Fix handling of errorFatal flag in rules.

[shibboleth/opensaml2.git] / saml / binding / impl / XMLSigningRule.cpp

diff --git a/saml/binding/impl/XMLSigningRule.cpp b/saml/binding/impl/XMLSigningRule.cpp
index 552cef8..047de86 100644 (file)
--- a/saml/binding/impl/XMLSigningRule.cpp
+++ b/saml/binding/impl/XMLSigningRule.cpp
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- *  Copyright 2001-2006 Internet2
+ *  Copyright 2001-2007 Internet2
  * 
  * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
  * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
@@ -22,96 +22,97 @@
 
 #include "internal.h"
 #include "exceptions.h"
-#include "binding/XMLSigningRule.h"
+#include "binding/SecurityPolicyRule.h"
 #include "saml2/core/Assertions.h"
 #include "saml2/metadata/Metadata.h"
+#include "saml2/metadata/MetadataCredentialCriteria.h"
 #include "saml2/metadata/MetadataProvider.h"
-#include "security/TrustEngine.h"
+#include "signature/SignatureProfileValidator.h"
 
-#include <xmltooling/util/NDC.h>
-#include <xmltooling/util/ReplayCache.h>
-#include <log4cpp/Category.hh>
+#include <xmltooling/logging.h>
+#include <xmltooling/security/SignatureTrustEngine.h>
 
 using namespace opensaml::saml2md;
 using namespace opensaml;
+using namespace xmltooling::logging;
 using namespace xmltooling;
-using namespace log4cpp;
 using namespace std;
 
+using xmlsignature::SignatureException;
+
 namespace opensaml {
+    class SAML_DLLLOCAL XMLSigningRule : public SecurityPolicyRule
+    {
+    public:
+        XMLSigningRule(const DOMElement* e);
+        virtual ~XMLSigningRule() {}
+        
+        const char* getType() const {
+            return XMLSIGNING_POLICY_RULE;
+        }
+        void evaluate(const XMLObject& message, const GenericRequest* request, SecurityPolicy& policy) const;
+
+    private:
+        bool m_errorFatal;
+    };
+
     SecurityPolicyRule* SAML_DLLLOCAL XMLSigningRuleFactory(const DOMElement* const & e)
     {
         return new XMLSigningRule(e);
     }
+    
+    static const XMLCh errorFatal[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_10(e,r,r,o,r,F,a,t,a,l);
 };
 
-pair<saml2::Issuer*,const RoleDescriptor*> XMLSigningRule::evaluate(
-    const GenericRequest& request,
-    const XMLObject& message,
-    const MetadataProvider* metadataProvider,
-    const QName* role,
-    const opensaml::TrustEngine* trustEngine,
-    const MessageExtractor& extractor
-    ) const
+XMLSigningRule::XMLSigningRule(const DOMElement* e) : m_errorFatal(false)
+{
+    if (e) {
+        const XMLCh* flag = e->getAttributeNS(NULL, errorFatal);
+        m_errorFatal = (flag && (*flag==chLatin_t || *flag==chDigit_1)); 
+    }
+}
+
+void XMLSigningRule::evaluate(const XMLObject& message, const GenericRequest* request, SecurityPolicy& policy) const
 {
     Category& log=Category::getInstance(SAML_LOGCAT".SecurityPolicyRule.XMLSigning");
-    log.debug("evaluating message signing policy");
-    
-    pair<saml2::Issuer*,const RoleDescriptor*> ret = pair<saml2::Issuer*,const RoleDescriptor*>(NULL,NULL);  
     
-    if (!metadataProvider || !role || !trustEngine) {
-        log.debug("ignoring message, no metadata or trust information supplied");
-        return ret;
+    if (!policy.getIssuerMetadata()) {
+        log.debug("ignoring message, no issuer metadata supplied");
+        return;
+    }
+
+    const SignatureTrustEngine* sigtrust;
+    if (!(sigtrust=dynamic_cast<const SignatureTrustEngine*>(policy.getTrustEngine()))) {
+        log.debug("ignoring message, no SignatureTrustEngine supplied");
+        return;
     }
     
+    const SignableObject* signable = dynamic_cast<const SignableObject*>(&message);
+    if (!signable || !signable->getSignature())
+        return;
+    
+    log.debug("validating signature profile");
     try {
-        const RootObject& root = dynamic_cast<const RootObject&>(message);
-        if (!root.getSignature()) {
-            log.debug("ignoring unsigned message");
-            return ret;
-        }
-        
-        log.debug("extracting issuer from message");
-        pair<saml2::Issuer*,const XMLCh*> issuerInfo = extractor.getIssuerAndProtocol(message);
-        
-        auto_ptr<saml2::Issuer> issuer(issuerInfo.first);
-        if (!issuerInfo.first || !issuerInfo.second ||
-                (issuer->getFormat() && !XMLString::equals(issuer->getFormat(), saml2::NameIDType::ENTITY))) {
-            log.warn("issuer identity not estabished, or was not an entityID");
-            return ret;
-        }
-        
-        log.debug("searching metadata for message issuer...");
-        const EntityDescriptor* entity = metadataProvider->getEntityDescriptor(issuer->getName());
-        if (!entity) {
-            auto_ptr_char temp(issuer->getName());
-            log.warn("no metadata found, can't establish identity of issuer (%s)", temp.get());
-            return ret;
-        }
-
-        log.debug("matched message issuer against metadata, searching for applicable role...");
-        const RoleDescriptor* roledesc=entity->getRoleDescriptor(*role, issuerInfo.second);
-        if (!roledesc) {
-            log.warn("unable to find compatible role (%s) in metadata", role->toString().c_str());
-            return ret;
-        }
-
-        if (!trustEngine->validate(*(root.getSignature()), *roledesc, metadataProvider->getKeyResolver())) {
-            log.error("unable to verify signature on message with supplied trust engine");
-            return ret;
-        }
-
-        if (log.isDebugEnabled()) {
-            auto_ptr_char iname(entity->getEntityID());
-            log.debug("message from (%s), signature verified", iname.get());
-        }
-        
-        ret.first = issuer.release();
-        ret.second = roledesc;
+        SignatureProfileValidator sigval;
+        sigval.validateSignature(*(signable->getSignature()));
     }
-    catch (bad_cast&) {
-        // Just trap it.
-        log.warn("caught a bad_cast while extracting issuer");
+    catch (ValidationException& ve) {
+        log.error("signature profile failed to validate: %s", ve.what());
+        if (m_errorFatal)
+            throw;
+        return;
     }
-    return ret;
+    
+    // Set up criteria object.
+    MetadataCredentialCriteria cc(*(policy.getIssuerMetadata()));
+
+    if (!sigtrust->validate(*(signable->getSignature()), *(policy.getMetadataProvider()), &cc)) {
+        log.error("unable to verify message signature with supplied trust engine");
+        if (m_errorFatal)
+            throw SecurityPolicyException("Message was signed, but signature could not be verified.");
+        return;
+    }
+
+    log.debug("signature verified against message issuer");
+    policy.setAuthenticated(true);
 }