2 * Copyright (c) 2011, JANET(UK)
5 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
6 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
10 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
16 * 3. Neither the name of JANET(UK) nor the names of its contributors
17 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
18 * without specific prior written permission.
20 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
21 * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
22 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
23 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
24 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
25 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
26 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
27 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
28 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
29 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
34 * Establish a security context on the acceptor (server). These functions
35 * wrap around libradsec and (thus) talk to a RADIUS server or proxy.
38 #include "gssapiP_eap.h"
40 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
42 eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
45 gss_name_t target __attribute__((__unused__)),
46 gss_OID mech __attribute__((__unused__)),
47 OM_uint32 reqFlags __attribute__((__unused__)),
48 OM_uint32 timeReq __attribute__((__unused__)),
49 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
50 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
51 gss_buffer_t outputToken);
55 * Mark an acceptor context as ready for cryptographic operations
58 acceptReadyEap(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred)
60 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
62 gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
64 /* Cache encryption type derived from selected mechanism OID */
65 major = gssEapOidToEnctype(minor, ctx->mechanismUsed,
66 &ctx->encryptionType);
70 gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName);
72 major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.vps,
73 PW_USER_NAME, 0, &vp);
74 if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
75 nameBuf.length = vp->length;
76 nameBuf.value = vp->vp_strvalue;
78 ctx->gssFlags |= GSS_C_ANON_FLAG;
81 major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf,
82 (ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_ANON_FLAG) ?
83 GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS : GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
88 major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.vps,
89 PW_MS_MPPE_SEND_KEY, VENDORPEC_MS, &vp);
90 if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
91 *minor = GSSEAP_KEY_UNAVAILABLE;
92 return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
95 major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor,
100 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
103 major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
105 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
108 major = sequenceInit(minor,
109 &ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq,
110 ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) != 0),
111 ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG) != 0),
113 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
116 major = gssEapCreateAttrContext(minor, cred, ctx,
117 &ctx->initiatorName->attrCtx,
119 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
123 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
127 * Emit a identity EAP request to force the initiator (peer) to identify
131 eapGssSmAcceptIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
134 gss_name_t target __attribute__((__unused__)),
135 gss_OID mech __attribute__((__unused__)),
136 OM_uint32 reqFlags __attribute__((__unused__)),
137 OM_uint32 timeReq __attribute__((__unused__)),
138 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings __attribute__((__unused__)),
139 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
140 gss_buffer_t outputToken)
143 struct wpabuf *reqData;
144 gss_buffer_desc pktBuffer;
146 if (!gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed)) {
147 *minor = GSSEAP_CRED_MECH_MISMATCH;
148 return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
151 if (inputToken != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER && inputToken->length != 0) {
152 *minor = GSSEAP_WRONG_SIZE;
153 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
156 assert(ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME);
158 if (cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
159 major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
160 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
164 reqData = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY, 0,
165 EAP_CODE_REQUEST, 0);
166 if (reqData == NULL) {
168 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
171 pktBuffer.length = wpabuf_len(reqData);
172 pktBuffer.value = (void *)wpabuf_head(reqData);
174 major = duplicateBuffer(minor, &pktBuffer, outputToken);
175 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
178 wpabuf_free(reqData);
181 return GSS_S_COMPLETE; /* advance state */
185 * Returns TRUE if the input token contains an EAP identity response.
188 isIdentityResponseP(gss_buffer_t inputToken)
190 struct wpabuf respData;
192 wpabuf_set(&respData, inputToken->value, inputToken->length);
194 return (eap_get_type(&respData) == EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY);
198 * Save the asserted initiator identity from the EAP identity response.
201 importInitiatorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
203 gss_buffer_t inputToken)
206 struct wpabuf respData;
207 const unsigned char *pos;
209 gss_buffer_desc nameBuf;
211 wpabuf_set(&respData, inputToken->value, inputToken->length);
213 pos = eap_hdr_validate(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY,
216 *minor = GSSEAP_PEER_BAD_MESSAGE;
217 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
220 nameBuf.value = (void *)pos;
221 nameBuf.length = len;
223 gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName);
225 return gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
226 &ctx->initiatorName);
230 * Pass the asserted initiator identity to the authentication server.
