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34 * Establish a security context on the acceptor (server). These functions
35 * wrap around libradsec and (thus) talk to a RADIUS server or proxy.
38 #include "gssapiP_eap.h"
40 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
42 eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
49 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
50 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
51 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
56 * Mark an acceptor context as ready for cryptographic operations
59 acceptReadyEap(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred)
61 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
63 gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
65 /* Cache encryption type derived from selected mechanism OID */
66 major = gssEapOidToEnctype(minor, ctx->mechanismUsed,
67 &ctx->encryptionType);
71 gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName);
73 major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.vps,
74 PW_USER_NAME, 0, &vp);
75 if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE && rs_avp_length(vp) != 0) {
76 rs_avp_octets_value_byref((rs_avp *)vp,
77 (unsigned char **)&nameBuf.value,
80 ctx->gssFlags |= GSS_C_ANON_FLAG;
83 major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf,
84 (ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_ANON_FLAG) ?
85 GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS : GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
91 major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.vps,
92 PW_MS_MPPE_SEND_KEY, VENDORPEC_MICROSOFT, &vp);
93 if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
94 *minor = GSSEAP_KEY_UNAVAILABLE;
95 return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
98 major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor,
99 rs_avp_octets_value_const_ptr(vp),
103 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
106 major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
108 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
111 major = sequenceInit(minor,
112 &ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq,
113 ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) != 0),
114 ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG) != 0),
116 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
119 major = gssEapCreateAttrContext(minor, cred, ctx,
120 &ctx->initiatorName->attrCtx,
122 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
125 if (ctx->expiryTime != 0 && ctx->expiryTime < time(NULL)) {
126 *minor = GSSEAP_CRED_EXPIRED;
127 return GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED;
131 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
135 eapGssSmAcceptAcceptorName(OM_uint32 *minor,
136 gss_cred_id_t cred GSSEAP_UNUSED,
138 gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED,
139 gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED,
140 OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED,
141 OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED,
142 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED,
143 gss_buffer_t inputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED,
144 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
145 OM_uint32 *smFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED)
149 /* XXX TODO import and validate name from inputToken */
151 if (ctx->acceptorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
152 /* Send desired target name to acceptor */
153 major = gssEapDisplayName(minor, ctx->acceptorName,
155 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
159 return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
164 eapGssSmAcceptVendorInfo(OM_uint32 *minor,
165 gss_cred_id_t cred GSSEAP_UNUSED,
166 gss_ctx_id_t ctx GSSEAP_UNUSED,
167 gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED,
168 gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED,
169 OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED,
170 OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED,
171 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED,
172 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
173 gss_buffer_t outputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED,
174 OM_uint32 *smFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED)
176 fprintf(stderr, "GSS-EAP: vendor: %.*s\n",
177 (int)inputToken->length, (char *)inputToken->value);
180 return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
186 * Emit a identity EAP request to force the initiator (peer) to identify
190 eapGssSmAcceptIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
193 gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED,
194 gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED,
195 OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED,
196 OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED,
197 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED,
198 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
199 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
203 struct wpabuf *reqData;
204 gss_buffer_desc pktBuffer;
206 if (!gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed)) {
207 *minor = GSSEAP_CRED_MECH_MISMATCH;
208 return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
211 if (inputToken != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER && inputToken->length != 0) {
212 *minor = GSSEAP_WRONG_SIZE;
213 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
216 reqData = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY, 0,
217 EAP_CODE_REQUEST, 0);
218 if (reqData == NULL) {
220 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
223 pktBuffer.length = wpabuf_len(reqData);
224 pktBuffer.value = (void *)wpabuf_head(reqData);
226 major = duplicateBuffer(minor, &pktBuffer, outputToken);
227 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
230 wpabuf_free(reqData);
232 GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION_NEXT(ctx);
235 *smFlags |= SM_FLAG_OUTPUT_TOKEN_CRITICAL;
237 return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
241 * Returns TRUE if the input token contains an EAP identity response.
244 isIdentityResponseP(gss_buffer_t inputToken)
246 struct wpabuf respData;
248 wpabuf_set(&respData, inputToken->value, inputToken->length);
250 return (eap_get_type(&respData) == EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY);
254 * Save the asserted initiator identity from the EAP identity response.
257 importInitiatorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
259 gss_buffer_t inputToken)
262 struct wpabuf respData;
263 const unsigned char *pos;
265 gss_buffer_desc nameBuf;
267 wpabuf_set(&respData, inputToken->value, inputToken->length);
269 pos = eap_hdr_validate(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY,
272 *minor = GSSEAP_PEER_BAD_MESSAGE;
273 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
276 nameBuf.value = (void *)pos;
277 nameBuf.length = len;
279 gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName);
281 return gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
282 ctx->mechanismUsed, &ctx->initiatorName);
286 * Pass the asserted initiator identity to the authentication server.
289 setInitiatorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
291 struct rs_packet *req)
293 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
294 gss_buffer_desc nameBuf;
297 * We should have got an EAP identity response, but if we didn't, then
298 * we will just avoid sending User-Name. Note that radsecproxy requires
299 * User-Name to be sent on every request (presumably so it can remain
302 if (ctx->initiatorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
303 major = gssEapDisplayName(minor, ctx->initiatorName, &nameBuf, NULL);
304 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
307 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, req, PW_USER_NAME, 0, &nameBuf);
308 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
311 gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &nameBuf);
315 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
319 * Pass the asserted acceptor identity to the authentication server.
322 setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
324 struct rs_packet *req)
327 gss_buffer_desc nameBuf;
328 krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
329 krb5_principal krbPrinc;
330 struct rs_context *rc = ctx->acceptorCtx.radContext;
332 GSSEAP_ASSERT(rc != NULL);
334 if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
336 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
339 if ((ctx->acceptorName->flags & NAME_FLAG_SERVICE) == 0) {
340 *minor = GSSEAP_BAD_SERVICE_NAME;
341 return GSS_S_BAD_NAME;
344 GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
346 krbPrinc = ctx->acceptorName->krbPrincipal;
347 GSSEAP_ASSERT(krbPrinc != NULL);
348 GSSEAP_ASSERT(KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(krbPrinc) >= 1);
350 /* Acceptor-Service-Name */
351 krbPrincComponentToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, 0, &nameBuf);
353 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, req,
354 PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_NAME,
357 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
360 /* Acceptor-Host-Name */
361 if (KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(krbPrinc) >= 2) {
362 krbPrincComponentToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, 1, &nameBuf);
364 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, req,
365 PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_HOST_NAME,
368 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
371 if (KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(krbPrinc) > 2) {
372 /* Acceptor-Service-Specific */
373 *minor = krbPrincUnparseServiceSpecifics(krbContext,
376 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
378 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, req,
379 PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_SPECIFICS,
382 krbFreeUnparsedName(krbContext, &nameBuf);
383 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
387 krbPrincRealmToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, &nameBuf);
388 if (nameBuf.length != 0) {
389 /* Acceptor-Realm-Name */
390 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, req,
391 PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_REALM_NAME,
394 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
399 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
403 * Allocate a RadSec handle
406 createRadiusHandle(OM_uint32 *minor,
410 struct gss_eap_acceptor_ctx *actx = &ctx->acceptorCtx;
411 struct rs_error *err;
412 const char *configStanza = "gss-eap";
415 GSSEAP_ASSERT(actx->radContext == NULL);
416 GSSEAP_ASSERT(actx->radConn == NULL);
417 GSSEAP_ASSERT(cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL);
419 major = gssEapCreateRadiusContext(minor, cred, &actx->radContext);
420 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
423 if (cred->radiusConfigStanza.value != NULL)
424 configStanza = (const char *)cred->radiusConfigStanza.value;
426 if (rs_conn_create(actx->radContext, &actx->radConn, configStanza) != 0) {
427 err = rs_err_conn_pop(actx->radConn);
428 return gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, err);
431 if (actx->radServer != NULL) {
432 if (rs_conn_select_peer(actx->radConn, actx->radServer) != 0) {
433 err = rs_err_conn_pop(actx->radConn);
434 return gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, err);
439 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
443 * Choose the correct error for an access reject packet.
446 eapGssAcceptHandleReject(
448 struct rs_packet *response)
451 rs_const_avp *vp = NULL;
453 const char * reply_message = NULL;
454 size_t reply_length = 0;
456 rs_packet_avps(response, &vps);
457 major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, *vps,
458 PW_REPLY_MESSAGE, 0, &vp);
459 if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
460 reply_message = rs_avp_string_value(vp);
461 reply_length = rs_avp_length(vp);
464 major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, *vps,
465 PW_ERROR_CAUSE, 0, &vp);
466 if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
467 switch (rs_avp_integer_value(vp)) {
468 /* Values from http://www.iana.org/assignments/radius-types/radius-types.xhtml#radius-types-18 */
469 case 502: /*request not routable (proxy)*/
470 *minor = GSSEAP_RADIUS_UNROUTABLE;
472 case 501: /*administratively prohibited*/
473 *minor = GSSEAP_RADIUS_ADMIN_PROHIBIT;
477 *minor = GSSEAP_RADIUS_AUTH_FAILURE;
480 } else *minor = GSSEAP_RADIUS_AUTH_FAILURE;
483 gssEapSaveStatusInfo(*minor, "%s: %.*s", error_message(*minor),
484 reply_length, reply_message);
485 else gssEapSaveStatusInfo( *minor, "%s", error_message(*minor));
486 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL;
489 * Process a EAP response from the initiator.
492 eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate(OM_uint32 *minor,
495 gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED,
496 gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED,
497 OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED,
498 OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED,
499 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED,
500 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
501 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
504 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
505 struct rs_connection *rconn;
506 struct rs_request *request = NULL;
507 struct rs_packet *req = NULL, *resp = NULL;
508 int isAccessChallenge;
510 if (ctx->acceptorCtx.radContext == NULL) {
511 /* May be NULL from an imported partial context */
512 major = createRadiusHandle(minor, cred, ctx);
513 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
517 if (isIdentityResponseP(inputToken)) {
518 major = importInitiatorIdentity(minor, ctx, inputToken);
519 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
523 rconn = ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn;
525 if (rs_packet_create_authn_request(rconn, &req, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
526 major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
530 major = setInitiatorIdentity(minor, ctx, req);
531 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
534 major = setAcceptorIdentity(minor, ctx, req);
535 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
538 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, req,
539 PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, inputToken);
540 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
543 if (ctx->acceptorCtx.state.length != 0) {
544 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, req, PW_STATE, 0,
545 &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
546 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
549 gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
552 if (rs_request_create(rconn, &request) != 0) {
553 major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
557 rs_request_add_reqpkt(request, req);
560 if (rs_request_send(request, &resp) != 0) {
561 major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
565 GSSEAP_ASSERT(resp != NULL);
567 isAccessChallenge = 0;
569 switch (rs_packet_code(resp)) {
570 case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
571 isAccessChallenge = 1;
573 case PW_ACCESS_ACCEPT:
575 case PW_ACCESS_REJECT:
576 major = eapGssAcceptHandleReject( minor, resp);
580 *minor = GSSEAP_UNKNOWN_RADIUS_CODE;
581 major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
586 major = gssEapRadiusGetAvp(minor, resp, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0,
588 if (major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && isAccessChallenge) {
589 *minor = GSSEAP_MISSING_EAP_REQUEST;
590 major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
592 } else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
595 if (isAccessChallenge) {
596 major = gssEapRadiusGetAvp(minor, resp, PW_STATE, 0,
597 &ctx->acceptorCtx.state, TRUE);
598 if (GSS_ERROR(major) && *minor != GSSEAP_NO_SUCH_ATTR)
603 rs_packet_avps(resp, &vps);
605 ctx->acceptorCtx.vps = *vps;
608 major = acceptReadyEap(minor, ctx, cred);
609 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
612 GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION_NEXT(ctx);
615 major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
617 *smFlags |= SM_FLAG_OUTPUT_TOKEN_CRITICAL;
621 rs_request_destroy(request);
623 rs_packet_destroy(req);
625 rs_packet_destroy(resp);
626 if (GSSEAP_SM_STATE(ctx) == GSSEAP_STATE_INITIATOR_EXTS) {
627 GSSEAP_ASSERT(major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
629 rs_conn_destroy(ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn);
630 ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn = NULL;
637 eapGssSmAcceptGssFlags(OM_uint32 *minor,
638 gss_cred_id_t cred GSSEAP_UNUSED,
640 gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED,
641 gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED,
642 OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED,
643 OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED,
644 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED,
645 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
646 gss_buffer_t outputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED,
647 OM_uint32 *smFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED)
650 OM_uint32 initiatorGssFlags;
652 GSSEAP_ASSERT((ctx->flags & CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH) == 0);
654 if (inputToken->length < 4) {
655 *minor = GSSEAP_TOK_TRUNC;
656 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
659 /* allow flags to grow for future expansion */
660 p = (unsigned char *)inputToken->value + inputToken->length - 4;
662 initiatorGssFlags = load_uint32_be(p);
663 initiatorGssFlags &= GSSEAP_WIRE_FLAGS_MASK;
665 ctx->gssFlags |= initiatorGssFlags;
667 return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
671 eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings(OM_uint32 *minor,
672 gss_cred_id_t cred GSSEAP_UNUSED,
674 gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED,
675 gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED,
676 OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED,
677 OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED,
678 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
679 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
680 gss_buffer_t outputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED,
681 OM_uint32 *smFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED)
683 krb5_error_code code;
684 krb5_context krbContext;
687 krb5_boolean valid = FALSE;
689 if (chanBindings == GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS ||
690 chanBindings->application_data.length == 0)
691 return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
693 GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
695 KRB_DATA_INIT(&data);
697 gssBufferToKrbData(&chanBindings->application_data, &data);
699 KRB_CHECKSUM_INIT(&cksum, ctx->checksumType, inputToken);
701 code = krb5_c_verify_checksum(krbContext, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
702 KEY_USAGE_GSSEAP_CHBIND_MIC,
703 &data, &cksum, &valid);
706 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
709 if (valid == FALSE) {
710 *minor = GSSEAP_BINDINGS_MISMATCH;
711 return GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS;
714 ctx->flags |= CTX_FLAG_CHANNEL_BINDINGS_VERIFIED;
717 return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
721 eapGssSmAcceptInitiatorMIC(OM_uint32 *minor,
722 gss_cred_id_t cred GSSEAP_UNUSED,
724 gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED,
725 gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED,
726 OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED,
727 OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED,
728 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
729 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
730 gss_buffer_t outputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED,
731 OM_uint32 *smFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED)
736 * The channel binding token is optional, however if the caller indicated
737 * bindings we must raise an error if it was absent.
739 * In the future, we might use a context option to allow the caller to
740 * indicate that missing bindings are acceptable.
742 if (chanBindings != NULL &&
743 chanBindings->application_data.length != 0 &&
744 (ctx->flags & CTX_FLAG_CHANNEL_BINDINGS_VERIFIED) == 0) {
745 *minor = GSSEAP_MISSING_BINDINGS;
746 return GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS;
749 major = gssEapVerifyTokenMIC(minor, ctx, inputToken);
750 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
753 GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION_NEXT(ctx);
756 return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
759 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
761 eapGssSmAcceptReauthCreds(OM_uint32 *minor,
764 gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED,
765 gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED,
766 OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED,
767 OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED,
768 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED,
769 gss_buffer_t inputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED,
770 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
771 OM_uint32 *smFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED)
776 * If we're built with fast reauthentication enabled, then
777 * fabricate a ticket from the initiator to ourselves.
779 major = gssEapMakeReauthCreds(minor, ctx, cred, outputToken);
780 if (major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE)
781 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
782 if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
783 major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
790 eapGssSmAcceptAcceptorMIC(OM_uint32 *minor,
791 gss_cred_id_t cred GSSEAP_UNUSED,
793 gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED,
794 gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED,
795 OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED,
796 OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED,
797 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED,
798 gss_buffer_t inputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED,
799 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
804 major = gssEapMakeTokenMIC(minor, ctx, outputToken);
805 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
808 GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION(ctx, GSSEAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED);
811 *smFlags |= SM_FLAG_OUTPUT_TOKEN_CRITICAL;
813 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
816 static struct gss_eap_sm eapGssAcceptorSm[] = {
818 ITOK_TYPE_ACCEPTOR_NAME_REQ,
819 ITOK_TYPE_ACCEPTOR_NAME_RESP,
820 GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL,
822 eapGssSmAcceptAcceptorName
826 ITOK_TYPE_VENDOR_INFO,
828 GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL,
830 eapGssSmAcceptVendorInfo,
833 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
835 ITOK_TYPE_REAUTH_REQ,
836 ITOK_TYPE_REAUTH_RESP,
837 GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL,
839 eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth,
845 GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL,
846 SM_ITOK_FLAG_REQUIRED,
847 eapGssSmAcceptIdentity,
852 GSSEAP_STATE_AUTHENTICATE,
853 SM_ITOK_FLAG_REQUIRED,
854 eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate
859 GSSEAP_STATE_INITIATOR_EXTS,
861 eapGssSmAcceptGssFlags
864 ITOK_TYPE_GSS_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
866 GSSEAP_STATE_INITIATOR_EXTS,
868 eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings,
871 ITOK_TYPE_INITIATOR_MIC,
873 GSSEAP_STATE_INITIATOR_EXTS,
874 SM_ITOK_FLAG_REQUIRED,
875 eapGssSmAcceptInitiatorMIC,
877 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
880 ITOK_TYPE_REAUTH_CREDS,
881 GSSEAP_STATE_ACCEPTOR_EXTS,
883 eapGssSmAcceptReauthCreds,
888 ITOK_TYPE_ACCEPTOR_NAME_RESP,
889 GSSEAP_STATE_ACCEPTOR_EXTS,
891 eapGssSmAcceptAcceptorName
895 ITOK_TYPE_ACCEPTOR_MIC,
896 GSSEAP_STATE_ACCEPTOR_EXTS,
898 eapGssSmAcceptAcceptorMIC
903 gssEapAcceptSecContext(OM_uint32 *minor,
906 gss_buffer_t input_token,
907 gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
908 gss_name_t *src_name,
910 gss_buffer_t output_token,
911 OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
913 gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle)
915 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
917 if (cred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
918 if (ctx->cred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
919 major = gssEapAcquireCred(minor,
927 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
935 * Previously we acquired the credential mutex here, but it should not be
936 * necessary as the acceptor does not access any mutable elements of the
940 if (cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
941 major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
942 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
946 major = gssEapSmStep(minor,
957 sizeof(eapGssAcceptorSm) / sizeof(eapGssAcceptorSm[0]));
958 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
961 if (mech_type != NULL) {
964 tmpMajor = gssEapCanonicalizeOid(&tmpMinor, ctx->mechanismUsed, 0, mech_type);
965 if (GSS_ERROR(tmpMajor)) {
971 if (ret_flags != NULL)
972 *ret_flags = ctx->gssFlags;
973 if (delegated_cred_handle != NULL)
974 *delegated_cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
976 if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
977 if (src_name != NULL && ctx->initiatorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
978 major = gssEapDuplicateName(&tmpMinor, ctx->initiatorName, src_name);
979 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
982 if (time_rec != NULL) {
983 major = gssEapContextTime(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec);
984 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
989 GSSEAP_ASSERT(CTX_IS_ESTABLISHED(ctx) || major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
995 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
997 acceptReadyKrb(OM_uint32 *minor,
1000 const gss_name_t initiator,
1006 major = gssEapGlueToMechName(minor, ctx, initiator, &ctx->initiatorName);
1007 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
1010 major = gssEapReauthComplete(minor, ctx, cred, mech, timeRec);
1011 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
1015 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1019 eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
1022 gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED,
1024 OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED,
1025 OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED,
1026 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
1027 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
1028 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
1031 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
1032 gss_name_t krbInitiator = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
1033 OM_uint32 gssFlags, timeRec = GSS_C_INDEFINITE;
1036 * If we're built with fast reauthentication support, it's valid
1037 * for an initiator to send a GSS reauthentication token as its
1038 * initial context token, causing us to short-circuit the state
1039 * machine and process Kerberos GSS messages instead.
1042 ctx->flags |= CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH;
1044 major = gssAcceptSecContext(minor,
1055 if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1056 major = acceptReadyKrb(minor, ctx, cred,
1057 krbInitiator, mech, timeRec);
1058 if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1059 GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION(ctx, GSSEAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED);
1061 ctx->gssFlags = gssFlags;
1062 } else if (GSS_ERROR(major) &&
1063 (*smFlags & SM_FLAG_INPUT_TOKEN_CRITICAL) == 0) {
1064 /* pretend reauthentication attempt never happened */
1065 gssDeleteSecContext(&tmpMinor, &ctx->reauthCtx, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
1066 ctx->flags &= ~(CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH);
1067 GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION(ctx, GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL);
1068 major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
1071 gssReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &krbInitiator);
1075 #endif /* GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH */
1077 OM_uint32 GSSAPI_CALLCONV
1078 gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor,
1079 gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
1081 gss_buffer_t input_token,
1082 gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
1083 gss_name_t *src_name,
1085 gss_buffer_t output_token,
1086 OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
1087 OM_uint32 *time_rec,
1088 gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle)
1090 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
1091 gss_ctx_id_t ctx = *context_handle;
1095 output_token->length = 0;
1096 output_token->value = NULL;
1098 if (src_name != NULL)
1099 *src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
1101 if (input_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER || input_token->length == 0) {
1102 *minor = GSSEAP_TOK_TRUNC;
1103 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
1106 if (ctx == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
1107 major = gssEapAllocContext(minor, &ctx);
1108 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
1111 *context_handle = ctx;
1114 GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&ctx->mutex);
1116 major = gssEapAcceptSecContext(minor,
1120 input_chan_bindings,
1126 delegated_cred_handle);
1128 GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ctx->mutex);
1130 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
1131 gssEapReleaseContext(&tmpMinor, context_handle);
1133 gssEapTraceStatus("gss_accept_sec_context", major, *minor);