2 * EAP server/peer: EAP-EKE shared routines
3 * Copyright (c) 2011-2013, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6 * See README for more details.
12 #include "crypto/aes.h"
13 #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
14 #include "crypto/crypto.h"
15 #include "crypto/dh_groups.h"
16 #include "crypto/random.h"
17 #include "crypto/sha1.h"
18 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
19 #include "eap_common/eap_defs.h"
20 #include "eap_eke_common.h"
23 static int eap_eke_dh_len(u8 group)
26 case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_2:
28 case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_5:
30 case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_14:
32 case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_15:
34 case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_16:
42 static int eap_eke_dhcomp_len(u8 dhgroup, u8 encr)
46 dhlen = eap_eke_dh_len(dhgroup);
47 if (dhlen < 0 || encr != EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
49 return AES_BLOCK_SIZE + dhlen;
53 static const struct dh_group * eap_eke_dh_group(u8 group)
56 case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_2:
57 return dh_groups_get(2);
58 case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_5:
59 return dh_groups_get(5);
60 case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_14:
61 return dh_groups_get(14);
62 case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_15:
63 return dh_groups_get(15);
64 case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_16:
65 return dh_groups_get(16);
72 static int eap_eke_dh_generator(u8 group)
75 case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_2:
77 case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_5:
79 case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_14:
81 case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_15:
83 case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_16:
91 static int eap_eke_pnonce_len(u8 mac)
95 if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA1)
96 mac_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
97 else if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA2_256)
98 mac_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
102 return AES_BLOCK_SIZE + 16 + mac_len;
106 static int eap_eke_pnonce_ps_len(u8 mac)
110 if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA1)
111 mac_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
112 else if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA2_256)
113 mac_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
117 return AES_BLOCK_SIZE + 2 * 16 + mac_len;
121 static int eap_eke_prf_len(u8 prf)
123 if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
125 if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
131 static int eap_eke_nonce_len(u8 prf)
135 prf_len = eap_eke_prf_len(prf);
139 if (prf_len > 2 * 16)
140 return (prf_len + 1) / 2;
146 static int eap_eke_auth_len(u8 prf)
149 case EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1:
151 case EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256:
152 return SHA256_MAC_LEN;
159 int eap_eke_dh_init(u8 group, u8 *ret_priv, u8 *ret_pub)
163 const struct dh_group *dh;
166 generator = eap_eke_dh_generator(group);
167 dh = eap_eke_dh_group(group);
168 if (generator < 0 || generator > 255 || !dh)
172 /* x = random number 2 .. p-1 */
173 if (random_get_bytes(ret_priv, dh->prime_len))
175 if (os_memcmp(ret_priv, dh->prime, dh->prime_len) > 0) {
176 /* Make sure private value is smaller than prime */
179 for (i = 0; i < dh->prime_len - 1; i++) {
183 if (i == dh->prime_len - 1 && (ret_priv[i] == 0 || ret_priv[i] == 1))
185 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: DH private value",
186 ret_priv, dh->prime_len);
188 /* y = g ^ x (mod p) */
189 pub_len = dh->prime_len;
190 if (crypto_mod_exp(&gen, 1, ret_priv, dh->prime_len,
191 dh->prime, dh->prime_len, ret_pub, &pub_len) < 0)
193 if (pub_len < dh->prime_len) {
194 size_t pad = dh->prime_len - pub_len;
195 os_memmove(ret_pub + pad, ret_pub, pub_len);
196 os_memset(ret_pub, 0, pad);
199 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: DH public value",
200 ret_pub, dh->prime_len);
206 static int eap_eke_prf(u8 prf, const u8 *key, size_t key_len, const u8 *data,
207 size_t data_len, const u8 *data2, size_t data2_len,
222 if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
223 return hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, num_elem, addr, len, res);
224 if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
225 return hmac_sha256_vector(key, key_len, num_elem, addr, len,
231 static int eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha1(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, const u8 *data,
232 size_t data_len, u8 *res, size_t len)
234 u8 hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
242 vlen[0] = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
251 ret = hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, 2, &addr[1],
254 ret = hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, 3, addr, vlen,
258 if (len > SHA1_MAC_LEN) {
259 os_memcpy(res, hash, SHA1_MAC_LEN);
263 os_memcpy(res, hash, len);
