{
public:
PKIXPathValidator(const xercesc::DOMElement* e)
- : m_log(Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".PathValidator.PKIX")),
- m_lock(XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().getNamedMutex(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".PathValidator.PKIX")),
+ : m_log(Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT ".PathValidator.PKIX")),
+ m_lock(XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().getNamedMutex(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT ".PathValidator.PKIX")),
m_minRefreshDelay(XMLHelper::getAttrInt(e, 60, minRefreshDelay)),
m_minSecondsRemaining(XMLHelper::getAttrInt(e, 86400, minSecondsRemaining)),
m_minPercentRemaining(XMLHelper::getAttrInt(e, 10, minPercentRemaining)) {
// AFAICT, EE and untrusted are passed in but not owned by the ctx.
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
- if (X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,store,EE,untrusted)!=1) {
+ if (X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,store,EE,untrusted) != 1) {
log_openssl();
m_log.error("unable to initialize X509_STORE_CTX");
X509_STORE_free(store);
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx,error_callback);
// Do a first pass verify. If CRLs aren't used, this is the only pass.
- int ret=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
- if (ret==1) {
+ int ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
+ if (ret == 1) {
// Now see if the depth was acceptable by counting the number of intermediates.
int depth=sk_X509_num(ctx.chain)-2;
if (pkixParams->getVerificationDepth() < depth) {
(depth==-1) ? 0 : depth,
pkixParams->getVerificationDepth()
);
- ret=0;
+ ret = 0;
}
}
- if (pkixParams->getRevocationChecking() != PKIXPathValidatorParams::REVOCATION_OFF) {
+ // If the first pass succeeded, check to see if we need a second with CRLs.
+ if (ret == 1 && pkixParams->getRevocationChecking() != PKIXPathValidatorParams::REVOCATION_OFF) {
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
- // When we add CRLs, we have to be sure the nextUpdate hasn't passed, because OpenSSL won't accept
+ // After the first X509_verify_cert call, the ctx can no longer be used
+ // (subsequent calls will fail with OpenSSL 1.0.1p / 1.0.2d or later).
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ // When we add CRLs, we have to be sure the nextUpdate hasn't passed, because OpenSSL won't accept
// the CRL in that case. If we end up not adding a CRL for a particular link in the chain, the
// validation will fail (if the fullChain option was set).
set<string> crlissuers;
time_t now = time(nullptr);
- const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>& crls = pkixParams->getCRLs();
- for (vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>::const_iterator j=crls.begin(); j!=crls.end(); ++j) {
- if ((*j)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL &&
- (X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), &now) > 0)) {
- // owned by store
- X509_STORE_add_crl(store, X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()));
- string crlissuer(X509_NAME_to_string(X509_CRL_get_issuer(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL())));
- if (!crlissuer.empty()) {
- m_log.debug("added CRL issued by (%s)", crlissuer.c_str());
- crlissuers.insert(crlissuer);
- }
- }
- }
-
+ // Pull CRLs from external CDP first, since an attacker is likely to stick an old but valid CRL into
+ // the signature.
for (int i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(untrusted); ++i) {
X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(untrusted, i);
string crlissuer(X509_NAME_to_string(X509_get_issuer_name(cert)));
// We already have a CRL for this cert, so skip CRLDP processing for this one.
continue;
}
-
bool foundUsableCDP = false;
STACK_OF(DIST_POINT)* dps = (STACK_OF(DIST_POINT)*)X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_crl_distribution_points, nullptr, nullptr);
for (int ii = 0; !foundUsableCDP && ii < sk_DIST_POINT_num(dps); ++ii) {
continue;
for (int iii = 0; !foundUsableCDP && iii < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->distpoint->name.fullname); ++iii) {
GENERAL_NAME* gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->distpoint->name.fullname, iii);
- // Only consider HTTP URIs, and stop after the first one we find.
-#ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
- if (gen->type == GEN_URI && (!strncasecmp((const char*)gen->d.ia5->data, "http:", 5))) {
-#else
- if (gen->type == GEN_URI && (!strnicmp((const char*)gen->d.ia5->data, "http:", 5))) {
-#endif
+ // Only consider URIs, and stop after the first one we find.
+ if (gen->type == GEN_URI) {
const char* cdpuri = (const char*)gen->d.ia5->data;
auto_ptr<XSECCryptoX509CRL> crl(getRemoteCRLs(cdpuri));
if (crl.get() && crl->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL &&
sk_DIST_POINT_free(dps);
}
- // Do a second pass verify with CRLs in place.
- if (pkixParams->getRevocationChecking() == PKIXPathValidatorParams::REVOCATION_FULLCHAIN)
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
- else
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
- ret=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
+ // Pick up any valid CRLs inline.
+ const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>& crls = pkixParams->getCRLs();
+ for (vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>::const_iterator j=crls.begin(); j!=crls.end(); ++j) {
+ if ((*j)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL &&
+ (X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), &now) > 0)) {
+ string crlissuer(X509_NAME_to_string(X509_CRL_get_issuer(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL())));
+ if (crlissuer.empty() || crlissuers.count(crlissuer)) {
+ // We already have a CRL for this cert, so skip this one.
+ continue;
+ }
+ m_log.debug("added CRL issued by (%s)", crlissuer.c_str());
+ crlissuers.insert(crlissuer);
+ // owned by store
+ X509_STORE_add_crl(store, X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()));
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Do a second pass verify with CRLs in place. Reinitialize ctx, see
+ // https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=aae41f8c54257d9fa6904d3a9aa09c5db6cefd0d
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
+ if (X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,store,EE,untrusted) != 1) {
+ log_openssl();
+ m_log.error("unable to initialize X509_STORE_CTX");
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+#else
+ X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,store,EE,untrusted);
+#endif
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&ctx,CAstack);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx,100); // already checked above
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx,error_callback);
+ if (pkixParams->getRevocationChecking() == PKIXPathValidatorParams::REVOCATION_FULLCHAIN)
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
+ else
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
+ ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
+ }
#else
m_log.warn("CRL checking is enabled, but OpenSSL version is too old");
ret = 0;
if (ret == 1) {
m_log.debug("successfully validated certificate chain");
}
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L)
+#if defined(X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L)
else if (X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx) == X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY && !pkixParams->isPolicyMappingInhibited()) {
m_log.warn("policy mapping requires OpenSSL 1.0.0 or later");
}
// The filenames for the CRL cache are based on a hash of the CRL location.
string cdpfile = SecurityHelper::doHash("SHA1", cdpuri, strlen(cdpuri)) + ".crl";
- XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().getPathResolver()->resolve(cdpfile, PathResolver::XMLTOOLING_RUN_FILE);
+ XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().getPathResolver()->resolve(cdpfile, PathResolver::XMLTOOLING_CACHE_FILE);
string cdpstaging = cdpfile + ".tmp";
time_t now = time(nullptr);
projects / shibboleth / cpp-xmltooling.git / blobdiff