Updated to hostap_2_6
[mech_eap.git] / libeap / src / eap_common / eap_eke_common.c
1 /*
2  * EAP server/peer: EAP-EKE shared routines
3  * Copyright (c) 2011-2013, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
4  *
5  * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6  * See README for more details.
7  */
8
9 #include "includes.h"
10
11 #include "common.h"
12 #include "crypto/aes.h"
13 #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
14 #include "crypto/crypto.h"
15 #include "crypto/dh_groups.h"
16 #include "crypto/random.h"
17 #include "crypto/sha1.h"
18 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
19 #include "eap_common/eap_defs.h"
20 #include "eap_eke_common.h"
21
22
23 static int eap_eke_dh_len(u8 group)
24 {
25         switch (group) {
26         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_2:
27                 return 128;
28         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_5:
29                 return 192;
30         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_14:
31                 return 256;
32         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_15:
33                 return 384;
34         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_16:
35                 return 512;
36         }
37
38         return -1;
39 }
40
41
42 static int eap_eke_dhcomp_len(u8 dhgroup, u8 encr)
43 {
44         int dhlen;
45
46         dhlen = eap_eke_dh_len(dhgroup);
47         if (dhlen < 0 || encr != EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
48                 return -1;
49         return AES_BLOCK_SIZE + dhlen;
50 }
51
52
53 static const struct dh_group * eap_eke_dh_group(u8 group)
54 {
55         switch (group) {
56         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_2:
57                 return dh_groups_get(2);
58         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_5:
59                 return dh_groups_get(5);
60         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_14:
61                 return dh_groups_get(14);
62         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_15:
63                 return dh_groups_get(15);
64         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_16:
65                 return dh_groups_get(16);
66         }
67
68         return NULL;
69 }
70
71
72 static int eap_eke_dh_generator(u8 group)
73 {
74         switch (group) {
75         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_2:
76                 return 5;
77         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_5:
78                 return 31;
79         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_14:
80                 return 11;
81         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_15:
82                 return 5;
83         case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_16:
84                 return 5;
85         }
86
87         return -1;
88 }
89
90
91 static int eap_eke_pnonce_len(u8 mac)
92 {
93         int mac_len;
94
95         if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA1)
96                 mac_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
97         else if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA2_256)
98                 mac_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
99         else
100                 return -1;
101
102         return AES_BLOCK_SIZE + 16 + mac_len;
103 }
104
105
106 static int eap_eke_pnonce_ps_len(u8 mac)
107 {
108         int mac_len;
109
110         if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA1)
111                 mac_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
112         else if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA2_256)
113                 mac_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
114         else
115                 return -1;
116
117         return AES_BLOCK_SIZE + 2 * 16 + mac_len;
118 }
119
120
121 static int eap_eke_prf_len(u8 prf)
122 {
123         if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
124                 return 20;
125         if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
126                 return 32;
127         return -1;
128 }
129
130
131 static int eap_eke_nonce_len(u8 prf)
132 {
133         int prf_len;
134
135         prf_len = eap_eke_prf_len(prf);
136         if (prf_len < 0)
137                 return -1;
138
139         if (prf_len > 2 * 16)
140                 return (prf_len + 1) / 2;
141
142         return 16;
143 }
144
145
146 static int eap_eke_auth_len(u8 prf)
147 {
148         switch (prf) {
