6 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
7 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
8 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
9 * (at your option) any later version.
11 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
12 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
14 * GNU General Public License for more details.
16 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
17 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
18 * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
20 * Copyright 2001 hereUare Communications, Inc. <raghud@hereuare.com>
21 * Copyright 2003 Alan DeKok <aland@freeradius.org>
22 * Copyright 2006 The FreeRADIUS server project
27 * TLS Packet Format in EAP
28 * --- ------ ------ -- ---
30 * 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
31 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
32 * | Code | Identifier | Length |
33 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
34 * | Type | Flags | TLS Message Length
35 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
36 * | TLS Message Length | TLS Data...
37 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
41 #include <freeradius-devel/ident.h>
44 #include <freeradius-devel/autoconf.h>
49 * Allocate a new TLS_PACKET
51 EAPTLS_PACKET *eaptls_alloc(void)
55 if ((rp = malloc(sizeof(EAPTLS_PACKET))) == NULL) {
56 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: out of memory");
59 memset(rp, 0, sizeof(EAPTLS_PACKET));
66 void eaptls_free(EAPTLS_PACKET **eaptls_packet_ptr)
68 EAPTLS_PACKET *eaptls_packet;
70 if (!eaptls_packet_ptr) return;
71 eaptls_packet = *eaptls_packet_ptr;
72 if (eaptls_packet == NULL) return;
74 if (eaptls_packet->data) {
75 free(eaptls_packet->data);
76 eaptls_packet->data = NULL;
80 *eaptls_packet_ptr = NULL;
84 The S flag is set only within the EAP-TLS start message
85 sent from the EAP server to the peer.
87 int eaptls_start(EAP_DS *eap_ds, int peap_flag)
91 reply.code = EAPTLS_START;
92 reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN + 1/*flags*/;
94 reply.flags = peap_flag;
95 reply.flags = SET_START(reply.flags);
100 eaptls_compose(eap_ds, &reply);
105 int eaptls_success(EAP_DS *eap_ds, int peap_flag)
109 reply.code = EAPTLS_SUCCESS;
110 reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN;
111 reply.flags = peap_flag;
115 eaptls_compose(eap_ds, &reply);
120 int eaptls_fail(EAP_DS *eap_ds, int peap_flag)
124 reply.code = EAPTLS_FAIL;
125 reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN;
126 reply.flags = peap_flag;
130 eaptls_compose(eap_ds, &reply);
136 A single TLS record may be up to 16384 octets in length, but a TLS
137 message may span multiple TLS records, and a TLS certificate message
138 may in principle be as long as 16MB.
142 * Frame the Dirty data that needs to be send to the client in an
143 * EAP-Request. We always embed the TLS-length in all EAP-TLS
144 * packets that we send, for easy reference purpose. Handle
145 * fragmentation and sending the next fragment etc.
147 int eaptls_request(EAP_DS *eap_ds, tls_session_t *ssn)
152 unsigned int lbit = 0;
154 /* This value determines whether we set (L)ength flag for
155 EVERY packet we send and add corresponding
156 "TLS Message Length" field.
159 This means we include L flag and "TLS Msg Len" in EVERY
163 This means we include L flag and "TLS Msg Len" **ONLY**
164 in First packet of a fragment series. We do not use
167 Having L flag in every packet is prefered.
170 if (ssn->length_flag) {
173 if (ssn->fragment == 0) {
174 ssn->tls_msg_len = ssn->dirty_out.used;
177 reply.code = EAPTLS_REQUEST;
178 reply.flags = ssn->peap_flag;
180 /* Send data, NOT more than the FRAGMENT size */
181 if (ssn->dirty_out.used > ssn->offset) {
183 reply.flags = SET_MORE_FRAGMENTS(reply.flags);
184 /* Length MUST be included if it is the First Fragment */
185 if (ssn->fragment == 0) {
190 size = ssn->dirty_out.used;
194 reply.dlen = lbit + size;
195 reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN + 1/*flags*/ + reply.dlen;
197 reply.data = malloc(reply.dlen);
199 nlen = htonl(ssn->tls_msg_len);
200 memcpy(reply.data, &nlen, lbit);
201 reply.flags = SET_LENGTH_INCLUDED(reply.flags);
203 (ssn->record_minus)(&ssn->dirty_out, reply.data + lbit, size);
205 eaptls_compose(eap_ds, &reply);
213 * Acknowledge received is for one of the following messages sent earlier
214 * 1. Handshake completed Message, so now send, EAP-Success
215 * 2. Alert Message, now send, EAP-Failure
216 * 3. Fragment Message, now send, next Fragment
218 static eaptls_status_t eaptls_ack_handler(EAP_HANDLER *handler)
220 tls_session_t *tls_session;
222 tls_session = (tls_session_t *)handler->opaque;
223 if (tls_session == NULL){
224 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Unexpected ACK received");
227 if (tls_session->info.initialized == 0) {
228 DEBUG(" rlm_eap_tls: No SSL info available. Waiting for more SSL data.");
229 return EAPTLS_REQUEST;
231 if (tls_session->info.origin == 0) {
232 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Unexpected ACK received");
236 switch (tls_session->info.content_type) {
238 DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_tls: ack alert");
239 eaptls_fail(handler->eap_ds, tls_session->peap_flag);
243 if (tls_session->info.handshake_type == finished) {
244 DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_tls: ack handshake is finished");
245 return EAPTLS_SUCCESS;
248 DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_tls: ack handshake fragment handler");
249 /* Fragmentation handler, send next fragment */
250 return EAPTLS_REQUEST;
253 * For the rest of the conditions, switch over
254 * to the default section below.
257 DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_tls: ack default");
258 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Invalid ACK received: %d",
259 tls_session->info.content_type);
265 * Similarly, when the EAP server receives an EAP-Response with
266 * the M bit set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Request with
267 * EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data. This serves as a fragment ACK.
269 * In order to prevent errors in the processing of fragments, the
270 * EAP server MUST use increment the Identifier value for each
271 * fragment ACK contained within an EAP-Request, and the peer
272 * MUST include this Identifier value in the subsequent fragment
273 * contained within an EAP- Reponse.
275 * EAP server sends an ACK when it determines there are More
276 * fragments to receive to make the complete
277 * TLS-record/TLS-Message
279 static int eaptls_send_ack(EAP_DS *eap_ds, int peap_flag)
283 reply.code = EAPTLS_ACK;
284 reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN + 1/*flags*/;
285 reply.flags = peap_flag;
289 eaptls_compose(eap_ds, &reply);
295 * The S flag is set only within the EAP-TLS start message sent
296 * from the EAP server to the peer.
298 * Similarly, when the EAP server receives an EAP-Response with
299 * the M bit set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Request with
300 * EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data. This serves as a fragment
301 * ACK. The EAP peer MUST wait.
303 static eaptls_status_t eaptls_verify(EAP_HANDLER *handler)
305 EAP_DS *eap_ds = handler->eap_ds;
306 EAP_DS *prev_eap_ds = handler->prev_eapds;
307 eaptls_packet_t *eaptls_packet, *eaptls_prev = NULL;
310 * We don't check ANY of the input parameters. It's all
311 * code which works together, so if something is wrong,
312 * we SHOULD core dump.
314 * e.g. if eap_ds is NULL, of if eap_ds->response is
315 * NULL, of if it's NOT an EAP-Response, or if the packet
316 * is too short. See eap_validation()., in ../../eap.c
318 * Also, eaptype_select() takes care of selecting the
319 * appropriate type, so we don't need to check
320 * eap_ds->response->type.type == PW_EAP_TLS, or anything
323 eaptls_packet = (eaptls_packet_t *)eap_ds->response->type.data;
324 if (prev_eap_ds && prev_eap_ds->response)
325 eaptls_prev = (eaptls_packet_t *)prev_eap_ds->response->type.data;
330 * If there's no TLS data, or there's 1 byte of TLS data,
331 * with the flags set to zero, then it's an ACK.
333 * Find if this is a reply to the previous request sent
335 if ((eaptls_packet == NULL) ||
336 ((eap_ds->response->length == EAP_HEADER_LEN + 2) &&
337 ((eaptls_packet->flags & 0xc0) == 0x00))) {
339 if (prev_eap_ds->request->id == eap_ds->response->id) {
341 * Run the ACK handler directly from here.
343 radlog(L_INFO, "rlm_eap_tls: Received EAP-TLS ACK message");
344 return eaptls_ack_handler(handler);
346 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Received Invalid EAP-TLS ACK message");
347 return EAPTLS_INVALID;
352 * We send TLS_START, but do not receive it.
