6 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
7 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
8 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
9 * (at your option) any later version.
11 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
12 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
14 * GNU General Public License for more details.
16 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
17 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
18 * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
20 * Copyright 2001 hereUare Communications, Inc. <raghud@hereuare.com>
21 * Copyright 2003 Alan DeKok <aland@freeradius.org>
22 * Copyright 2006 The FreeRADIUS server project
25 #include <freeradius-devel/ident.h>
28 #include <freeradius-devel/autoconf.h>
29 #include <freeradius-devel/radiusd.h>
30 #include <freeradius-devel/process.h>
31 #include <freeradius-devel/rad_assert.h>
33 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
38 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_RAND_H
39 #include <openssl/rand.h>
42 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
43 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
47 #define PTHREAD_MUTEX_LOCK pthread_mutex_lock
48 #define PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK pthread_mutex_unlock
50 #define PTHREAD_MUTEX_LOCK(_x)
51 #define PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(_x)
56 static void record_init(record_t *buf);
57 static void record_close(record_t *buf);
58 static unsigned int record_plus(record_t *buf, const void *ptr,
60 static unsigned int record_minus(record_t *buf, void *ptr,
63 tls_session_t *tls_new_client_session(fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf, int fd)
66 tls_session_t *ssn = NULL;
68 ssn = (tls_session_t *) malloc(sizeof(*ssn));
69 memset(ssn, 0, sizeof(*ssn));
72 ssn->ssl = SSL_new(ssn->ctx);
73 rad_assert(ssn->ssl != NULL);
76 * Add the message callback to identify what type of
77 * message/handshake is passed
79 SSL_set_msg_callback(ssn->ssl, cbtls_msg);
80 SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssn->ssl, ssn);
81 SSL_set_info_callback(ssn->ssl, cbtls_info);
84 * Always verify the peer certificate.
86 DEBUG2("Requiring Server certificate");
87 verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
88 verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT;
89 SSL_set_verify(ssn->ssl, verify_mode, cbtls_verify);
91 SSL_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF, (void *)conf);
92 SSL_set_fd(ssn->ssl, fd);
93 if (SSL_connect(ssn->ssl) <= 0) {
95 while ((err = ERR_get_error())) {
96 DEBUG("OpenSSL Err says %s",
97 ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
106 tls_session_t *tls_new_session(fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf, REQUEST *request,
109 tls_session_t *state = NULL;
115 * Manually flush the sessions every so often. If HALF
116 * of the session lifetime has passed since we last
117 * flushed, then flush it again.
119 * FIXME: Also do it every N sessions?
121 if (conf->session_cache_enable &&
122 ((conf->session_last_flushed + (conf->session_timeout * 1800)) <= request->timestamp)){
123 RDEBUG2("Flushing SSL sessions (of #%ld)",
124 SSL_CTX_sess_number(conf->ctx));
126 SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(conf->ctx, request->timestamp);
127 conf->session_last_flushed = request->timestamp;
130 if ((new_tls = SSL_new(conf->ctx)) == NULL) {
131 radlog(L_ERR, "SSL: Error creating new SSL: %s",
132 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
136 /* We use the SSL's "app_data" to indicate a call-back */
137 SSL_set_app_data(new_tls, NULL);
139 state = (tls_session_t *)malloc(sizeof(*state));
140 memset(state, 0, sizeof(*state));
143 state->ctx = conf->ctx;
144 state->ssl = new_tls;
147 * Initialize callbacks
149 state->record_init = record_init;
150 state->record_close = record_close;
151 state->record_plus = record_plus;
152 state->record_minus = record_minus;
155 * Create & hook the BIOs to handle the dirty side of the
156 * SSL. This is *very important* as we want to handle
157 * the transmission part. Now the only IO interface
158 * that SSL is aware of, is our defined BIO buffers.
160 * This means that all SSL IO is done to/from memory,
161 * and we can update those BIOs from the packets we've
164 state->into_ssl = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
165 state->from_ssl = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
166 SSL_set_bio(state->ssl, state->into_ssl, state->from_ssl);
169 * Add the message callback to identify what type of
170 * message/handshake is passed
172 SSL_set_msg_callback(new_tls, cbtls_msg);
173 SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(new_tls, state);
174 SSL_set_info_callback(new_tls, cbtls_info);
177 * In Server mode we only accept.
179 SSL_set_accept_state(state->ssl);
182 * Verify the peer certificate, if asked.
185 RDEBUG2("Requiring client certificate");
186 verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
187 verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT;
188 verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
190 SSL_set_verify(state->ssl, verify_mode, cbtls_verify);
192 SSL_set_ex_data(state->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF, (void *)conf);
193 state->length_flag = conf->include_length;
196 * We use default fragment size, unless the Framed-MTU
197 * tells us it's too big. Note that we do NOT account
198 * for the EAP-TLS headers if conf->fragment_size is
199 * large, because that config item looks to be confusing.
201 * i.e. it should REALLY be called MTU, and the code here
202 * should figure out what that means for TLS fragment size.
203 * asking the administrator to know the internal details
204 * of EAP-TLS in order to calculate fragment sizes is
207 state->offset = conf->fragment_size;
208 vp = pairfind(request->packet->vps, PW_FRAMED_MTU, 0);
209 if (vp && (vp->vp_integer > 100) && (vp->vp_integer < state->offset)) {
210 state->offset = vp->vp_integer;
213 if (conf->session_cache_enable) {
214 state->allow_session_resumption = 1; /* otherwise it's zero */
223 * Print out some text describing the error.
225 static int int_ssl_check(REQUEST *request, SSL *s, int ret, const char *text)
230 if ((l = ERR_get_error()) != 0) {
231 const char *p = ERR_error_string(l, NULL);
234 radlog(L_ERR, "SSL error %s", p);
237 vp = pairmake("Module-Failure-Message", p, T_OP_ADD);
238 if (vp) pairadd(&request->packet->vps, vp);
241 e = SSL_get_error(s, ret);
245 * These seem to be harmless and already "dealt
246 * with" by our non-blocking environment. NB:
247 * "ZERO_RETURN" is the clean "error"
248 * indicating a successfully closed SSL
249 * tunnel. We let this happen because our IO
250 * loop should not appear to have broken on
251 * this condition - and outside the IO loop, the
252 * "shutdown" state is checked.
254 * Don't print anything if we ignore the error.
257 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
258 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
259 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
260 case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
264 * These seem to be indications of a genuine
265 * error that should result in the SSL tunnel
266 * being regarded as "dead".
268 case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
269 radlog(L_ERR, "SSL: %s failed in a system call (%d), TLS session fails.",
274 radlog(L_ERR, "SSL: %s failed inside of TLS (%d), TLS session fails.",
280 * For any other errors that (a) exist, and (b)
281 * crop up - we need to interpret what to do with
282 * them - so "politely inform" the caller that
283 * the code needs updating here.
285 radlog(L_ERR, "SSL: FATAL SSL error ..... %d\n", e);
293 * We are the server, we always get the dirty data
294 * (Handshake data is also considered as dirty data)
295 * During handshake, since SSL API handles itself,
296 * After clean-up, dirty_out will be filled with
297 * the data required for handshaking. So we check
298 * if dirty_out is empty then we simply send it back.
299 * As of now, if handshake is successful, then we keep going,
302 * Fill the Bio with the dirty data to clean it
303 * Get the cleaned data from SSL, if it is not Handshake data
305 int tls_handshake_recv(REQUEST *request, tls_session_t *ssn)
309 err = BIO_write(ssn->into_ssl, ssn->dirty_in.data, ssn->dirty_in.used);
310 if (err != (int) ssn->dirty_in.used) {
311 RDEBUG("Failed writing %d to SSL BIO: %d", ssn->dirty_in.used,
313 record_init(&ssn->dirty_in);
316 record_init(&ssn->dirty_in);
318 err = SSL_read(ssn->ssl, ssn->clean_out.data + ssn->clean_out.used,
319 sizeof(ssn->clean_out.data) - ssn->clean_out.used);
321 ssn->clean_out.used += err;
325 if (!int_ssl_check(request, ssn->ssl, err, "SSL_read")) {
329 /* Some Extra STATE information for easy debugging */
330 if (SSL_is_init_finished(ssn->ssl)) {
331 DEBUG2("SSL Connection Established\n");
333 if (SSL_in_init(ssn->ssl)) {
334 DEBUG2("In SSL Handshake Phase\n");
336 if (SSL_in_before(ssn->ssl)) {
337 DEBUG2("Before SSL Handshake Phase\n");
339 if (SSL_in_accept_init(ssn->ssl)) {
340 DEBUG2("In SSL Accept mode \n");
342 if (SSL_in_connect_init(ssn->ssl)) {
343 DEBUG2("In SSL Connect mode \n");
346 err = BIO_ctrl_pending(ssn->from_ssl);
348 err = BIO_read(ssn->from_ssl, ssn->dirty_out.data,
349 sizeof(ssn->dirty_out.data));
351 ssn->dirty_out.used = err;
353 } else if (BIO_should_retry(ssn->from_ssl)) {
354 record_init(&ssn->dirty_in);
355 DEBUG2(" tls: Asking for more data in tunnel");
359 int_ssl_check(request, ssn->ssl, err, "BIO_read");
360 record_init(&ssn->dirty_in);
364 DEBUG2("SSL Application Data");
365 /* Its clean application data, do whatever we want */
366 record_init(&ssn->clean_out);
369 /* We are done with dirty_in, reinitialize it */
370 record_init(&ssn->dirty_in);
375 * Take clear-text user data, and encrypt it into the output buffer,
376 * to send to the client at the other end of the SSL connection.
