# include "SessionCache.h"
# include "TransactionLog.h"
# include "attribute/resolver/ResolutionContext.h"
+# include <boost/iterator/indirect_iterator.hpp>
# include <saml/exceptions.h>
# include <saml/SAMLConfig.h>
# include <saml/binding/SecurityPolicyRule.h>
using namespace opensaml::saml2p;
using namespace opensaml::saml2md;
using namespace opensaml;
+using namespace boost;
# ifndef min
# define min(a,b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
# endif
SAML2Consumer(const DOMElement* e, const char* appId)
: AssertionConsumerService(e, appId, Category::getInstance(SHIBSP_LOGCAT".SSO.SAML2")) {
#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
- m_ssoRule = nullptr;
if (SPConfig::getConfig().isEnabled(SPConfig::OutOfProcess))
- m_ssoRule = SAMLConfig::getConfig().SecurityPolicyRuleManager.newPlugin(BEARER_POLICY_RULE, e);
-#endif
- }
- virtual ~SAML2Consumer() {
-#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
- delete m_ssoRule;
+ m_ssoRule.reset(SAMLConfig::getConfig().SecurityPolicyRuleManager.newPlugin(BEARER_POLICY_RULE, e));
#endif
}
+ virtual ~SAML2Consumer() {}
#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
void generateMetadata(SPSSODescriptor& role, const char* handlerURL) const {
const XMLObject& xmlObject
) const;
- SecurityPolicyRule* m_ssoRule;
+ scoped_ptr<SecurityPolicyRule> m_ssoRule;
#else
const XMLCh* getProtocolFamily() const {
return samlconstants::SAML20P_NS;
vector<const opensaml::Assertion*> badtokens;
// And also track "owned" tokens that we decrypt here.
- vector<saml2::Assertion*> ownedtokens;
+ vector< boost::shared_ptr<saml2::Assertion> > ownedtokens;
+
+ // With this flag on, we block unauthenticated ciphertext when decrypting,
+ // unless the protocol was authenticated.
+ pair<bool,bool> requireAuthenticatedEncryption = application.getBool("requireAuthenticatedEncryption");
+ if (alreadySecured)
+ requireAuthenticatedEncryption.second = false;
// With this flag on, we ignore any unsigned assertions.
const EntityDescriptor* entity = nullptr;
- pair<bool,bool> flag = make_pair(false,false);
+ pair<bool,bool> requireSignedAssertions = make_pair(false,false);
if (alreadySecured && policy.getIssuerMetadata()) {
entity = dynamic_cast<const EntityDescriptor*>(policy.getIssuerMetadata()->getParent());
- flag = application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getBool("requireSignedAssertions");
+ const PropertySet* rp = application.getRelyingParty(entity);
+ requireSignedAssertions = rp->getBool("requireSignedAssertions");
}
// authnskew allows rejection of SSO if AuthnInstant is too old.
// Ensure the Bearer rule is in the policy set.
if (find_if(policy.getRules(), _rulenamed(BEARER_POLICY_RULE)) == nullptr)
- policy.getRules().push_back(m_ssoRule);
+ policy.getRules().push_back(m_ssoRule.get());
// Populate recipient as audience.
policy.getAudiences().push_back(application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getXMLString("entityID").second);
time_t now = time(nullptr);
- for (vector<saml2::Assertion*>::const_iterator a = assertions.begin(); a!=assertions.end(); ++a) {
+ for (indirect_iterator<vector<saml2::Assertion*>::const_iterator> a = make_indirect_iterator(assertions.begin());
+ a != make_indirect_iterator(assertions.end()); ++a) {
try {
// Skip unsigned assertion?
- if (!(*a)->getSignature() && flag.first && flag.second)
+ if (!a->getSignature() && requireSignedAssertions.first && requireSignedAssertions.second)
throw SecurityPolicyException("The incoming assertion was unsigned, violating local security policy.");
// We clear the security flag, so we can tell whether the token was secured on its own.
policy.reset(true);
// Extract message bits and re-verify Issuer information.