354 if (TLS_START(eaptls_packet->flags)) {
355 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Received unexpected EAP-TLS Start message");
356 return EAPTLS_INVALID;
360 * The L bit (length included) is set to indicate the
361 * presence of the four octet TLS Message Length field,
362 * and MUST be set for the first fragment of a fragmented
363 * TLS message or set of messages.
365 * The M bit (more fragments) is set on all but the last
368 * The S bit (EAP-TLS start) is set in an EAP-TLS Start
369 * message. This differentiates the EAP-TLS Start message
370 * from a fragment acknowledgement.
372 if (TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED(eaptls_packet->flags)) {
373 if (TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS(eaptls_packet->flags)) {
375 * FIRST_FRAGMENT is identified
376 * 1. If there is no previous EAP-response received.
377 * 2. If EAP-response received, then its M bit not set.
378 * (It is because Last fragment will not have M bit set)
380 if ((prev_eap_ds->response == NULL) ||
381 (eaptls_prev == NULL) ||
382 !TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS(eaptls_prev->flags)) {
384 radlog(L_INFO, "rlm_eap_tls: Received EAP-TLS First Fragment of the message");
385 return EAPTLS_FIRST_FRAGMENT;
388 radlog(L_INFO, "rlm_eap_tls: More Fragments with length included");
389 return EAPTLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS_WITH_LENGTH;
393 radlog(L_INFO, "rlm_eap_tls: Length Included");
394 return EAPTLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED;
398 if (TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS(eaptls_packet->flags)) {
399 radlog(L_INFO, "rlm_eap_tls: More fragments to follow");
400 return EAPTLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS;
404 * None of the flags are set, but it's still a valid
414 * length = code + id + length + flags + tlsdata
415 * = 1 + 1 + 2 + 1 + X
416 * length = EAP-length - 1(EAP-Type = 1 octet)
417 * flags = EAP-typedata[0] (1 octet)
418 * dlen = EAP-typedata[1-4] (4 octets), if L flag set
419 * = length - 5(code+id+length+flags), otherwise
420 * data = EAP-typedata[5-n], if L flag set
421 * = EAP-typedata[1-n], otherwise
422 * packet = EAP-typedata (complete typedata)
424 * Points to consider during EAP-TLS data extraction
425 * 1. In the received packet, No data will be present incase of ACK-NAK
426 * 2. Incase if more fragments need to be received then ACK after retreiving this fragment.
428 * RFC 2716 Section 4.2. PPP EAP TLS Request Packet
431 * 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
432 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
433 * | Code | Identifier | Length |
434 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
435 * | Type | Flags | TLS Message Length
436 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
437 * | TLS Message Length | TLS Data...
438 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
440 * The Length field is two octets and indicates the length of the EAP
441 * packet including the Code, Identifir, Length, Type, and TLS data
444 static EAPTLS_PACKET *eaptls_extract(EAP_DS *eap_ds, eaptls_status_t status)
446 EAPTLS_PACKET *tlspacket;
447 uint32_t data_len = 0;
449 uint8_t *data = NULL;
451 if (status == EAPTLS_INVALID)
455 * The main EAP code & eaptls_verify() take care of
456 * ensuring that the packet is OK, and that we can
457 * extract the various fields we want.
459 * e.g. a TLS packet with zero data is allowed as an ACK,
460 * but we will never see it here, as we will simply
461 * send another fragment, instead of trying to extract
464 * MUST have TLS type octet, followed by flags, followed
467 assert(eap_ds->response->length > 2);
469 tlspacket = eaptls_alloc();
470 if (tlspacket == NULL) return NULL;
473 * Code & id for EAPTLS & EAP are same
474 * but eaptls_length = eap_length - 1(EAP-Type = 1 octet)
476 * length = code + id + length + type + tlsdata
477 * = 1 + 1 + 2 + 1 + X
479 tlspacket->code = eap_ds->response->code;
480 tlspacket->id = eap_ds->response->id;
481 tlspacket->length = eap_ds->response->length - 1; /* EAP type */
482 tlspacket->flags = eap_ds->response->type.data[0];
485 * A quick sanity check of the flags. If we've been told
486 * that there's a length, and there isn't one, then stop.
488 if (TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED(tlspacket->flags) &&
489 (tlspacket->length < 5)) { /* flags + TLS message length */
490 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Invalid EAP-TLS packet received. (Length bit is set, but no length was found.)");
491 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
496 * If the final TLS packet is larger than we can handle, die
499 * Likewise, if the EAP packet says N bytes, and the TLS
500 * packet says there's fewer bytes, it's a problem.
