*/
#include "internal.h"
-#include "Application.h"
-#include "exceptions.h"
-#include "ServiceProvider.h"
-#include "SessionCache.h"
-#include "attribute/resolver/ResolutionContext.h"
#include "handler/AssertionConsumerService.h"
-#include <saml/saml2/core/Protocols.h>
-#include <saml/saml2/profile/BrowserSSOProfileValidator.h>
-#include <saml/saml2/metadata/Metadata.h>
-
-using namespace shibsp;
+#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
+# include "exceptions.h"
+# include "Application.h"
+# include "ServiceProvider.h"
+# include "SessionCache.h"
+# include "attribute/resolver/ResolutionContext.h"
+# include <saml/saml2/core/Protocols.h>
+# include <saml/saml2/profile/BrowserSSOProfileValidator.h>
+# include <saml/saml2/metadata/Metadata.h>
+# include <saml/saml2/metadata/MetadataCredentialCriteria.h>
using namespace opensaml::saml2;
using namespace opensaml::saml2p;
+using namespace opensaml::saml2md;
using namespace opensaml;
+# ifndef min
+# define min(a,b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
+# endif
+#endif
+
+using namespace shibsp;
using namespace xmltooling;
-using namespace log4cpp;
using namespace std;
-using saml2md::EntityDescriptor;
namespace shibsp {
{
public:
SAML2Consumer(const DOMElement* e, const char* appId)
- : AssertionConsumerService(e, appId, Category::getInstance(SHIBSP_LOGCAT".SAML2")) {
+ : AssertionConsumerService(e, appId, Category::getInstance(SHIBSP_LOGCAT".SSO.SAML2")) {
}
virtual ~SAML2Consumer() {}
+#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
+ void generateMetadata(SPSSODescriptor& role, const char* handlerURL) const {
+ AssertionConsumerService::generateMetadata(role, handlerURL);
+ role.addSupport(samlconstants::SAML20P_NS);
+ }
+
private:
- string implementProtocol(
+ void implementProtocol(
const Application& application,
const HTTPRequest& httpRequest,
+ HTTPResponse& httpResponse,
SecurityPolicy& policy,
const PropertySet* settings,
const XMLObject& xmlObject
) const;
+#endif
};
#if defined (_MSC_VER)
};
-string SAML2Consumer::implementProtocol(
+#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
+
+void SAML2Consumer::implementProtocol(
const Application& application,
const HTTPRequest& httpRequest,
+ HTTPResponse& httpResponse,
SecurityPolicy& policy,
const PropertySet* settings,
const XMLObject& xmlObject
// Remember whether we already established trust.
// None of the SAML 2 bindings require security at the protocol layer.
- bool alreadySecured = policy.isSecure();
+ bool alreadySecured = policy.isAuthenticated();
// Check for errors...this will throw if it's not a successful message.
checkError(&xmlObject);
// And also track "owned" tokens that we decrypt here.
vector<saml2::Assertion*> ownedtokens;
- // Profile validator.
+ // With this flag on, we ignore any unsigned assertions.
+ const EntityDescriptor* entity = NULL;
+ pair<bool,bool> flag = make_pair(false,false);
+ if (alreadySecured && policy.getIssuerMetadata()) {
+ entity = dynamic_cast<const EntityDescriptor*>(policy.getIssuerMetadata()->getParent());
+ flag = application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getBool("signedAssertions");
+ }
+
time_t now = time(NULL);
string dest = httpRequest.getRequestURL();
- BrowserSSOProfileValidator ssoValidator(application.getAudiences(), now, dest.substr(0,dest.find('?')).c_str());
- // With this flag on, we ignore any unsigned assertions.
- pair<bool,bool> flag = settings->getBool("signedAssertions");
+ // authnskew allows rejection of SSO if AuthnInstant is too old.
+ const PropertySet* sessionProps = application.getPropertySet("Sessions");
+ pair<bool,unsigned int> authnskew = sessionProps ? sessionProps->getUnsignedInt("maxTimeSinceAuthn") : pair<bool,unsigned int>(false,0);
- // Saves off IP-mismatch error message because it's potentially helpful for users.
- string addressMismatch;
+ // Saves off error messages potentially helpful for users.
+ string contextualError;
for (vector<saml2::Assertion*>::const_iterator a = assertions.begin(); a!=assertions.end(); ++a) {
- // Skip unsigned assertion?
- if (!(*a)->getSignature() && flag.first && flag.second) {
- m_log.warn("found unsigned assertion in SAML response, ignoring it per signedAssertions policy");
- badtokens.push_back(*a);
- continue;
- }
-
try {
+ // Skip unsigned assertion?
+ if (!(*a)->getSignature() && flag.first && flag.second)
+ throw SecurityPolicyException("The incoming assertion was unsigned, violating local security policy.");
+
// We clear the security flag, so we can tell whether the token was secured on its own.
- policy.setSecure(false);
-
- // Run the policy over the assertion. Handles issuer consistency, replay, freshness,
- // and signature verification, assuming the relevant rules are configured.
+ policy.setAuthenticated(false);
+ policy.reset(true);
+
+ // Extract message bits and re-verify Issuer information.
+ extractMessageDetails(*(*a), samlconstants::SAML20P_NS, policy);
+
+ // Run the policy over the assertion. Handles replay, freshness, and
+ // signature verification, assuming the relevant rules are configured.
policy.evaluate(*(*a));
// If no security is in place now, we kick it.
- if (!alreadySecured && !policy.isSecure()) {
- m_log.warn("unable to establish security of assertion");
- badtokens.push_back(*a);
- continue;
+ if (!alreadySecured && !policy.isAuthenticated())
+ throw SecurityPolicyException("Unable to establish security of incoming assertion.");
+
+ // If we hadn't established Issuer yet, redo the signedAssertions check.
+ if (!entity && policy.getIssuerMetadata()) {
+ entity = dynamic_cast<const EntityDescriptor*>(policy.getIssuerMetadata()->getParent());
+ flag = application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getBool("signedAssertions");
+ if (!(*a)->getSignature() && flag.first && flag.second)
+ throw SecurityPolicyException("The incoming assertion was unsigned, violating local security policy.");
}
// Now do profile and core semantic validation to ensure we can use it for SSO.
+ BrowserSSOProfileValidator ssoValidator(
+ application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getXMLString("entityID").second, application.getAudiences(), now, dest.substr(0,dest.find('?')).c_str()
+ );
ssoValidator.validateAssertion(*(*a));
// Address checking.
- try {
- if (ssoValidator.getAddress())
- checkAddress(application, httpRequest, ssoValidator.getAddress());
- }
- catch (exception& ex) {
- // We save off the message if there's no SSO statement yet.
- if (!ssoStatement)
- addressMismatch = ex.what();
- throw;
- }
+ checkAddress(application, httpRequest, ssoValidator.getAddress());
// Track it as a valid token.
tokens.push_back(*a);
// Save off the first valid SSO statement, but favor the "soonest" session expiration.
const vector<AuthnStatement*>& statements = const_cast<const saml2::Assertion*>(*a)->getAuthnStatements();
for (vector<AuthnStatement*>::const_iterator s = statements.begin(); s!=statements.end(); ++s) {
- if (!ssoStatement || (*s)->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() < ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch())
+ if (authnskew.first && authnskew.second && (*s)->getAuthnInstant() && (now - (*s)->getAuthnInstantEpoch() > authnskew.second))
+ contextualError = "The gap between now and the time you logged into your identity provider exceeds the limit.";
+ else if (!ssoStatement || (*s)->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() < ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch())
ssoStatement = *s;
}
}
catch (exception& ex) {
m_log.warn("detected a problem with assertion: %s", ex.what());
+ if (!ssoStatement)
+ contextualError = ex.what();
badtokens.push_back(*a);
}
}
- // We look up decryption credentials based on the peer who did the encrypting.
- CredentialCriteria cc;
- if (policy.getIssuerMetadata()) {
- auto_ptr_char assertingParty(dynamic_cast<const EntityDescriptor*>(policy.getIssuerMetadata()->getParent())->getEntityID());
- cc.setPeerName(assertingParty.get());
- }
+ // In case we need decryption...
CredentialResolver* cr=application.getCredentialResolver();
-
if (!cr && !encassertions.empty())
m_log.warn("found encrypted assertions, but no CredentialResolver was available");
saml2::Assertion* decrypted=NULL;
try {
Locker credlocker(cr);
- auto_ptr<XMLObject> wrapper((*ea)->decrypt(*cr, application.getXMLString("entityID").second, &cc));
+ auto_ptr<MetadataCredentialCriteria> mcc(
+ policy.getIssuerMetadata() ? new MetadataCredentialCriteria(*policy.getIssuerMetadata()) : NULL
+ );
+ auto_ptr<XMLObject> wrapper((*ea)->decrypt(*cr, application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getXMLString("entityID").second, mcc.get()));
decrypted = dynamic_cast<saml2::Assertion*>(wrapper.get());
if (decrypted) {
wrapper.release();
ownedtokens.push_back(decrypted);
+ if (m_log.isDebugEnabled())
+ m_log.debugStream() << "decrypted Assertion:" << logging::eol << *decrypted << logging::eol;
}
}
catch (exception& ex) {
if (!decrypted)
continue;
- // Skip unsigned assertion?
- if (!decrypted->getSignature() && flag.first && flag.second) {
- m_log.warn("found unsigned assertion in SAML response, ignoring it per signedAssertions policy");
- badtokens.push_back(decrypted);
- continue;
- }
-
try {
+ // Skip unsigned assertion?
+ if (!decrypted->getSignature() && flag.first && flag.second)
+ throw SecurityPolicyException("The incoming assertion was unsigned, violating local security policy.");
+
// We clear the security flag, so we can tell whether the token was secured on its own.
- policy.setSecure(false);
-
- // Run the policy over the assertion. Handles issuer consistency, replay, freshness,
- // and signature verification, assuming the relevant rules are configured.
+ policy.setAuthenticated(false);
+ policy.reset(true);
+
+ // Extract message bits and re-verify Issuer information.
+ extractMessageDetails(*decrypted, samlconstants::SAML20P_NS, policy);
+
+ // Run the policy over the assertion. Handles replay, freshness, and
+ // signature verification, assuming the relevant rules are configured.
// We have to marshall the object first to ensure signatures can be checked.
- decrypted->marshall();
+ if (!decrypted->getDOM())
+ decrypted->marshall();
policy.evaluate(*decrypted);
// If no security is in place now, we kick it.
- if (!alreadySecured && !policy.isSecure()) {
- m_log.warn("unable to establish security of assertion");
- badtokens.push_back(decrypted);
- continue;
- }
+ if (!alreadySecured && !policy.isAuthenticated())
+ throw SecurityPolicyException("Unable to establish security of incoming assertion.");
// Now do profile and core semantic validation to ensure we can use it for SSO.
+ BrowserSSOProfileValidator ssoValidator(
+ application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getXMLString("entityID").second, application.getAudiences(), now, dest.substr(0,dest.find('?')).c_str()
+ );
ssoValidator.validateAssertion(*decrypted);
// Address checking.
- try {
- if (ssoValidator.getAddress())
- checkAddress(application, httpRequest, ssoValidator.getAddress());
- }
- catch (exception& ex) {
- // We save off the message if there's no SSO statement yet.
- if (!ssoStatement)
- addressMismatch = ex.what();
- throw;
- }
+ checkAddress(application, httpRequest, ssoValidator.getAddress());
// Track it as a valid token.
tokens.push_back(decrypted);
// Save off the first valid SSO statement, but favor the "soonest" session expiration.
const vector<AuthnStatement*>& statements = const_cast<const saml2::Assertion*>(decrypted)->getAuthnStatements();
for (vector<AuthnStatement*>::const_iterator s = statements.begin(); s!=statements.end(); ++s) {
- if (!ssoStatement || (*s)->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() < ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch())
+ if (authnskew.first && authnskew.second && (*s)->getAuthnInstant() && (now - (*s)->getAuthnInstantEpoch() > authnskew.second))
+ contextualError = "The gap between now and the time you logged into your identity provider exceeds the limit.";
+ else if (!ssoStatement || (*s)->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() < ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch())
ssoStatement = *s;
}
}
catch (exception& ex) {
m_log.warn("detected a problem with assertion: %s", ex.what());
+ if (!ssoStatement)
+ contextualError = ex.what();
badtokens.push_back(decrypted);
}
}
if (!ssoStatement) {
for_each(ownedtokens.begin(), ownedtokens.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<saml2::Assertion>());
- if (addressMismatch.empty())
+ if (contextualError.empty())
throw FatalProfileException("A valid authentication statement was not found in the incoming message.");
- throw FatalProfileException(addressMismatch.c_str());
+ throw FatalProfileException(contextualError.c_str());
}
// May need to decrypt NameID.
m_log.warn("found encrypted NameID, but no decryption credential was available");
else {
Locker credlocker(cr);
+ auto_ptr<MetadataCredentialCriteria> mcc(
+ policy.getIssuerMetadata() ? new MetadataCredentialCriteria(*policy.getIssuerMetadata()) : NULL
+ );
try {
- auto_ptr<XMLObject> decryptedID(encname->decrypt(*cr,application.getXMLString("entityID").second,&cc));
+ auto_ptr<XMLObject> decryptedID(encname->decrypt(*cr,application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getXMLString("entityID").second,mcc.get()));
ssoName = dynamic_cast<NameID*>(decryptedID.get());
if (ssoName) {
ownedName = true;
decryptedID.release();
+ if (m_log.isDebugEnabled())
+ m_log.debugStream() << "decrypted NameID:" << logging::eol << *ssoName << logging::eol;
}
}
catch (exception& ex) {
m_log.debug("SSO profile processing completed successfully");
// We've successfully "accepted" at least one SSO token, along with any additional valid tokens.
- // To complete processing, we need to resolve attributes and then create the session.
+ // To complete processing, we need to extract and resolve attributes and then create the session.
+
+ // Now we have to extract the authentication details for session setup.
+
+ // Session expiration for SAML 2.0 is jointly IdP- and SP-driven.
+ time_t sessionExp = ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfter() ? ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() : 0;
+ pair<bool,unsigned int> lifetime = sessionProps ? sessionProps->getUnsignedInt("lifetime") : pair<bool,unsigned int>(true,28800);
+ if (!lifetime.first || lifetime.second == 0)
+ lifetime.second = 28800;
+ if (sessionExp == 0)
+ sessionExp = now + lifetime.second; // IdP says nothing, calulate based on SP.
+ else
+ sessionExp = min(sessionExp, now + lifetime.second); // Use the lowest.
+
+ const AuthnContext* authnContext = ssoStatement->getAuthnContext();
try {
- const EntityDescriptor* issuerMetadata = dynamic_cast<const EntityDescriptor*>(policy.getIssuerMetadata()->getParent());
+ // The context will handle deleting attributes and new tokens.
auto_ptr<ResolutionContext> ctx(
- resolveAttributes(application, httpRequest, issuerMetadata, ssoName, &tokens)
+ resolveAttributes(
+ application,
+ policy.getIssuerMetadata(),
+ samlconstants::SAML20P_NS,
+ NULL,
+ ssoName,
+ (authnContext && authnContext->getAuthnContextClassRef()) ? authnContext->getAuthnContextClassRef()->getReference() : NULL,
+ (authnContext && authnContext->getAuthnContextDeclRef()) ? authnContext->getAuthnContextDeclRef()->getReference() : NULL,
+ &tokens
+ )
);
- // Copy over any new tokens, but leave them in the context for cleanup.
- tokens.insert(tokens.end(), ctx->getResolvedAssertions().begin(), ctx->getResolvedAssertions().end());
+ if (ctx.get()) {
+ // Copy over any new tokens, but leave them in the context for cleanup.
+ tokens.insert(tokens.end(), ctx->getResolvedAssertions().begin(), ctx->getResolvedAssertions().end());
+ }
// Now merge in bad tokens for caching.
tokens.insert(tokens.end(), badtokens.begin(), badtokens.end());
- // Now we have to extract the authentication details for session setup.
-
- // Session expiration for SAML 2.0 is jointly IdP- and SP-driven.
- time_t sessionExp = ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfter() ? ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() : 0;
- const PropertySet* sessionProps = application.getPropertySet("Sessions");
- pair<bool,unsigned int> lifetime = sessionProps ? sessionProps->getUnsignedInt("lifetime") : make_pair(true,28800);
- if (!lifetime.first)
- lifetime.second = 28800;
- if (lifetime.second != 0) {
- if (sessionExp == 0)
- sessionExp = now + lifetime.second; // IdP says nothing, calulate based on SP.
- else
- sessionExp = min(sessionExp, now + lifetime.second); // Use the lowest.
- }
-
- // Other details...
- const AuthnContext* authnContext = ssoStatement->getAuthnContext();
- auto_ptr_char authnClass((authnContext && authnContext->getAuthnContextClassRef()) ? authnContext->getAuthnContextClassRef()->getReference() : NULL);
- auto_ptr_char authnDecl((authnContext && authnContext->getAuthnContextDeclRef()) ? authnContext->getAuthnContextDeclRef()->getReference() : NULL);
- auto_ptr_char index(ssoStatement->getSessionIndex());
- auto_ptr_char authnInstant(ssoStatement->getAuthnInstant() ? ssoStatement->getAuthnInstant()->getRawData() : NULL);
-
- vector<shibsp::Attribute*>& attrs = ctx->getResolvedAttributes();
- string key = application.getServiceProvider().getSessionCache()->insert(
- sessionExp,
+ application.getServiceProvider().getSessionCache()->insert(
application,
- httpRequest.getRemoteAddr().c_str(),
- issuerMetadata,
+ httpRequest,
+ httpResponse,
+ sessionExp,
+ entity,
+ samlconstants::SAML20P_NS,
ssoName,
- authnInstant.get(),
- index.get(),
- authnClass.get(),
- authnDecl.get(),
+ ssoStatement->getAuthnInstant() ? ssoStatement->getAuthnInstant()->getRawData() : NULL,
+ ssoStatement->getSessionIndex(),
+ (authnContext && authnContext->getAuthnContextClassRef()) ? authnContext->getAuthnContextClassRef()->getReference() : NULL,
+ (authnContext && authnContext->getAuthnContextDeclRef()) ? authnContext->getAuthnContextDeclRef()->getReference() : NULL,
&tokens,
- &attrs
+ ctx.get() ? &ctx->getResolvedAttributes() : NULL
);
- attrs.clear(); // Attributes are owned by cache now.
if (ownedName)
delete ssoName;
for_each(ownedtokens.begin(), ownedtokens.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<saml2::Assertion>());
-
- return key;
}
catch (exception&) {
if (ownedName)
throw;
}
}
+
+#endif
projects / shibboleth / sp.git / blobdiff