2 * rlm_eap_ttls.c contains the interfaces that are called from eap
6 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
7 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
8 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
9 * (at your option) any later version.
11 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
12 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
14 * GNU General Public License for more details.
16 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
17 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
18 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
20 * Copyright 2003 Alan DeKok <aland@freeradius.org>
27 * 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
28 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
30 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
31 * |V M r r r r r r| AVP Length |
32 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
34 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
40 * Verify that the diameter packet is valid.
42 static int diameter_verify(const uint8_t *data, unsigned int data_len)
47 unsigned int data_left = data_len;
49 while (data_left > 0) {
50 rad_assert(data_left <= data_len);
51 memcpy(&attr, data, sizeof(attr));
55 DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_ttls: Non-RADIUS attribute in tunneled authentication is not supported");
59 memcpy(&length, data , sizeof(length));
61 length = ntohl(length);
64 * A "vendor" flag, with a vendor ID of zero,
65 * is equivalent to no vendor. This is stupid.
68 if ((length & (1 << 31)) != 0) {
73 memcpy(&vendor, data, sizeof(vendor));
74 vendor = ntohl(vendor);
77 DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_ttls: Vendor codes larger than 65535 are not supported");
81 attribute = (vendor << 16) | attr;
83 da = dict_attrbyvalue(attribute);
86 * SHOULD check ((length & (1 << 30)) != 0)
87 * for the mandatory bit.
90 DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_ttls: Fatal! Vendor %u, Attribute %u was not found in our dictionary. ",
95 data += 4; /* skip the vendor field */
96 offset += 4; /* offset to value field */
100 * Ignore the M bit. We support all RADIUS attributes...
104 * Get the length. If it's too big, die.
106 length &= 0x00ffffff;
109 * Too short or too long is bad.
113 if (length < offset) {
114 DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_ttls: Tunneled attribute %d is too short (%d)to contain anything useful.", attr, length);
118 if (length > (MAX_STRING_LEN + 8)) {
119 DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_ttls: Tunneled attribute %d is too long (%d) to pack into a RADIUS attribute.", attr, length);
123 if (length > data_left) {
124 DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_ttls: Tunneled attribute %d is longer than room left in the packet (%d > %d).", attr, length, data_left);
129 * Check for broken implementations, which don't
130 * pad the AVP to a 4-octet boundary.
132 if (data_left == length) break;
135 * The length does NOT include the padding, so
136 * we've got to account for it here by rounding up
137 * to the nearest 4-byte boundary.
143 * If the rest of the diameter packet is larger than
144 * this attribute, continue.
146 * Otherwise, if the attribute over-flows the end
147 * of the packet, die.
149 if (data_left < length) {
150 DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_ttls: ERROR! Diameter attribute overflows packet!");
155 * Check again for equality, now that we're padded
156 * length to a multiple of 4 octets.
158 if (data_left == length) break;
161 * data_left > length, continue.
164 data += length - offset;
168 * We got this far. It looks OK.
175 * Convert diameter attributes to our VALUE_PAIR's
177 static VALUE_PAIR *diameter2vp(SSL *ssl,
178 const uint8_t *data, unsigned int data_len)
184 unsigned int data_left = data_len;
185 VALUE_PAIR *first = NULL;
186 VALUE_PAIR **last = &first;
189 while (data_left > 0) {
190 rad_assert(data_left <= data_len);
191 memcpy(&attr, data, sizeof(attr));
195 memcpy(&length, data, sizeof(length));
197 length = ntohl(length);
200 * Ignore the M bit. We support all RADIUS attributes...
204 * A "vendor" flag, with a vendor ID of zero,
205 * is equivalent to no vendor. This is stupid.
208 if ((length & (1 << 31)) != 0) {
211 memcpy(&vendor, data, sizeof(vendor));
212 vendor = ntohl(vendor);
214 attr |= (vendor << 16);
216 data += 4; /* skip the vendor field, it's zero */
217 offset += 4; /* offset to value field */
223 length &= 0x00ffffff;
226 * diameter code + length, and it must fit in
229 rad_assert(length <= (offset + MAX_STRING_LEN));
232 * Get the size of the value portion of the
235 size = length - offset;
240 vp = paircreate(attr, PW_TYPE_OCTETS);
242 DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_ttls: Failure in creating VP");
248 * If it's a type from our dictionary, then
249 * we need to put the data in a relevant place.