272 static int eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha256(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, const u8 *data,
273 size_t data_len, u8 *res, size_t len)
275 u8 hash[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
283 vlen[0] = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
292 ret = hmac_sha256_vector(key, key_len, 2, &addr[1],
295 ret = hmac_sha256_vector(key, key_len, 3, addr, vlen,
299 if (len > SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
300 os_memcpy(res, hash, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
301 res += SHA256_MAC_LEN;
302 len -= SHA256_MAC_LEN;
304 os_memcpy(res, hash, len);
313 static int eap_eke_prfplus(u8 prf, const u8 *key, size_t key_len,
314 const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *res, size_t len)
316 if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
317 return eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha1(key, key_len, data, data_len, res,
319 if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
320 return eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha256(key, key_len, data, data_len,
326 int eap_eke_derive_key(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
327 const u8 *password, size_t password_len,
328 const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len, const u8 *id_p,
329 size_t id_p_len, u8 *key)
331 u8 zeros[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
332 u8 temp[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
333 size_t key_len = 16; /* Only AES-128-CBC is used here */
336 /* temp = prf(0+, password) */
337 os_memset(zeros, 0, sess->prf_len);
338 if (eap_eke_prf(sess->prf, zeros, sess->prf_len,
339 password, password_len, NULL, 0, temp) < 0)
341 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: temp = prf(0+, password)",
342 temp, sess->prf_len);
344 /* key = prf+(temp, ID_S | ID_P) */
345 id = os_malloc(id_s_len + id_p_len);
348 os_memcpy(id, id_s, id_s_len);
349 os_memcpy(id + id_s_len, id_p, id_p_len);
350 wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: ID_S | ID_P",
351 id, id_s_len + id_p_len);
352 if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, temp, sess->prf_len,
353 id, id_s_len + id_p_len, key, key_len) < 0) {
358 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: key = prf+(temp, ID_S | ID_P)",
365 int eap_eke_dhcomp(struct eap_eke_session *sess, const u8 *key, const u8 *dhpub,
368 u8 pub[EAP_EKE_MAX_DH_LEN];
370 u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
372 dh_len = eap_eke_dh_len(sess->dhgroup);
377 * DHComponent = Encr(key, y)
379 * All defined DH groups use primes that have length devisible by 16, so
380 * no need to do extra padding for y (= pub).
382 if (sess->encr != EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
384 if (random_get_bytes(iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
386 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: IV for Encr(key, y)",
388 os_memcpy(pub, dhpub, dh_len);
389 if (aes_128_cbc_encrypt(key, iv, pub, dh_len) < 0)
391 os_memcpy(ret_dhcomp, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
392 os_memcpy(ret_dhcomp + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, pub, dh_len);
393 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: DHComponent = Encr(key, y)",
394 ret_dhcomp, AES_BLOCK_SIZE + dh_len);
400 int eap_eke_shared_secret(struct eap_eke_session *sess, const u8 *key,
401 const u8 *dhpriv, const u8 *peer_dhcomp)
403 u8 zeros[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
404 u8 peer_pub[EAP_EKE_MAX_DH_LEN];
405 u8 modexp[EAP_EKE_MAX_DH_LEN];
407 const struct dh_group *dh;
409 dh = eap_eke_dh_group(sess->dhgroup);
410 if (sess->encr != EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC || !dh)
413 /* Decrypt peer DHComponent */
414 os_memcpy(peer_pub, peer_dhcomp + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, dh->prime_len);
415 if (aes_128_cbc_decrypt(key, peer_dhcomp, peer_pub, dh->prime_len) < 0) {
416 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Failed to decrypt DHComponent");
419 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Decrypted peer DH pubkey",
420 peer_pub, dh->prime_len);
422 /* SharedSecret = prf(0+, g ^ (x_s * x_p) (mod p)) */
424 if (crypto_mod_exp(peer_pub, dh->prime_len, dhpriv, dh->prime_len,
425 dh->prime, dh->prime_len, modexp, &len) < 0)
427 if (len < dh->prime_len) {
428 size_t pad = dh->prime_len - len;
429 os_memmove(modexp + pad, modexp, len);
430 os_memset(modexp, 0, pad);
433 os_memset(zeros, 0, sess->auth_len);
434 if (eap_eke_prf(sess->prf, zeros, sess->auth_len, modexp, dh->prime_len,
435 NULL, 0, sess->shared_secret) < 0)
437 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: SharedSecret",
438 sess->shared_secret, sess->auth_len);
444 int eap_eke_derive_ke_ki(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
445 const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len,
446 const u8 *id_p, size_t id_p_len)
448 u8 buf[EAP_EKE_MAX_KE_LEN + EAP_EKE_MAX_KI_LEN];
449 size_t ke_len, ki_len;
452 const char *label = "EAP-EKE Keys";
456 * Ke | Ki = prf+(SharedSecret, "EAP-EKE Keys" | ID_S | ID_P)
457 * Ke = encryption key
458 * Ki = integrity protection key
459 * Length of each key depends on the selected algorithms.