233 setInitiatorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
237 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
238 gss_buffer_desc nameBuf;
241 * We should have got an EAP identity response, but if we didn't, then
242 * we will just avoid sending User-Name. Note that radsecproxy requires
243 * User-Name to be sent on every request (presumably so it can remain
246 if (ctx->initiatorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
247 major = gssEapDisplayName(minor, ctx->initiatorName, &nameBuf, NULL);
248 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
251 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps, PW_USER_NAME, 0, &nameBuf);
252 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
255 gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &nameBuf);
259 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
263 * Pass the asserted acceptor identity to the authentication server.
266 setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
271 gss_buffer_desc nameBuf;
272 krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
273 krb5_principal krbPrinc;
274 struct rs_context *rc = ctx->acceptorCtx.radContext;
278 if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
280 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
283 if ((ctx->acceptorName->flags & NAME_FLAG_SERVICE) == 0) {
284 *minor = GSSEAP_BAD_SERVICE_NAME;
285 return GSS_S_BAD_NAME;
288 GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
290 krbPrinc = ctx->acceptorName->krbPrincipal;
291 assert(krbPrinc != NULL);
292 assert(KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(krbPrinc) >= 2);
294 /* Acceptor-Service-Name */
295 krbPrincComponentToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, 0, &nameBuf);
297 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
298 PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_NAME,
301 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
304 /* Acceptor-Host-Name */
305 krbPrincComponentToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, 1, &nameBuf);
307 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
308 PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_HOST_NAME,
311 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
314 if (KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(krbPrinc) > 2) {
315 /* Acceptor-Service-Specific */
316 krb5_principal_data ssiPrinc = *krbPrinc;
319 KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(&ssiPrinc) -= 2;
320 KRB_PRINC_NAME(&ssiPrinc) += 2;
322 *minor = krb5_unparse_name_flags(krbContext, &ssiPrinc,
323 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &ssi);
325 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
328 nameBuf.length = strlen(ssi);
330 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
331 PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_SPECIFIC,
335 if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
336 krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi);
339 krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi);
342 krbPrincRealmToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, &nameBuf);
343 if (nameBuf.length != 0) {
344 /* Acceptor-Realm-Name */
345 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
346 PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_REALM_NAME,
349 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
354 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
358 * Allocate a RadSec handle
361 createRadiusHandle(OM_uint32 *minor,
365 struct gss_eap_acceptor_ctx *actx = &ctx->acceptorCtx;
366 const char *configFile = RS_CONFIG_FILE;
367 const char *configStanza = "gss-eap";
368 struct rs_alloc_scheme ralloc;
369 struct rs_error *err;
371 assert(actx->radContext == NULL);
372 assert(actx->radConn == NULL);
374 if (rs_context_create(&actx->radContext, RS_DICT_FILE) != 0) {
375 *minor = GSSEAP_RADSEC_CONTEXT_FAILURE;
376 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
379 if (cred->radiusConfigFile != NULL)
380 configFile = cred->radiusConfigFile;
381 if (cred->radiusConfigStanza != NULL)
382 configStanza = cred->radiusConfigStanza;
384 ralloc.calloc = GSSEAP_CALLOC;
385 ralloc.malloc = GSSEAP_MALLOC;
386 ralloc.free = GSSEAP_FREE;
387 ralloc.realloc = GSSEAP_REALLOC;
389 rs_context_set_alloc_scheme(actx->radContext, &ralloc);
391 if (rs_context_read_config(actx->radContext, configFile) != 0) {
392 err = rs_err_ctx_pop(actx->radContext);
396 if (rs_conn_create(actx->radContext, &actx->radConn, configStanza) != 0) {
397 err = rs_err_conn_pop(actx->radConn);
401 if (actx->radServer != NULL) {
402 if (rs_conn_select_peer(actx->radConn, actx->radServer) != 0) {
403 err = rs_err_conn_pop(actx->radConn);
409 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
412 return gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, err);
416 * Process a EAP response from the initiator.
