+//#define BUILTIN_EAP
+
+#ifdef BUILTIN_EAP
+#define EAP_KEY_AVAILABLE(ctx) ((ctx)->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapKeyAvailable)
+#define EAP_KEY_DATA(ctx) ((ctx)->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapKeyData)
+#define EAP_KEY_LENGTH(ctx) ((ctx)->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapKeyDataLen)
+#else
+#define EAP_KEY_AVAILABLE(ctx) 0
+#define EAP_KEY_DATA(ctx) NULL
+#define EAP_KEY_LENGTH(ctx) 0
+#endif /* BUILTIN_EAP */
+
+/*
+ * Mark a context as ready for cryptographic operations
+ */
+static OM_uint32
+acceptReady(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major;
+
+ /* Cache encryption type derived from selected mechanism OID */
+ major = gssEapOidToEnctype(minor, ctx->mechanismUsed, &ctx->encryptionType);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ if (ctx->encryptionType != ENCTYPE_NULL &&
+ EAP_KEY_AVAILABLE(ctx)) {
+ major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor,
+ EAP_KEY_DATA(ctx),
+ EAP_KEY_LENGTH(ctx),
+ ctx->encryptionType,
+ &ctx->rfc3961Key);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
+ &ctx->checksumType);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * draft-howlett-eap-gss says that integrity/confidentialty should
+ * always be advertised as available, but if we have no keying
+ * material it seems confusing to the caller to advertise this.
+ */
+ ctx->gssFlags &= ~(GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG);
+ }
+
+ major = sequenceInit(minor,
+ &ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq,
+ ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) != 0),
+ ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG) != 0),
+ TRUE);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}