378 int tls_handshake_send(REQUEST *request, tls_session_t *ssn)
383 * If there's un-encrypted data in 'clean_in', then write
384 * that data to the SSL session, and then call the BIO function
385 * to get that encrypted data from the SSL session, into
386 * a buffer which we can then package into an EAP packet.
388 * Based on Server's logic this clean_in is expected to
389 * contain the data to send to the client.
391 if (ssn->clean_in.used > 0) {
394 written = SSL_write(ssn->ssl, ssn->clean_in.data, ssn->clean_in.used);
395 record_minus(&ssn->clean_in, NULL, written);
397 /* Get the dirty data from Bio to send it */
398 err = BIO_read(ssn->from_ssl, ssn->dirty_out.data,
399 sizeof(ssn->dirty_out.data));
401 ssn->dirty_out.used = err;
403 int_ssl_check(request, ssn->ssl, err, "handshake_send");
410 void session_init(tls_session_t *ssn)
413 ssn->into_ssl = ssn->from_ssl = NULL;
414 record_init(&ssn->clean_in);
415 record_init(&ssn->clean_out);
416 record_init(&ssn->dirty_in);
417 record_init(&ssn->dirty_out);
419 memset(&ssn->info, 0, sizeof(ssn->info));
423 ssn->tls_msg_len = 0;
424 ssn->length_flag = 0;
426 ssn->free_opaque = NULL;
429 void session_close(tls_session_t *ssn)
431 SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(ssn->ssl, 1);
432 SSL_shutdown(ssn->ssl);
437 record_close(&ssn->clean_in);
438 record_close(&ssn->clean_out);
439 record_close(&ssn->dirty_in);
440 record_close(&ssn->dirty_out);
444 void session_free(void *ssn)
446 tls_session_t *sess = (tls_session_t *)ssn;
451 * Free any opaque TTLS or PEAP data.
453 if ((sess->opaque) && (sess->free_opaque)) {
454 sess->free_opaque(sess->opaque);
463 static void record_init(record_t *rec)
468 static void record_close(record_t *rec)
475 * Copy data to the intermediate buffer, before we send
478 static unsigned int record_plus(record_t *rec, const void *ptr,
481 unsigned int added = MAX_RECORD_SIZE - rec->used;
487 memcpy(rec->data + rec->used, ptr, added);
493 * Take data from the buffer, and give it to the caller.
495 static unsigned int record_minus(record_t *rec, void *ptr,
498 unsigned int taken = rec->used;
505 memcpy(ptr, rec->data, taken);
509 * This is pretty bad...
512 memmove(rec->data, rec->data + taken, rec->used);
516 void tls_session_information(tls_session_t *tls_session)
518 const char *str_write_p, *str_version, *str_content_type = "";
519 const char *str_details1 = "", *str_details2= "";
523 * Don't print this out in the normal course of
526 if (debug_flag == 0) {
530 str_write_p = tls_session->info.origin ? ">>>" : "<<<";
532 switch (tls_session->info.version)
535 str_version = "SSL 2.0";
538 str_version = "SSL 3.0 ";
541 str_version = "TLS 1.0 ";
544 str_version = "Unknown TLS version";
548 if (tls_session->info.version == SSL3_VERSION ||
549 tls_session->info.version == TLS1_VERSION) {
550 switch (tls_session->info.content_type) {
551 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
552 str_content_type = "ChangeCipherSpec";
555 str_content_type = "Alert";
557 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
558 str_content_type = "Handshake";
560 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
561 str_content_type = "ApplicationData";
564 str_content_type = "UnknownContentType";
568 if (tls_session->info.content_type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
569 str_details1 = ", ???";
571 if (tls_session->info.record_len == 2) {
573 switch (tls_session->info.alert_level) {
574 case SSL3_AL_WARNING:
575 str_details1 = ", warning";
578 str_details1 = ", fatal";
582 str_details2 = " ???";
583 switch (tls_session->info.alert_description) {
584 case SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
585 str_details2 = " close_notify";
587 case SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
588 str_details2 = " unexpected_message";
590 case SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
591 str_details2 = " bad_record_mac";
593 case TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
594 str_details2 = " decryption_failed";
596 case TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
597 str_details2 = " record_overflow";
599 case SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
600 str_details2 = " decompression_failure";
602 case SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
603 str_details2 = " handshake_failure";
605 case SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
606 str_details2 = " bad_certificate";
608 case SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
609 str_details2 = " unsupported_certificate";
611 case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
612 str_details2 = " certificate_revoked";
614 case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
615 str_details2 = " certificate_expired";
617 case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
618 str_details2 = " certificate_unknown";
620 case SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
621 str_details2 = " illegal_parameter";
623 case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
624 str_details2 = " unknown_ca";
626 case TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
627 str_details2 = " access_denied";
629 case TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
630 str_details2 = " decode_error";
632 case TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
633 str_details2 = " decrypt_error";
635 case TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
636 str_details2 = " export_restriction";
638 case TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
639 str_details2 = " protocol_version";
641 case TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
642 str_details2 = " insufficient_security";
644 case TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
645 str_details2 = " internal_error";
647 case TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
648 str_details2 = " user_canceled";
650 case TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
651 str_details2 = " no_renegotiation";
657 if (tls_session->info.content_type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
658 str_details1 = "???";
660 if (tls_session->info.record_len > 0)
661 switch (tls_session->info.handshake_type)
663 case SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST:
664 str_details1 = ", HelloRequest";
666 case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO:
667 str_details1 = ", ClientHello";
669 case SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO:
670 str_details1 = ", ServerHello";
672 case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE:
673 str_details1 = ", Certificate";
675 case SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
676 str_details1 = ", ServerKeyExchange";
678 case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
679 str_details1 = ", CertificateRequest";
681 case SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE:
682 str_details1 = ", ServerHelloDone";
684 case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
685 str_details1 = ", CertificateVerify";
687 case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
688 str_details1 = ", ClientKeyExchange";
690 case SSL3_MT_FINISHED:
691 str_details1 = ", Finished";
697 snprintf(tls_session->info.info_description,
698 sizeof(tls_session->info.info_description),
699 "%s %s%s [length %04lx]%s%s\n",
700 str_write_p, str_version, str_content_type,
701 (unsigned long)tls_session->info.record_len,
702 str_details1, str_details2);
704 request = SSL_get_ex_data(tls_session->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST);
706 RDEBUG2("%s\n", tls_session->info.info_description);
709 static CONF_PARSER cache_config[] = {
710 { "enable", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
711 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, session_cache_enable), NULL, "no" },
712 { "lifetime", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
713 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, session_timeout), NULL, "24" },
714 { "max_entries", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
715 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, session_cache_size), NULL, "255" },
716 { "name", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
717 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, session_id_name), NULL, NULL},
718 { NULL, -1, 0, NULL, NULL } /* end the list */
721 static CONF_PARSER verify_config[] = {
722 { "tmpdir", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
723 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, verify_tmp_dir), NULL, NULL},
724 { "client", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
725 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, verify_client_cert_cmd), NULL, NULL},
726 { NULL, -1, 0, NULL, NULL } /* end the list */
729 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
730 static CONF_PARSER ocsp_config[] = {
731 { "enable", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
732 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ocsp_enable), NULL, "no"},
733 { "override_cert_url", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
734 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ocsp_override_url), NULL, "no"},
735 { "url", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
736 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ocsp_url), NULL, NULL },
737 { NULL, -1, 0, NULL, NULL } /* end the list */
741 static CONF_PARSER tls_server_config[] = {
742 { "rsa_key_exchange", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
743 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, rsa_key), NULL, "no" },
744 { "dh_key_exchange", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
745 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_key), NULL, "yes" },
746 { "rsa_key_length", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
747 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, rsa_key_length), NULL, "512" },
748 { "dh_key_length", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
749 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_key_length), NULL, "512" },
750 { "verify_depth", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
751 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, verify_depth), NULL, "0" },
752 { "CA_path", PW_TYPE_FILENAME,
753 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_path), NULL, NULL },
754 { "pem_file_type", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
755 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, file_type), NULL, "yes" },
756 { "private_key_file", PW_TYPE_FILENAME,
757 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, private_key_file), NULL, NULL },
758 { "certificate_file", PW_TYPE_FILENAME,
759 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, certificate_file), NULL, NULL },
760 { "CA_file", PW_TYPE_FILENAME,
761 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_file), NULL, NULL },
762 { "private_key_password", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
763 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, private_key_password), NULL, NULL },
764 { "dh_file", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
765 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_file), NULL, NULL },
766 { "random_file", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
767 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, random_file), NULL, NULL },
768 { "fragment_size", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
769 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, fragment_size), NULL, "1024" },
770 { "include_length", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
771 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, include_length), NULL, "yes" },
772 { "check_crl", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
