/*
- * Copyright 2001-2007 Internet2
- *
+ * Copyright 2001-2010 Internet2
+ *
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
/**
* SAML1Consumer.cpp
- *
- * SAML 1.x assertion consumer service
+ *
+ * SAML 1.x assertion consumer service.
*/
#include "internal.h"
#include "handler/AssertionConsumerService.h"
#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
-# include "exceptions.h"
# include "Application.h"
# include "ServiceProvider.h"
# include "SessionCache.h"
# include "attribute/resolver/ResolutionContext.h"
+# include <saml/exceptions.h>
+# include <saml/SAMLConfig.h>
+# include <saml/binding/SecurityPolicy.h>
+# include <saml/binding/SecurityPolicyRule.h>
# include <saml/saml1/core/Assertions.h>
# include <saml/saml1/core/Protocols.h>
-# include <saml/saml1/profile/BrowserSSOProfileValidator.h>
# include <saml/saml2/metadata/Metadata.h>
+# include <xmltooling/io/HTTPRequest.h>
+# include <xmltooling/util/DateTime.h>
using namespace opensaml::saml1;
using namespace opensaml::saml1p;
using namespace opensaml;
using saml2::NameID;
using saml2::NameIDBuilder;
using saml2md::EntityDescriptor;
+using saml2md::SPSSODescriptor;
using saml2md::MetadataException;
#else
# include "lite/SAMLConstants.h"
#pragma warning( push )
#pragma warning( disable : 4250 )
#endif
-
+
class SHIBSP_DLLLOCAL SAML1Consumer : public AssertionConsumerService
{
public:
SAML1Consumer(const DOMElement* e, const char* appId)
- : AssertionConsumerService(e, appId, Category::getInstance(SHIBSP_LOGCAT".SSO.SAML1")) {
+ : AssertionConsumerService(e, appId, Category::getInstance(SHIBSP_LOGCAT".SSO.SAML1")) {
#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
+ m_ssoRule = nullptr;
m_post = XMLString::equals(getString("Binding").second, samlconstants::SAML1_PROFILE_BROWSER_POST);
+ if (SPConfig::getConfig().isEnabled(SPConfig::OutOfProcess))
+ m_ssoRule = SAMLConfig::getConfig().SecurityPolicyRuleManager.newPlugin(SAML1BROWSERSSO_POLICY_RULE, e);
#endif
}
- virtual ~SAML1Consumer() {}
-
- private:
+ virtual ~SAML1Consumer() {
#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
- string implementProtocol(
+ delete m_ssoRule;
+#endif
+ }
+
+#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
+ void generateMetadata(SPSSODescriptor& role, const char* handlerURL) const {
+ AssertionConsumerService::generateMetadata(role, handlerURL);
+ role.addSupport(samlconstants::SAML11_PROTOCOL_ENUM);
+ role.addSupport(samlconstants::SAML10_PROTOCOL_ENUM);
+ }
+
+ private:
+ void implementProtocol(
const Application& application,
const HTTPRequest& httpRequest,
+ HTTPResponse& httpResponse,
SecurityPolicy& policy,
- const PropertySet* settings,
+ const PropertySet*,
const XMLObject& xmlObject
) const;
+
bool m_post;
+ SecurityPolicyRule* m_ssoRule;
#endif
};
{
return new SAML1Consumer(p.first, p.second);
}
-
+
+#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
+ class SHIBSP_DLLLOCAL _rulenamed : std::unary_function<const SecurityPolicyRule*,bool>
+ {
+ public:
+ _rulenamed(const char* name) : m_name(name) {}
+ bool operator()(const SecurityPolicyRule* rule) const {
+ return rule ? !strcmp(m_name, rule->getType()) : false;
+ }
+ private:
+ const char* m_name;
+ };
+#endif
};
#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
-string SAML1Consumer::implementProtocol(
+void SAML1Consumer::implementProtocol(
const Application& application,
const HTTPRequest& httpRequest,
+ HTTPResponse& httpResponse,
SecurityPolicy& policy,
- const PropertySet* settings,
+ const PropertySet*,
const XMLObject& xmlObject
) const
{
// the focus here is on the assertion content. For SAML 1.x POST,
// all the security comes from the protocol layer, and signing
// the assertion isn't sufficient. So we can check the policy
- // object now and bail if it's not a secure message.