- extractMessageDetails(*(*a), samlconstants::SAML20P_NS, policy);
+ extractMessageDetails(*a, samlconstants::SAML20P_NS, policy);
// Run the policy over the assertion. Handles replay, freshness, and
// signature verification, assuming the relevant rules are configured,
// along with condition and profile enforcement.
- policy.evaluate(*(*a), &httpRequest);
+ policy.evaluate(*a, &httpRequest);
// If no security is in place now, we kick it.
if (!alreadySecured && !policy.isAuthenticated())
// If we hadn't established Issuer yet, redo the signedAssertions check.
if (!entity && policy.getIssuerMetadata()) {
entity = dynamic_cast<const EntityDescriptor*>(policy.getIssuerMetadata()->getParent());
- flag = application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getBool("requireSignedAssertions");
- if (!(*a)->getSignature() && flag.first && flag.second)
+ requireSignedAssertions = application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getBool("requireSignedAssertions");
+ if (!a->getSignature() && requireSignedAssertions.first && requireSignedAssertions.second)
throw SecurityPolicyException("The incoming assertion was unsigned, violating local security policy.");
}
}
// Track it as a valid token.
- tokens.push_back(*a);
+ tokens.push_back(&(*a));
// Save off the first valid SSO statement, but favor the "soonest" session expiration.
- const vector<AuthnStatement*>& statements = const_cast<const saml2::Assertion*>(*a)->getAuthnStatements();
- for (vector<AuthnStatement*>::const_iterator s = statements.begin(); s!=statements.end(); ++s) {
- if ((*s)->getAuthnInstant() && (*s)->getAuthnInstantEpoch() - XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().clock_skew_secs > now) {
+ const vector<AuthnStatement*>& statements = const_cast<const saml2::Assertion&>(*a).getAuthnStatements();
+ for (indirect_iterator<vector<AuthnStatement*>::const_iterator> s = make_indirect_iterator(statements.begin());
+ s != make_indirect_iterator(statements.end()); ++s) {
+ if (s->getAuthnInstant() && s->getAuthnInstantEpoch() - XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().clock_skew_secs > now) {
contextualError = "The login time at your identity provider was future-dated.";
}
- else if (authnskew.first && authnskew.second && (*s)->getAuthnInstant() &&
- (*s)->getAuthnInstantEpoch() <= now && (now - (*s)->getAuthnInstantEpoch() > authnskew.second)) {
+ else if (authnskew.first && authnskew.second && s->getAuthnInstant() &&
+ s->getAuthnInstantEpoch() <= now && (now - s->getAuthnInstantEpoch() > authnskew.second)) {
contextualError = "The gap between now and the time you logged into your identity provider exceeds the allowed limit.";
}
- else if (authnskew.first && authnskew.second && (*s)->getAuthnInstant() == nullptr) {
+ else if (authnskew.first && authnskew.second && s->getAuthnInstant() == nullptr) {
contextualError = "Your identity provider did not supply a time of login, violating local policy.";
}
- else if (!ssoStatement || (*s)->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() < ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch()) {
- ssoStatement = *s;
+ else if (!ssoStatement || s->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() < ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch()) {
+ ssoStatement = &(*s);
}
}
// Save off the first valid Subject, but favor an unencrypted NameID over anything else.
- if (!ssoSubject || (!ssoSubject->getNameID() && (*a)->getSubject()->getNameID()))
- ssoSubject = (*a)->getSubject();
+ if (!ssoSubject || (!ssoSubject->getNameID() && a->getSubject()->getNameID()))
+ ssoSubject = a->getSubject();
}
- catch (exception& ex) {
+ catch (std::exception& ex) {
m_log.warn("detected a problem with assertion: %s", ex.what());
if (!ssoStatement)
contextualError = ex.what();
- badtokens.push_back(*a);
+ badtokens.push_back(&(*a));
}
}
// In case we need decryption...