419 eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate(OM_uint32 *minor,
422 gss_name_t target __attribute__((__unused__)),
423 gss_OID mech __attribute__((__unused__)),
424 OM_uint32 reqFlags __attribute__((__unused__)),
425 OM_uint32 timeReq __attribute__((__unused__)),
426 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
427 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
428 gss_buffer_t outputToken)
430 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
431 struct rs_connection *rconn;
432 struct rs_request *request = NULL;
433 struct rs_packet *req = NULL, *resp = NULL;
434 struct radius_packet *frreq, *frresp;
436 if (ctx->acceptorCtx.radContext == NULL) {
437 /* May be NULL from an imported partial context */
438 major = createRadiusHandle(minor, cred, ctx);
439 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
443 if (isIdentityResponseP(inputToken)) {
444 major = importInitiatorIdentity(minor, ctx, inputToken);
445 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
449 rconn = ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn;
451 if (rs_packet_create_authn_request(rconn, &req, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
452 major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
455 frreq = rs_packet_frpkt(req);
457 major = setInitiatorIdentity(minor, ctx, &frreq->vps);
458 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
461 major = setAcceptorIdentity(minor, ctx, &frreq->vps);
462 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
465 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, &frreq->vps,
466 PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, inputToken);
467 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
470 if (ctx->acceptorCtx.state.length != 0) {
471 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, &frreq->vps, PW_STATE, 0,
472 &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
473 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
476 gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
479 if (rs_request_create(rconn, &request) != 0) {
480 major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
484 rs_request_add_reqpkt(request, req);
487 if (rs_request_send(request, &resp) != 0) {
488 major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
492 assert(resp != NULL);
494 frresp = rs_packet_frpkt(resp);
495 switch (frresp->code) {
496 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
497 case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
499 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
500 *minor = GSSEAP_RADIUS_AUTH_FAILURE;
501 major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL;
505 *minor = GSSEAP_UNKNOWN_RADIUS_CODE;
506 major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
511 major = gssEapRadiusGetAvp(minor, frresp->vps, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0,
513 if (major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && frresp->code == PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) {
514 *minor = GSSEAP_MISSING_EAP_REQUEST;
515 major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
517 } else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
520 if (frresp->code == PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) {
521 major = gssEapRadiusGetAvp(minor, frresp->vps, PW_STATE, 0,
522 &ctx->acceptorCtx.state, TRUE);
523 if (GSS_ERROR(major) && *minor != GSSEAP_NO_SUCH_ATTR)
526 major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
528 ctx->acceptorCtx.vps = frresp->vps;
531 rs_conn_destroy(ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn);
532 ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn = NULL;
534 major = acceptReadyEap(minor, ctx, cred);
535 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
538 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE; /* advance state */
543 rs_request_destroy(request);
545 rs_packet_destroy(req);
551 eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings(OM_uint32 *minor,
554 gss_name_t target __attribute__((__unused__)),
555 gss_OID mech __attribute__((__unused__)),
556 OM_uint32 reqFlags __attribute__((__unused__)),
557 OM_uint32 timeReq __attribute__((__unused__)),
558 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
559 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
560 gss_buffer_t outputToken)
562 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
563 gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[2];
565 iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA | GSS_IOV_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE;
566 iov[0].buffer.length = 0;
567 iov[0].buffer.value = NULL;
569 iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_STREAM;
570 iov[1].buffer = *inputToken;
572 major = gssEapUnwrapOrVerifyMIC(minor, ctx, NULL, NULL,
573 iov, 2, TOK_TYPE_WRAP);
574 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
575 return GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS;
577 if (chanBindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS &&
578 !bufferEqual(&iov[0].buffer, &chanBindings->application_data)) {
579 major = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS;
580 *minor = GSSEAP_BINDINGS_MISMATCH;
582 major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; /* process additional extensions */
586 gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &iov[0].buffer);
591 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
593 eapGssSmAcceptReauthCreds(OM_uint32 *minor,
596 gss_name_t target __attribute__((__unused__)),
597 gss_OID mech __attribute__((__unused__)),
598 OM_uint32 reqFlags __attribute__((__unused__)),
599 OM_uint32 timeReq __attribute__((__unused__)),
600 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings __attribute__((__unused__)),
601 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
602 gss_buffer_t outputToken)
607 * If we're built with fast reauthentication enabled, then
608 * fabricate a ticket from the initiator to ourselves.