- if (m_post && !policy.isSecure()) {
+ // object now and bail if it's not a secured message.
+ if (m_post && !policy.isAuthenticated()) {
if (policy.getIssuer() && !policy.getIssuerMetadata())
throw MetadataException("Security of SAML 1.x SSO POST response not established.");
throw SecurityPolicyException("Security of SAML 1.x SSO POST response not established.");
}
-
+
// Remember whether we already established trust.
- bool alreadySecured = policy.isSecure();
+ bool alreadySecured = policy.isAuthenticated();
const Response* response = dynamic_cast<const Response*>(&xmlObject);
if (!response)
if (assertions.empty())
throw FatalProfileException("Incoming message contained no SAML assertions.");
+ pair<bool,int> minor = response->getMinorVersion();
+
// Maintain list of "legit" tokens to feed to SP subsystems.
- const AuthenticationStatement* ssoStatement=NULL;
+ const AuthenticationStatement* ssoStatement=nullptr;
vector<const opensaml::Assertion*> tokens;
// Also track "bad" tokens that we'll cache but not use.
// This is necessary because there may be valid tokens not aimed at us.
vector<const opensaml::Assertion*> badtokens;
- // Profile validator.
- time_t now = time(NULL);
- BrowserSSOProfileValidator ssoValidator(application.getAudiences(), now);
-
// With this flag on, we ignore any unsigned assertions.
- pair<bool,bool> flag = settings->getBool("signedAssertions");
+ const EntityDescriptor* entity = policy.getIssuerMetadata() ? dynamic_cast<const EntityDescriptor*>(policy.getIssuerMetadata()->getParent()) : nullptr;
+ pair<bool,bool> flag = application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getBool("requireSignedAssertions");
- for (vector<saml1::Assertion*>::const_iterator a = assertions.begin(); a!=assertions.end(); ++a) {
- // Skip unsigned assertion?
- if (!(*a)->getSignature() && flag.first && flag.second) {
- m_log.warn("found unsigned assertion in SAML response, ignoring it per signedAssertions policy");
- badtokens.push_back(*a);
- continue;
- }
+ // authnskew allows rejection of SSO if AuthnInstant is too old.
+ const PropertySet* sessionProps = application.getPropertySet("Sessions");
+ pair<bool,unsigned int> authnskew = sessionProps ? sessionProps->getUnsignedInt("maxTimeSinceAuthn") : pair<bool,unsigned int>(false,0);
+ // Saves off error messages potentially helpful for users.
+ string contextualError;
+
+ // Ensure the BrowserSSO rule is in the policy set.
+ if (find_if(policy.getRules(), _rulenamed(SAML1BROWSERSSO_POLICY_RULE)) == nullptr)
+ policy.getRules().push_back(m_ssoRule);
+
+ // Populate recipient as audience.
+ policy.getAudiences().push_back(application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getXMLString("entityID").second);
+
+ time_t now = time(nullptr);
+ for (vector<saml1::Assertion*>::const_iterator a = assertions.begin(); a!=assertions.end(); ++a) {
try {
+ // Skip unsigned assertion?
+ if (!(*a)->getSignature() && flag.first && flag.second)
+ throw SecurityPolicyException("The incoming assertion was unsigned, violating local security policy.");
+
// We clear the security flag, so we can tell whether the token was secured on its own.
- policy.setSecure(false);
-
- // Run the policy over the assertion. Handles issuer consistency, replay, freshness,
- // and signature verification, assuming the relevant rules are configured.
- policy.evaluate(*(*a));
-
- // If no security is in place now, we kick it.
- if (!alreadySecured && !policy.isSecure()) {
- m_log.warn("unable to establish security of assertion");
- badtokens.push_back(*a);
- continue;
- }
+ policy.setAuthenticated(false);
+ policy.reset(true);
+
+ // Extract message bits and re-verify Issuer information.
+ extractMessageDetails(
+ *(*a), (minor.first && minor.second==0) ? samlconstants::SAML10_PROTOCOL_ENUM : samlconstants::SAML11_PROTOCOL_ENUM, policy
+ );
- // Now do profile and core semantic validation to ensure we can use it for SSO.
- ssoValidator.validateAssertion(*(*a));
+ // Run the policy over the assertion. Handles replay, freshness, and
+ // signature verification, assuming the relevant rules are configured,
+ // along with condition and profile enforcement.
+ policy.evaluate(*(*a), &httpRequest);
+
+ // If no security is in place now, we kick it.
+ if (!alreadySecured && !policy.isAuthenticated())
+ throw SecurityPolicyException("Unable to establish security of incoming assertion.");
// Track it as a valid token.
tokens.push_back(*a);
// Save off the first valid SSO statement.
- if (!ssoStatement && !(*a)->getAuthenticationStatements().empty())
- ssoStatement = (*a)->getAuthenticationStatements().front();
+ const vector<AuthenticationStatement*>& statements = const_cast<const saml1::Assertion*>(*a)->getAuthenticationStatements();
+ for (vector<AuthenticationStatement*>::const_iterator s = statements.begin(); s!=statements.end(); ++s) {
+ if (authnskew.first && authnskew.second &&
+ (*s)->getAuthenticationInstant() && (now - (*s)->getAuthenticationInstantEpoch() > authnskew.second))
+ contextualError = "The gap between now and the time you logged into your identity provider exceeds the limit.";
+ else if (!ssoStatement) {
+ ssoStatement = *s;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
}
catch (exception& ex) {
m_log.warn("detected a problem with assertion: %s", ex.what());
+ if (!ssoStatement)
+ contextualError = ex.what();
badtokens.push_back(*a);
}
}
- if (!ssoStatement)
- throw FatalProfileException("A valid authentication statement was not found in the incoming message.");
+ if (!ssoStatement) {
+ if (contextualError.empty())
+ throw FatalProfileException("A valid authentication statement was not found in the incoming message.");
+ throw FatalProfileException(contextualError.c_str());
+ }
// Address checking.
SubjectLocality* locality = ssoStatement->getSubjectLocality();
// Now we have to extract the authentication details for attribute and session setup.
// Session expiration for SAML 1.x is purely SP-driven, and the method is mapped to a ctx class.
- const PropertySet* sessionProps = application.getPropertySet("Sessions");
pair<bool,unsigned int> lifetime = sessionProps ? sessionProps->getUnsignedInt("lifetime") : pair<bool,unsigned int>(true,28800);
if (!lifetime.first || lifetime.second == 0)
lifetime.second = 28800;
// To complete processing, we need to extract and resolve attributes and then create the session.
// Normalize the SAML 1.x NameIdentifier...
- auto_ptr<NameID> nameid(n ? NameIDBuilder::buildNameID() : NULL);
+ auto_ptr<NameID> nameid(n ? NameIDBuilder::buildNameID() : nullptr);
if (n) {
nameid->setName(n->getName());
nameid->setFormat(n->getFormat());
n,
nameid.get(),
ssoStatement->getAuthenticationMethod(),
- NULL,
+ nullptr,
&tokens
)
);
// Now merge in bad tokens for caching.
tokens.insert(tokens.end(), badtokens.begin(), badtokens.end());
- return application.getServiceProvider().getSessionCache()->insert(
- now + lifetime.second,
+ application.getServiceProvider().getSessionCache()->insert(
application,
- httpRequest.getRemoteAddr().c_str(),
- policy.getIssuerMetadata() ? dynamic_cast<const EntityDescriptor*>(policy.getIssuerMetadata()->getParent()) : NULL,
+ httpRequest,
+ httpResponse,
+ now + lifetime.second,
+ entity,
(!response->getMinorVersion().first || response->getMinorVersion().second==1) ?
samlconstants::SAML11_PROTOCOL_ENUM : samlconstants::SAML10_PROTOCOL_ENUM,
nameid.get(),
- ssoStatement->getAuthenticationInstant() ? ssoStatement->getAuthenticationInstant()->getRawData() : NULL,
- NULL,
+ ssoStatement->getAuthenticationInstant() ? ssoStatement->getAuthenticationInstant()->getRawData() : nullptr,
+ nullptr,
ssoStatement->getAuthenticationMethod(),
- NULL,
+ nullptr,
&tokens,
- ctx.get() ? &ctx->getResolvedAttributes() : NULL
+ ctx.get() ? &ctx->getResolvedAttributes() : nullptr
);
}