462 if (sess->encr == EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
467 if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
469 else if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
474 label_len = os_strlen(label);
475 data_len = label_len + id_s_len + id_p_len;
476 data = os_malloc(data_len);
479 os_memcpy(data, label, label_len);
480 os_memcpy(data + label_len, id_s, id_s_len);
481 os_memcpy(data + label_len + id_s_len, id_p, id_p_len);
482 if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, sess->shared_secret, sess->prf_len,
483 data, data_len, buf, ke_len + ki_len) < 0) {
488 os_memcpy(sess->ke, buf, ke_len);
489 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ke", sess->ke, ke_len);
490 os_memcpy(sess->ki, buf + ke_len, ki_len);
491 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ki", sess->ki, ki_len);
498 int eap_eke_derive_ka(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
499 const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len,
500 const u8 *id_p, size_t id_p_len,
501 const u8 *nonce_p, const u8 *nonce_s)
505 const char *label = "EAP-EKE Ka";
509 * Ka = prf+(SharedSecret, "EAP-EKE Ka" | ID_S | ID_P | Nonce_P |
511 * Ka = authentication key
512 * Length of the key depends on the selected algorithms.
515 label_len = os_strlen(label);
516 data_len = label_len + id_s_len + id_p_len + 2 * sess->nonce_len;
517 data = os_malloc(data_len);
521 os_memcpy(pos, label, label_len);
523 os_memcpy(pos, id_s, id_s_len);
525 os_memcpy(pos, id_p, id_p_len);
527 os_memcpy(pos, nonce_p, sess->nonce_len);
528 pos += sess->nonce_len;
529 os_memcpy(pos, nonce_s, sess->nonce_len);
530 if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, sess->shared_secret, sess->prf_len,
531 data, data_len, sess->ka, sess->prf_len) < 0) {
537 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ka", sess->ka, sess->prf_len);
543 int eap_eke_derive_msk(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
544 const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len,
545 const u8 *id_p, size_t id_p_len,
546 const u8 *nonce_p, const u8 *nonce_s,
551 const char *label = "EAP-EKE Exported Keys";
553 u8 buf[EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN];
556 * MSK | EMSK = prf+(SharedSecret, "EAP-EKE Exported Keys" | ID_S |
557 * ID_P | Nonce_P | Nonce_S)
560 label_len = os_strlen(label);
561 data_len = label_len + id_s_len + id_p_len + 2 * sess->nonce_len;
562 data = os_malloc(data_len);
566 os_memcpy(pos, label, label_len);
568 os_memcpy(pos, id_s, id_s_len);
570 os_memcpy(pos, id_p, id_p_len);
572 os_memcpy(pos, nonce_p, sess->nonce_len);
573 pos += sess->nonce_len;
574 os_memcpy(pos, nonce_s, sess->nonce_len);
575 if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, sess->shared_secret, sess->prf_len,
576 data, data_len, buf, EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN) <
583 os_memcpy(msk, buf, EAP_MSK_LEN);
584 os_memcpy(emsk, buf + EAP_MSK_LEN, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
585 os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
587 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: MSK", msk, EAP_MSK_LEN);
588 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: EMSK", msk, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
594 static int eap_eke_mac(u8 mac, const u8 *key, const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
597 if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA1)
598 return hmac_sha1(key, SHA1_MAC_LEN, data, data_len, res);
599 if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA2_256)
600 return hmac_sha256(key, SHA256_MAC_LEN, data, data_len, res);
605 int eap_eke_prot(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
606 const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
607 u8 *prot, size_t *prot_len)
609 size_t block_size, icv_len, pad;
612 if (sess->encr == EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