502 * FIXME: Try to ensure that the claimed length is
503 * consistent across multiple TLS fragments.
505 if (TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED(tlspacket->flags)) {
506 memcpy(&data_len, &eap_ds->response->type.data[1], 4);
507 data_len = ntohl(data_len);
508 if (data_len > MAX_RECORD_SIZE) {
509 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: The EAP-TLS packet will contain more data than we can process.");
510 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
515 DEBUG2(" TLS: %d %d\n", data_len, tlspacket->length);
517 if (data_len < tlspacket->length) {
518 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: EAP-TLS packet claims to be smaller than the encapsulating EAP packet.");
519 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
527 * The TLS Message Length field is four octets, and
528 * provides the total length of the TLS message or set of
529 * messages that is being fragmented; this simplifies
532 * Dynamic allocation of buffers as & when we know the
533 * length should solve the problem.
535 case EAPTLS_FIRST_FRAGMENT:
536 case EAPTLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED:
537 case EAPTLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS_WITH_LENGTH:
538 if (tlspacket->length < 5) { /* flags + TLS message length */
539 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Invalid EAP-TLS packet received. (Expected length, got none.)");
540 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
545 * Extract all the TLS fragments from the
546 * previous eap_ds Start appending this
547 * fragment to the above ds
549 memcpy(&data_len, &eap_ds->response->type.data[1], sizeof(uint32_t));
550 data_len = ntohl(data_len);
551 data = (eap_ds->response->type.data + 5/*flags+TLS-Length*/);
552 len = eap_ds->response->type.length - 5/*flags+TLS-Length*/;
555 * Hmm... this should be an error, too.
557 if (data_len > len) {
563 * Data length is implicit, from the EAP header.
565 case EAPTLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS:
567 data_len = eap_ds->response->type.length - 1/*flags*/;
568 data = eap_ds->response->type.data + 1/*flags*/;
572 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Invalid EAP-TLS packet received");
573 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
577 tlspacket->dlen = data_len;
579 tlspacket->data = (unsigned char *)malloc(data_len);
580 if (tlspacket->data == NULL) {
581 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: out of memory");
582 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
585 memcpy(tlspacket->data, data, data_len);
594 * To process the TLS,
596 * 1. EAP-TLS should get the compelete TLS data from the peer.
597 * 2. Store that data in a data structure with any other required info
598 * 3. Handle that data structure to the TLS module.
599 * 4. TLS module will perform its operations on the data and
600 * handle back to EAP-TLS
603 * 1. EAP-TLS if necessary will fragment it and send it to the
606 * During EAP-TLS initialization, TLS Context object will be
607 * initialized and stored. For every new authentication
608 * requests, TLS will open a new session object and that session
609 * object should be maintained even after the session is
610 * completed for session resumption. (Probably later as a feature
611 * as we donot know who maintains these session objects ie,
612 * SSL_CTX (internally) or TLS module(explicitly). If TLS module,
613 * then how to let SSL API know about these sessions.)
615 static void eaptls_operation(EAPTLS_PACKET *eaptls_packet UNUSED,
616 eaptls_status_t status, EAP_HANDLER *handler)
618 tls_session_t *tls_session;
620 tls_session = (tls_session_t *)handler->opaque;
622 if ((status == EAPTLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS) ||
623 (status == EAPTLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS_WITH_LENGTH) ||
624 (status == EAPTLS_FIRST_FRAGMENT)) {
628 eaptls_send_ack(handler->eap_ds, tls_session->peap_flag);
631 * We have the complete TLS-data or TLS-message.
633 * Clean the dirty message.
635 * Authenticate the user and send
639 * is required then send another request. */
640 if (tls_handshake_recv(tls_session)) {
642 * FIXME: return success/fail.
644 * TLS proper can decide what to do, then.
646 eaptls_request(handler->eap_ds, tls_session);
648 eaptls_fail(handler->eap_ds, tls_session->peap_flag);
656 * In the actual authentication first verify the packet and then create the data structure
659 * To process the TLS,
661 * 1. EAP-TLS should get the compelete TLS data from the peer.
662 * 2. Store that data in a data structure with any other required info
663 * 3. Hand this data structure to the TLS module.
664 * 4. TLS module will perform its operations on the data and hands back to EAP-TLS
666 * 1. EAP-TLS if necessary will fragment it and send it to the destination.
668 * During EAP-TLS initialization, TLS Context object will be
669 * initialized and stored. For every new authentication
670 * requests, TLS will open a new session object and that
671 * session object SHOULD be maintained even after the session
672 * is completed, for session resumption. (Probably later as a
673 * feature, as we do not know who maintains these session
674 * objects ie, SSL_CTX (internally) or TLS module (explicitly). If
675 * TLS module, then how to let SSL API know about these
680 * Process an EAP request
682 eaptls_status_t eaptls_process(EAP_HANDLER *handler)
684 tls_session_t *tls_session = (tls_session_t *) handler->opaque;
685 EAPTLS_PACKET *tlspacket;
686 eaptls_status_t status;
688 DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_tls: processing TLS");
690 /* This case is when SSL generates Alert then we
691 * send that alert to the client and then send the EAP-Failure
693 status = eaptls_verify(handler);
694 DEBUG2(" eaptls_verify returned %d\n", status);
702 * Success means that we're done the initial
703 * handshake. For TTLS, this means send stuff
704 * back to the client, and the client sends us
705 * more tunneled data.
712 * Normal TLS request, continue with the "get rest
713 * of fragments" phase.
716 eaptls_request(handler->eap_ds, tls_session);
717 return EAPTLS_HANDLED;
721 * The handshake is done, and we're in the "tunnel
725 DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_tls: Done initial handshake");
728 * Get the rest of the fragments.
730 case EAPTLS_FIRST_FRAGMENT:
731 case EAPTLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS:
732 case EAPTLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED:
733 case EAPTLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS_WITH_LENGTH:
738 * Extract the TLS packet from the buffer.
740 if ((tlspacket = eaptls_extract(handler->eap_ds, status)) == NULL)
744 * Get the session struct from the handler
746 * update the dirty_in buffer
748 * NOTE: This buffer will contain partial data when M bit is set.
750 * CAUTION while reinitializing this buffer, it should be
751 * reinitialized only when this M bit is NOT set.
753 if (tlspacket->dlen !=
754 (tls_session->record_plus)(&tls_session->dirty_in, tlspacket->data, tlspacket->dlen)) {
755 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
756 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Exceeded maximum record size");
761 * SSL initalization is done. Return.
763 * The TLS data will be in the tls_session structure.
765 if (SSL_is_init_finished(tls_session->ssl)) {
766 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
771 * Continue the handshake.
773 eaptls_operation(tlspacket, status, handler);
775 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
776 return EAPTLS_HANDLED;
781 * compose the TLS reply packet in the EAP reply typedata
783 int eaptls_compose(EAP_DS *eap_ds, EAPTLS_PACKET *reply)
788 * Don't set eap_ds->request->type.type, as the main EAP
789 * handler will do that for us. This allows the TLS
790 * module to be called from TTLS & PEAP.
794 * When the EAP server receives an EAP-Response with the
795 * M bit set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Request with
796 * EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data. This serves as a
797 * fragment ACK. The EAP peer MUST wait until it receives
798 * the EAP-Request before sending another fragment.
800 * In order to prevent errors in the processing of
801 * fragments, the EAP server MUST use increment the
802 * Identifier value for each fragment ACK contained
803 * within an EAP-Request, and the peer MUST include this
804 * Identifier value in the subsequent fragment contained
805 * within an EAP- Reponse.
807 eap_ds->request->type.data = malloc(reply->length - TLS_HEADER_LEN + 1);
808 if (eap_ds->request->type.data == NULL) {
809 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: out of memory");
813 /* EAPTLS Header length is excluded while computing EAP typelen */
814 eap_ds->request->type.length = reply->length - TLS_HEADER_LEN;
816 ptr = eap_ds->request->type.data;
817 *ptr++ = (uint8_t)(reply->flags & 0xFF);
819 if (reply->dlen) memcpy(ptr, reply->data, reply->dlen);
821 switch (reply->code) {
825 eap_ds->request->code = PW_EAP_REQUEST;
828 eap_ds->request->code = PW_EAP_SUCCESS;
831 eap_ds->request->code = PW_EAP_FAILURE;
834 /* Should never enter here */
835 eap_ds->request->code = PW_EAP_FAILURE;