252 case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
254 if (size != vp->length) {
255 DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_ttls: Invalid length attribute %d",
260 memcpy(&vp->lvalue, data, vp->length);
263 * Stored in host byte order: change it.
265 vp->lvalue = ntohl(vp->lvalue);
269 if (size != vp->length) {
270 DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_ttls: Invalid length attribute %d",
275 memcpy(&vp->lvalue, data, vp->length);
278 * Stored in network byte order: don't change it.
283 * String, octet, etc. Copy the data from the
284 * value field over verbatim.
286 * FIXME: Ipv6 attributes ?
291 memcpy(vp->strvalue, data, vp->length);
296 * User-Password is NUL padded to a multiple
297 * of 16 bytes. Let's chop it to something
300 * NOTE: This means that the User-Password
301 * attribute CANNOT EVER have embedded zeros in it!
303 switch (vp->attribute) {
304 case PW_USER_PASSWORD:
305 rad_assert(vp->length <= 128); /* RFC requirements */
308 * If the password is exactly 16 octets,
309 * it won't be zero-terminated.
311 vp->strvalue[vp->length] = '\0';
312 vp->length = strlen(vp->strvalue);
316 * Ensure that the client is using the
317 * correct challenge. This weirdness is
318 * to protect against against replay
319 * attacks, where anyone observing the
320 * CHAP exchange could pose as that user,
321 * by simply choosing to use the same
324 * By using a challenge based on
325 * information from the current session,
326 * we can guarantee that the client is
327 * not *choosing* a challenge.
329 * We're a little forgiving in that we
330 * have loose checks on the length, and
331 * we do NOT check the Id (first octet of
332 * the response to the challenge)
334 * But if the client gets the challenge correct,
335 * we're not too worried about the Id.
337 case PW_CHAP_CHALLENGE:
338 case PW_MSCHAP_CHALLENGE:
339 if ((vp->length < 8) ||
341 DEBUG2(" TTLS: Tunneled challenge has invalid length");
347 uint8_t challenge[16];
349 eapttls_gen_challenge(ssl, challenge,
352 for (i = 0; i < vp->length; i++) {
353 if (challenge[i] != vp->strvalue[i]) {
354 DEBUG2(" TTLS: Tunneled challenge is incorrect");
364 } /* switch over checking/re-writing of attributes. */
373 * Catch non-aligned attributes.
375 if (data_left == length) break;
378 * The length does NOT include the padding, so
379 * we've got to account for it here by rounding up
380 * to the nearest 4-byte boundary.
385 rad_assert(data_left >= length);
387 data += length - offset; /* already updated */
391 * We got this far. It looks OK.
397 * Convert VALUE_PAIR's to diameter attributes, and write them
400 * The ONLY VALUE_PAIR's which may be passed to this function
401 * are ones which can go inside of a RADIUS (i.e. diameter)
402 * packet. So no server-configuration attributes, or the like.
404 static int vp2diameter(tls_session_t *tls_session, VALUE_PAIR *first)
407 * RADIUS packets are no more than 4k in size, so if
408 * we've got more than 4k of data to write, it's very
411 uint8_t buffer[4096];
422 for (vp = first; vp != NULL; vp = vp->next) {
424 * Too much data: die.
426 if ((total + vp->length + 12) >= sizeof(buffer)) {
427 DEBUG2(" TTLS output buffer is full!");
432 * Hmm... we don't group multiple EAP-Messages
433 * together. Maybe we should...
437 * Length is no more than 253, due to RADIUS
441 vendor = (vp->attribute >> 16) & 0xffff;
443 attr = vp->attribute & 0xffff;
446 attr = vp->attribute;
450 * Hmm... set the M bit for all attributes?
456 memcpy(p, &attr, sizeof(attr));
460 length += 8; /* includes 8 bytes of attr & length */
463 length += 4; /* include 4 bytes of vendor */
465 length = ntohl(length);
466 memcpy(p, &length, sizeof(length));
470 vendor = ntohl(vendor);
471 memcpy(p, &vendor, sizeof(vendor));
475 length = ntohl(length);
476 memcpy(p, &length, sizeof(length));
482 case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
484 attr = ntohl(vp->lvalue); /* stored in host order */
485 memcpy(p, &attr, sizeof(attr));
490 attr = vp->lvalue; /* stored in network order */
491 memcpy(p, &attr, sizeof(attr));
498 memcpy(p, vp->strvalue, vp->length);
504 * Skip to the end of the data.
