/*
- * Copyright 2001-2007 Internet2
- *
+ * Copyright 2001-2010 Internet2
+ *
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
/**
* SAML2Consumer.cpp
- *
- * SAML 2.0 assertion consumer service
+ *
+ * SAML 2.0 assertion consumer service.
*/
#include "internal.h"
#include "handler/AssertionConsumerService.h"
#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
-# include "exceptions.h"
# include "Application.h"
# include "ServiceProvider.h"
# include "SessionCache.h"
# include "attribute/resolver/ResolutionContext.h"
+# include <saml/exceptions.h>
+# include <saml/SAMLConfig.h>
+# include <saml/binding/SecurityPolicyRule.h>
# include <saml/saml2/core/Protocols.h>
-# include <saml/saml2/profile/BrowserSSOProfileValidator.h>
# include <saml/saml2/metadata/Metadata.h>
# include <saml/saml2/metadata/MetadataCredentialCriteria.h>
+# include <saml/saml2/profile/SAML2AssertionPolicy.h>
+# include <xmltooling/XMLToolingConfig.h>
+# include <xmltooling/io/HTTPRequest.h>
+# include <xmltooling/util/DateTime.h>
using namespace opensaml::saml2;
using namespace opensaml::saml2p;
using namespace opensaml::saml2md;
#pragma warning( push )
#pragma warning( disable : 4250 )
#endif
-
+
class SHIBSP_DLLLOCAL SAML2Consumer : public AssertionConsumerService
{
public:
SAML2Consumer(const DOMElement* e, const char* appId)
: AssertionConsumerService(e, appId, Category::getInstance(SHIBSP_LOGCAT".SSO.SAML2")) {
+#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
+ m_ssoRule = nullptr;
+ if (SPConfig::getConfig().isEnabled(SPConfig::OutOfProcess))
+ m_ssoRule = SAMLConfig::getConfig().SecurityPolicyRuleManager.newPlugin(BEARER_POLICY_RULE, e);
+#endif
}
- virtual ~SAML2Consumer() {}
-
- private:
+ virtual ~SAML2Consumer() {
#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
- string implementProtocol(
+ delete m_ssoRule;
+#endif
+ }
+
+#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
+ void generateMetadata(SPSSODescriptor& role, const char* handlerURL) const {
+ AssertionConsumerService::generateMetadata(role, handlerURL);
+ role.addSupport(samlconstants::SAML20P_NS);
+ }
+
+ private:
+ void implementProtocol(
const Application& application,
const HTTPRequest& httpRequest,
+ HTTPResponse& httpResponse,
SecurityPolicy& policy,
const PropertySet* settings,
const XMLObject& xmlObject
) const;
+
+ SecurityPolicyRule* m_ssoRule;
#endif
};
{
return new SAML2Consumer(p.first, p.second);
}
-
+
+#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
+ class SHIBSP_DLLLOCAL _rulenamed : std::unary_function<const SecurityPolicyRule*,bool>
+ {
+ public:
+ _rulenamed(const char* name) : m_name(name) {}
+ bool operator()(const SecurityPolicyRule* rule) const {
+ return rule ? !strcmp(m_name, rule->getType()) : false;
+ }
+ private:
+ const char* m_name;
+ };
+#endif
};
#ifndef SHIBSP_LITE
-string SAML2Consumer::implementProtocol(
+void SAML2Consumer::implementProtocol(
const Application& application,
const HTTPRequest& httpRequest,
+ HTTPResponse& httpResponse,
SecurityPolicy& policy,
const PropertySet* settings,
const XMLObject& xmlObject
// Remember whether we already established trust.
// None of the SAML 2 bindings require security at the protocol layer.
- bool alreadySecured = policy.isSecure();
+ bool alreadySecured = policy.isAuthenticated();
// Check for errors...this will throw if it's not a successful message.
- checkError(&xmlObject);
+ checkError(&xmlObject, policy.getIssuerMetadata());
const Response* response = dynamic_cast<const Response*>(&xmlObject);
if (!response)
throw FatalProfileException("Incoming message contained no SAML assertions.");
// Maintain list of "legit" tokens to feed to SP subsystems.
- const Subject* ssoSubject=NULL;
- const AuthnStatement* ssoStatement=NULL;
+ const Subject* ssoSubject=nullptr;
+ const AuthnStatement* ssoStatement=nullptr;
vector<const opensaml::Assertion*> tokens;
// Also track "bad" tokens that we'll cache but not use.
// And also track "owned" tokens that we decrypt here.
vector<saml2::Assertion*> ownedtokens;
- // Profile validator.
- time_t now = time(NULL);
- string dest = httpRequest.getRequestURL();
- BrowserSSOProfileValidator ssoValidator(application.getAudiences(), now, dest.substr(0,dest.find('?')).c_str());
-
// With this flag on, we ignore any unsigned assertions.
- pair<bool,bool> flag = settings->getBool("signedAssertions");
+ const EntityDescriptor* entity = nullptr;
+ pair<bool,bool> flag = make_pair(false,false);
+ if (alreadySecured && policy.getIssuerMetadata()) {
+ entity = dynamic_cast<const EntityDescriptor*>(policy.getIssuerMetadata()->getParent());
+ flag = application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getBool("requireSignedAssertions");
+ }
- // Saves off IP-mismatch error message because it's potentially helpful for users.
- string addressMismatch;
+ // authnskew allows rejection of SSO if AuthnInstant is too old.
+ const PropertySet* sessionProps = application.getPropertySet("Sessions");
+ pair<bool,unsigned int> authnskew = sessionProps ? sessionProps->getUnsignedInt("maxTimeSinceAuthn") : pair<bool,unsigned int>(false,0);
- for (vector<saml2::Assertion*>::const_iterator a = assertions.begin(); a!=assertions.end(); ++a) {
- // Skip unsigned assertion?
- if (!(*a)->getSignature() && flag.first && flag.second) {
- m_log.warn("found unsigned assertion in SAML response, ignoring it per signedAssertions policy");
- badtokens.push_back(*a);
- continue;
- }
+ // Saves off error messages potentially helpful for users.
+ string contextualError;
+
+ // Ensure the Bearer rule is in the policy set.
+ if (find_if(policy.getRules(), _rulenamed(BEARER_POLICY_RULE)) == nullptr)
+ policy.getRules().push_back(m_ssoRule);
+ // Populate recipient as audience.
+ policy.getAudiences().push_back(application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getXMLString("entityID").second);
+
+ time_t now = time(nullptr);
+ for (vector<saml2::Assertion*>::const_iterator a = assertions.begin(); a!=assertions.end(); ++a) {
try {
+ // Skip unsigned assertion?
+ if (!(*a)->getSignature() && flag.first && flag.second)
+ throw SecurityPolicyException("The incoming assertion was unsigned, violating local security policy.");
+
// We clear the security flag, so we can tell whether the token was secured on its own.
- policy.setSecure(false);
-
- // Run the policy over the assertion. Handles issuer consistency, replay, freshness,
- // and signature verification, assuming the relevant rules are configured.
- policy.evaluate(*(*a));
-
+ policy.setAuthenticated(false);
+ policy.reset(true);
+
+ // Extract message bits and re-verify Issuer information.
+ extractMessageDetails(*(*a), samlconstants::SAML20P_NS, policy);
+
+ // Run the policy over the assertion. Handles replay, freshness, and
+ // signature verification, assuming the relevant rules are configured,
+ // along with condition and profile enforcement.
+ policy.evaluate(*(*a), &httpRequest);
+
// If no security is in place now, we kick it.
- if (!alreadySecured && !policy.isSecure()) {
- m_log.warn("unable to establish security of assertion");
- badtokens.push_back(*a);
- continue;
+ if (!alreadySecured && !policy.isAuthenticated())
+ throw SecurityPolicyException("Unable to establish security of incoming assertion.");
+
+ // If we hadn't established Issuer yet, redo the signedAssertions check.