613 block_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
617 if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
618 icv_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
619 else if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
620 icv_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
624 pad = data_len % block_size;
626 pad = block_size - pad;
628 if (*prot_len < block_size + data_len + pad + icv_len) {
629 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Not enough room for Prot() data");
634 if (random_get_bytes(pos, block_size))
637 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: IV for Prot()", iv, block_size);
641 os_memcpy(pos, data, data_len);
644 if (random_get_bytes(pos, pad))
649 if (aes_128_cbc_encrypt(sess->ke, iv, e, data_len + pad) < 0 ||
650 eap_eke_mac(sess->mac, sess->ki, e, data_len + pad, pos) < 0)
654 *prot_len = pos - prot;
659 int eap_eke_decrypt_prot(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
660 const u8 *prot, size_t prot_len,
661 u8 *data, size_t *data_len)
663 size_t block_size, icv_len;
664 u8 icv[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
666 if (sess->encr == EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
667 block_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
671 if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
672 icv_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
673 else if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
674 icv_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
678 if (prot_len < 2 * block_size + icv_len ||
679 (prot_len - icv_len) % block_size)
682 if (eap_eke_mac(sess->mac, sess->ki, prot + block_size,
683 prot_len - block_size - icv_len, icv) < 0)
685 if (os_memcmp_const(icv, prot + prot_len - icv_len, icv_len) != 0) {
686 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: ICV mismatch in Prot() data");
690 if (*data_len < prot_len - block_size - icv_len) {
691 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Not enough room for decrypted Prot() data");
695 *data_len = prot_len - block_size - icv_len;
696 os_memcpy(data, prot + block_size, *data_len);
697 if (aes_128_cbc_decrypt(sess->ke, prot, data, *data_len) < 0) {
698 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Failed to decrypt Prot() data");
701 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Decrypted Prot() data",
708 int eap_eke_auth(struct eap_eke_session *sess, const char *label,
709 const struct wpabuf *msgs, u8 *auth)
711 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Auth(%s)", label);
712 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ka for Auth",
713 sess->ka, sess->auth_len);
714 wpa_hexdump_buf(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-EKE: Messages for Auth", msgs);
715 return eap_eke_prf(sess->prf, sess->ka, sess->auth_len,
716 (const u8 *) label, os_strlen(label),
717 wpabuf_head(msgs), wpabuf_len(msgs), auth);
721 int eap_eke_session_init(struct eap_eke_session *sess, u8 dhgroup, u8 encr,
724 sess->dhgroup = dhgroup;
729 sess->prf_len = eap_eke_prf_len(prf);
730 sess->nonce_len = eap_eke_nonce_len(prf);
731 sess->auth_len = eap_eke_auth_len(prf);
732 sess->dhcomp_len = eap_eke_dhcomp_len(sess->dhgroup, sess->encr);
733 sess->pnonce_len = eap_eke_pnonce_len(sess->mac);
734 sess->pnonce_ps_len = eap_eke_pnonce_ps_len(sess->mac);
735 if (sess->prf_len < 0 || sess->nonce_len < 0 || sess->auth_len < 0 ||
736 sess->dhcomp_len < 0 || sess->pnonce_len < 0 ||
737 sess->pnonce_ps_len < 0)
744 void eap_eke_session_clean(struct eap_eke_session *sess)
746 os_memset(sess->shared_secret, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN);
747 os_memset(sess->ke, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_KE_LEN);
748 os_memset(sess->ki, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_KI_LEN);
749 os_memset(sess->ka, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_KA_LEN);