/*
- * Copyright 2001-2007 Internet2
- *
+ * Copyright 2001-2009 Internet2
+ *
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
/**
* SAML2Consumer.cpp
- *
- * SAML 2.0 assertion consumer service
+ *
+ * SAML 2.0 assertion consumer service
*/
#include "internal.h"
# include "ServiceProvider.h"
# include "SessionCache.h"
# include "attribute/resolver/ResolutionContext.h"
+# include <saml/SAMLConfig.h>
# include <saml/saml2/core/Protocols.h>
-# include <saml/saml2/profile/BrowserSSOProfileValidator.h>
# include <saml/saml2/metadata/Metadata.h>
# include <saml/saml2/metadata/MetadataCredentialCriteria.h>
+# include <saml/saml2/profile/SAML2AssertionPolicy.h>
using namespace opensaml::saml2;
using namespace opensaml::saml2p;
using namespace opensaml::saml2md;
#pragma warning( push )
#pragma warning( disable : 4250 )
#endif
-
+
class SHIBSP_DLLLOCAL SAML2Consumer : public AssertionConsumerService
{
public:
SAML2Consumer(const DOMElement* e, const char* appId)
: AssertionConsumerService(e, appId, Category::getInstance(SHIBSP_LOGCAT".SSO.SAML2")) {
+#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
+ m_ssoRule = NULL;
+ if (SPConfig::getConfig().isEnabled(SPConfig::OutOfProcess))
+ m_ssoRule = SAMLConfig::getConfig().SecurityPolicyRuleManager.newPlugin(BEARER_POLICY_RULE, e);
+#endif
}
- virtual ~SAML2Consumer() {}
-
+ virtual ~SAML2Consumer() {
+#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
+ delete m_ssoRule;
+#endif
+ }
+
#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
void generateMetadata(SPSSODescriptor& role, const char* handlerURL) const {
AssertionConsumerService::generateMetadata(role, handlerURL);
const PropertySet* settings,
const XMLObject& xmlObject
) const;
+
+ SecurityPolicyRule* m_ssoRule;
#endif
};
{
return new SAML2Consumer(p.first, p.second);
}
-
+
+#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
+ class SHIBSP_DLLLOCAL _rulenamed : std::unary_function<const SecurityPolicyRule*,bool>
+ {
+ public:
+ _rulenamed(const char* name) : m_name(name) {}
+ bool operator()(const SecurityPolicyRule* rule) const {
+ return rule ? !strcmp(m_name, rule->getType()) : false;
+ }
+ private:
+ const char* m_name;
+ };
+#endif
};
#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
bool alreadySecured = policy.isAuthenticated();
// Check for errors...this will throw if it's not a successful message.
- checkError(&xmlObject);
+ checkError(&xmlObject, policy.getIssuerMetadata());
const Response* response = dynamic_cast<const Response*>(&xmlObject);
if (!response)
flag = application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getBool("requireSignedAssertions");
}
- time_t now = time(NULL);
- string dest = httpRequest.getRequestURL();
-
// authnskew allows rejection of SSO if AuthnInstant is too old.
const PropertySet* sessionProps = application.getPropertySet("Sessions");
pair<bool,unsigned int> authnskew = sessionProps ? sessionProps->getUnsignedInt("maxTimeSinceAuthn") : pair<bool,unsigned int>(false,0);
// Saves off error messages potentially helpful for users.
string contextualError;
+ // Ensure the Bearer rule is in the policy set.
+ if (find_if(policy.getRules(), _rulenamed(BEARER_POLICY_RULE)) == NULL)
+ policy.getRules().push_back(m_ssoRule);
+
+ // Populate recipient as audience.
+ policy.getAudiences().push_back(application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getXMLString("entityID").second);
+
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
for (vector<saml2::Assertion*>::const_iterator a = assertions.begin(); a!=assertions.end(); ++a) {
try {
// Skip unsigned assertion?
extractMessageDetails(*(*a), samlconstants::SAML20P_NS, policy);
// Run the policy over the assertion. Handles replay, freshness, and
- // signature verification, assuming the relevant rules are configured.
- policy.evaluate(*(*a));
-
+ // signature verification, assuming the relevant rules are configured,
+ // along with condition and profile enforcement.
+ policy.evaluate(*(*a), &httpRequest);
+
// If no security is in place now, we kick it.
if (!alreadySecured && !policy.isAuthenticated())
throw SecurityPolicyException("Unable to establish security of incoming assertion.");
throw SecurityPolicyException("The incoming assertion was unsigned, violating local security policy.");
}
- // Now do profile and core semantic validation to ensure we can use it for SSO.
- BrowserSSOProfileValidator ssoValidator(
- application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getXMLString("entityID").second, application.getAudiences(), now, dest.substr(0,dest.find('?')).c_str()
- );
- ssoValidator.validateAssertion(*(*a));
-
// Address checking.
- checkAddress(application, httpRequest, ssoValidator.getAddress());
+ SubjectConfirmationData* subcondata = dynamic_cast<SubjectConfirmationData*>(
+ dynamic_cast<SAML2AssertionPolicy&>(policy).getSubjectConfirmation()->getSubjectConfirmationData()
+ );
+ if (subcondata && subcondata->getAddress()) {
+ auto_ptr_char boundip(subcondata->getAddress());
+ checkAddress(application, httpRequest, boundip.get());
+ }
// Track it as a valid token.
tokens.push_back(*a);
continue;
try {
- // Skip unsigned assertion?
- if (!decrypted->getSignature() && flag.first && flag.second)
- throw SecurityPolicyException("The incoming assertion was unsigned, violating local security policy.");
-
// We clear the security flag, so we can tell whether the token was secured on its own.
policy.setAuthenticated(false);
policy.reset(true);
extractMessageDetails(*decrypted, samlconstants::SAML20P_NS, policy);
// Run the policy over the assertion. Handles replay, freshness, and
- // signature verification, assuming the relevant rules are configured.
+ // signature verification, assuming the relevant rules are configured,
+ // along with condition and profile enforcement.
// We have to marshall the object first to ensure signatures can be checked.
if (!decrypted->getDOM())
decrypted->marshall();
- policy.evaluate(*decrypted);
-
+ policy.evaluate(*decrypted, &httpRequest);
+
// If no security is in place now, we kick it.
if (!alreadySecured && !policy.isAuthenticated())
throw SecurityPolicyException("Unable to establish security of incoming assertion.");
- // Now do profile and core semantic validation to ensure we can use it for SSO.
- BrowserSSOProfileValidator ssoValidator(
- application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getXMLString("entityID").second, application.getAudiences(), now, dest.substr(0,dest.find('?')).c_str()
- );
- ssoValidator.validateAssertion(*decrypted);
+ // If we hadn't established Issuer yet, redo the signedAssertions check.
+ if (!entity && policy.getIssuerMetadata()) {
+ entity = dynamic_cast<const EntityDescriptor*>(policy.getIssuerMetadata()->getParent());
+ flag = application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getBool("requireSignedAssertions");
+ if (!decrypted->getSignature() && flag.first && flag.second)
+ throw SecurityPolicyException("The decrypted assertion was unsigned, violating local security policy.");
+ }
// Address checking.
- checkAddress(application, httpRequest, ssoValidator.getAddress());
+ SubjectConfirmationData* subcondata = dynamic_cast<SubjectConfirmationData*>(
+ dynamic_cast<SAML2AssertionPolicy&>(policy).getSubjectConfirmation()->getSubjectConfirmationData()
+ );
+ if (subcondata && subcondata->getAddress()) {
+ auto_ptr_char boundip(subcondata->getAddress());
+ checkAddress(application, httpRequest, boundip.get());
+ }
// Track it as a valid token.
tokens.push_back(decrypted);
// Now we have to extract the authentication details for session setup.
// Session expiration for SAML 2.0 is jointly IdP- and SP-driven.
- time_t sessionExp = ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfter() ? ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() : 0;
+ time_t sessionExp = ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfter() ?
+ (ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() + XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().clock_skew_secs) : 0;
pair<bool,unsigned int> lifetime = sessionProps ? sessionProps->getUnsignedInt("lifetime") : pair<bool,unsigned int>(true,28800);
if (!lifetime.first || lifetime.second == 0)
lifetime.second = 28800;
projects / shibboleth / sp.git / blobdiff