}
virtual ~SAML2Consumer() {}
- private:
#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
- string implementProtocol(
+ void generateMetadata(SPSSODescriptor& role, const char* handlerURL) const {
+ AssertionConsumerService::generateMetadata(role, handlerURL);
+ role.addSupport(samlconstants::SAML20P_NS);
+ }
+
+ private:
+ void implementProtocol(
const Application& application,
const HTTPRequest& httpRequest,
+ HTTPResponse& httpResponse,
SecurityPolicy& policy,
const PropertySet* settings,
const XMLObject& xmlObject
#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
-string SAML2Consumer::implementProtocol(
+void SAML2Consumer::implementProtocol(
const Application& application,
const HTTPRequest& httpRequest,
+ HTTPResponse& httpResponse,
SecurityPolicy& policy,
const PropertySet* settings,
const XMLObject& xmlObject
// And also track "owned" tokens that we decrypt here.
vector<saml2::Assertion*> ownedtokens;
- // Profile validator.
+ // With this flag on, we ignore any unsigned assertions.
+ const EntityDescriptor* entity = NULL;
+ pair<bool,bool> flag = make_pair(false,false);
+ if (alreadySecured && policy.getIssuerMetadata()) {
+ entity = dynamic_cast<const EntityDescriptor*>(policy.getIssuerMetadata()->getParent());
+ flag = application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getBool("requireSignedAssertions");
+ }
+
time_t now = time(NULL);
string dest = httpRequest.getRequestURL();
- BrowserSSOProfileValidator ssoValidator(application.getAudiences(), now, dest.substr(0,dest.find('?')).c_str());
- // With this flag on, we ignore any unsigned assertions.
- pair<bool,bool> flag = settings->getBool("signedAssertions");
+ // authnskew allows rejection of SSO if AuthnInstant is too old.
+ const PropertySet* sessionProps = application.getPropertySet("Sessions");
+ pair<bool,unsigned int> authnskew = sessionProps ? sessionProps->getUnsignedInt("maxTimeSinceAuthn") : pair<bool,unsigned int>(false,0);
- // Saves off IP-mismatch error message because it's potentially helpful for users.
- string addressMismatch;
+ // Saves off error messages potentially helpful for users.
+ string contextualError;
for (vector<saml2::Assertion*>::const_iterator a = assertions.begin(); a!=assertions.end(); ++a) {
- // Skip unsigned assertion?
- if (!(*a)->getSignature() && flag.first && flag.second) {
- m_log.warn("found unsigned assertion in SAML response, ignoring it per signedAssertions policy");
- badtokens.push_back(*a);
- continue;
- }
-
try {
+ // Skip unsigned assertion?
+ if (!(*a)->getSignature() && flag.first && flag.second)
+ throw SecurityPolicyException("The incoming assertion was unsigned, violating local security policy.");
+
// We clear the security flag, so we can tell whether the token was secured on its own.
policy.setAuthenticated(false);
policy.reset(true);
policy.evaluate(*(*a));
// If no security is in place now, we kick it.
- if (!alreadySecured && !policy.isAuthenticated()) {
- m_log.warn("unable to establish security of assertion");
- badtokens.push_back(*a);
- continue;
+ if (!alreadySecured && !policy.isAuthenticated())
+ throw SecurityPolicyException("Unable to establish security of incoming assertion.");
+
+ // If we hadn't established Issuer yet, redo the signedAssertions check.
+ if (!entity && policy.getIssuerMetadata()) {
+ entity = dynamic_cast<const EntityDescriptor*>(policy.getIssuerMetadata()->getParent());
+ flag = application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getBool("requireSignedAssertions");
+ if (!(*a)->getSignature() && flag.first && flag.second)
+ throw SecurityPolicyException("The incoming assertion was unsigned, violating local security policy.");
}
// Now do profile and core semantic validation to ensure we can use it for SSO.
+ BrowserSSOProfileValidator ssoValidator(
+ application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getXMLString("entityID").second, application.getAudiences(), now, dest.substr(0,dest.find('?')).c_str()
+ );
ssoValidator.validateAssertion(*(*a));
// Address checking.
- try {
- if (ssoValidator.getAddress())
- checkAddress(application, httpRequest, ssoValidator.getAddress());
- }
- catch (exception& ex) {
- // We save off the message if there's no SSO statement yet.
- if (!ssoStatement)
- addressMismatch = ex.what();
- throw;
- }
+ checkAddress(application, httpRequest, ssoValidator.getAddress());
// Track it as a valid token.
tokens.push_back(*a);
// Save off the first valid SSO statement, but favor the "soonest" session expiration.
const vector<AuthnStatement*>& statements = const_cast<const saml2::Assertion*>(*a)->getAuthnStatements();
for (vector<AuthnStatement*>::const_iterator s = statements.begin(); s!=statements.end(); ++s) {
- if (!ssoStatement || (*s)->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() < ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch())
+ if (authnskew.first && authnskew.second && (*s)->getAuthnInstant() && (now - (*s)->getAuthnInstantEpoch() > authnskew.second))
+ contextualError = "The gap between now and the time you logged into your identity provider exceeds the limit.";
+ else if (!ssoStatement || (*s)->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() < ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch())
ssoStatement = *s;
}
}
catch (exception& ex) {
m_log.warn("detected a problem with assertion: %s", ex.what());
+ if (!ssoStatement)
+ contextualError = ex.what();
badtokens.push_back(*a);
}
}
auto_ptr<MetadataCredentialCriteria> mcc(
policy.getIssuerMetadata() ? new MetadataCredentialCriteria(*policy.getIssuerMetadata()) : NULL
);
- auto_ptr<XMLObject> wrapper((*ea)->decrypt(*cr, application.getXMLString("entityID").second, mcc.get()));
+ auto_ptr<XMLObject> wrapper((*ea)->decrypt(*cr, application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getXMLString("entityID").second, mcc.get()));
decrypted = dynamic_cast<saml2::Assertion*>(wrapper.get());
if (decrypted) {
wrapper.release();
ownedtokens.push_back(decrypted);
+ if (m_log.isDebugEnabled())
+ m_log.debugStream() << "decrypted Assertion: " << *decrypted << logging::eol;
}
}
catch (exception& ex) {
if (!decrypted)
continue;
- // Skip unsigned assertion?
- if (!decrypted->getSignature() && flag.first && flag.second) {
- m_log.warn("found unsigned assertion in SAML response, ignoring it per signedAssertions policy");
- badtokens.push_back(decrypted);
- continue;
- }
-
try {
+ // Skip unsigned assertion?
+ if (!decrypted->getSignature() && flag.first && flag.second)
+ throw SecurityPolicyException("The incoming assertion was unsigned, violating local security policy.");
+
// We clear the security flag, so we can tell whether the token was secured on its own.
policy.setAuthenticated(false);
policy.reset(true);
policy.evaluate(*decrypted);
// If no security is in place now, we kick it.
- if (!alreadySecured && !policy.isAuthenticated()) {
- m_log.warn("unable to establish security of assertion");
- badtokens.push_back(decrypted);
- continue;
- }
+ if (!alreadySecured && !policy.isAuthenticated())
+ throw SecurityPolicyException("Unable to establish security of incoming assertion.");
// Now do profile and core semantic validation to ensure we can use it for SSO.
+ BrowserSSOProfileValidator ssoValidator(
+ application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getXMLString("entityID").second, application.getAudiences(), now, dest.substr(0,dest.find('?')).c_str()
+ );
ssoValidator.validateAssertion(*decrypted);
// Address checking.
- try {
- if (ssoValidator.getAddress())
- checkAddress(application, httpRequest, ssoValidator.getAddress());
- }
- catch (exception& ex) {
- // We save off the message if there's no SSO statement yet.
- if (!ssoStatement)
- addressMismatch = ex.what();
- throw;
- }
+ checkAddress(application, httpRequest, ssoValidator.getAddress());
// Track it as a valid token.
tokens.push_back(decrypted);
// Save off the first valid SSO statement, but favor the "soonest" session expiration.
const vector<AuthnStatement*>& statements = const_cast<const saml2::Assertion*>(decrypted)->getAuthnStatements();
for (vector<AuthnStatement*>::const_iterator s = statements.begin(); s!=statements.end(); ++s) {
- if (!ssoStatement || (*s)->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() < ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch())
+ if (authnskew.first && authnskew.second && (*s)->getAuthnInstant() && (now - (*s)->getAuthnInstantEpoch() > authnskew.second))
+ contextualError = "The gap between now and the time you logged into your identity provider exceeds the limit.";
+ else if (!ssoStatement || (*s)->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() < ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch())
ssoStatement = *s;
}
}
catch (exception& ex) {
m_log.warn("detected a problem with assertion: %s", ex.what());
+ if (!ssoStatement)
+ contextualError = ex.what();
badtokens.push_back(decrypted);
}
}
if (!ssoStatement) {
for_each(ownedtokens.begin(), ownedtokens.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<saml2::Assertion>());
- if (addressMismatch.empty())
+ if (contextualError.empty())
throw FatalProfileException("A valid authentication statement was not found in the incoming message.");
- throw FatalProfileException(addressMismatch.c_str());
+ throw FatalProfileException(contextualError.c_str());
}
// May need to decrypt NameID.
policy.getIssuerMetadata() ? new MetadataCredentialCriteria(*policy.getIssuerMetadata()) : NULL
);
try {
- auto_ptr<XMLObject> decryptedID(encname->decrypt(*cr,application.getXMLString("entityID").second,mcc.get()));
+ auto_ptr<XMLObject> decryptedID(encname->decrypt(*cr,application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getXMLString("entityID").second,mcc.get()));
ssoName = dynamic_cast<NameID*>(decryptedID.get());
if (ssoName) {
ownedName = true;
decryptedID.release();
+ if (m_log.isDebugEnabled())
+ m_log.debugStream() << "decrypted NameID: " << *ssoName << logging::eol;
}
}
catch (exception& ex) {
// Session expiration for SAML 2.0 is jointly IdP- and SP-driven.
time_t sessionExp = ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfter() ? ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() : 0;
- const PropertySet* sessionProps = application.getPropertySet("Sessions");
pair<bool,unsigned int> lifetime = sessionProps ? sessionProps->getUnsignedInt("lifetime") : pair<bool,unsigned int>(true,28800);
if (!lifetime.first || lifetime.second == 0)
lifetime.second = 28800;
// Now merge in bad tokens for caching.
tokens.insert(tokens.end(), badtokens.begin(), badtokens.end());
- string key = application.getServiceProvider().getSessionCache()->insert(
- sessionExp,
+ application.getServiceProvider().getSessionCache()->insert(
application,
- httpRequest.getRemoteAddr().c_str(),
- policy.getIssuerMetadata() ? dynamic_cast<const EntityDescriptor*>(policy.getIssuerMetadata()->getParent()) : NULL,
+ httpRequest,
+ httpResponse,
+ sessionExp,
+ entity,
samlconstants::SAML20P_NS,
ssoName,
ssoStatement->getAuthnInstant() ? ssoStatement->getAuthnInstant()->getRawData() : NULL,
if (ownedName)
delete ssoName;
for_each(ownedtokens.begin(), ownedtokens.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<saml2::Assertion>());
- return key;
}
catch (exception&) {
if (ownedName)
projects / shibboleth / sp.git / blobdiff