773 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_crl), NULL, "no"},
774 { "allow_expired_crl", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
775 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, allow_expired_crl), NULL, NULL},
776 { "check_cert_cn", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
777 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_cert_cn), NULL, NULL},
778 { "cipher_list", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
779 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, cipher_list), NULL, NULL},
780 { "check_cert_issuer", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
781 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_cert_issuer), NULL, NULL},
782 { "make_cert_command", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
783 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, make_cert_command), NULL, NULL},
784 { "require_client_cert", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
785 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, require_client_cert), NULL, NULL },
787 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL
788 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
789 { "ecdh_curve", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
790 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ecdh_curve), NULL, "prime256v1"},
794 { "cache", PW_TYPE_SUBSECTION, 0, NULL, (const void *) cache_config },
796 { "verify", PW_TYPE_SUBSECTION, 0, NULL, (const void *) verify_config },
798 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
799 { "ocsp", PW_TYPE_SUBSECTION, 0, NULL, (const void *) ocsp_config },
802 { NULL, -1, 0, NULL, NULL } /* end the list */
806 static CONF_PARSER tls_client_config[] = {
807 { "rsa_key_exchange", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
808 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, rsa_key), NULL, "no" },
809 { "dh_key_exchange", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
810 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_key), NULL, "yes" },
811 { "rsa_key_length", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
812 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, rsa_key_length), NULL, "512" },
813 { "dh_key_length", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
814 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_key_length), NULL, "512" },
815 { "verify_depth", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
816 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, verify_depth), NULL, "0" },
817 { "CA_path", PW_TYPE_FILENAME,
818 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_path), NULL, NULL },
819 { "pem_file_type", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
820 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, file_type), NULL, "yes" },
821 { "private_key_file", PW_TYPE_FILENAME,
822 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, private_key_file), NULL, NULL },
823 { "certificate_file", PW_TYPE_FILENAME,
824 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, certificate_file), NULL, NULL },
825 { "CA_file", PW_TYPE_FILENAME,
826 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_file), NULL, NULL },
827 { "private_key_password", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
828 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, private_key_password), NULL, NULL },
829 { "dh_file", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
830 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_file), NULL, NULL },
831 { "random_file", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
832 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, random_file), NULL, NULL },
833 { "fragment_size", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
834 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, fragment_size), NULL, "1024" },
835 { "include_length", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
836 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, include_length), NULL, "yes" },
837 { "check_crl", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
838 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_crl), NULL, "no"},
839 { "check_cert_cn", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
840 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_cert_cn), NULL, NULL},
841 { "cipher_list", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
842 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, cipher_list), NULL, NULL},
843 { "check_cert_issuer", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
844 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_cert_issuer), NULL, NULL},
846 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL
847 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
848 { "ecdh_curve", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
849 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ecdh_curve), NULL, "prime256v1"},
853 { NULL, -1, 0, NULL, NULL } /* end the list */
858 * TODO: Check for the type of key exchange * like conf->dh_key
860 static int load_dh_params(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *file)
865 if ((bio = BIO_new_file(file, "r")) == NULL) {
866 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Unable to open DH file - %s", file);
870 dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
873 DEBUG2("WARNING: rlm_eap_tls: Unable to set DH parameters. DH cipher suites may not work!");
874 DEBUG2("WARNING: Fix this by running the OpenSSL command listed in eap.conf");
878 if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh) < 0) {
879 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Unable to set DH parameters");
890 * Generate ephemeral RSA keys.
892 static int generate_eph_rsa_key(SSL_CTX *ctx)
896 rsa = RSA_generate_key(512, RSA_F4, NULL, NULL);
898 if (!SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(ctx, rsa)) {
899 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Couldn't set ephemeral RSA key");
909 * Print debugging messages, and free data.
911 * FIXME: Write sessions to some long-term storage, so that
912 * session resumption can still occur after the server
915 #define MAX_SESSION_SIZE (256)
917 static void cbtls_remove_session(UNUSED SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)
922 char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1];
924 size = sess->session_id_length;
925 if (size > MAX_SESSION_SIZE) size = MAX_SESSION_SIZE;
927 fr_bin2hex(sess->session_id, buffer, size);
929 DEBUG2(" SSL: Removing session %s from the cache", buffer);
934 static int cbtls_new_session(UNUSED SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *sess)
937 char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1];
939 size = sess->session_id_length;
940 if (size > MAX_SESSION_SIZE) size = MAX_SESSION_SIZE;
942 fr_bin2hex(sess->session_id, buffer, size);
944 DEBUG2(" SSL: adding session %s to cache", buffer);
949 static SSL_SESSION *cbtls_get_session(UNUSED SSL *s,
950 unsigned char *data, int len,
954 char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1];
957 if (size > MAX_SESSION_SIZE) size = MAX_SESSION_SIZE;
959 fr_bin2hex(data, buffer, size);
961 DEBUG2(" SSL: Client requested nonexistent cached session %s",
968 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
970 * This function extracts the OCSP Responder URL
971 * from an existing x509 certificate.
973 static int ocsp_parse_cert_url(X509 *cert, char **phost, char **pport,
974 char **ppath, int *pssl)
978 AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *aia;
979 ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *ad;
981 aia = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_info_access, NULL, NULL);
983 for (i = 0; i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(aia); i++) {
984 ad = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(aia, 0);
985 if (OBJ_obj2nid(ad->method) == NID_ad_OCSP) {
986 if (ad->location->type == GEN_URI) {
987 if(OCSP_parse_url(ad->location->d.ia5->data,
988 phost, pport, ppath, pssl))
997 * This function sends a OCSP request to a defined OCSP responder
998 * and checks the OCSP response for correctness.
1001 /* Maximum leeway in validity period: default 5 minutes */
1002 #define MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD (5 * 60)
1004 static int ocsp_check(X509_STORE *store, X509 *issuer_cert, X509 *client_cert,
1005 fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf)
1007 OCSP_CERTID *certid;
1009 OCSP_RESPONSE *resp;
1010 OCSP_BASICRESP *bresp = NULL;
1015 long nsec = MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD, maxage = -1;
1016 BIO *cbio, *bio_out;
1019 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
1023 * Create OCSP Request
1025 certid = OCSP_cert_to_id(NULL, client_cert, issuer_cert);
1026 req = OCSP_REQUEST_new();
1027 OCSP_request_add0_id(req, certid);
1028 OCSP_request_add1_nonce(req, NULL, 8);
1031 * Send OCSP Request and get OCSP Response
1034 /* Get OCSP responder URL */
1035 if(conf->ocsp_override_url) {
1036 OCSP_parse_url(conf->ocsp_url, &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl);
1039 ocsp_parse_cert_url(client_cert, &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl);
1042 DEBUG2("[ocsp] --> Responder URL = http://%s:%s%s", host, port, path);
1044 /* Setup BIO socket to OCSP responder */
1045 cbio = BIO_new_connect(host);
1047 bio_out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
1049 BIO_set_conn_port(cbio, port);
1050 BIO_do_connect(cbio);
1052 /* Send OCSP request and wait for response */
1053 resp = OCSP_sendreq_bio(cbio, path, req);
1055 radlog(L_ERR, "Error: Couldn't get OCSP response");
1059 /* Verify OCSP response status */
1060 status = OCSP_response_status(resp);
1061 DEBUG2("[ocsp] --> Response status: %s",OCSP_response_status_str(status));
1062 if(status != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) {
1063 radlog(L_ERR, "Error: OCSP response status: %s", OCSP_response_status_str(status));
1066 bresp = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp);
1067 if(OCSP_check_nonce(req, bresp)!=1) {
1068 radlog(L_ERR, "Error: OCSP response has wrong nonce value");
1071 if(OCSP_basic_verify(bresp, NULL, store, 0)!=1){
1072 radlog(L_ERR, "Error: Couldn't verify OCSP basic response");
1076 /* Verify OCSP cert status */
1077 if(!OCSP_resp_find_status(bresp, certid, &status, &reason,
1078 &rev, &thisupd, &nextupd)) {
1079 radlog(L_ERR, "ERROR: No Status found.\n");
1083 if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, nsec, maxage)) {
1084 BIO_puts(bio_out, "WARNING: Status times invalid.\n");
1085 ERR_print_errors(bio_out);
1088 BIO_puts(bio_out, "\tThis Update: ");
1089 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bio_out, thisupd);
1090 BIO_puts(bio_out, "\n");
1091 BIO_puts(bio_out, "\tNext Update: ");
1092 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bio_out, nextupd);
1093 BIO_puts(bio_out, "\n");
1096 case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD:
1097 DEBUG2("[oscp] --> Cert status: good");
1102 /* REVOKED / UNKNOWN */
1103 DEBUG2("[ocsp] --> Cert status: %s",OCSP_cert_status_str(status));
1105 DEBUG2("[ocsp] --> Reason: %s", OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason));
1106 BIO_puts(bio_out, "\tRevocation Time: ");
1107 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bio_out, rev);
1108 BIO_puts(bio_out, "\n");
1113 /* Free OCSP Stuff */
1114 OCSP_REQUEST_free(req);
1115 OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp);
1120 OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bresp);
1123 DEBUG2("[ocsp] --> Certificate is valid!");
1125 DEBUG2("[ocsp] --> Certificate has been expired/revoked!");
1130 #endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H */
1133 * For creating certificate attributes.
1135 static const char *cert_attr_names[6][2] = {
1136 { "TLS-Client-Cert-Serial", "TLS-Cert-Serial" },
1137 { "TLS-Client-Cert-Expiration", "TLS-Cert-Expiration" },
1138 { "TLS-Client-Cert-Subject", "TLS-Cert-Subject" },
1139 { "TLS-Client-Cert-Issuer", "TLS-Cert-Issuer" },
1140 { "TLS-Client-Cert-Common-Name", "TLS-Cert-Common-Name" },
1141 { "TLS-Client-Cert-Subject-Alt-Name-Email", "TLS-Cert-Subject-Alt-Name-Email" }
1144 #define FR_TLS_SERIAL (0)
1145 #define FR_TLS_EXPIRATION (1)
1146 #define FR_TLS_SUBJECT (2)
1147 #define FR_TLS_ISSUER (3)
1148 #define FR_TLS_CN (4)
1149 #define FR_TLS_SAN_EMAIL (5)
1152 * Before trusting a certificate, you must make sure that the
1153 * certificate is 'valid'. There are several steps that your
1154 * application can take in determining if a certificate is
1155 * valid. Commonly used steps are:
1157 * 1.Verifying the certificate's signature, and verifying that
1158 * the certificate has been issued by a trusted Certificate
1161 * 2.Verifying that the certificate is valid for the present date
1162 * (i.e. it is being presented within its validity dates).
1164 * 3.Verifying that the certificate has not been revoked by its
1165 * issuing Certificate Authority, by checking with respect to a
1166 * Certificate Revocation List (CRL).
1168 * 4.Verifying that the credentials presented by the certificate
1169 * fulfill additional requirements specific to the application,
1170 * such as with respect to access control lists or with respect
1171 * to OCSP (Online Certificate Status Processing).
1173 * NOTE: This callback will be called multiple times based on the
1174 * depth of the root certificate chain
1176 int cbtls_verify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1178 char subject[1024]; /* Used for the subject name */
1179 char issuer[1024]; /* Used for the issuer name */
1180 char common_name[1024];
1185 int err, depth, lookup, loc;
1186 fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf;
1189 ASN1_INTEGER *sn = NULL;
1190 ASN1_TIME *asn_time = NULL;
1193 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
1194 X509_STORE *ocsp_store = NULL;
1198 client_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
1199 err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
1200 depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
1205 * Log client/issuing cert. If there's an error, log
1208 if ((lookup > 1) && !my_ok) lookup = 1;
1211 * Retrieve the pointer to the SSL of the connection currently treated
1212 * and the application specific data stored into the SSL object.
1214 ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
1215 conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF);
1216 if (!conf) return 1;
1218 request = (REQUEST *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST);
1220 if (!request) return 1; /* FIXME: outbound TLS */
1222 rad_assert(request != NULL);
1223 certs = (VALUE_PAIR **)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CERTS);
1224 rad_assert(certs != NULL);
1225 identity = (char **)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_IDENTITY);
1226 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
1227 ocsp_store = (X509_STORE *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_STORE);
1232 * Get the Serial Number
1235 sn = X509_get_serialNumber(client_cert);
1238 * For this next bit, we create the attributes *only* if
1239 * we're at the client or issuing certificate, AND we
1240 * have a user identity. i.e. we don't create the
1241 * attributes for RadSec connections.
1244 (lookup <= 1) && sn && ((size_t) sn->length < (sizeof(buf) / 2))) {
1248 for (i = 0; i < sn->length; i++) {
1249 sprintf(p, "%02x", (unsigned int)sn->data[i]);
1253 pairmake(cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_SERIAL][lookup], buf, T_OP_SET));
1258 * Get the Expiration Date
1261 asn_time = X509_get_notAfter(client_cert);
1262 if (identity && (lookup <= 1) && asn_time &&
1263 (asn_time->length < MAX_STRING_LEN)) {
1264 memcpy(buf, (char*) asn_time->data, asn_time->length);
1265 buf[asn_time->length] = '\0';
1267 pairmake(cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_EXPIRATION][lookup], buf, T_OP_SET));
1271 * Get the Subject & Issuer
1273 subject[0] = issuer[0] = '\0';
1274 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(client_cert), subject,
1276 subject[sizeof(subject) - 1] = '\0';
1277 if (identity && (lookup <= 1) && subject[0] &&
1278 (strlen(subject) < MAX_STRING_LEN)) {
1280 pairmake(cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_SUBJECT][lookup], subject, T_OP_SET));
1283 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert), issuer,
1285 issuer[sizeof(issuer) - 1] = '\0';
1286 if (identity && (lookup <= 1) && issuer[0] &&
1287 (strlen(issuer) < MAX_STRING_LEN)) {
1289 pairmake(cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_ISSUER][lookup], issuer, T_OP_SET));
1293 * Get the Common Name
1295 X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(client_cert),
1296 NID_commonName, common_name, sizeof(common_name));
1297 common_name[sizeof(common_name) - 1] = '\0';
1298 if (identity && (lookup <= 1) && common_name[0] &&
1299 (strlen(common_name) < MAX_STRING_LEN)) {
1301 pairmake(cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_CN][lookup], common_name, T_OP_SET));
1306 * Get the RFC822 Subject Alternative Name
1308 loc = X509_get_ext_by_NID(client_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, 0);
1309 if (lookup <= 1 && loc >= 0) {
1310 X509_EXTENSION *ext = NULL;
1311 GENERAL_NAMES *names = NULL;
1314 if ((ext = X509_get_ext(client_cert, loc)) &&
1315 (names = X509V3_EXT_d2i(ext))) {
1316 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(names); i++) {
1317 GENERAL_NAME *name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(names, i);
1319 switch (name->type) {
1321 if (ASN1_STRING_length(name->d.rfc822Name) >= MAX_STRING_LEN)
1325 pairmake(cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_SAN_EMAIL][lookup],
1326 ASN1_STRING_data(name->d.rfc822Name), T_OP_SET));
1329 /* XXX TODO handle other SAN types */
1335 sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(names);
1337 #endif /* GEN_EMAIL */
1340 * If the CRL has expired, that might still be OK.
1343 (conf->allow_expired_crl) &&
1344 (err == X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED)) {
1346 X509_STORE_CTX_set_error( ctx, 0 );
1350 const char *p = X509_verify_cert_error_string(err);
1351 radlog(L_ERR,"--> verify error:num=%d:%s\n",err, p);
1352 radius_pairmake(request, &request->packet->vps,
1353 "Module-Failure-Message", p, T_OP_SET);
1357 switch (ctx->error) {
1359 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
1360 radlog(L_ERR, "issuer= %s\n", issuer);
1362 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
1363 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
1364 radlog(L_ERR, "notBefore=");
1366 ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get_notBefore(ctx->current_cert));
1369 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
1370 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
1371 radlog(L_ERR, "notAfter=");
1373 ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get_notAfter(ctx->current_cert));
1379 * If we're at the actual client cert, apply additional
1384 * If the conf tells us to, check cert issuer
1385 * against the specified value and fail
1386 * verification if they don't match.
1388 if (conf->check_cert_issuer &&
1389 (strcmp(issuer, conf->check_cert_issuer) != 0)) {
1390 radlog(L_AUTH, "rlm_eap_tls: Certificate issuer (%s) does not match specified value (%s)!", issuer, conf->check_cert_issuer);
1395 * If the conf tells us to, check the CN in the
1396 * cert against xlat'ed value, but only if the
1397 * previous checks passed.
1399 if (my_ok && conf->check_cert_cn) {
1400 if (!radius_xlat(cn_str, sizeof(cn_str), conf->check_cert_cn, request, NULL)) {
1401 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls (%s): xlat failed.",
1402 conf->check_cert_cn);
1403 /* if this fails, fail the verification */
1406 RDEBUG2("checking certificate CN (%s) with xlat'ed value (%s)", common_name, cn_str);
1407 if (strcmp(cn_str, common_name) != 0) {
1408 radlog(L_AUTH, "rlm_eap_tls: Certificate CN (%s) does not match specified value (%s)!", common_name, cn_str);
1412 } /* check_cert_cn */
1414 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
1415 if (my_ok && conf->ocsp_enable){
1416 RDEBUG2("--> Starting OCSP Request");
1417 if(X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer(&issuer_cert, ctx, client_cert)!=1) {
1418 radlog(L_ERR, "Error: Couldn't get issuer_cert for %s", common_name);
1420 my_ok = ocsp_check(ocsp_store, issuer_cert, client_cert, conf);
1424 while (conf->verify_client_cert_cmd) {
1429 snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s.client.XXXXXXXX",
1430 conf->verify_tmp_dir, progname);
1431 fd = mkstemp(filename);
1433 RDEBUG("Failed creating file in %s: %s",
1434 conf->verify_tmp_dir, strerror(errno));
1438 fp = fdopen(fd, "w");
1440 RDEBUG("Failed opening file %s: %s",
1441 filename, strerror(errno));
1445 if (!PEM_write_X509(fp, client_cert)) {
1447 RDEBUG("Failed writing certificate to file");
1452 if (!radius_pairmake(request, &request->packet->vps,
1453 "TLS-Client-Cert-Filename",
1454 filename, T_OP_SET)) {
1455 RDEBUG("Failed creating TLS-Client-Cert-Filename");
1460 RDEBUG("Verifying client certificate: %s",
1461 conf->verify_client_cert_cmd);
1462 if (radius_exec_program(conf->verify_client_cert_cmd,
1463 request, 1, NULL, 0,
1464 request->packet->vps,
1466 radlog(L_AUTH, "rlm_eap_tls: Certificate CN (%s) fails external verification!", common_name);
1469 RDEBUG("Client certificate CN %s passed external validation", common_name);
1480 if (debug_flag > 0) {
1481 RDEBUG2("chain-depth=%d, ", depth);
1482 RDEBUG2("error=%d", err);
1484 if (identity) RDEBUG2("--> User-Name = %s", *identity);
1485 RDEBUG2("--> BUF-Name = %s", common_name);
1486 RDEBUG2("--> subject = %s", subject);
1487 RDEBUG2("--> issuer = %s", issuer);
1488 RDEBUG2("--> verify return:%d", my_ok);
1494 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
1496 * Create Global X509 revocation store and use it to verify
1499 * - Load the trusted CAs
1500 * - Load the trusted issuer certificates
1502 static X509_STORE *init_revocation_store(fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf)
1504 X509_STORE *store = NULL;
1506 store = X509_STORE_new();
1508 /* Load the CAs we trust */
1509 if (conf->ca_file || conf->ca_path)
1510 if(!X509_STORE_load_locations(store, conf->ca_file, conf->ca_path)) {
1511 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: X509_STORE error %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
1512 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Error reading Trusted root CA list %s",conf->ca_file );
1516 #ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
1517 if (conf->check_crl)
1518 X509_STORE_set_flags(store, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
1522 #endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H */
1524 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL
1525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1526 static int set_ecdh_curve(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *ecdh_curve)
1531 if (!ecdh_curve || !*ecdh_curve) return 0;
1533 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(ecdh_curve);
1535 radlog(L_ERR, "Unknown ecdh_curve \"%s\"", ecdh_curve);
1539 ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1541 radlog(L_ERR, "Unable to create new curve \"%s\"", ecdh_curve);
1545 SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ctx, ecdh);
1547 SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE);
1556 /* index we use to store cached session VPs
1557 * needs to be dynamic so we can supply a "free" function
1559 static int FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_VPS = -1;
1562 * DIE OPENSSL DIE DIE DIE
1564 * What a palaver, just to free some data attached the
1565 * session. We need to do this because the "remove" callback
1566 * is called when refcount > 0 sometimes, if another thread
1567 * is using the session
1569 static void sess_free_vps(UNUSED void *parent, void *data_ptr,
1570 UNUSED CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, UNUSED int idx,
1571 UNUSED long argl, UNUSED void *argp)
1573 VALUE_PAIR *vp = data_ptr;
1576 DEBUG2(" Freeing cached session VPs %p", vp);
1583 * Create Global context SSL and use it in every new session
1585 * - Load the trusted CAs
1586 * - Load the Private key & the certificate
1587 * - Set the Context options & Verify options
1589 static SSL_CTX *init_tls_ctx(fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf)
1591 const SSL_METHOD *meth;
1593 X509_STORE *certstore;
1594 int verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
1595 int ctx_options = 0;
1599 * Add all the default ciphers and message digests
1600 * Create our context.
1603 SSL_load_error_strings();
1606 * SHA256 is in all versions of OpenSSL, but isn't
1607 * initialized by default. It's needed for WiMAX
1610 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_SHA256
1611 EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
1614 meth = TLSv1_method();
1615 ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
1618 * Identify the type of certificates that needs to be loaded
1620 if (conf->file_type) {
1621 type = SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
1623 type = SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1;
1627 * Set the password to load private key
1629 if (conf->private_key_password) {
1632 * We don't want to put the private key password in eap.conf, so check
1633 * for our special string which indicates we should get the password
1636 const char* special_string = "Apple:UseCertAdmin";
1637 if (strncmp(conf->private_key_password,
1639 strlen(special_string)) == 0)
1642 const long max_password_len = 128;
1643 snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd) - 1,
1644 "/usr/sbin/certadmin --get-private-key-passphrase \"%s\"",
1645 conf->private_key_file);
1647 DEBUG2("rlm_eap: Getting private key passphrase using command \"%s\"", cmd);
1649 FILE* cmd_pipe = popen(cmd, "r");
1651 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: %s command failed. Unable to get private_key_password", cmd);
1652 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: Error reading private_key_file %s", conf->private_key_file);
1656 free(conf->private_key_password);
1657 conf->private_key_password = malloc(max_password_len * sizeof(char));
1658 if (!conf->private_key_password) {
1659 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: Can't malloc space for private_key_password");
1660 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: Error reading private_key_file %s", conf->private_key_file);
1665 fgets(conf->private_key_password, max_password_len, cmd_pipe);
1668 /* Get rid of newline at end of password. */
1669 conf->private_key_password[strlen(conf->private_key_password) - 1] = '\0';
1670 DEBUG2("rlm_eap: Password from command = \"%s\"", conf->private_key_password);
1673 SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx, conf->private_key_password);
1674 SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ctx, cbtls_password);
1678 * Load our keys and certificates
1680 * If certificates are of type PEM then we can make use
1681 * of cert chain authentication using openssl api call
1682 * SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file. Please see how
1683 * the cert chain needs to be given in PEM from
1686 if (!conf->certificate_file) goto load_ca;
1688 if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
1689 if (!(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, conf->certificate_file))) {
1690 radlog(L_ERR, "Error reading certificate file %s:%s",
1691 conf->certificate_file,
1692 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
1696 } else if (!(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, conf->certificate_file, type))) {
1697 radlog(L_ERR, "Error reading certificate file %s:%s",
1698 conf->certificate_file,
1699 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
1703 /* Load the CAs we trust */
1705 if (conf->ca_file || conf->ca_path) {
1706 if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, conf->ca_file, conf->ca_path)) {
1707 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: SSL error %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
1708 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Error reading Trusted root CA list %s",conf->ca_file );
1712 if (conf->ca_file && *conf->ca_file) SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(conf->ca_file));
1714 if (conf->private_key_file) {
1715 if (!(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, conf->private_key_file, type))) {
1716 radlog(L_ERR, "Failed reading private key file %s:%s",
1717 conf->private_key_file,
1718 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
1723 * Check if the loaded private key is the right one
1725 if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
1726 radlog(L_ERR, "Private key does not match the certificate public key");
1734 ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
1735 ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
1736 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
1737 ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET ;
1741 * SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used in order to prevent
1742 * small subgroup attacks and forward secrecy. Always
1745 * SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE has an impact on the computer
1746 * time needed during negotiation, but it is not very
1749 ctx_options |= SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE;
1752 * SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS to work around issues
1753 * in Windows Vista client.
1754 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt
1755 * http://www.nabble.com/(RADIATOR)-Radiator-Version-3.16-released-t2600070.html
1757 ctx_options |= SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS;
1759 SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, ctx_options);
1762 * TODO: Set the RSA & DH
1763 * SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx, cbtls_rsa);
1764 * SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(ctx, cbtls_dh);
1768 * set the message callback to identify the type of
1769 * message. For every new session, there can be a
1770 * different callback argument.
1772 * SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(ctx, cbtls_msg);
1776 * Set eliptical curve crypto configuration.
1778 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL
1779 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1780 if (set_ecdh_curve(ctx, conf->ecdh_curve) < 0) {
1786 /* Set Info callback */
1787 SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, cbtls_info);
1790 * Callbacks, etc. for session resumption.
1792 if (conf->session_cache_enable) {
1793 SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(ctx, cbtls_new_session);
1794 SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(ctx, cbtls_get_session);
1795 SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(ctx, cbtls_remove_session);
1797 SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(ctx, 1);
1798 if (FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_VPS < 0)
1799 FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_VPS = SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, sess_free_vps);
1803 * Check the certificates for revocation.
1805 #ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
1806 if (conf->check_crl) {
1807 certstore = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx);
1808 if (certstore == NULL) {
1809 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: SSL error %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
1810 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Error reading Certificate Store");
1813 X509_STORE_set_flags(certstore, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
1819 * Always verify the peer certificate
1821 verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
1822 verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT;
1823 verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
1824 SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify_mode, cbtls_verify);
1826 if (conf->verify_depth) {
1827 SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(ctx, conf->verify_depth);
1830 /* Load randomness */
1831 if (!(RAND_load_file(conf->random_file, 1024*1024))) {
1832 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: SSL error %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
1833 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Error loading randomness");
1838 * Set the cipher list if we were told to
1840 if (conf->cipher_list) {
1841 if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, conf->cipher_list)) {
1842 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Error setting cipher list");
1848 * Setup session caching
1850 if (conf->session_cache_enable) {
1852 * Create a unique context Id per EAP-TLS configuration.
1854 if (conf->session_id_name) {
1855 snprintf(conf->session_context_id,
1856 sizeof(conf->session_context_id),
1858 conf->session_id_name);
1860 snprintf(conf->session_context_id,
1861 sizeof(conf->session_context_id),
1866 * Cache it, and DON'T auto-clear it.
1868 SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR);
1870 SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx,
1871 (unsigned char *) conf->session_context_id,
1872 (unsigned int) strlen(conf->session_context_id));
1875 * Our timeout is in hours, this is in seconds.
1877 SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ctx, conf->session_timeout * 3600);
1880 * Set the maximum number of entries in the
1883 SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx, conf->session_cache_size);
1886 SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
1893 void tls_server_conf_free(fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf)
1897 if (conf->cs) cf_section_parse_free(conf->cs, conf);
1899 if (conf->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(conf->ctx);
1901 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
1902 if (conf->ocsp_store) X509_STORE_free(conf->ocsp_store);
1903 conf->ocsp_store = NULL;
1906 memset(conf, 0, sizeof(*conf));
1911 fr_tls_server_conf_t *tls_server_conf_parse(CONF_SECTION *cs)
1913 fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf;
1915 conf = malloc(sizeof(*conf));
1917 radlog(L_ERR, "Out of memory");
1920 memset(conf, 0, sizeof(*conf));
1922 if (cf_section_parse(cs, conf, tls_server_config) < 0) {
1924 tls_server_conf_free(conf);
1929 * Save people from their own stupidity.
1931 if (conf->fragment_size < 100) conf->fragment_size = 100;
1934 * This magic makes the administrators life HUGELY easier
1935 * on initial deployments.
1937 * If the server starts up in debugging mode, AND the
1938 * bootstrap command is configured, AND it exists, AND
1939 * there is no server certificate
1941 if (conf->make_cert_command && (debug_flag >= 2)) {
1944 if ((stat(conf->make_cert_command, &buf) == 0) &&
1945 (stat(conf->certificate_file, &buf) < 0) &&
1946 (errno == ENOENT) &&
1947 (radius_exec_program(conf->make_cert_command, NULL, 1,
1948 NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, 0) != 0)) {
1953 if (!conf->private_key_file) {
1954 radlog(L_ERR, "TLS Server requires a private key file");
1958 if (!conf->certificate_file) {
1959 radlog(L_ERR, "TLS Server requires a certificate file");
1966 conf->ctx = init_tls_ctx(conf);
1967 if (conf->ctx == NULL) {
1971 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
1973 * Initialize OCSP Revocation Store
1975 if (conf->ocsp_enable) {
1976 conf->ocsp_store = init_revocation_store(conf);
1977 if (conf->ocsp_store == NULL) goto error;
1979 #endif /*HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H*/
1981 if (load_dh_params(conf->ctx, conf->dh_file) < 0) {
1985 if (generate_eph_rsa_key(conf->ctx) < 0) {
1989 if (conf->verify_tmp_dir) {
1990 if (chmod(conf->verify_tmp_dir, S_IRWXU) < 0) {
1991 radlog(L_ERR, "Failed changing permissions on %s: %s", conf->verify_tmp_dir, strerror(errno));
1996 if (conf->verify_client_cert_cmd && !conf->verify_tmp_dir) {
1997 radlog(L_ERR, "You MUST set the verify directory in order to use verify_client_cmd");
2004 fr_tls_server_conf_t *tls_client_conf_parse(CONF_SECTION *cs)
2006 fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf;
2008 conf = malloc(sizeof(*conf));
2010 radlog(L_ERR, "Out of memory");
2013 memset(conf, 0, sizeof(*conf));
2015 if (cf_section_parse(cs, conf, tls_client_config) < 0) {
2017 tls_server_conf_free(conf);
2022 * Save people from their own stupidity.
2024 if (conf->fragment_size < 100) conf->fragment_size = 100;
2029 conf->ctx = init_tls_ctx(conf);
2030 if (conf->ctx == NULL) {
2034 if (load_dh_params(conf->ctx, conf->dh_file) < 0) {
2038 if (generate_eph_rsa_key(conf->ctx) < 0) {
2045 int tls_success(tls_session_t *ssn, REQUEST *request)
2047 VALUE_PAIR *vp, *vps = NULL;
2048 fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf;
2050 conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF);
2051 rad_assert(conf != NULL);
2054 * If there's no session resumption, delete the entry
2055 * from the cache. This means either it's disabled
2056 * globally for this SSL context, OR we were told to
2057 * disable it for this user.
2059 * This also means you can't turn it on just for one
2062 if ((!ssn->allow_session_resumption) ||
2063 (((vp = pairfind(request->config_items, 1127, 0)) != NULL) &&
2064 (vp->vp_integer == 0))) {
2065 SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssn->ctx,
2067 ssn->allow_session_resumption = 0;
2070 * If we're in a resumed session and it's
2073 if (SSL_session_reused(ssn->ssl)) {
2074 RDEBUG("FAIL: Forcibly stopping session resumption as it is not allowed.");
2079 * Else resumption IS allowed, so we store the
2080 * user data in the cache.
2082 } else if (!SSL_session_reused(ssn->ssl)) {
2084 char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1];
2086 size = ssn->ssl->session->session_id_length;
2087 if (size > MAX_SESSION_SIZE) size = MAX_SESSION_SIZE;
2089 fr_bin2hex(ssn->ssl->session->session_id, buffer, size);
2092 vp = paircopy2(request->reply->vps, PW_USER_NAME, 0);
2093 if (vp) pairadd(&vps, vp);
2095 vp = paircopy2(request->packet->vps, PW_STRIPPED_USER_NAME, 0);
2096 if (vp) pairadd(&vps, vp);
2098 vp = paircopy2(request->reply->vps, PW_CACHED_SESSION_POLICY, 0);
2099 if (vp) pairadd(&vps, vp);
2102 RDEBUG2("Saving session %s vps %p in the cache", buffer, vps);
2103 SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl->session,
2104 FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_VPS, vps);
2106 RDEBUG2("WARNING: No information to cache: session caching will be disabled for session %s", buffer);
2107 SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssn->ctx,
2112 * Else the session WAS allowed. Copy the cached
2117 char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1];
2119 size = ssn->ssl->session->session_id_length;
2120 if (size > MAX_SESSION_SIZE) size = MAX_SESSION_SIZE;
2122 fr_bin2hex(ssn->ssl->session->session_id, buffer, size);
2125 vp = SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(ssn->ssl->session,
2126 FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_VPS);
2128 RDEBUG("WARNING: No information in cached session %s", buffer);
2132 RDEBUG("Adding cached attributes for session %s vps %p to the reply:", buffer, vp);
2133 debug_pair_list(vp);
2134 pairadd(&request->reply->vps, paircopy(vp));
2137 * Mark the request as resumed.
2139 vp = pairmake("EAP-Session-Resumed", "1", T_OP_SET);
2140 if (vp) pairadd(&request->packet->vps, vp);
2148 void tls_fail(tls_session_t *ssn)
2151 * Force the session to NOT be cached.
2153 SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssn->ctx, ssn->ssl->session);
2156 fr_tls_status_t tls_application_data(tls_session_t *ssn,
2163 * Decrypt the complete record.
2165 err = BIO_write(ssn->into_ssl, ssn->dirty_in.data,
2166 ssn->dirty_in.used);
2167 if (err != (int) ssn->dirty_in.used) {
2168 record_init(&ssn->dirty_in);
2169 RDEBUG("Failed writing %d to SSL BIO: %d",
2170 ssn->dirty_in.used, err);
2175 * Clear the dirty buffer now that we are done with it
2176 * and init the clean_out buffer to store decrypted data
2178 record_init(&ssn->dirty_in);
2179 record_init(&ssn->clean_out);
2182 * Read (and decrypt) the tunneled data from the
2183 * SSL session, and put it into the decrypted
2186 err = SSL_read(ssn->ssl, ssn->clean_out.data,
2187 sizeof(ssn->clean_out.data));
2192 RDEBUG("SSL_read Error");
2194 code = SSL_get_error(ssn->ssl, err);
2196 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
2197 return FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS;
2198 DEBUG("Error in fragmentation logic: SSL_WANT_READ");
2201 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
2202 DEBUG("Error in fragmentation logic: SSL_WANT_WRITE");
2206 DEBUG("Error in fragmentation logic: ?");
2209 * FIXME: Call int_ssl_check?
2217 RDEBUG("WARNING: No data inside of the tunnel.");
2221 * Passed all checks, successfully decrypted data
2223 ssn->clean_out.used = err;
2230 * Acknowledge received is for one of the following messages sent earlier
2231 * 1. Handshake completed Message, so now send, EAP-Success
2232 * 2. Alert Message, now send, EAP-Failure
2233 * 3. Fragment Message, now send, next Fragment
2235 fr_tls_status_t tls_ack_handler(tls_session_t *ssn, REQUEST *request)
2237 RDEBUG2("Received TLS ACK");
2240 radlog_request(L_ERR, 0, request, "FAIL: Unexpected ACK received. Could not obtain session information.");
2241 return FR_TLS_INVALID;
2243 if (ssn->info.initialized == 0) {
2244 RDEBUG("No SSL info available. Waiting for more SSL data.");
2245 return FR_TLS_REQUEST;
2247 if ((ssn->info.content_type == handshake) &&
2248 (ssn->info.origin == 0)) {
2249 radlog_request(L_ERR, 0, request, "FAIL: ACK without earlier message.");
2250 return FR_TLS_INVALID;
2253 switch (ssn->info.content_type) {
2255 RDEBUG2("ACK alert");
2259 if ((ssn->info.handshake_type == finished) &&
2260 (ssn->dirty_out.used == 0)) {
2261 RDEBUG2("ACK handshake is finished");
2264 * From now on all the content is
2265 * application data set it here as nobody else
2268 ssn->info.content_type = application_data;
2269 return FR_TLS_SUCCESS;
2270 } /* else more data to send */
2272 RDEBUG2("ACK handshake fragment handler");
2273 /* Fragmentation handler, send next fragment */
2274 return FR_TLS_REQUEST;
2276 case application_data:
2277 RDEBUG2("ACK handshake fragment handler in application data");
2278 return FR_TLS_REQUEST;
2281 * For the rest of the conditions, switch over
2282 * to the default section below.
2285 RDEBUG2("ACK default");
2286 radlog_request(L_ERR, 0, request, "Invalid ACK received: %d",
2287 ssn->info.content_type);
2288 return FR_TLS_INVALID;
2292 static void dump_hex(const char *msg, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len)
2296 if (debug_flag < 3) return;
2298 printf("%s %d\n", msg, (int) data_len);
2299 if (data_len > 256) data_len = 256;
2301 for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
2302 if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x00) printf ("%02x: ", (unsigned int) i);
2303 printf("%02x ", data[i]);
2304 if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f) printf ("\n");
2310 static void tls_socket_close(rad_listen_t *listener)
2312 listen_socket_t *sock = listener->data;
2314 listener->status = RAD_LISTEN_STATUS_REMOVE_FD;
2315 listener->tls = NULL; /* parent owns this! */
2319 * Decrement the number of connections.
2321 if (sock->parent->num_connections > 0) {
2322 sock->parent->num_connections--;
2324 if (sock->client->num_connections > 0) {
2325 sock->client->num_connections--;
2330 * Tell the event handler that an FD has disappeared.
2332 DEBUG("Client has closed connection");
2333 event_new_fd(listener);
2336 * Do NOT free the listener here. It's in use by
2337 * a request, and will need to hang around until
2338 * all of the requests are done.
2340 * It is instead free'd in remove_from_request_hash()
2344 static int tls_socket_write(rad_listen_t *listener, REQUEST *request)
2348 listen_socket_t *sock = listener->data;
2350 p = sock->ssn->dirty_out.data;
2352 while (p < (sock->ssn->dirty_out.data + sock->ssn->dirty_out.used)) {
2353 RDEBUG3("Writing to socket %d", request->packet->sockfd);
2354 rcode = write(request->packet->sockfd, p,
2355 (sock->ssn->dirty_out.data + sock->ssn->dirty_out.used) - p);
2357 RDEBUG("Error writing to TLS socket: %s", strerror(errno));
2359 tls_socket_close(listener);
2365 sock->ssn->dirty_out.used = 0;
2371 static int tls_socket_recv(rad_listen_t *listener)
2373 int doing_init = FALSE;
2375 RADIUS_PACKET *packet;
2377 listen_socket_t *sock = listener->data;
2378 fr_tls_status_t status;
2379 RADCLIENT *client = sock->client;
2381 if (!sock->packet) {
2382 sock->packet = rad_alloc(0);
2383 if (!sock->packet) return 0;
2385 sock->packet->sockfd = listener->fd;
2386 sock->packet->src_ipaddr = sock->other_ipaddr;
2387 sock->packet->src_port = sock->other_port;
2388 sock->packet->dst_ipaddr = sock->my_ipaddr;
2389 sock->packet->dst_port = sock->my_port;
2391 if (sock->request) sock->request->packet = sock->packet;
2395 * Allocate a REQUEST for debugging.
2397 if (!sock->request) {
2398 sock->request = request = request_alloc();
2399 if (!sock->request) {
2400 radlog(L_ERR, "Out of memory");
2404 rad_assert(request->packet == NULL);
2405 rad_assert(sock->packet != NULL);
2406 request->packet = sock->packet;
2408 request->component = "<core>";
2409 request->component = "<tls-connect>";
2412 * Not sure if we should do this on every packet...
2414 request->reply = rad_alloc(0);
2415 if (!request->reply) return 0;
2417 request->options = RAD_REQUEST_OPTION_DEBUG2;
2419 rad_assert(sock->ssn == NULL);
2421 sock->ssn = tls_new_session(listener->tls, sock->request,
2422 listener->tls->require_client_cert);
2424 request_free(&sock->request);
2425 sock->packet = NULL;
2429 SSL_set_ex_data(sock->ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST, (void *)request);
2430 SSL_set_ex_data(sock->ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CERTS, (void *)&request->packet->vps);
2435 rad_assert(sock->request != NULL);
2436 rad_assert(sock->request->packet != NULL);
2437 rad_assert(sock->packet != NULL);
2438 rad_assert(sock->ssn != NULL);
2440 request = sock->request;
2442 RDEBUG3("Reading from socket %d", request->packet->sockfd);
2443 PTHREAD_MUTEX_LOCK(&sock->mutex);
2444 rcode = read(request->packet->sockfd,
2445 sock->ssn->dirty_in.data,
2446 sizeof(sock->ssn->dirty_in.data));
2447 if ((rcode < 0) && (errno == ECONNRESET)) {
2449 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2450 tls_socket_close(listener);
2455 RDEBUG("Error reading TLS socket: %s", strerror(errno));
2460 * Normal socket close.
2462 if (rcode == 0) goto do_close;
2464 sock->ssn->dirty_in.used = rcode;
2465 memset(sock->ssn->dirty_in.data + sock->ssn->dirty_in.used,
2468 dump_hex("READ FROM SSL", sock->ssn->dirty_in.data, sock->ssn->dirty_in.used);
2471 * Catch attempts to use non-SSL.
2473 if (doing_init && (sock->ssn->dirty_in.data[0] != handshake)) {
2474 RDEBUG("Non-TLS data sent to TLS socket: closing");
2479 * Skip ahead to reading application data.
2481 if (SSL_is_init_finished(sock->ssn->ssl)) goto app;
2483 if (!tls_handshake_recv(request, sock->ssn)) {
2484 RDEBUG("FAILED in TLS handshake receive");
2488 if (sock->ssn->dirty_out.used > 0) {
2489 tls_socket_write(listener, request);
2490 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2496 * FIXME: Run the packet through a virtual server in
2497 * order to see if we like the certificate presented by
2501 status = tls_application_data(sock->ssn, request);
2502 RDEBUG("Application data status %d", status);
2504 if (status == FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS) {
2505 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2509 if (sock->ssn->clean_out.used == 0) {
2510 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2514 dump_hex("TUNNELED DATA", sock->ssn->clean_out.data, sock->ssn->clean_out.used);
2517 * If the packet is a complete RADIUS packet, return it to
2518 * the caller. Otherwise...
2520 if ((sock->ssn->clean_out.used < 20) ||
2521 (((sock->ssn->clean_out.data[2] << 8) | sock->ssn->clean_out.data[3]) != (int) sock->ssn->clean_out.used)) {
2522 RDEBUG("Received bad packet: Length %d contents %d",
2523 sock->ssn->clean_out.used,
2524 (sock->ssn->clean_out.data[2] << 8) | sock->ssn->clean_out.data[3]);
2528 packet = sock->packet;
2529 packet->data = rad_malloc(sock->ssn->clean_out.used);
2530 packet->data_len = sock->ssn->clean_out.used;
2531 record_minus(&sock->ssn->clean_out, packet->data, packet->data_len);
2533 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2535 if (!rad_packet_ok(packet, 0)) {
2536 RDEBUG("Received bad packet: %s", fr_strerror());
2537 tls_socket_close(listener);
2538 return 0; /* do_close unlocks the mutex */
2542 * Copied from src/lib/radius.c, rad_recv();
2544 if (fr_debug_flag) {
2545 char host_ipaddr[128];
2547 if ((packet->code > 0) && (packet->code < FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
2548 RDEBUG("tls_recv: %s packet from host %s port %d, id=%d, length=%d",
2549 fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
2550 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2551 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2552 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2554 packet->id, (int) packet->data_len);
2556 RDEBUG("tls_recv: Packet from host %s port %d code=%d, id=%d, length=%d",
2557 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2558 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2559 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2562 packet->id, (int) packet->data_len);
2566 FR_STATS_INC(auth, total_requests);
2572 int dual_tls_recv(rad_listen_t *listener)
2574 RADIUS_PACKET *packet;
2576 RAD_REQUEST_FUNP fun = NULL;
2577 listen_socket_t *sock = listener->data;
2578 RADCLIENT *client = sock->client;
2580 if (!tls_socket_recv(listener)) {
2584 rad_assert(sock->request != NULL);
2585 rad_assert(sock->request->packet != NULL);
2586 rad_assert(sock->packet != NULL);
2587 rad_assert(sock->ssn != NULL);
2589 request = sock->request;
2590 packet = sock->packet;
2593 * Some sanity checks, based on the packet code.
2595 switch(packet->code) {
2596 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REQUEST:
2597 if (listener->type != RAD_LISTEN_AUTH) goto bad_packet;
2598 FR_STATS_INC(auth, total_requests);
2599 fun = rad_authenticate;
2602 case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
2603 if (listener->type != RAD_LISTEN_ACCT) goto bad_packet;
2604 FR_STATS_INC(acct, total_requests);
2605 fun = rad_accounting;
2608 case PW_STATUS_SERVER:
2609 if (!mainconfig.status_server) {
2610 FR_STATS_INC(auth, total_unknown_types);
2611 DEBUG("WARNING: Ignoring Status-Server request due to security configuration");
2612 rad_free(&sock->packet);
2613 request->packet = NULL;
2616 fun = rad_status_server;
2621 FR_STATS_INC(auth, total_unknown_types);
2623 DEBUG("Invalid packet code %d sent from client %s port %d : IGNORED",
2624 packet->code, client->shortname, packet->src_port);
2625 rad_free(&sock->packet);
2626 request->packet = NULL;
2628 } /* switch over packet types */
2630 if (!request_receive(listener, packet, client, fun)) {
2631 FR_STATS_INC(auth, total_packets_dropped);
2632 rad_free(&sock->packet);
2633 request->packet = NULL;
2637 sock->packet = NULL; /* we have no need for more partial reads */
2638 request->packet = NULL;
2645 * Send a response packet
2647 int dual_tls_send(rad_listen_t *listener, REQUEST *request)
2649 listen_socket_t *sock = listener->data;
2651 rad_assert(request->listener == listener);
2652 rad_assert(listener->send == dual_tls_send);
2655 * Accounting reject's are silently dropped.
2657 * We do it here to avoid polluting the rest of the
2658 * code with this knowledge
2660 if (request->reply->code == 0) return 0;
2665 if (rad_encode(request->reply, request->packet,
2666 request->client->secret) < 0) {
2667 RDEBUG("Failed encoding packet: %s", fr_strerror());
2674 if (rad_sign(request->reply, request->packet,
2675 request->client->secret) < 0) {
2676 RDEBUG("Failed signing packet: %s", fr_strerror());
2680 PTHREAD_MUTEX_LOCK(&sock->mutex);
2682 * Write the packet to the SSL buffers.
2684 record_plus(&sock->ssn->clean_in,
2685 request->reply->data, request->reply->data_len);
2688 * Do SSL magic to get encrypted data.
2690 tls_handshake_send(request, sock->ssn);
2693 * And finally write the data to the socket.
2695 if (sock->ssn->dirty_out.used > 0) {
2696 dump_hex("WRITE TO SSL", sock->ssn->dirty_out.data, sock->ssn->dirty_out.used);
2698 tls_socket_write(listener, request);
2700 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2706 int proxy_tls_recv(rad_listen_t *listener)
2710 listen_socket_t *sock = listener->data;
2713 RADIUS_PACKET *packet;
2714 RAD_REQUEST_FUNP fun = NULL;
2716 DEBUG3("Proxy SSL socket has data to read");
2717 PTHREAD_MUTEX_LOCK(&sock->mutex);
2719 rcode = SSL_read(sock->ssn->ssl, data, 4);
2721 int err = SSL_get_error(sock->ssn->ssl, rcode);
2723 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
2724 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
2727 case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
2728 /* remote end sent close_notify, send one back */
2729 SSL_shutdown(sock->ssn->ssl);
2731 case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
2733 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2734 tls_socket_close(listener);
2738 while ((err = ERR_get_error())) {
2739 DEBUG("proxy recv says %s",
2740 ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
2747 length = (data[2] << 8) | data[3];
2748 DEBUG3("Proxy received header saying we have a packet of %u bytes",
2749 (unsigned int) length);
2751 if (length > sizeof(data)) {
2752 DEBUG("Received packet will be too large! (%u)",
2753 (data[2] << 8) | data[3]);
2757 rcode = SSL_read(sock->ssn->ssl, data + 4, length);
2759 switch (SSL_get_error(sock->ssn->ssl, rcode)) {
2760 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
2761 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
2765 case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
2766 /* remote end sent close_notify, send one back */
2767 SSL_shutdown(sock->ssn->ssl);
2773 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2775 packet = rad_alloc(0);
2776 packet->sockfd = listener->fd;
2777 packet->src_ipaddr = sock->other_ipaddr;
2778 packet->src_port = sock->other_port;
2779 packet->dst_ipaddr = sock->my_ipaddr;
2780 packet->dst_port = sock->my_port;
2781 packet->code = data[0];
2782 packet->id = data[1];
2783 packet->data_len = length;
2784 packet->data = rad_malloc(packet->data_len);
2785 memcpy(packet->data, data, packet->data_len);
2786 memcpy(packet->vector, packet->data + 4, 16);
2789 * FIXME: Client MIB updates?
2791 switch(packet->code) {
2792 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
2793 case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
2794 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
2795 fun = rad_authenticate;
2798 #ifdef WITH_ACCOUNTING
2799 case PW_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
2800 fun = rad_accounting;
2806 * FIXME: Update MIB for packet types?
2808 radlog(L_ERR, "Invalid packet code %d sent to a proxy port "
2809 "from home server %s port %d - ID %d : IGNORED",
2811 ip_ntoh(&packet->src_ipaddr, buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
2812 packet->src_port, packet->id);
2817 if (!request_proxy_reply(packet)) {
2825 int proxy_tls_send(rad_listen_t *listener, REQUEST *request)
2828 listen_socket_t *sock = listener->data;
2831 * Normal proxying calls us with the data already
2832 * encoded. The "ping home server" code does not. So,
2833 * if there's no packet, encode it here.
2835 if (!request->proxy->data) {
2836 request->proxy_listener->encode(request->proxy_listener,
2840 DEBUG3("Proxy is writing %u bytes to SSL",
2841 (unsigned int) request->proxy->data_len);
2842 PTHREAD_MUTEX_LOCK(&sock->mutex);
2843 while ((rcode = SSL_write(sock->ssn->ssl, request->proxy->data,
2844 request->proxy->data_len)) < 0) {
2846 while ((err = ERR_get_error())) {
2847 DEBUG("proxy SSL_write says %s",
2848 ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
2850 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2851 tls_socket_close(listener);
2854 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2859 #endif /* WITH_TLS */