+ if (!entity && policy.getIssuerMetadata()) {
+ entity = dynamic_cast<const EntityDescriptor*>(policy.getIssuerMetadata()->getParent());
+ flag = application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getBool("requireSignedAssertions");
+ if (!(*a)->getSignature() && flag.first && flag.second)
+ throw SecurityPolicyException("The incoming assertion was unsigned, violating local security policy.");
}
- // Now do profile and core semantic validation to ensure we can use it for SSO.
- ssoValidator.validateAssertion(*(*a));
-
// Address checking.
- try {
- if (ssoValidator.getAddress())
- checkAddress(application, httpRequest, ssoValidator.getAddress());
- }
- catch (exception& ex) {
- // We save off the message if there's no SSO statement yet.
- if (!ssoStatement)
- addressMismatch = ex.what();
- throw;
+ SubjectConfirmationData* subcondata = dynamic_cast<SubjectConfirmationData*>(
+ dynamic_cast<SAML2AssertionPolicy&>(policy).getSubjectConfirmation()->getSubjectConfirmationData()
+ );
+ if (subcondata && subcondata->getAddress()) {
+ auto_ptr_char boundip(subcondata->getAddress());
+ checkAddress(application, httpRequest, boundip.get());
}
// Track it as a valid token.
// Save off the first valid SSO statement, but favor the "soonest" session expiration.
const vector<AuthnStatement*>& statements = const_cast<const saml2::Assertion*>(*a)->getAuthnStatements();
for (vector<AuthnStatement*>::const_iterator s = statements.begin(); s!=statements.end(); ++s) {
- if (!ssoStatement || (*s)->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() < ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch())
+ if (authnskew.first && authnskew.second && (*s)->getAuthnInstant() && (now - (*s)->getAuthnInstantEpoch() > authnskew.second))
+ contextualError = "The gap between now and the time you logged into your identity provider exceeds the limit.";
+ else if (!ssoStatement || (*s)->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() < ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch())
ssoStatement = *s;
}
}
catch (exception& ex) {
m_log.warn("detected a problem with assertion: %s", ex.what());
+ if (!ssoStatement)
+ contextualError = ex.what();
badtokens.push_back(*a);
}
}
for (vector<saml2::EncryptedAssertion*>::const_iterator ea = encassertions.begin(); cr && ea!=encassertions.end(); ++ea) {
// Attempt to decrypt it.
- saml2::Assertion* decrypted=NULL;
+ saml2::Assertion* decrypted=nullptr;
try {
Locker credlocker(cr);
auto_ptr<MetadataCredentialCriteria> mcc(
- policy.getIssuerMetadata() ? new MetadataCredentialCriteria(*policy.getIssuerMetadata()) : NULL
+ policy.getIssuerMetadata() ? new MetadataCredentialCriteria(*policy.getIssuerMetadata()) : nullptr
);
- auto_ptr<XMLObject> wrapper((*ea)->decrypt(*cr, application.getXMLString("entityID").second, mcc.get()));
+ auto_ptr<XMLObject> wrapper((*ea)->decrypt(*cr, application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getXMLString("entityID").second, mcc.get()));
decrypted = dynamic_cast<saml2::Assertion*>(wrapper.get());
if (decrypted) {
wrapper.release();
ownedtokens.push_back(decrypted);
+ if (m_log.isDebugEnabled())
+ m_log.debugStream() << "decrypted Assertion: " << *decrypted << logging::eol;
}
}
catch (exception& ex) {
if (!decrypted)
continue;
- // Skip unsigned assertion?
- if (!decrypted->getSignature() && flag.first && flag.second) {
- m_log.warn("found unsigned assertion in SAML response, ignoring it per signedAssertions policy");
- badtokens.push_back(decrypted);
- continue;
- }
-
try {
// We clear the security flag, so we can tell whether the token was secured on its own.
- policy.setSecure(false);
-
- // Run the policy over the assertion. Handles issuer consistency, replay, freshness,
- // and signature verification, assuming the relevant rules are configured.
