set<string> crlissuers;
time_t now = time(nullptr);
- const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>& crls = pkixParams->getCRLs();
- for (vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>::const_iterator j=crls.begin(); j!=crls.end(); ++j) {
- if ((*j)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL &&
- (X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), &now) > 0)) {
- // owned by store
- X509_STORE_add_crl(store, X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()));
- string crlissuer(X509_NAME_to_string(X509_CRL_get_issuer(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL())));
- if (!crlissuer.empty()) {
- m_log.debug("added CRL issued by (%s)", crlissuer.c_str());
- crlissuers.insert(crlissuer);
- }
- }
- }
-
+ // Pull CRLs from external CDP first, since an attacker is likely to stick an old but valid CRL into
+ // the signature.
for (int i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(untrusted); ++i) {
X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(untrusted, i);
string crlissuer(X509_NAME_to_string(X509_get_issuer_name(cert)));
// We already have a CRL for this cert, so skip CRLDP processing for this one.
continue;
}
-
bool foundUsableCDP = false;
STACK_OF(DIST_POINT)* dps = (STACK_OF(DIST_POINT)*)X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_crl_distribution_points, nullptr, nullptr);
for (int ii = 0; !foundUsableCDP && ii < sk_DIST_POINT_num(dps); ++ii) {
continue;
for (int iii = 0; !foundUsableCDP && iii < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->distpoint->name.fullname); ++iii) {
GENERAL_NAME* gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->distpoint->name.fullname, iii);
- // Only consider HTTP URIs, and stop after the first one we find.
-#ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
- if (gen->type == GEN_URI && (!strncasecmp((const char*)gen->d.ia5->data, "http:", 5))) {
-#else
- if (gen->type == GEN_URI && (!strnicmp((const char*)gen->d.ia5->data, "http:", 5))) {
-#endif
+ // Only consider URIs, and stop after the first one we find.
+ if (gen->type == GEN_URI) {
const char* cdpuri = (const char*)gen->d.ia5->data;
auto_ptr<XSECCryptoX509CRL> crl(getRemoteCRLs(cdpuri));
if (crl.get() && crl->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL &&
sk_DIST_POINT_free(dps);
}
+ // Pick up any valid CRLs inline.
+ const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>& crls = pkixParams->getCRLs();
+ for (vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>::const_iterator j=crls.begin(); j!=crls.end(); ++j) {
+ if ((*j)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL &&
+ (X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), &now) > 0)) {
+ string crlissuer(X509_NAME_to_string(X509_CRL_get_issuer(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL())));
+ if (crlissuer.empty() || crlissuers.count(crlissuer)) {
+ // We already have a CRL for this cert, so skip this one.
+ continue;
+ }
+ m_log.debug("added CRL issued by (%s)", crlissuer.c_str());
+ crlissuers.insert(crlissuer);
+ // owned by store
+ X509_STORE_add_crl(store, X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()));
+ }
+ }
+
// Do a second pass verify with CRLs in place.
if (pkixParams->getRevocationChecking() == PKIXPathValidatorParams::REVOCATION_FULLCHAIN)
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);