149         case EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1:
150                 return SHA1_MAC_LEN;
151         case EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256:
152                 return SHA256_MAC_LEN;
153         }
154
155         return -1;
156 }
157
158
159 int eap_eke_dh_init(u8 group, u8 *ret_priv, u8 *ret_pub)
160 {
161         int generator;
162         u8 gen;
163         const struct dh_group *dh;
164         size_t pub_len, i;
165
166         generator = eap_eke_dh_generator(group);
167         dh = eap_eke_dh_group(group);
168         if (generator < 0 || generator > 255 || !dh)
169                 return -1;
170         gen = generator;
171
172         /* x = random number 2 .. p-1 */
173         if (random_get_bytes(ret_priv, dh->prime_len))
174                 return -1;
175         if (os_memcmp(ret_priv, dh->prime, dh->prime_len) > 0) {
176                 /* Make sure private value is smaller than prime */
177                 ret_priv[0] = 0;
178         }
179         for (i = 0; i < dh->prime_len - 1; i++) {
180                 if (ret_priv[i])
181                         break;
182         }
183         if (i == dh->prime_len - 1 && (ret_priv[i] == 0 || ret_priv[i] == 1))
184                 return -1;
185         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: DH private value",
186                         ret_priv, dh->prime_len);
187
188         /* y = g ^ x (mod p) */
189         pub_len = dh->prime_len;
190         if (crypto_mod_exp(&gen, 1, ret_priv, dh->prime_len,
191                            dh->prime, dh->prime_len, ret_pub, &pub_len) < 0)
192                 return -1;
193         if (pub_len < dh->prime_len) {
194                 size_t pad = dh->prime_len - pub_len;
195                 os_memmove(ret_pub + pad, ret_pub, pub_len);
196                 os_memset(ret_pub, 0, pad);
197         }
198
199         wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: DH public value",
200                     ret_pub, dh->prime_len);
201
202         return 0;
203 }
204
205
206 static int eap_eke_prf(u8 prf, const u8 *key, size_t key_len, const u8 *data,
207                        size_t data_len, const u8 *data2, size_t data2_len,
208                        u8 *res)
209 {
210         const u8 *addr[2];
211         size_t len[2];
212         size_t num_elem = 1;
213
214         addr[0] = data;
215         len[0] = data_len;
216         if (data2) {
217                 num_elem++;
218                 addr[1] = data2;
219                 len[1] = data2_len;
220         }
221
222         if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
223                 return hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, num_elem, addr, len, res);
224         if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
225                 return hmac_sha256_vector(key, key_len, num_elem, addr, len,
226                                           res);
227         return -1;
228 }
229
230
231 static int eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha1(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, const u8 *data,
232                                  size_t data_len, u8 *res, size_t len)
233 {
234         u8 hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
235         u8 idx;
236         const u8 *addr[3];
237         size_t vlen[3];
238         int ret;
239
240         idx = 0;
241         addr[0] = hash;
242         vlen[0] = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
243         addr[1] = data;
244         vlen[1] = data_len;
245         addr[2] = &idx;
246         vlen[2] = 1;
247
248         while (len > 0) {
249                 idx++;
250                 if (idx == 1)
251                         ret = hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, 2, &addr[1],
252                                                &vlen[1], hash);
253                 else
254                         ret = hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, 3, addr, vlen,
255                                                hash);
256                 if (ret < 0)
257                         return -1;
258                 if (len > SHA1_MAC_LEN) {
259                         os_memcpy(res, hash, SHA1_MAC_LEN);
260                         res += SHA1_MAC_LEN;
261                         len -= SHA1_MAC_LEN;
262                 } else {
263                         os_memcpy(res, hash, len);
264                         len = 0;
265                 }
266         }
267
268         return 0;
269 }
270
271
272 static int eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha256(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, const u8 *data,