510 * Align the data to a multiple of 4 bytes.
512 if ((total & 0x03) != 0) {
515 length = 4 - (total & 0x03);
516 for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
522 } /* loop over the VP's to write. */
525 * Write the data in the buffer to the SSL session.
531 if (debug_flag > 2) {
532 for (i = 0; i < total; i++) {
533 if ((i & 0x0f) == 0) printf(" TTLS tunnel data out %04x: ", i);
535 printf("%02x ", buffer[i]);
537 if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f) printf("\n");
539 if ((total & 0x0f) != 0) printf("\n");
543 record_plus(&tls_session->clean_in, buffer, total);
546 * FIXME: Check the return code.
548 tls_handshake_send(tls_session);
549 record_init(&tls_session->clean_in);
559 * Use a reply packet to determine what to do.
561 static int process_reply(EAP_HANDLER *handler, tls_session_t *tls_session,
562 REQUEST *request, RADIUS_PACKET *reply)
564 int rcode = RLM_MODULE_REJECT;
566 ttls_tunnel_t *t = tls_session->opaque;
568 handler = handler; /* -Wunused */
571 * If the response packet was Access-Accept, then
572 * we're OK. If not, die horribly.
574 * FIXME: Take MS-CHAP2-Success attribute, and
575 * tunnel it back to the client, to authenticate
576 * ourselves to the client.
578 * FIXME: If we have an Access-Challenge, then
579 * the Reply-Message is tunneled back to the client.
581 * FIXME: If we have an EAP-Message, then that message
582 * must be tunneled back to the client.
584 * FIXME: If we have an Access-Challenge with a State
585 * attribute, then do we tunnel that to the client, or
586 * keep track of it ourselves?
588 * FIXME: EAP-Messages can only start with 'identity',
589 * NOT 'eap start', so we should check for that....
591 switch (reply->code) {
592 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
593 DEBUG2(" TTLS: Got tunneled Access-Accept");
595 rcode = RLM_MODULE_OK;
598 * MS-CHAP2-Success means that we do NOT return
599 * an Access-Accept, but instead tunnel that
600 * attribute to the client, and keep going with
601 * the TTLS session. Once the client accepts
602 * our identity, it will respond with an empty
603 * packet, and we will send EAP-Success.
606 pairmove2(&vp, &reply->vps, PW_MSCHAP2_SUCCESS);
610 * FIXME: Tunneling MS-CHAP2-Success causes
611 * the only client we have access to, to die.
613 * We don't want that...
617 DEBUG2(" TTLS: Got MS-CHAP2-Success, tunneling it to the client in a challenge.");
618 rcode = RLM_MODULE_HANDLED;
619 t->authenticated = TRUE;
621 } else { /* no MS-CHAP2-Success */
623 * Can only have EAP-Message if there's
624 * no MS-CHAP2-Success. (FIXME: EAP-MSCHAP?)
626 * We also do NOT tunnel the EAP-Success
627 * attribute back to the client, as the client
628 * can figure it out, from the non-tunneled
629 * EAP-Success packet.
631 pairmove2(&vp, &reply->vps, PW_EAP_MESSAGE);
635 * If we've been told to use the attributes from
636 * the reply, then do so.
638 * WARNING: This may leak information about the
641 if (t->use_tunneled_reply) {
642 pairadd(&request->reply->vps, reply->vps);
648 * Handle the ACK, by tunneling any necessary reply
649 * VP's back to the client.
652 vp2diameter(tls_session, vp);
658 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
659 DEBUG2(" TTLS: Got tunneled Access-Reject");
660 rcode = RLM_MODULE_REJECT;
664 * Handle Access-Challenge, but only if we
665 * send tunneled reply data. This is because
666 * an Access-Challenge means that we MUST tunnel
667 * a Reply-Message to the client.
669 case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
670 DEBUG2(" TTLS: Got tunneled Access-Challenge");
673 * Keep the State attribute, if necessary.
675 * Get rid of the old State, too.
678 pairmove2(&t->state, &reply->vps, PW_STATE);
681 * We should really be a bit smarter about this,
682 * and move over only those attributes which
683 * are relevant to the authentication request,
684 * but that's a lot more work, and this "dumb"
685 * method works in 99.9% of the situations.
688 pairmove2(&vp, &reply->vps, PW_EAP_MESSAGE);
691 * There MUST be a Reply-Message in the challenge,
692 * which we tunnel back to the client.
694 * If there isn't one in the reply VP's, then
695 * we MUST create one, with an empty string as
698 pairmove2(&vp, &reply->vps, PW_REPLY_MESSAGE);
701 * Handle the ACK, by tunneling any necessary reply
702 * VP's back to the client.
705 vp2diameter(tls_session, vp);
708 rcode = RLM_MODULE_HANDLED;
712 DEBUG2(" TTLS: Unknown RADIUS packet type %d: rejecting tunneled user", reply->code);
713 rcode = RLM_MODULE_REJECT;
722 * Do post-proxy processing,
724 static int eapttls_postproxy(EAP_HANDLER *handler, void *data)
727 tls_session_t *tls_session = (tls_session_t *) data;
730 DEBUG2(" TTLS: Passing reply from proxy back into the tunnel.");
733 * If there was a fake request associated with the proxied
734 * request, do more processing of it.
736 fake = (REQUEST *) request_data_get(handler->request,
737 handler->request->proxy,
738 REQUEST_DATA_EAP_MSCHAP_TUNNEL_CALLBACK);
741 * Do the callback, if it exists, and if it was a success.
743 if (fake && (handler->request->proxy_reply->code == PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK)) {
745 REQUEST *request = handler->request;
750 rad_assert(fake->packet == NULL);
751 fake->packet = request->proxy;
752 request->proxy = NULL;
754 rad_assert(fake->reply == NULL);
755 fake->reply = request->proxy_reply;
756 request->proxy_reply = NULL;
759 * Perform a post-auth stage for the tunneled
762 fake->options &= ~RAD_REQUEST_OPTION_PROXY_EAP;
763 rcode = rad_postauth(fake);
764 DEBUG2(" POST-AUTH %d", rcode);
767 if (debug_flag > 0) {
768 printf(" TTLS: Final reply from tunneled session code %d\n",
771 for (vp = fake->reply->vps; vp != NULL; vp = vp->next) {
772 putchar('\t');vp_print(stdout, vp);putchar('\n');
780 request->proxy = fake->packet;
782 request->proxy_reply = fake->reply;
786 * And we're done with this request.
790 case RLM_MODULE_FAIL:
792 eaptls_fail(handler->eap_ds, 0);
796 default: /* Don't Do Anything */
797 DEBUG2(" TTLS: Got reply %d",
798 request->proxy_reply->code);
802 request_free(&fake); /* robust if fake == NULL */
805 * Process the reply from the home server.
807 rcode = process_reply(handler, tls_session, handler->request,
808 handler->request->proxy_reply);
811 * The proxy code uses the reply from the home server as
812 * the basis for the reply to the NAS. We don't want that,
813 * so we toss it, after we've had our way with it.
815 pairfree(&handler->request->proxy_reply->vps);
818 case RLM_MODULE_REJECT:
819 DEBUG2(" TTLS: Reply was rejected");
822 case RLM_MODULE_HANDLED:
823 DEBUG2(" TTLS: Reply was handled");
824 eaptls_request(handler->eap_ds, tls_session);
828 DEBUG2(" TTLS: Reply was OK");
829 eaptls_success(handler->eap_ds, 0);
830 eaptls_gen_mppe_keys(&handler->request->reply->vps,
832 "ttls keying material");
836 DEBUG2(" TTLS: Reply was unknown.");
840 eaptls_fail(handler->eap_ds, 0);
848 static void my_request_free(void *data)
850 REQUEST *request = (REQUEST *)data;
852 request_free(&request);
857 * Process the "diameter" contents of the tunneled data.
859 int eapttls_process(EAP_HANDLER *handler, tls_session_t *tls_session)
862 int rcode = PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT;
867 unsigned int data_len;
869 REQUEST *request = handler->request;
872 * Grab the dirty data, and copy it to our buffer.
874 * I *really* don't like these 'record_t' things...
876 data_len = record_minus(&tls_session->dirty_in, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
880 * Write the data from the dirty buffer (i.e. packet
881 * data) into the buffer which we will give to SSL for
884 * Some of this code COULD technically go into the TLS
885 * module, in eaptls_process(), where it returns EAPTLS_OK.
887 * Similarly, the writing of data to the SSL context could
890 BIO_write(tls_session->into_ssl, buffer, data_len);
891 record_init(&tls_session->clean_out);
894 * Read (and decrypt) the tunneled data from the SSL session,
895 * and put it into the decrypted data buffer.
897 err = SSL_read(tls_session->ssl, tls_session->clean_out.data,
898 sizeof(tls_session->clean_out.data));
901 * FIXME: Call SSL_get_error() to see what went
904 radlog(L_INFO, "rlm_eap_ttls: SSL_read Error");
905 return PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT;
908 t = (ttls_tunnel_t *) tls_session->opaque;
911 * If there's no data, maybe this is an ACK to an
915 if (t->authenticated) {
916 DEBUG2(" TTLS: Got ACK, and the user was already authenticated.");
917 return PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK;
918 } /* else no session, no data, die. */
921 * FIXME: Call SSL_get_error() to see what went
924 radlog(L_INFO, "rlm_eap_ttls: SSL_read Error");
925 return PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT;
928 data_len = tls_session->clean_out.used = err;
929 data = tls_session->clean_out.data;
932 if (debug_flag > 2) {
935 for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
936 if ((i & 0x0f) == 0) printf(" TTLS tunnel data in %04x: ", i);
938 printf("%02x ", data[i]);
940 if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f) printf("\n");
942 if ((data_len & 0x0f) != 0) printf("\n");
946 if (!diameter_verify(data, data_len)) {
947 return PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT;
951 * Allocate a fake REQUEST structe.
953 fake = request_alloc_fake(request);
955 rad_assert(fake->packet->vps == NULL);
958 * Add the tunneled attributes to the fake request.
960 fake->packet->vps = diameter2vp(tls_session->ssl, data, data_len);
961 if (!fake->packet->vps) {
962 return PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT;
966 * Tell the request that it's a fake one.
968 vp = pairmake("Freeradius-Proxied-To", "127.0.0.1", T_OP_EQ);
970 pairadd(&fake->packet->vps, vp);
974 if (debug_flag > 0) {
975 printf(" TTLS: Got tunneled request\n");
977 for (vp = fake->packet->vps; vp != NULL; vp = vp->next) {
978 putchar('\t');vp_print(stdout, vp);putchar('\n');
984 * Update other items in the REQUEST data structure.
986 fake->username = pairfind(fake->packet->vps, PW_USER_NAME);
987 fake->password = pairfind(fake->packet->vps, PW_PASSWORD);
990 * No User-Name, try to create one from stored data.
992 if (!fake->username) {
994 * No User-Name in the stored data, look for
995 * an EAP-Identity, and pull it out of there.
998 vp = pairfind(fake->packet->vps, PW_EAP_MESSAGE);
1000 (vp->length >= EAP_HEADER_LEN + 2) &&
1001 (vp->strvalue[0] == PW_EAP_RESPONSE) &&
1002 (vp->strvalue[EAP_HEADER_LEN] == PW_EAP_IDENTITY) &&
1003 (vp->strvalue[EAP_HEADER_LEN + 1] != 0)) {
1005 * Create & remember a User-Name
1007 t->username = pairmake("User-Name", "", T_OP_EQ);
1008 rad_assert(t->username != NULL);
1010 memcpy(t->username->strvalue, vp->strvalue + 5,
1012 t->username->length = vp->length - 5;
1013 t->username->strvalue[t->username->length] = 0;
1015 DEBUG2(" TTLS: Got tunneled identity of %s",
1016 t->username->strvalue);
1019 * If there's a default EAP type,
1022 if (t->default_eap_type != 0) {
1023 DEBUG2(" TTLS: Setting default EAP type for tunneled EAP session.");
1024 vp = paircreate(PW_EAP_TYPE,
1026 rad_assert(vp != NULL);
1027 vp->lvalue = t->default_eap_type;
1028 pairadd(&fake->config_items, vp);
1033 * Don't reject the request outright,
1034 * as it's permitted to do EAP without
1037 DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_ttls: WARNING! No EAP-Identity found to start EAP conversation.");
1039 } /* else there WAS a t->username */
1042 vp = paircopy(t->username);
1043 pairadd(&fake->packet->vps, vp);
1044 fake->username = pairfind(fake->packet->vps, PW_USER_NAME);
1046 } /* else the request ALREADY had a User-Name */
1049 * Add the State attribute, too, if it exists.
1052 DEBUG2(" TTLS: Adding old state with %02x %02x",
1053 t->state->strvalue[0], t->state->strvalue[1]);
1054 vp = paircopy(t->state);
1055 if (vp) pairadd(&fake->packet->vps, vp);
1059 * If this is set, we copy SOME of the request attributes
1060 * from outside of the tunnel to inside of the tunnel.