+ policy.setAuthenticated(false);
+ policy.reset(true);
+
+ // Extract message bits and re-verify Issuer information.
+ extractMessageDetails(*decrypted, samlconstants::SAML20P_NS, policy);
+
+ // Run the policy over the assertion. Handles replay, freshness, and
+ // signature verification, assuming the relevant rules are configured,
+ // along with condition and profile enforcement.
// We have to marshall the object first to ensure signatures can be checked.
- policy.evaluate(*decrypted);
-
+ if (!decrypted->getDOM())
+ decrypted->marshall();
+ policy.evaluate(*decrypted, &httpRequest);
+
// If no security is in place now, we kick it.
- if (!alreadySecured && !policy.isSecure()) {
- m_log.warn("unable to establish security of assertion");
- badtokens.push_back(decrypted);
- continue;
+ if (!alreadySecured && !policy.isAuthenticated())
+ throw SecurityPolicyException("Unable to establish security of incoming assertion.");
+
+ // If we hadn't established Issuer yet, redo the signedAssertions check.
+ if (!entity && policy.getIssuerMetadata()) {
+ entity = dynamic_cast<const EntityDescriptor*>(policy.getIssuerMetadata()->getParent());
+ flag = application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getBool("requireSignedAssertions");
+ if (!decrypted->getSignature() && flag.first && flag.second)
+ throw SecurityPolicyException("The decrypted assertion was unsigned, violating local security policy.");
}
- // Now do profile and core semantic validation to ensure we can use it for SSO.
- ssoValidator.validateAssertion(*decrypted);
-
// Address checking.
- try {
- if (ssoValidator.getAddress())
- checkAddress(application, httpRequest, ssoValidator.getAddress());
- }
- catch (exception& ex) {
- // We save off the message if there's no SSO statement yet.
- if (!ssoStatement)
- addressMismatch = ex.what();
- throw;
+ SubjectConfirmationData* subcondata = dynamic_cast<SubjectConfirmationData*>(
+ dynamic_cast<SAML2AssertionPolicy&>(policy).getSubjectConfirmation()->getSubjectConfirmationData()
+ );
+ if (subcondata && subcondata->getAddress()) {
+ auto_ptr_char boundip(subcondata->getAddress());
+ checkAddress(application, httpRequest, boundip.get());
}
// Track it as a valid token.
// Save off the first valid SSO statement, but favor the "soonest" session expiration.
const vector<AuthnStatement*>& statements = const_cast<const saml2::Assertion*>(decrypted)->getAuthnStatements();
for (vector<AuthnStatement*>::const_iterator s = statements.begin(); s!=statements.end(); ++s) {
- if (!ssoStatement || (*s)->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() < ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch())
+ if (authnskew.first && authnskew.second && (*s)->getAuthnInstant() && (now - (*s)->getAuthnInstantEpoch() > authnskew.second))
+ contextualError = "The gap between now and the time you logged into your identity provider exceeds the limit.";
+ else if (!ssoStatement || (*s)->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() < ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch())
ssoStatement = *s;
}
}
catch (exception& ex) {
m_log.warn("detected a problem with assertion: %s", ex.what());
+ if (!ssoStatement)
+ contextualError = ex.what();
badtokens.push_back(decrypted);
}
}
if (!ssoStatement) {
for_each(ownedtokens.begin(), ownedtokens.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<saml2::Assertion>());
- if (addressMismatch.empty())
+ if (contextualError.empty())
throw FatalProfileException("A valid authentication statement was not found in the incoming message.");
- throw FatalProfileException(addressMismatch.c_str());
+ throw FatalProfileException(contextualError.c_str());
}
// May need to decrypt NameID.