- CredentialResolver* cr=application.getCredentialResolver();
+ CredentialResolver* cr = application.getCredentialResolver();
if (!cr && !encassertions.empty())
m_log.warn("found encrypted assertions, but no CredentialResolver was available");
- for (vector<saml2::EncryptedAssertion*>::const_iterator ea = encassertions.begin(); cr && ea!=encassertions.end(); ++ea) {
+ for (indirect_iterator<vector<saml2::EncryptedAssertion*>::const_iterator> ea = make_indirect_iterator(encassertions.begin());
+ ea != make_indirect_iterator(encassertions.end()); ++ea) {
// Attempt to decrypt it.
- saml2::Assertion* decrypted=nullptr;
+ boost::shared_ptr<saml2::Assertion> decrypted;
try {
Locker credlocker(cr);
- auto_ptr<MetadataCredentialCriteria> mcc(
+ scoped_ptr<MetadataCredentialCriteria> mcc(
policy.getIssuerMetadata() ? new MetadataCredentialCriteria(*policy.getIssuerMetadata()) : nullptr
);
- auto_ptr<XMLObject> wrapper((*ea)->decrypt(*cr, application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getXMLString("entityID").second, mcc.get()));
- decrypted = dynamic_cast<saml2::Assertion*>(wrapper.get());
+ boost::shared_ptr<XMLObject> wrapper(
+ ea->decrypt(
+ *cr,
+ application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getXMLString("entityID").second,
+ mcc.get(),
+ requireAuthenticatedEncryption.first && requireAuthenticatedEncryption.second
+ )
+ );
+ decrypted = dynamic_pointer_cast<saml2::Assertion>(wrapper);
if (decrypted) {
- wrapper.release();
ownedtokens.push_back(decrypted);
if (m_log.isDebugEnabled())
m_log.debugStream() << "decrypted Assertion: " << *decrypted << logging::eol;
}
}
- catch (exception& ex) {
- m_log.error(ex.what());
+ catch (std::exception& ex) {
+ m_log.error("failed to decrypt assertion: %s", ex.what());
}
if (!decrypted)
continue;
try {
+ // Skip unsigned assertion?
+ if (!decrypted->getSignature() && requireSignedAssertions.first && requireSignedAssertions.second)
+ throw SecurityPolicyException("The incoming assertion was unsigned, violating local security policy.");
+
// We clear the security flag, so we can tell whether the token was secured on its own.
policy.setAuthenticated(false);
policy.reset(true);
// If we hadn't established Issuer yet, redo the signedAssertions check.
if (!entity && policy.getIssuerMetadata()) {
entity = dynamic_cast<const EntityDescriptor*>(policy.getIssuerMetadata()->getParent());
- flag = application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getBool("requireSignedAssertions");
- if (!decrypted->getSignature() && flag.first && flag.second)
+ requireSignedAssertions = application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getBool("requireSignedAssertions");
+ if (!decrypted->getSignature() && requireSignedAssertions.first && requireSignedAssertions.second)
throw SecurityPolicyException("The decrypted assertion was unsigned, violating local security policy.");
}
}
// Track it as a valid token.
- tokens.push_back(decrypted);
+ tokens.push_back(decrypted.get());
// Save off the first valid SSO statement, but favor the "soonest" session expiration.
- const vector<AuthnStatement*>& statements = const_cast<const saml2::Assertion*>(decrypted)->getAuthnStatements();
- for (vector<AuthnStatement*>::const_iterator s = statements.begin(); s!=statements.end(); ++s) {
- if (authnskew.first && authnskew.second && (*s)->getAuthnInstant() && (now - (*s)->getAuthnInstantEpoch() > authnskew.second))
+ const vector<AuthnStatement*>& statements = const_cast<const saml2::Assertion*>(decrypted.get())->getAuthnStatements();
+ for (indirect_iterator<vector<AuthnStatement*>::const_iterator> s = make_indirect_iterator(statements.begin());
+ s != make_indirect_iterator(statements.end()); ++s) {
+ if (authnskew.first && authnskew.second && s->getAuthnInstant() && (now - s->getAuthnInstantEpoch() > authnskew.second))
contextualError = "The gap between now and the time you logged into your identity provider exceeds the limit.";
- else if (!ssoStatement || (*s)->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() < ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch())
- ssoStatement = *s;
+ else if (!ssoStatement || s->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() < ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch())
+ ssoStatement = &(*s);
}
// Save off the first valid Subject, but favor an unencrypted NameID over anything else.
if (!ssoSubject || (!ssoSubject->getNameID() && decrypted->getSubject()->getNameID()))
ssoSubject = decrypted->getSubject();
}
- catch (exception& ex) {
+ catch (std::exception& ex) {
m_log.warn("detected a problem with assertion: %s", ex.what());
if (!ssoStatement)
contextualError = ex.what();
- badtokens.push_back(decrypted);
+ badtokens.push_back(decrypted.get());
}
}
if (!ssoStatement) {
- for_each(ownedtokens.begin(), ownedtokens.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<saml2::Assertion>());
if (contextualError.empty())
throw FatalProfileException("A valid authentication statement was not found in the incoming message.");
throw FatalProfileException(contextualError.c_str());
}
// May need to decrypt NameID.
- bool ownedName = false;
+ scoped_ptr<XMLObject> decryptedID;
NameID* ssoName = ssoSubject->getNameID();
if (!ssoName) {
EncryptedID* encname = ssoSubject->getEncryptedID();
m_log.warn("found encrypted NameID, but no decryption credential was available");
else {
Locker credlocker(cr);
- auto_ptr<MetadataCredentialCriteria> mcc(
+ scoped_ptr<MetadataCredentialCriteria> mcc(
policy.getIssuerMetadata() ? new MetadataCredentialCriteria(*policy.getIssuerMetadata()) : nullptr
);
try {
- auto_ptr<XMLObject> decryptedID(encname->decrypt(*cr,application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getXMLString("entityID").second,mcc.get()));
+ decryptedID.reset(encname->decrypt(*cr, application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getXMLString("entityID").second, mcc.get()));
ssoName = dynamic_cast<NameID*>(decryptedID.get());
if (ssoName) {
- ownedName = true;
- decryptedID.release();
if (m_log.isDebugEnabled())
m_log.debugStream() << "decrypted NameID: " << *ssoName << logging::eol;
}
}
- catch (exception& ex) {
- m_log.error(ex.what());
+ catch (std::exception& ex) {
+ m_log.error("failed to decrypt NameID: %s", ex.what());
}
}
}
const AuthnContext* authnContext = ssoStatement->getAuthnContext();
- try {
- // The context will handle deleting attributes and new tokens.
- auto_ptr<ResolutionContext> ctx(
- resolveAttributes(
- application,
- policy.getIssuerMetadata(),
- samlconstants::SAML20P_NS,
- nullptr,
- nullptr,
- ssoName,
- ssoStatement,
- (authnContext && authnContext->getAuthnContextClassRef()) ? authnContext->getAuthnContextClassRef()->getReference() : nullptr,
- (authnContext && authnContext->getAuthnContextDeclRef()) ? authnContext->getAuthnContextDeclRef()->getReference() : nullptr,
- &tokens
- )
- );
-
- if (ctx.get()) {
- // Copy over any new tokens, but leave them in the context for cleanup.
- tokens.insert(tokens.end(), ctx->getResolvedAssertions().begin(), ctx->getResolvedAssertions().end());
- }
-
- // Now merge in bad tokens for caching.
- tokens.insert(tokens.end(), badtokens.begin(), badtokens.end());
-
- string session_id;
- application.getServiceProvider().getSessionCache()->insert(
- session_id,
+ // The context will handle deleting attributes and new tokens.
+ scoped_ptr<ResolutionContext> ctx(
+ resolveAttributes(
application,
- httpRequest,
- httpResponse,
- sessionExp,
- entity,
+ &httpRequest,
+ policy.getIssuerMetadata(),
samlconstants::SAML20P_NS,
+ response,
+ nullptr,
+ nullptr,
ssoName,
- ssoStatement->getAuthnInstant() ? ssoStatement->getAuthnInstant()->getRawData() : nullptr,
- ssoStatement->getSessionIndex(),
+ ssoStatement,
(authnContext && authnContext->getAuthnContextClassRef()) ? authnContext->getAuthnContextClassRef()->getReference() : nullptr,
(authnContext && authnContext->getAuthnContextDeclRef()) ? authnContext->getAuthnContextDeclRef()->getReference() : nullptr,
- &tokens,
- ctx.get() ? &ctx->getResolvedAttributes() : nullptr
- );
+ &tokens
+ )
+ );
- try {
- auto_ptr<TransactionLog::Event> event(newLoginEvent(application, httpRequest));
- LoginEvent* login_event = dynamic_cast<LoginEvent*>(event.get());
- if (login_event) {
- login_event->m_sessionID = session_id.c_str();
- login_event->m_peer = entity;
- auto_ptr_char prot(getProtocolFamily());
- login_event->m_protocol = prot.get();
- login_event->m_nameID = ssoName;
- login_event->m_saml2AuthnStatement = ssoStatement;
- login_event->m_saml2Response = response;
- if (ctx.get())
- login_event->m_attributes = &ctx->getResolvedAttributes();
- application.getServiceProvider().getTransactionLog()->write(*login_event);
- }
- else {
- m_log.warn("unable to audit event, log event object was of an incorrect type");
- }
+ if (ctx) {
+ // Copy over any new tokens, but leave them in the context for cleanup.
+ tokens.insert(tokens.end(), ctx->getResolvedAssertions().begin(), ctx->getResolvedAssertions().end());
+ }
+
+ // Now merge in bad tokens for caching.
+ tokens.insert(tokens.end(), badtokens.begin(), badtokens.end());
+
+ string session_id;
+ application.getServiceProvider().getSessionCache()->insert(
+ session_id,
+ application,
+ httpRequest,
+ httpResponse,
+ sessionExp,
+ entity,
+ samlconstants::SAML20P_NS,
+ ssoName,
+ ssoStatement->getAuthnInstant() ? ssoStatement->getAuthnInstant()->getRawData() : nullptr,
+ ssoStatement->getSessionIndex(),
+ (authnContext && authnContext->getAuthnContextClassRef()) ? authnContext->getAuthnContextClassRef()->getReference() : nullptr,
+ (authnContext && authnContext->getAuthnContextDeclRef()) ? authnContext->getAuthnContextDeclRef()->getReference() : nullptr,
+ &tokens,
+ ctx ? &ctx->getResolvedAttributes() : nullptr
+ );
+
+ try {
+ scoped_ptr<TransactionLog::Event> event(newLoginEvent(application, httpRequest));
+ LoginEvent* login_event = dynamic_cast<LoginEvent*>(event.get());
+ if (login_event) {
+ login_event->m_sessionID = session_id.c_str();
+ login_event->m_peer = entity;
+ auto_ptr_char prot(getProtocolFamily());
+ login_event->m_protocol = prot.get();
+ login_event->m_nameID = ssoName;
+ login_event->m_saml2AuthnStatement = ssoStatement;
+ login_event->m_saml2Response = response;
+ if (ctx)
+ login_event->m_attributes = &ctx->getResolvedAttributes();
+ application.getServiceProvider().getTransactionLog()->write(*login_event);
}
- catch (exception& ex) {
- m_log.warn("exception auditing event: %s", ex.what());
+ else {
+ m_log.warn("unable to audit event, log event object was of an incorrect type");
}
-
- if (ownedName)
- delete ssoName;
- for_each(ownedtokens.begin(), ownedtokens.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<saml2::Assertion>());
}
- catch (exception&) {
- if (ownedName)
- delete ssoName;
- for_each(ownedtokens.begin(), ownedtokens.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<saml2::Assertion>());
- throw;
+ catch (std::exception& ex) {
+ m_log.warn("exception auditing event: %s", ex.what());
}
}
projects / shibboleth / sp.git / blobdiff