1062 * We copy ONLY those attributes which do NOT already
1063 * exist in the tunneled request.
1065 if (t->copy_request_to_tunnel) {
1068 for (vp = request->packet->vps; vp != NULL; vp = vp->next) {
1070 * The attribute is a server-side thingy,
1073 if ((vp->attribute > 255) &&
1074 (((vp->attribute >> 16) & 0xffff) == 0)) {
1079 * The outside attribute is already in the
1080 * tunnel, don't copy it.
1082 * This works for BOTH attributes which
1083 * are originally in the tunneled request,
1084 * AND attributes which are copied there
1087 if (pairfind(fake->packet->vps, vp->attribute)) {
1092 * Some attributes are handled specially.
1094 switch (vp->attribute) {
1096 * NEVER copy Message-Authenticator,
1097 * EAP-Message, or State. They're
1098 * only for outside of the tunnel.
1101 case PW_USER_PASSWORD:
1102 case PW_CHAP_PASSWORD:
1103 case PW_CHAP_CHALLENGE:
1104 case PW_PROXY_STATE:
1105 case PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR:
1106 case PW_EAP_MESSAGE:
1112 * By default, copy it over.
1119 * Don't copy from the head, we've already
1122 copy = paircopy2(vp, vp->attribute);
1123 pairadd(&fake->packet->vps, copy);
1128 if (debug_flag > 0) {
1129 printf(" TTLS: Sending tunneled request\n");
1131 for (vp = fake->packet->vps; vp != NULL; vp = vp->next) {
1132 putchar('\t');vp_print(stdout, vp);putchar('\n');
1138 * Call authentication recursively, which will
1139 * do PAP, CHAP, MS-CHAP, etc.
1141 rad_authenticate(fake);
1144 * Note that we don't do *anything* with the reply
1148 if (debug_flag > 0) {
1149 printf(" TTLS: Got tunneled reply RADIUS code %d\n",
1152 for (vp = fake->reply->vps; vp != NULL; vp = vp->next) {
1153 putchar('\t');vp_print(stdout, vp);putchar('\n');
1159 * Decide what to do with the reply.
1161 switch (fake->reply->code) {
1162 case 0: /* No reply code, must be proxied... */
1163 vp = pairfind(fake->config_items, PW_PROXY_TO_REALM);
1165 eap_tunnel_data_t *tunnel;
1166 DEBUG2(" TTLS: Tunneled authentication will be proxied to %s", vp->strvalue);
1169 * Tell the original request that it's going
1172 pairmove2(&(request->config_items),
1173 &(fake->config_items),
1177 * Seed the proxy packet with the
1180 rad_assert(request->proxy == NULL);
1181 request->proxy = fake->packet;
1182 fake->packet = NULL;
1183 rad_free(&fake->reply);
1187 * Set up the callbacks for the tunnel
1189 tunnel = rad_malloc(sizeof(*tunnel));
1190 memset(tunnel, 0, sizeof(*tunnel));
1192 tunnel->tls_session = tls_session;
1193 tunnel->callback = eapttls_postproxy;
1196 * Associate the callback with the request.
1198 rcode = request_data_add(request,
1200 REQUEST_DATA_EAP_TUNNEL_CALLBACK,
1202 rad_assert(rcode == 0);
1205 * rlm_eap.c has taken care of associating
1206 * the handler with the fake request.
1208 * So we associate the fake request with
1211 rcode = request_data_add(request,
1213 REQUEST_DATA_EAP_MSCHAP_TUNNEL_CALLBACK,
1214 fake, my_request_free);
1215 rad_assert(rcode == 0);
1219 * Didn't authenticate the packet, but
1220 * we're proxying it.
1222 rcode = PW_STATUS_CLIENT;
1225 DEBUG2(" TTLS: No tunneled reply was found for request %d , and the request was not proxied: rejecting the user.",
1227 rcode = PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT;
1233 * Returns RLM_MODULE_FOO, and we want to return
1236 rcode = process_reply(handler, tls_session, request,
1239 case RLM_MODULE_REJECT:
1240 rcode = PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT;
1243 case RLM_MODULE_HANDLED:
1244 rcode = PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE;
1248 rcode = PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK;
1252 rcode = PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT;
1258 request_free(&fake);