else {
Locker credlocker(cr);
auto_ptr<MetadataCredentialCriteria> mcc(
- policy.getIssuerMetadata() ? new MetadataCredentialCriteria(*policy.getIssuerMetadata()) : NULL
+ policy.getIssuerMetadata() ? new MetadataCredentialCriteria(*policy.getIssuerMetadata()) : nullptr
);
try {
- auto_ptr<XMLObject> decryptedID(encname->decrypt(*cr,application.getXMLString("entityID").second,mcc.get()));
+ auto_ptr<XMLObject> decryptedID(encname->decrypt(*cr,application.getRelyingParty(entity)->getXMLString("entityID").second,mcc.get()));
ssoName = dynamic_cast<NameID*>(decryptedID.get());
if (ssoName) {
ownedName = true;
decryptedID.release();
+ if (m_log.isDebugEnabled())
+ m_log.debugStream() << "decrypted NameID: " << *ssoName << logging::eol;
}
}
catch (exception& ex) {
// Now we have to extract the authentication details for session setup.
// Session expiration for SAML 2.0 is jointly IdP- and SP-driven.
- time_t sessionExp = ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfter() ? ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() : 0;
- const PropertySet* sessionProps = application.getPropertySet("Sessions");
+ time_t sessionExp = ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfter() ?
+ (ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() + XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().clock_skew_secs) : 0;
pair<bool,unsigned int> lifetime = sessionProps ? sessionProps->getUnsignedInt("lifetime") : pair<bool,unsigned int>(true,28800);
if (!lifetime.first || lifetime.second == 0)
lifetime.second = 28800;
application,
policy.getIssuerMetadata(),
samlconstants::SAML20P_NS,
- NULL,
+ nullptr,
ssoName,
- (authnContext && authnContext->getAuthnContextClassRef()) ? authnContext->getAuthnContextClassRef()->getReference() : NULL,
- (authnContext && authnContext->getAuthnContextDeclRef()) ? authnContext->getAuthnContextDeclRef()->getReference() : NULL,
+ (authnContext && authnContext->getAuthnContextClassRef()) ? authnContext->getAuthnContextClassRef()->getReference() : nullptr,
+ (authnContext && authnContext->getAuthnContextDeclRef()) ? authnContext->getAuthnContextDeclRef()->getReference() : nullptr,
&tokens
)
);
// Now merge in bad tokens for caching.
tokens.insert(tokens.end(), badtokens.begin(), badtokens.end());
- string key = application.getServiceProvider().getSessionCache()->insert(
- sessionExp,
+ application.getServiceProvider().getSessionCache()->insert(
application,
- httpRequest.getRemoteAddr().c_str(),
- policy.getIssuerMetadata() ? dynamic_cast<const EntityDescriptor*>(policy.getIssuerMetadata()->getParent()) : NULL,
+ httpRequest,
+ httpResponse,
+ sessionExp,
+ entity,
samlconstants::SAML20P_NS,
ssoName,
- ssoStatement->getAuthnInstant() ? ssoStatement->getAuthnInstant()->getRawData() : NULL,
+ ssoStatement->getAuthnInstant() ? ssoStatement->getAuthnInstant()->getRawData() : nullptr,
ssoStatement->getSessionIndex(),
- (authnContext && authnContext->getAuthnContextClassRef()) ? authnContext->getAuthnContextClassRef()->getReference() : NULL,
- (authnContext && authnContext->getAuthnContextDeclRef()) ? authnContext->getAuthnContextDeclRef()->getReference() : NULL,
+ (authnContext && authnContext->getAuthnContextClassRef()) ? authnContext->getAuthnContextClassRef()->getReference() : nullptr,
+ (authnContext && authnContext->getAuthnContextDeclRef()) ? authnContext->getAuthnContextDeclRef()->getReference() : nullptr,
&tokens,
- ctx.get() ? &ctx->getResolvedAttributes() : NULL
+ ctx.get() ? &ctx->getResolvedAttributes() : nullptr
);
if (ownedName)
delete ssoName;
for_each(ownedtokens.begin(), ownedtokens.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<saml2::Assertion>());
- return key;
}
catch (exception&) {
if (ownedName)
projects / shibboleth / sp.git / blobdiff