273                                    size_t data_len, u8 *res, size_t len)
274 {
275         u8 hash[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
276         u8 idx;
277         const u8 *addr[3];
278         size_t vlen[3];
279         int ret;
280
281         idx = 0;
282         addr[0] = hash;
283         vlen[0] = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
284         addr[1] = data;
285         vlen[1] = data_len;
286         addr[2] = &idx;
287         vlen[2] = 1;
288
289         while (len > 0) {
290                 idx++;
291                 if (idx == 1)
292                         ret = hmac_sha256_vector(key, key_len, 2, &addr[1],
293                                                  &vlen[1], hash);
294                 else
295                         ret = hmac_sha256_vector(key, key_len, 3, addr, vlen,
296                                                  hash);
297                 if (ret < 0)
298                         return -1;
299                 if (len > SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
300                         os_memcpy(res, hash, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
301                         res += SHA256_MAC_LEN;
302                         len -= SHA256_MAC_LEN;
303                 } else {
304                         os_memcpy(res, hash, len);
305                         len = 0;
306                 }
307         }
308
309         return 0;
310 }
311
312
313 static int eap_eke_prfplus(u8 prf, const u8 *key, size_t key_len,
314                            const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *res, size_t len)
315 {
316         if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
317                 return eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha1(key, key_len, data, data_len, res,
318                                              len);
319         if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
320                 return eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha256(key, key_len, data, data_len,
321                                                res, len);
322         return -1;
323 }
324
325
326 int eap_eke_derive_key(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
327                        const u8 *password, size_t password_len,
328                        const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len, const u8 *id_p,
329                        size_t id_p_len, u8 *key)
330 {
331         u8 zeros[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
332         u8 temp[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
333         size_t key_len = 16; /* Only AES-128-CBC is used here */
334         u8 *id;
335
336         /* temp = prf(0+, password) */
337         os_memset(zeros, 0, sess->prf_len);
338         if (eap_eke_prf(sess->prf, zeros, sess->prf_len,
339                         password, password_len, NULL, 0, temp) < 0)
340                 return -1;
341         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: temp = prf(0+, password)",
342                         temp, sess->prf_len);
343
344         /* key = prf+(temp, ID_S | ID_P) */
345         id = os_malloc(id_s_len + id_p_len);
346         if (id == NULL)
347                 return -1;
348         os_memcpy(id, id_s, id_s_len);
349         os_memcpy(id + id_s_len, id_p, id_p_len);
350         wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: ID_S | ID_P",
351                           id, id_s_len + id_p_len);
352         if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, temp, sess->prf_len,
353                             id, id_s_len + id_p_len, key, key_len) < 0) {
354                 os_free(id);
355                 return -1;
356         }
357         os_free(id);
358         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: key = prf+(temp, ID_S | ID_P)",
359                         key, key_len);
360
361         return 0;
362 }
363
364
365 int eap_eke_dhcomp(struct eap_eke_session *sess, const u8 *key, const u8 *dhpub,
366                    u8 *ret_dhcomp)
367 {
368         u8 pub[EAP_EKE_MAX_DH_LEN];
369         int dh_len;
370         u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
371
372         dh_len = eap_eke_dh_len(sess->dhgroup);
373         if (dh_len < 0)
374                 return -1;
375
376         /*
377          * DHComponent = Encr(key, y)
378          *
379          * All defined DH groups use primes that have length devisible by 16, so
380          * no need to do extra padding for y (= pub).
381          */
382         if (sess->encr != EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
383                 return -1;
384         if (random_get_bytes(iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
385                 return -1;
386         wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: IV for Encr(key, y)",
387                     iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
388         os_memcpy(pub, dhpub, dh_len);
389         if (aes_128_cbc_encrypt(key, iv, pub, dh_len) < 0)
390                 return -1;
391         os_memcpy(ret_dhcomp, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
392         os_memcpy(ret_dhcomp + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, pub, dh_len);
393         wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: DHComponent = Encr(key, y)",
394                     ret_dhcomp, AES_BLOCK_SIZE + dh_len);
395
396         return 0;
397 }
398
399
400 int eap_eke_shared_secret(struct eap_eke_session *sess, const u8 *key,
401                           const u8 *dhpriv, const u8 *peer_dhcomp)
402 {
403         u8 zeros[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
404         u8 peer_pub[EAP_EKE_MAX_DH_LEN];
405         u8 modexp[EAP_EKE_MAX_DH_LEN];
406         size_t len;
407         const struct dh_group *dh;
408
409         dh = eap_eke_dh_group(sess->dhgroup);
410         if (sess->encr != EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC || !dh)
411                 return -1;
412
413         /* Decrypt peer DHComponent */
414         os_memcpy(peer_pub, peer_dhcomp + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, dh->prime_len);
415         if (aes_128_cbc_decrypt(key, peer_dhcomp, peer_pub, dh->prime_len) < 0) {
416                 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Failed to decrypt DHComponent");
417                 return -1;
418         }
419         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Decrypted peer DH pubkey",
420                         peer_pub, dh->prime_len);
421
422         /* SharedSecret = prf(0+, g ^ (x_s * x_p) (mod p)) */
423         len = dh->prime_len;
424         if (crypto_mod_exp(peer_pub, dh->prime_len, dhpriv, dh->prime_len,
425                            dh->prime, dh->prime_len, modexp, &len) < 0)
426                 return -1;
427         if (len < dh->prime_len) {
428                 size_t pad = dh->prime_len - len;
429                 os_memmove(modexp + pad, modexp, len);
430                 os_memset(modexp, 0, pad);
431         }
432
433         os_memset(zeros, 0, sess->auth_len);
434         if (eap_eke_prf(sess->prf, zeros, sess->auth_len, modexp, dh->prime_len,
435                         NULL, 0, sess->shared_secret) < 0)
436                 return -1;
437         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: SharedSecret",
438                         sess->shared_secret, sess->auth_len);
439
440         return 0;
441 }
442
443
444 int eap_eke_derive_ke_ki(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
445                          const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len,
446                          const u8 *id_p, size_t id_p_len)
447 {
448         u8 buf[EAP_EKE_MAX_KE_LEN + EAP_EKE_MAX_KI_LEN];
449         size_t ke_len, ki_len;
450         u8 *data;
451         size_t data_len;
452         const char *label = "EAP-EKE Keys";
453         size_t label_len;
454
455         /*
456          * Ke | Ki = prf+(SharedSecret, "EAP-EKE Keys" | ID_S | ID_P)
457          * Ke = encryption key
458          * Ki = integrity protection key
459          * Length of each key depends on the selected algorithms.
460          */
461
462         if (sess->encr == EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
463                 ke_len = 16;
464         else
465                 return -1;
466
467         if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
468                 ki_len = 20;
469         else if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
470                 ki_len = 32;
471         else
472                 return -1;
473
474         label_len = os_strlen(label);
475         data_len = label_len + id_s_len + id_p_len;
476         data = os_malloc(data_len);
477         if (data == NULL)
478                 return -1;
479         os_memcpy(data, label, label_len);
480         os_memcpy(data + label_len, id_s, id_s_len);
481         os_memcpy(data + label_len + id_s_len, id_p, id_p_len);
482         if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, sess->shared_secret, sess->prf_len,
483                             data, data_len, buf, ke_len + ki_len) < 0) {
484                 os_free(data);
485                 return -1;
486         }
487
488         os_memcpy(sess->ke, buf, ke_len);
489         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ke", sess->ke, ke_len);
490         os_memcpy(sess->ki, buf + ke_len, ki_len);
491         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ki", sess->ki, ki_len);
492
493         os_free(data);
494         return 0;
495 }
496
497
498 int eap_eke_derive_ka(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
499                       const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len,
500                       const u8 *id_p, size_t id_p_len,
501                       const u8 *nonce_p, const u8 *nonce_s)
502 {
503         u8 *data, *pos;
504         size_t data_len;
505         const char *label = "EAP-EKE Ka";
506         size_t label_len;
507
508         /*
509          * Ka = prf+(SharedSecret, "EAP-EKE Ka" | ID_S | ID_P | Nonce_P |
510          *           Nonce_S)
511          * Ka = authentication key
512          * Length of the key depends on the selected algorithms.
513          */
514
515         label_len = os_strlen(label);
516         data_len = label_len + id_s_len + id_p_len + 2 * sess->nonce_len;
517         data = os_malloc(data_len);
518         if (data == NULL)
519                 return -1;
520         pos = data;
521         os_memcpy(pos, label, label_len);
522         pos += label_len;
523         os_memcpy(pos, id_s, id_s_len);
524         pos += id_s_len;
525         os_memcpy(pos, id_p, id_p_len);
526         pos += id_p_len;
527         os_memcpy(pos, nonce_p, sess->nonce_len);
528         pos += sess->nonce_len;
529         os_memcpy(pos, nonce_s, sess->nonce_len);
530         if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, sess->shared_secret, sess->prf_len,
531                             data, data_len, sess->ka, sess->prf_len) < 0) {
532                 os_free(data);
533                 return -1;
534         }
535         os_free(data);
536
537         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ka", sess->ka, sess->prf_len);
538
539         return 0;
540 }
541
542
543 int eap_eke_derive_msk(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
544                        const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len,
545                        const u8 *id_p, size_t id_p_len,
546                        const u8 *nonce_p, const u8 *nonce_s,
547                        u8 *msk, u8 *emsk)
548 {
549         u8 *data, *pos;
550         size_t data_len;
551         const char *label = "EAP-EKE Exported Keys";
552         size_t label_len;
553         u8 buf[EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN];
554
555         /*
556          * MSK | EMSK = prf+(SharedSecret, "EAP-EKE Exported Keys" | ID_S |
557          *                   ID_P | Nonce_P | Nonce_S)
558          */
559
560         label_len = os_strlen(label);
561         data_len = label_len + id_s_len + id_p_len + 2 * sess->nonce_len;
562         data = os_malloc(data_len);
563         if (data == NULL)
564                 return -1;
565         pos = data;
566         os_memcpy(pos, label, label_len);
567         pos += label_len;
568         os_memcpy(pos, id_s, id_s_len);
569         pos += id_s_len;
570         os_memcpy(pos, id_p, id_p_len);
571         pos += id_p_len;
572         os_memcpy(pos, nonce_p, sess->nonce_len);
573         pos += sess->nonce_len;
574         os_memcpy(pos, nonce_s, sess->nonce_len);
575         if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, sess->shared_secret, sess->prf_len,
576                             data, data_len, buf, EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN) <
577             0) {
578                 os_free(data);
579                 return -1;
580         }
581         os_free(data);
582
583         os_memcpy(msk, buf, EAP_MSK_LEN);
584         os_memcpy(emsk, buf + EAP_MSK_LEN, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
585         os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
586
587         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: MSK", msk, EAP_MSK_LEN);
588         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: EMSK", msk, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
589
590         return 0;
591 }
592
593
594 static int eap_eke_mac(u8 mac, const u8 *key, const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
595                        u8 *res)
596 {
597         if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA1)
598                 return hmac_sha1(key, SHA1_MAC_LEN, data, data_len, res);
599         if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA2_256)
600                 return hmac_sha256(key, SHA256_MAC_LEN, data, data_len, res);
601         return -1;
602 }
603
604
605 int eap_eke_prot(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
606                  const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
607                  u8 *prot, size_t *prot_len)
608 {
609         size_t block_size, icv_len, pad;
610         u8 *pos, *iv, *e;
611
612         if (sess->encr == EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
613                 block_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
614         else
615                 return -1;
616
617         if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
618                 icv_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
619         else if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
620                 icv_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
621         else
622                 return -1;
623
624         pad = data_len % block_size;
625         if (pad)
626                 pad = block_size - pad;
627
628         if (*prot_len < block_size + data_len + pad + icv_len) {
629                 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Not enough room for Prot() data");
630                 return -1;
631         }
632         pos = prot;
633
634         if (random_get_bytes(pos, block_size))
635                 return -1;
636         iv = pos;
637         wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: IV for Prot()", iv, block_size);
638         pos += block_size;
639
640         e = pos;
641         os_memcpy(pos, data, data_len);
642         pos += data_len;
643         if (pad) {
644                 if (random_get_bytes(pos, pad))
645                         return -1;
646                 pos += pad;
647         }
648
649         if (aes_128_cbc_encrypt(sess->ke, iv, e, data_len + pad) < 0 ||
650             eap_eke_mac(sess->mac, sess->ki, e, data_len + pad, pos) < 0)
651                 return -1;
652         pos += icv_len;
653
654         *prot_len = pos - prot;
655         return 0;
656 }
657
658
659 int eap_eke_decrypt_prot(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
660                          const u8 *prot, size_t prot_len,
661                          u8 *data, size_t *data_len)
662 {
663         size_t block_size, icv_len;
664         u8 icv[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
665
666         if (sess->encr == EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
667                 block_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
668         else
669                 return -1;
670
671         if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
672                 icv_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
673         else if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
674                 icv_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
675         else
676                 return -1;
677
678         if (prot_len < 2 * block_size + icv_len ||
679             (prot_len - icv_len) % block_size)
680                 return -1;
681
682         if (eap_eke_mac(sess->mac, sess->ki, prot + block_size,
683                         prot_len - block_size - icv_len, icv) < 0)
684                 return -1;
685         if (os_memcmp_const(icv, prot + prot_len - icv_len, icv_len) != 0) {
686                 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: ICV mismatch in Prot() data");
687                 return -1;
688         }
689
690         if (*data_len < prot_len - block_size - icv_len) {
691                 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Not enough room for decrypted Prot() data");
692                 return -1;
693         }
694
695         *data_len = prot_len - block_size - icv_len;
696         os_memcpy(data, prot + block_size, *data_len);
697         if (aes_128_cbc_decrypt(sess->ke, prot, data, *data_len) < 0) {
698                 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Failed to decrypt Prot() data");
699                 return -1;
700         }
701         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Decrypted Prot() data",
702                         data, *data_len);
703
704         return 0;
705 }
706
707
708 int eap_eke_auth(struct eap_eke_session *sess, const char *label,
709                  const struct wpabuf *msgs, u8 *auth)
710 {
711         wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Auth(%s)", label);
712         wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ka for Auth",
713                         sess->ka, sess->auth_len);
714         wpa_hexdump_buf(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-EKE: Messages for Auth", msgs);
715         return eap_eke_prf(sess->prf, sess->ka, sess->auth_len,
716                            (const u8 *) label, os_strlen(label),
717                            wpabuf_head(msgs), wpabuf_len(msgs), auth);
718 }
719
720
721 int eap_eke_session_init(struct eap_eke_session *sess, u8 dhgroup, u8 encr,
722                          u8 prf, u8 mac)
723 {
724         sess->dhgroup = dhgroup;
725         sess->encr = encr;
726         sess->prf = prf;
727         sess->mac = mac;
728
729         sess->prf_len = eap_eke_prf_len(prf);
730         sess->nonce_len = eap_eke_nonce_len(prf);
731         sess->auth_len = eap_eke_auth_len(prf);
732         sess->dhcomp_len = eap_eke_dhcomp_len(sess->dhgroup, sess->encr);
733         sess->pnonce_len = eap_eke_pnonce_len(sess->mac);
734         sess->pnonce_ps_len = eap_eke_pnonce_ps_len(sess->mac);
735         if (sess->prf_len < 0 || sess->nonce_len < 0 || sess->auth_len < 0 ||
736             sess->dhcomp_len < 0 || sess->pnonce_len < 0 ||
737             sess->pnonce_ps_len < 0)
738                 return -1;
739
740         return 0;
741 }
742
743
744 void eap_eke_session_clean(struct eap_eke_session *sess)
745 {
746         os_memset(sess->shared_secret, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN);
747         os_memset(sess->ke, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_KE_LEN);
748         os_memset(sess->ki, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_KI_LEN);
749         os_memset(sess->ka, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_KA_LEN);
750 }