValidators.push_back(ospv);
+ }
+ }
+ catch (exception& ex) {
+ Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine.PKIX").error(
+ "error building PathValidator: %s", ex.what()
+ );
+ }
+ }
c = XMLHelper::getNextSiblingElement(c);
}
+
+ if (m_pathValidators.empty()) {
+ m_pathValidators.push_back(
+ dynamic_cast<OpenSSLPathValidator*>(
+ XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().PathValidatorManager.newPlugin(PKIX_PATHVALIDATOR, e)
+ )
+ );
+ }
}
AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::~AbstractPKIXTrustEngine()
{
+ for_each(m_pathValidators.begin(), m_pathValidators.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<PathValidator>());
}
bool AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::checkEntityNames(
STACK_OF(X509)* certChain,
const CredentialResolver& credResolver,
CredentialCriteria* criteria,
- const std::vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>* inlineCRLs
+ const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>* inlineCRLs
) const
{
#ifdef _DEBUG
auto_ptr<PKIXValidationInfoIterator> pkix(getPKIXValidationInfoIterator(credResolver, criteria));
while (pkix->next()) {
- if (::validate(
- certEE,
- certChain,
- pkix.get(),
- (m_checkRevocation=="entityOnly" || m_checkRevocation=="fullChain"),
- (m_checkRevocation=="fullChain"),
- (m_checkRevocation=="entityOnly" || m_checkRevocation=="fullChain") ? inlineCRLs : nullptr,
- m_policyMappingInhibit,
- m_anyPolicyInhibit,
- &m_policyOIDs
- )) {
- return true;
+ PKIXParams params(*this, *pkix.get(), inlineCRLs);
+ for (vector<OpenSSLPathValidator*>::const_iterator v = m_pathValidators.begin(); v != m_pathValidators.end(); ++v) {
+ if ((*v)->validate(certEE, certChain, params)) {
+ return true;
+ }
}
}
projects / shibboleth / cpp-xmltooling.git / blobdiff