610 major = gssEapMakeReauthCreds(minor, ctx, cred, outputToken);
611 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
615 return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; /* process additional extensions */
620 eapGssSmAcceptNegoExtFinished(OM_uint32 *minor,
623 gss_name_t target __attribute__((__unused__)),
624 gss_OID mech __attribute__((__unused__)),
625 OM_uint32 reqFlags __attribute__((__unused__)),
626 OM_uint32 timeReq __attribute__((__unused__)),
627 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings __attribute__((__unused__)),
628 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
629 gss_buffer_t outputToken)
632 return GSS_S_COMPLETE; /* advance state */
635 static struct gss_eap_sm eapGssAcceptorSm[] = {
636 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
638 ITOK_TYPE_REAUTH_REQ,
639 ITOK_TYPE_REAUTH_RESP,
640 GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL,
643 eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth,
649 GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL,
652 eapGssSmAcceptIdentity,
657 GSSEAP_STATE_AUTHENTICATE,
660 eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate
663 ITOK_TYPE_GSS_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
665 GSSEAP_STATE_NEGO_EXT,
668 eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings,
672 ITOK_TYPE_REAUTH_CREDS,
673 GSSEAP_STATE_NEGO_EXT,
676 eapGssSmAcceptReauthCreds,
681 GSSEAP_STATE_NEGO_EXT,
684 eapGssSmAcceptNegoExtFinished
689 gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor,
690 gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
692 gss_buffer_t input_token,
693 gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
694 gss_name_t *src_name,
696 gss_buffer_t output_token,
697 OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
699 gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle)
701 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
702 gss_ctx_id_t ctx = *context_handle;
706 output_token->length = 0;
707 output_token->value = NULL;
709 if (src_name != NULL)
710 *src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
712 if (input_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER || input_token->length == 0) {
713 *minor = GSSEAP_TOK_TRUNC;
714 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
717 if (ctx == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
718 major = gssEapAllocContext(minor, &ctx);
719 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
722 *context_handle = ctx;
725 GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&ctx->mutex);
727 if (cred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
728 if (ctx->defaultCred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
729 major = gssEapAcquireCred(minor,
738 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
742 cred = ctx->defaultCred;
745 GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&cred->mutex);
747 major = gssEapSmStep(minor,
758 sizeof(eapGssAcceptorSm) / sizeof(eapGssAcceptorSm[0]));
759 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
762 if (mech_type != NULL) {
763 if (!gssEapInternalizeOid(ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type))
764 duplicateOid(&tmpMinor, ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type);
766 if (ret_flags != NULL)
767 *ret_flags = ctx->gssFlags;
768 if (delegated_cred_handle != NULL)
769 *delegated_cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
771 if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
772 if (src_name != NULL && ctx->initiatorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
773 major = gssEapDuplicateName(&tmpMinor, ctx->initiatorName, src_name);
774 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
777 if (time_rec != NULL) {
778 major = gssEapContextTime(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec);
779 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
784 assert(ctx->state == GSSEAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED || major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
787 if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
788 GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&cred->mutex);
789 GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ctx->mutex);
791 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
792 gssEapReleaseContext(&tmpMinor, context_handle);
797 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
799 acceptReadyKrb(OM_uint32 *minor,
802 const gss_name_t initiator,
808 major = gssEapGlueToMechName(minor, ctx, initiator, &ctx->initiatorName);
809 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
812 if (cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
813 major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
814 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
818 major = gssEapReauthComplete(minor, ctx, cred, mech, timeRec);
819 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
822 ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_NEGO_EXT; /* skip */
825 return GSS_S_COMPLETE; /* advance state */
829 eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
832 gss_name_t target __attribute__((__unused__)),
834 OM_uint32 reqFlags __attribute__((__unused__)),
835 OM_uint32 timeReq __attribute__((__unused__)),
836 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
837 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
838 gss_buffer_t outputToken)
840 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
841 gss_name_t krbInitiator = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
842 OM_uint32 gssFlags, timeRec = GSS_C_INDEFINITE;
845 * If we're built with fast reauthentication support, it's valid
846 * for an initiator to send a GSS reauthentication token as its
847 * initial context token, causing us to short-circuit the state
848 * machine and process Kerberos GSS messages instead.
851 ctx->flags |= CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH;
853 major = gssAcceptSecContext(minor,
864 if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
865 major = acceptReadyKrb(minor, ctx, cred,
866 krbInitiator, mech, timeRec);
869 ctx->gssFlags = gssFlags;
871 gssReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &krbInitiator);
875 #endif /* GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH */