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33 #include "gssapiP_eap.h"
35 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
37 eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
40 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
41 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
42 gss_buffer_t outputToken);
46 * Mark a context as ready for cryptographic operations
49 acceptReadyEap(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred)
51 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
53 gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
55 /* Cache encryption type derived from selected mechanism OID */
56 major = gssEapOidToEnctype(minor, ctx->mechanismUsed,
57 &ctx->encryptionType);
61 gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName);
63 vp = rc_avpair_get(ctx->acceptorCtx.avps, PW_USER_NAME, 0);
65 nameBuf.length = vp->lvalue;
66 nameBuf.value = vp->strvalue;
68 ctx->gssFlags |= GSS_C_ANON_FLAG;
71 major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
76 ctx->initiatorName->attrCtx = gssEapCreateAttrContext(cred, ctx);
78 vp = rc_avpair_get(ctx->acceptorCtx.avps,
79 VENDOR_ATTR_MS_MPPE_SEND_KEY,
81 if (ctx->encryptionType != ENCTYPE_NULL && vp != NULL) {
82 major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor,
83 (unsigned char *)vp->strvalue,
90 major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
96 * draft-howlett-eap-gss says that integrity/confidentialty should
97 * always be advertised as available, but if we have no keying
98 * material it seems confusing to the caller to advertise this.
100 ctx->gssFlags &= ~(GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG);
101 ctx->encryptionType = ENCTYPE_NULL;
104 major = sequenceInit(minor,
105 &ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq,
106 ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) != 0),
107 ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG) != 0),
109 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
112 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
116 eapGssSmAcceptIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
119 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
120 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
121 gss_buffer_t outputToken)
126 unsigned char data[5];
128 gss_buffer_desc pktBuffer;
130 if (inputToken != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER && inputToken->length != 0)
131 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
133 assert(ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle == NULL);
135 major = gssEapRadiusAllocHandle(minor, cred, &ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle);
136 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
139 assert(ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME);
141 if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
142 major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
143 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
147 pkt.pdu.code = EAP_CODE_REQUEST;
148 pkt.pdu.identifier = 0;
149 pkt.pdu.length = htons(sizeof(pkt.data));
150 pkt.data[4] = EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY;
152 pktBuffer.length = sizeof(pkt.data);
153 pktBuffer.value = pkt.data;
155 major = duplicateBuffer(minor, &pktBuffer, outputToken);
156 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
159 ctx->state = EAP_STATE_AUTHENTICATE;
161 return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
165 setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
170 gss_buffer_desc nameBuf;
171 krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
172 krb5_principal krbPrinc;
174 /* Awaits further specification */
175 if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME)
176 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
178 GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
180 krbPrinc = ctx->acceptorName->krbPrincipal;
181 assert(krbPrinc != NULL);
183 if (krb5_princ_size(krbContext, krbPrinc) < 2)
184 return GSS_S_BAD_NAME;
186 /* Acceptor-Service-Name */
187 krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, krbPrinc, 0), &nameBuf);
189 major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps,
190 VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_NAME,
193 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
196 /* Acceptor-Host-Name */
197 krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, krbPrinc, 1), &nameBuf);
199 major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps,
200 VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_HOST_NAME,
203 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
206 if (krb5_princ_size(krbContext, krbPrinc) > 2) {
207 /* Acceptor-Service-Specific */
208 krb5_principal_data ssiPrinc = *krbPrinc;
211 krb5_princ_size(krbContext, &ssiPrinc) -= 2;
212 krb5_princ_name(krbContext, &ssiPrinc) += 2;
214 *minor = krb5_unparse_name_flags(krbContext, &ssiPrinc,
215 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &ssi);
217 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
220 nameBuf.length = strlen(ssi);
222 major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps,
223 VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_SPECIFIC,
227 if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
228 krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi);
231 krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi);
234 krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_realm(krbContext, krbPrinc), &nameBuf);
235 if (nameBuf.length != 0) {
236 /* Acceptor-Realm-Name */
237 major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps,
238 VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_REALM_NAME,
241 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
245 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
249 eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate(OM_uint32 *minor,
252 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
253 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
254 gss_buffer_t outputToken)
256 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
258 VALUE_PAIR *send = NULL;
259 VALUE_PAIR *received = NULL;
260 rc_handle *rh = ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle;
261 char msgBuffer[4096];
264 gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
266 pdu = (struct eap_hdr *)inputToken->value;
267 pos = (unsigned char *)(pdu + 1);
269 if (inputToken->length > sizeof(*pdu) &&
270 pdu->code == EAP_CODE_RESPONSE &&
271 pos[0] == EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY) {
273 * XXX TODO do we really need to set User-Name? FreeRADIUS does
274 * not require it but some other RADIUS servers might.
276 major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_USER_NAME, 0, &nameBuf);
277 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
280 major = setAcceptorIdentity(minor, ctx, &send);
281 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
285 major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, inputToken);
286 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
289 if (ctx->acceptorCtx.lastStatus == CHALLENGE_RC) {
290 major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_STATE, 0,
291 &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
292 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
295 gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
298 code = rc_auth(rh, 0, send, &received, msgBuffer);
302 major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
305 major = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
308 major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL;
311 major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
315 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
318 ctx->acceptorCtx.lastStatus = code;
320 major = getBufferFromAvps(minor, received, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0,
322 if ((major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && code != OK_RC) ||
326 if (code == CHALLENGE_RC) {
327 major = getBufferFromAvps(minor, received, PW_STATE, 0,
328 &ctx->acceptorCtx.state, TRUE);
329 if (major != GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && GSS_ERROR(major))
332 ctx->acceptorCtx.avps = received;
335 major = acceptReadyEap(minor, ctx, cred);
336 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
339 ctx->state = EAP_STATE_EXTENSIONS_REQ;
342 major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
345 if (received != NULL)
346 rc_avpair_free(received);
352 acceptGssChannelBindings(OM_uint32 *minor,
355 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
356 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings)
358 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
359 gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[2];
361 iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA | GSS_IOV_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE;
362 iov[0].buffer.length = 0;
363 iov[0].buffer.value = NULL;
365 iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_STREAM;
366 iov[1].buffer = *inputToken;
368 major = gssEapUnwrapOrVerifyMIC(minor, ctx, NULL, NULL,
369 iov, 2, TOK_TYPE_WRAP);
370 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
373 if (chanBindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS &&
374 !bufferEqual(&iov[0].buffer, &chanBindings->application_data)) {
375 major = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS;
377 major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
380 gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &iov[0].buffer);
386 eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsReq(OM_uint32 *minor,
389 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
390 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
391 gss_buffer_t outputToken)
395 outputToken->length = 0;
396 outputToken->value = NULL;
398 major = acceptGssChannelBindings(minor, ctx, cred, inputToken,
400 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
403 ctx->state = EAP_STATE_EXTENSIONS_RESP;
405 return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
409 eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsResp(OM_uint32 *minor,
412 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
413 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
414 gss_buffer_t outputToken)
416 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
417 gss_buffer_desc credsToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
419 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
421 * If we're built with fast reauthentication enabled, then
422 * fabricate a ticket from the initiator to ourselves.
423 * Otherwise return an empty token.
425 major = gssEapMakeReauthCreds(minor, ctx, cred, &credsToken);
426 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
429 credsToken.value = "";
430 #endif /* GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH */
432 major = duplicateBuffer(minor, &credsToken, outputToken);
433 if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
434 gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &credsToken);
438 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
439 gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &credsToken);
442 ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
444 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
448 eapGssSmAcceptEstablished(OM_uint32 *minor,
451 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
452 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
453 gss_buffer_t outputToken)
455 /* Called with already established context */
457 return GSS_S_BAD_STATUS;
460 static struct gss_eap_acceptor_sm {
461 enum gss_eap_token_type inputTokenType;
462 enum gss_eap_token_type outputTokenType;
463 OM_uint32 (*processToken)(OM_uint32 *,
467 gss_channel_bindings_t,
469 } eapGssAcceptorSm[] = {
470 { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, eapGssSmAcceptIdentity },
471 { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate },
472 { TOK_TYPE_EXT_REQ, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsReq },
473 { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_EXT_RESP, eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsResp },
474 { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmAcceptEstablished },
475 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
476 { TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH, TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH, eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth },
481 gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor,
482 gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
484 gss_buffer_t input_token,
485 gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
486 gss_name_t *src_name,
488 gss_buffer_t output_token,
489 OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
491 gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle)
494 OM_uint32 tmpMajor, tmpMinor;
495 gss_ctx_id_t ctx = *context_handle;
496 struct gss_eap_acceptor_sm *sm = NULL;
497 gss_buffer_desc innerInputToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
498 gss_buffer_desc innerOutputToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
499 enum gss_eap_token_type tokType;
500 int initialContextToken = 0;
504 output_token->length = 0;
505 output_token->value = NULL;
507 if (input_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER || input_token->length == 0) {
508 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
511 if (ctx == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
512 major = gssEapAllocContext(minor, &ctx);
513 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
516 initialContextToken = 1;
517 *context_handle = ctx;
520 GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&ctx->mutex);
522 sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[ctx->state];
524 major = gssEapVerifyToken(minor, ctx, input_token,
525 &tokType, &innerInputToken);
526 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
529 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
531 * If we're built with fast reauthentication support, it's valid
532 * for an initiator to send a GSS reauthentication token as its
533 * initial context token, causing us to short-circuit the state
534 * machine and process Kerberos GSS messages instead.
536 if (tokType == TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH && initialContextToken) {
537 ctx->state = EAP_STATE_KRB_REAUTH_GSS;
540 if (tokType != sm->inputTokenType) {
541 major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
545 /* Validate and lock credentials */
546 if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
547 if ((cred->flags & CRED_FLAG_ACCEPT) == 0) {
548 major = GSS_S_NO_CRED;
550 } else if (!gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed)) {
551 major = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
555 GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&cred->mutex);
559 sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[ctx->state];
561 major = (sm->processToken)(minor,
567 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
569 } while (major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED && innerOutputToken.length == 0);
571 if (mech_type != NULL) {
572 if (!gssEapInternalizeOid(ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type))
573 duplicateOid(&tmpMinor, ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type);
575 if (innerOutputToken.value != NULL) {
576 tmpMajor = gssEapMakeToken(&tmpMinor, ctx, &innerOutputToken,
577 sm->outputTokenType, output_token);
578 if (GSS_ERROR(tmpMajor)) {
584 if (ret_flags != NULL)
585 *ret_flags = ctx->gssFlags;
586 if (delegated_cred_handle != NULL)
587 *delegated_cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
589 if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
590 if (src_name != NULL && ctx->initiatorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
591 major = gssEapDuplicateName(&tmpMinor, ctx->initiatorName, src_name);
592 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
595 if (time_rec != NULL)
596 gssEapContextTime(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec);
599 assert(ctx->state == EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED || major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
602 if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
603 GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&cred->mutex);
604 GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ctx->mutex);
606 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
607 gssEapReleaseContext(&tmpMinor, context_handle);
609 gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &innerOutputToken);
614 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
616 acceptReadyKrb(OM_uint32 *minor,
619 const gss_name_t initiator,
625 major = gssEapGlueToMechName(minor, initiator, &ctx->initiatorName);
626 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
629 if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
630 major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
631 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
635 major = gssEapReauthComplete(minor, ctx, cred, mech, timeRec);
636 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
639 ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
641 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
645 eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
648 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
649 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
650 gss_buffer_t outputToken)
652 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
653 gss_cred_id_t krbCred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
654 gss_name_t krbInitiator = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
655 gss_OID mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
656 OM_uint32 gssFlags, timeRec = GSS_C_INDEFINITE;
658 ctx->flags |= CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH_GSS;
660 if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
661 krbCred = cred->krbCred;
663 major = gssAcceptSecContext(minor,
674 if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
675 major = acceptReadyKrb(minor, ctx, cred,
676 krbInitiator, mech, timeRec);
679 ctx->gssFlags = gssFlags;
681 gssReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &krbInitiator);
685 #endif /* GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH */