This adds a new password-based EAP method defined in RFC 6124.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME = 50 /* RFC 5448 */,
EAP_TYPE_GPSK = 51 /* RFC 5433 */,
EAP_TYPE_PWD = 52 /* RFC 5931 */,
+ EAP_TYPE_EKE = 53 /* RFC 6124 */,
EAP_TYPE_EXPANDED = 254 /* RFC 3748 */
} EapType;
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * EAP server/peer: EAP-EKE shared routines
+ * Copyright (c) 2011-2013, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+ *
+ * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
+ * See README for more details.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "crypto/aes.h"
+#include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
+#include "crypto/crypto.h"
+#include "crypto/dh_groups.h"
+#include "crypto/random.h"
+#include "crypto/sha1.h"
+#include "crypto/sha256.h"
+#include "eap_common/eap_defs.h"
+#include "eap_eke_common.h"
+
+
+static int eap_eke_dh_len(u8 group)
+{
+ switch (group) {
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_2:
+ return 128;
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_5:
+ return 192;
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_14:
+ return 256;
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_15:
+ return 384;
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_16:
+ return 512;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_dhcomp_len(u8 dhgroup, u8 encr)
+{
+ int dhlen;
+
+ dhlen = eap_eke_dh_len(dhgroup);
+ if (dhlen < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (encr != EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
+ return -1;
+ return AES_BLOCK_SIZE + dhlen;
+}
+
+
+static const struct dh_group * eap_eke_dh_group(u8 group)
+{
+ switch (group) {
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_2:
+ return dh_groups_get(2);
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_5:
+ return dh_groups_get(5);
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_14:
+ return dh_groups_get(14);
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_15:
+ return dh_groups_get(15);
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_16:
+ return dh_groups_get(16);
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_dh_generator(u8 group)
+{
+ switch (group) {
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_2:
+ return 5;
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_5:
+ return 31;
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_14:
+ return 11;
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_15:
+ return 5;
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_16:
+ return 5;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_pnonce_len(u8 mac)
+{
+ int mac_len;
+
+ if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA1)
+ mac_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
+ else if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA2_256)
+ mac_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
+ else
+ return -1;
+
+ return AES_BLOCK_SIZE + 16 + mac_len;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_pnonce_ps_len(u8 mac)
+{
+ int mac_len;
+
+ if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA1)
+ mac_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
+ else if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA2_256)
+ mac_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
+ else
+ return -1;
+
+ return AES_BLOCK_SIZE + 2 * 16 + mac_len;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_prf_len(u8 prf)
+{
+ if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
+ return 20;
+ if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
+ return 32;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_nonce_len(u8 prf)
+{
+ int prf_len;
+
+ prf_len = eap_eke_prf_len(prf);
+ if (prf_len < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (prf_len > 2 * 16)
+ return (prf_len + 1) / 2;
+
+ return 16;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_auth_len(u8 prf)
+{
+ switch (prf) {
+ case EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1:
+ return SHA1_MAC_LEN;
+ case EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256:
+ return SHA256_MAC_LEN;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+
+int eap_eke_dh_init(u8 group, u8 *ret_priv, u8 *ret_pub)
+{
+ int generator;
+ u8 gen;
+ const struct dh_group *dh;
+ size_t pub_len, i;
+
+ generator = eap_eke_dh_generator(group);
+ if (generator < 0 || generator > 255)
+ return -1;
+ gen = generator;
+
+ dh = eap_eke_dh_group(group);
+ if (dh == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* x = random number 2 .. p-1 */
+ if (random_get_bytes(ret_priv, dh->prime_len))
+ return -1;
+ if (os_memcmp(ret_priv, dh->prime, dh->prime_len) > 0) {
+ /* Make sure private value is smaller than prime */
+ ret_priv[0] = 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < dh->prime_len - 1; i++) {
+ if (ret_priv[i])
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i == dh->prime_len - 1 && (ret_priv[i] == 0 || ret_priv[i] == 1))
+ return -1;
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: DH private value",
+ ret_priv, dh->prime_len);
+
+ /* y = g ^ x (mod p) */
+ pub_len = dh->prime_len;
+ if (crypto_mod_exp(&gen, 1, ret_priv, dh->prime_len,
+ dh->prime, dh->prime_len, ret_pub, &pub_len) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (pub_len < dh->prime_len) {
+ size_t pad = dh->prime_len - pub_len;
+ os_memmove(ret_pub + pad, ret_pub, pub_len);
+ os_memset(ret_pub, 0, pad);
+ }
+
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: DH public value",
+ ret_pub, dh->prime_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_prf(u8 prf, const u8 *key, size_t key_len, const u8 *data,
+ size_t data_len, const u8 *data2, size_t data2_len,
+ u8 *res)
+{
+ const u8 *addr[2];
+ size_t len[2];
+ size_t num_elem = 1;
+
+ addr[0] = data;
+ len[0] = data_len;
+ if (data2) {
+ num_elem++;
+ addr[1] = data2;
+ len[1] = data2_len;
+ }
+
+ if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
+ return hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, num_elem, addr, len, res);
+ if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
+ return hmac_sha256_vector(key, key_len, num_elem, addr, len,
+ res);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha1(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, const u8 *data,
+ size_t data_len, u8 *res, size_t len)
+{
+ u8 hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
+ u8 idx;
+ const u8 *addr[3];
+ size_t vlen[3];
+ int ret;
+
+ idx = 0;
+ addr[0] = hash;
+ vlen[0] = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
+ addr[1] = data;
+ vlen[1] = data_len;
+ addr[2] = &idx;
+ vlen[2] = 1;
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+ idx++;
+ if (idx == 1)
+ ret = hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, 2, &addr[1],
+ &vlen[1], hash);
+ else
+ ret = hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, 3, addr, vlen,
+ hash);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (len > SHA1_MAC_LEN) {
+ os_memcpy(res, hash, SHA1_MAC_LEN);
+ res += SHA1_MAC_LEN;
+ len -= SHA1_MAC_LEN;
+ } else {
+ os_memcpy(res, hash, len);
+ len = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha256(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, const u8 *data,
+ size_t data_len, u8 *res, size_t len)
+{
+ u8 hash[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
+ u8 idx;
+ const u8 *addr[3];
+ size_t vlen[3];
+ int ret;
+
+ idx = 0;
+ addr[0] = hash;
+ vlen[0] = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
+ addr[1] = data;
+ vlen[1] = data_len;
+ addr[2] = &idx;
+ vlen[2] = 1;
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+ idx++;
+ if (idx == 1)
+ ret = hmac_sha256_vector(key, key_len, 2, &addr[1],
+ &vlen[1], hash);
+ else
+ ret = hmac_sha256_vector(key, key_len, 3, addr, vlen,
+ hash);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (len > SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
+ os_memcpy(res, hash, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
+ res += SHA256_MAC_LEN;
+ len -= SHA256_MAC_LEN;
+ } else {
+ os_memcpy(res, hash, len);
+ len = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_prfplus(u8 prf, const u8 *key, size_t key_len,
+ const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *res, size_t len)
+{
+ if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
+ return eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha1(key, key_len, data, data_len, res,
+ len);
+ if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
+ return eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha256(key, key_len, data, data_len,
+ res, len);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+
+int eap_eke_derive_key(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
+ const u8 *password, size_t password_len,
+ const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len, const u8 *id_p,
+ size_t id_p_len, u8 *key)
+{
+ u8 zeros[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
+ u8 temp[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
+ size_t key_len = 16; /* Only AES-128-CBC is used here */
+ u8 *id;
+
+ /* temp = prf(0+, password) */
+ os_memset(zeros, 0, sess->prf_len);
+ if (eap_eke_prf(sess->prf, zeros, sess->prf_len,
+ password, password_len, NULL, 0, temp) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: temp = prf(0+, password)",
+ temp, sess->prf_len);
+
+ /* key = prf+(temp, ID_S | ID_P) */
+ id = os_malloc(id_s_len + id_p_len);
+ if (id == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ os_memcpy(id, id_s, id_s_len);
+ os_memcpy(id + id_s_len, id_p, id_p_len);
+ wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: ID_S | ID_P",
+ id, id_s_len + id_p_len);
+ if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, temp, sess->prf_len,
+ id, id_s_len + id_p_len, key, key_len) < 0) {
+ os_free(id);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ os_free(id);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: key = prf+(temp, ID_S | ID_P)",
+ key, key_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+int eap_eke_dhcomp(struct eap_eke_session *sess, const u8 *key, const u8 *dhpub,
+ u8 *ret_dhcomp)
+{
+ u8 pub[EAP_EKE_MAX_DH_LEN];
+ int dh_len;
+ u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ dh_len = eap_eke_dh_len(sess->dhgroup);
+ if (dh_len < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * DHComponent = Encr(key, y)
+ *
+ * All defined DH groups use primes that have length devisible by 16, so
+ * no need to do extra padding for y (= pub).
+ */
+ if (sess->encr != EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
+ return -1;
+ if (random_get_bytes(iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+ return -1;
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: IV for Encr(key, y)",
+ iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ os_memcpy(pub, dhpub, dh_len);
+ if (aes_128_cbc_encrypt(key, iv, pub, dh_len) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ os_memcpy(ret_dhcomp, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ os_memcpy(ret_dhcomp + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, pub, dh_len);
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: DHComponent = Encr(key, y)",
+ ret_dhcomp, AES_BLOCK_SIZE + dh_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+int eap_eke_shared_secret(struct eap_eke_session *sess, const u8 *key,
+ const u8 *dhpriv, const u8 *peer_dhcomp)
+{
+ u8 zeros[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
+ u8 peer_pub[EAP_EKE_MAX_DH_LEN];
+ u8 modexp[EAP_EKE_MAX_DH_LEN];
+ size_t len;
+ const struct dh_group *dh;
+
+ if (sess->encr != EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
+ return -1;
+
+ dh = eap_eke_dh_group(sess->dhgroup);
+ if (dh == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Decrypt peer DHComponent */
+ os_memcpy(peer_pub, peer_dhcomp + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, dh->prime_len);
+ if (aes_128_cbc_decrypt(key, peer_dhcomp, peer_pub, dh->prime_len) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Failed to decrypt DHComponent");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Decrypted peer DH pubkey",
+ peer_pub, dh->prime_len);
+
+ /* SharedSecret = prf(0+, g ^ (x_s * x_p) (mod p)) */
+ len = dh->prime_len;
+ if (crypto_mod_exp(peer_pub, dh->prime_len, dhpriv, dh->prime_len,
+ dh->prime, dh->prime_len, modexp, &len) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (len < dh->prime_len) {
+ size_t pad = dh->prime_len - len;
+ os_memmove(modexp + pad, modexp, len);
+ os_memset(modexp, 0, pad);
+ }
+
+ os_memset(zeros, 0, sess->auth_len);
+ if (eap_eke_prf(sess->prf, zeros, sess->auth_len, modexp, dh->prime_len,
+ NULL, 0, sess->shared_secret) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: SharedSecret",
+ sess->shared_secret, sess->auth_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+int eap_eke_derive_ke_ki(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
+ const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len,
+ const u8 *id_p, size_t id_p_len)
+{
+ u8 buf[EAP_EKE_MAX_KE_LEN + EAP_EKE_MAX_KI_LEN];
+ size_t ke_len, ki_len;
+ u8 *data;
+ size_t data_len;
+ const char *label = "EAP-EKE Keys";
+ size_t label_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Ke | Ki = prf+(SharedSecret, "EAP-EKE Keys" | ID_S | ID_P)
+ * Ke = encryption key
+ * Ki = integrity protection key
+ * Length of each key depends on the selected algorithms.
+ */
+
+ if (sess->encr == EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
+ ke_len = 16;
+ else
+ return -1;
+
+ if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
+ ki_len = 20;
+ else if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
+ ki_len = 32;
+ else
+ return -1;
+
+ label_len = os_strlen(label);
+ data_len = label_len + id_s_len + id_p_len;
+ data = os_malloc(data_len);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ os_memcpy(data, label, label_len);
+ os_memcpy(data + label_len, id_s, id_s_len);
+ os_memcpy(data + label_len + id_s_len, id_p, id_p_len);
+ if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, sess->shared_secret, sess->prf_len,
+ data, data_len, buf, ke_len + ki_len) < 0) {
+ os_free(data);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ os_memcpy(sess->ke, buf, ke_len);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ke", sess->ke, ke_len);
+ os_memcpy(sess->ki, buf + ke_len, ki_len);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ki", sess->ki, ki_len);
+
+ os_free(data);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+int eap_eke_derive_ka(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
+ const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len,
+ const u8 *id_p, size_t id_p_len,
+ const u8 *nonce_p, const u8 *nonce_s)
+{
+ u8 *data, *pos;
+ size_t data_len;
+ const char *label = "EAP-EKE Ka";
+ size_t label_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Ka = prf+(SharedSecret, "EAP-EKE Ka" | ID_S | ID_P | Nonce_P |
+ * Nonce_S)
+ * Ka = authentication key
+ * Length of the key depends on the selected algorithms.
+ */
+
+ label_len = os_strlen(label);
+ data_len = label_len + id_s_len + id_p_len + 2 * sess->nonce_len;
+ data = os_malloc(data_len);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ pos = data;
+ os_memcpy(pos, label, label_len);
+ pos += label_len;
+ os_memcpy(pos, id_s, id_s_len);
+ pos += id_s_len;
+ os_memcpy(pos, id_p, id_p_len);
+ pos += id_p_len;
+ os_memcpy(pos, nonce_p, sess->nonce_len);
+ pos += sess->nonce_len;
+ os_memcpy(pos, nonce_s, sess->nonce_len);
+ if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, sess->shared_secret, sess->prf_len,
+ data, data_len, sess->ka, sess->prf_len) < 0) {
+ os_free(data);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ os_free(data);
+
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ka", sess->ka, sess->prf_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+int eap_eke_derive_msk(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
+ const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len,
+ const u8 *id_p, size_t id_p_len,
+ const u8 *nonce_p, const u8 *nonce_s,
+ u8 *msk, u8 *emsk)
+{
+ u8 *data, *pos;
+ size_t data_len;
+ const char *label = "EAP-EKE Exported Keys";
+ size_t label_len;
+ u8 buf[EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN];
+
+ /*
+ * MSK | EMSK = prf+(SharedSecret, "EAP-EKE Exported Keys" | ID_S |
+ * ID_P | Nonce_P | Nonce_S)
+ */
+
+ label_len = os_strlen(label);
+ data_len = label_len + id_s_len + id_p_len + 2 * sess->nonce_len;
+ data = os_malloc(data_len);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ pos = data;
+ os_memcpy(pos, label, label_len);
+ pos += label_len;
+ os_memcpy(pos, id_s, id_s_len);
+ pos += id_s_len;
+ os_memcpy(pos, id_p, id_p_len);
+ pos += id_p_len;
+ os_memcpy(pos, nonce_p, sess->nonce_len);
+ pos += sess->nonce_len;
+ os_memcpy(pos, nonce_s, sess->nonce_len);
+ if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, sess->shared_secret, sess->prf_len,
+ data, data_len, buf, EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN) <
+ 0) {
+ os_free(data);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ os_free(data);
+
+ os_memcpy(msk, buf, EAP_MSK_LEN);
+ os_memcpy(emsk, buf + EAP_MSK_LEN, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
+ os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: MSK", msk, EAP_MSK_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: EMSK", msk, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_mac(u8 mac, const u8 *key, const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
+ u8 *res)
+{
+ if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA1)
+ return hmac_sha1(key, SHA1_MAC_LEN, data, data_len, res);
+ if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA2_256)
+ return hmac_sha256(key, SHA256_MAC_LEN, data, data_len, res);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+
+int eap_eke_prot(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
+ const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
+ u8 *prot, size_t *prot_len)
+{
+ size_t block_size, icv_len, pad;
+ u8 *pos, *iv, *e;
+
+ if (sess->encr == EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
+ block_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ else
+ return -1;
+
+ if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
+ icv_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
+ else if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
+ icv_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
+ else
+ return -1;
+
+ pad = data_len % block_size;
+ if (pad)
+ pad = block_size - pad;
+
+ if (*prot_len < block_size + data_len + pad + icv_len) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Not enough room for Prot() data");
+ }
+ pos = prot;
+
+ if (random_get_bytes(pos, block_size))
+ return -1;
+ iv = pos;
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: IV for Prot()", iv, block_size);
+ pos += block_size;
+
+ e = pos;
+ os_memcpy(pos, data, data_len);
+ pos += data_len;
+ if (pad) {
+ if (random_get_bytes(pos, pad))
+ return -1;
+ pos += pad;
+ }
+
+ if (aes_128_cbc_encrypt(sess->ke, iv, e, data_len + pad) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (eap_eke_mac(sess->mac, sess->ki, e, data_len + pad, pos) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ pos += icv_len;
+
+ *prot_len = pos - prot;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+int eap_eke_decrypt_prot(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
+ const u8 *prot, size_t prot_len,
+ u8 *data, size_t *data_len)
+{
+ size_t block_size, icv_len;
+ u8 icv[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
+
+ if (sess->encr == EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
+ block_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ else
+ return -1;
+
+ if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
+ icv_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
+ else if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
+ icv_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
+ else
+ return -1;
+
+ if (prot_len < 2 * block_size + icv_len)
+ return -1;
+ if ((prot_len - icv_len) % block_size)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (eap_eke_mac(sess->mac, sess->ki, prot + block_size,
+ prot_len - block_size - icv_len, icv) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (os_memcmp(icv, prot + prot_len - icv_len, icv_len) != 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: ICV mismatch in Prot() data");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (*data_len < prot_len - block_size - icv_len) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Not enough room for decrypted Prot() data");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ *data_len = prot_len - block_size - icv_len;
+ os_memcpy(data, prot + block_size, *data_len);
+ if (aes_128_cbc_decrypt(sess->ke, prot, data, *data_len) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Failed to decrypt Prot() data");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Decrypted Prot() data",
+ data, *data_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+int eap_eke_auth(struct eap_eke_session *sess, const char *label,
+ const struct wpabuf *msgs, u8 *auth)
+{
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Auth(%s)", label);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ka for Auth",
+ sess->ka, sess->auth_len);
+ wpa_hexdump_buf(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-EKE: Messages for Auth", msgs);
+ return eap_eke_prf(sess->prf, sess->ka, sess->auth_len,
+ (const u8 *) label, os_strlen(label),
+ wpabuf_head(msgs), wpabuf_len(msgs), auth);
+}
+
+
+int eap_eke_session_init(struct eap_eke_session *sess, u8 dhgroup, u8 encr,
+ u8 prf, u8 mac)
+{
+ sess->dhgroup = dhgroup;
+ sess->encr = encr;
+ sess->prf = prf;
+ sess->mac = mac;
+
+ sess->prf_len = eap_eke_prf_len(prf);
+ if (sess->prf_len < 0)
+ return -1;
+ sess->nonce_len = eap_eke_nonce_len(prf);
+ if (sess->nonce_len < 0)
+ return -1;
+ sess->auth_len = eap_eke_auth_len(prf);
+ if (sess->auth_len < 0)
+ return -1;
+ sess->dhcomp_len = eap_eke_dhcomp_len(sess->dhgroup, sess->encr);
+ if (sess->dhcomp_len < 0)
+ return -1;
+ sess->pnonce_len = eap_eke_pnonce_len(sess->mac);
+ if (sess->pnonce_len < 0)
+ return -1;
+ sess->pnonce_ps_len = eap_eke_pnonce_ps_len(sess->mac);
+ if (sess->pnonce_ps_len < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+void eap_eke_session_clean(struct eap_eke_session *sess)
+{
+ os_memset(sess->shared_secret, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN);
+ os_memset(sess->ke, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_KE_LEN);
+ os_memset(sess->ki, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_KI_LEN);
+ os_memset(sess->ka, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_KA_LEN);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * EAP server/peer: EAP-EKE shared routines
+ * Copyright (c) 2011-2013, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+ *
+ * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
+ * See README for more details.
+ */
+
+#ifndef EAP_EKE_COMMON_H
+#define EAP_EKE_COMMON_H
+
+/* EKE Exchange */
+#define EAP_EKE_ID 1
+#define EAP_EKE_COMMIT 2
+#define EAP_EKE_CONFIRM 3
+#define EAP_EKE_FAILURE 4
+
+/* Diffie-Hellman Group Registry */
+#define EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_2 1
+#define EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_5 2
+#define EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_14 3 /* mandatory to implement */
+#define EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_15 4
+#define EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_16 5
+
+/* Encryption Algorithm Registry */
+#define EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC 1 /* mandatory to implement */
+
+/* Pseudo Random Function Registry */
+#define EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1 1 /* mandatory to implement */
+#define EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 2
+
+/* Keyed Message Digest (MAC) Registry */
+#define EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA1 1 /* mandatory to implement */
+#define EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA2_256 2
+
+/* Identity Type Registry */
+#define EAP_EKE_ID_OPAQUE 1
+#define EAP_EKE_ID_NAI 2
+#define EAP_EKE_ID_IPv4 3
+#define EAP_EKE_ID_IPv6 4
+#define EAP_EKE_ID_FQDN 5
+#define EAP_EKE_ID_DN 6
+
+/* Failure-Code */
+#define EAP_EKE_FAIL_NO_ERROR 1
+#define EAP_EKE_FAIL_PROTO_ERROR 2
+#define EAP_EKE_FAIL_PASSWD_NOT_FOUND 3
+#define EAP_EKE_FAIL_AUTHENTICATION_FAIL 4
+#define EAP_EKE_FAIL_AUTHORIZATION_FAIL 5
+#define EAP_EKE_FAIL_NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN 6
+#define EAP_EKE_FAIL_PRIVATE_INTERNAL_ERROR 0xffffffff
+
+#define EAP_EKE_MAX_DH_LEN 512
+#define EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN 32
+#define EAP_EKE_MAX_KEY_LEN 16
+#define EAP_EKE_MAX_KE_LEN 16
+#define EAP_EKE_MAX_KI_LEN 32
+#define EAP_EKE_MAX_KA_LEN 32
+#define EAP_EKE_MAX_NONCE_LEN 16
+
+struct eap_eke_session {
+ /* Selected proposal */
+ u8 dhgroup;
+ u8 encr;
+ u8 prf;
+ u8 mac;
+
+ u8 shared_secret[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
+ u8 ke[EAP_EKE_MAX_KE_LEN];
+ u8 ki[EAP_EKE_MAX_KI_LEN];
+ u8 ka[EAP_EKE_MAX_KA_LEN];
+
+ int prf_len;
+ int nonce_len;
+ int auth_len;
+ int dhcomp_len;
+ int pnonce_len;
+ int pnonce_ps_len;
+};
+
+int eap_eke_session_init(struct eap_eke_session *sess, u8 dhgroup, u8 encr,
+ u8 prf, u8 mac);
+void eap_eke_session_clean(struct eap_eke_session *sess);
+int eap_eke_dh_init(u8 group, u8 *ret_priv, u8 *ret_pub);
+int eap_eke_derive_key(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
+ const u8 *password, size_t password_len,
+ const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len, const u8 *id_p,
+ size_t id_p_len, u8 *key);
+int eap_eke_dhcomp(struct eap_eke_session *sess, const u8 *key, const u8 *dhpub,
+ u8 *ret_dhcomp);
+int eap_eke_shared_secret(struct eap_eke_session *sess, const u8 *key,
+ const u8 *dhpriv, const u8 *peer_dhcomp);
+int eap_eke_derive_ke_ki(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
+ const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len,
+ const u8 *id_p, size_t id_p_len);
+int eap_eke_derive_ka(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
+ const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len,
+ const u8 *id_p, size_t id_p_len,
+ const u8 *nonce_p, const u8 *nonce_s);
+int eap_eke_derive_msk(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
+ const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len,
+ const u8 *id_p, size_t id_p_len,
+ const u8 *nonce_p, const u8 *nonce_s,
+ u8 *msk, u8 *emsk);
+int eap_eke_prot(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
+ const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
+ u8 *prot, size_t *prot_len);
+int eap_eke_decrypt_prot(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
+ const u8 *prot, size_t prot_len,
+ u8 *data, size_t *data_len);
+int eap_eke_auth(struct eap_eke_session *sess, const char *label,
+ const struct wpabuf *msgs, u8 *auth);
+
+#endif /* EAP_EKE_COMMON_H */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * EAP peer method: EAP-EKE (RFC 6124)
+ * Copyright (c) 2013, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+ *
+ * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
+ * See README for more details.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "crypto/random.h"
+#include "eap_peer/eap_i.h"
+#include "eap_common/eap_eke_common.h"
+
+struct eap_eke_data {
+ enum {
+ IDENTITY, COMMIT, CONFIRM, SUCCESS, FAILURE
+ } state;
+ u8 msk[EAP_MSK_LEN];
+ u8 emsk[EAP_EMSK_LEN];
+ u8 *peerid;
+ size_t peerid_len;
+ u8 *serverid;
+ size_t serverid_len;
+ u8 dh_priv[EAP_EKE_MAX_DH_LEN];
+ struct eap_eke_session sess;
+ u8 nonce_p[EAP_EKE_MAX_NONCE_LEN];
+ u8 nonce_s[EAP_EKE_MAX_NONCE_LEN];
+ struct wpabuf *msgs;
+};
+
+
+static const char * eap_eke_state_txt(int state)
+{
+ switch (state) {
+ case IDENTITY:
+ return "IDENTITY";
+ case COMMIT:
+ return "COMMIT";
+ case CONFIRM:
+ return "CONFIRM";
+ case SUCCESS:
+ return "SUCCESS";
+ case FAILURE:
+ return "FAILURE";
+ default:
+ return "?";
+ }
+}
+
+
+static void eap_eke_state(struct eap_eke_data *data, int state)
+{
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: %s -> %s",
+ eap_eke_state_txt(data->state), eap_eke_state_txt(state));
+ data->state = state;
+}
+
+
+static void eap_eke_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv);
+
+
+static void * eap_eke_init(struct eap_sm *sm)
+{
+ struct eap_eke_data *data;
+ const u8 *identity, *password;
+ size_t identity_len, password_len;
+
+ password = eap_get_config_password(sm, &password_len);
+ if (!password) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: No password configured");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ data = os_zalloc(sizeof(*data));
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ eap_eke_state(data, IDENTITY);
+
+ identity = eap_get_config_identity(sm, &identity_len);
+ if (identity) {
+ data->peerid = os_malloc(identity_len);
+ if (data->peerid == NULL) {
+ eap_eke_deinit(sm, data);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ os_memcpy(data->peerid, identity, identity_len);
+ data->peerid_len = identity_len;
+ }
+
+ return data;
+}
+
+
+static void eap_eke_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
+{
+ struct eap_eke_data *data = priv;
+ eap_eke_session_clean(&data->sess);
+ os_free(data->serverid);
+ os_free(data->peerid);
+ wpabuf_free(data->msgs);
+ os_free(data);
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_eke_build_msg(struct eap_eke_data *data, int id,
+ size_t length, u8 eke_exch)
+{
+ struct wpabuf *msg;
+ size_t plen;
+
+ plen = 1 + length;
+
+ msg = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_EKE, plen,
+ EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id);
+ if (msg == NULL) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-EKE: Failed to allocate memory");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ wpabuf_put_u8(msg, eke_exch);
+
+ return msg;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_supp_dhgroup(u8 dhgroup)
+{
+ return dhgroup == EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_2 ||
+ dhgroup == EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_5 ||
+ dhgroup == EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_14 ||
+ dhgroup == EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_15 ||
+ dhgroup == EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_16;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_supp_encr(u8 encr)
+{
+ return encr == EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_supp_prf(u8 prf)
+{
+ return prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1 ||
+ prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_supp_mac(u8 mac)
+{
+ return mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA1 ||
+ mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA2_256;
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_eke_build_fail(struct eap_eke_data *data,
+ struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+ const struct wpabuf *reqData,
+ u32 failure_code)
+{
+ struct wpabuf *resp;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Sending EAP-EKE-Failure/Response - code=0x%x",
+ failure_code);
+
+ resp = eap_eke_build_msg(data, eap_get_id(reqData), 4, EAP_EKE_FAILURE);
+ if (resp)
+ wpabuf_put_be32(resp, failure_code);
+
+ os_memset(data->dh_priv, 0, sizeof(data->dh_priv));
+ eap_eke_session_clean(&data->sess);
+
+ eap_eke_state(data, FAILURE);
+ ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
+ ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
+ ret->allowNotifications = FALSE;
+
+ return resp;
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_eke_process_id(struct eap_eke_data *data,
+ struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+ const struct wpabuf *reqData,
+ const u8 *payload,
+ size_t payload_len)
+{
+ struct wpabuf *resp;
+ unsigned num_prop, i;
+ const u8 *pos, *end;
+ const u8 *prop = NULL;
+ u8 idtype;
+
+ if (data->state != IDENTITY) {
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PROTO_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Received EAP-EKE-ID/Request");
+
+ if (payload_len < 2 + 4) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Too short ID/Request Data");
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PROTO_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ pos = payload;
+ end = payload + payload_len;
+
+ num_prop = *pos++;
+ pos++; /* Ignore Reserved field */
+
+ if (pos + num_prop * 4 > end) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Too short ID/Request Data (num_prop=%u)",
+ num_prop);
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PROTO_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_prop; i++) {
+ const u8 *tmp = pos;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Proposal #%u: dh=%u encr=%u prf=%u mac=%u",
+ i, pos[0], pos[1], pos[2], pos[3]);
+ pos += 4;
+
+ if (!eap_eke_supp_dhgroup(*tmp))
+ continue;
+ tmp++;
+ if (!eap_eke_supp_encr(*tmp))
+ continue;
+ tmp++;
+ if (!eap_eke_supp_prf(*tmp))
+ continue;
+ tmp++;
+ if (!eap_eke_supp_mac(*tmp))
+ continue;
+
+ prop = tmp - 3;
+ if (eap_eke_session_init(&data->sess, prop[0], prop[1], prop[2],
+ prop[3]) < 0) {
+ prop = NULL;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Selected proposal");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (prop == NULL) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: No acceptable proposal found");
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN);
+ }
+
+ pos += (num_prop - i - 1) * 4;
+
+ if (pos == end) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Too short ID/Request Data to include IDType/Identity");
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PROTO_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ idtype = *pos++;
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Server IDType %u", idtype);
+ wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Server Identity",
+ pos, end - pos);
+ os_free(data->serverid);
+ data->serverid = os_malloc(end - pos);
+ if (data->serverid == NULL) {
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PRIVATE_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+ os_memcpy(data->serverid, pos, end - pos);
+ data->serverid_len = end - pos;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Sending EAP-EKE-ID/Response");
+
+ resp = eap_eke_build_msg(data, eap_get_id(reqData),
+ 2 + 4 + 1 + data->peerid_len,
+ EAP_EKE_ID);
+ if (resp == NULL) {
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PRIVATE_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ wpabuf_put_u8(resp, 1); /* NumProposals */
+ wpabuf_put_u8(resp, 0); /* Reserved */
+ wpabuf_put_data(resp, prop, 4); /* Selected Proposal */
+ wpabuf_put_u8(resp, EAP_EKE_ID_NAI);
+ if (data->peerid)
+ wpabuf_put_data(resp, data->peerid, data->peerid_len);
+
+ wpabuf_free(data->msgs);
+ data->msgs = wpabuf_alloc(wpabuf_len(reqData) + wpabuf_len(resp));
+ if (data->msgs == NULL) {
+ wpabuf_free(resp);
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PRIVATE_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+ wpabuf_put_buf(data->msgs, reqData);
+ wpabuf_put_buf(data->msgs, resp);
+
+ eap_eke_state(data, COMMIT);
+
+ return resp;
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_eke_process_commit(struct eap_sm *sm,
+ struct eap_eke_data *data,
+ struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+ const struct wpabuf *reqData,
+ const u8 *payload,
+ size_t payload_len)
+{
+ struct wpabuf *resp;
+ const u8 *pos, *end, *dhcomp;
+ size_t prot_len;
+ u8 *rpos;
+ u8 key[EAP_EKE_MAX_KEY_LEN];
+ u8 pub[EAP_EKE_MAX_DH_LEN];
+ const u8 *password;
+ size_t password_len;
+
+ if (data->state != COMMIT) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: EAP-EKE-Commit/Request received in unexpected state (%d)", data->state);
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PROTO_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Received EAP-EKE-Commit/Request");
+
+ password = eap_get_config_password(sm, &password_len);
+ if (password == NULL) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: No password configured!");
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PASSWD_NOT_FOUND);
+ }
+
+ pos = payload;
+ end = payload + payload_len;
+
+ if (pos + data->sess.dhcomp_len > end) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Too short EAP-EKE-Commit");
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PROTO_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: DHComponent_S",
+ pos, data->sess.dhcomp_len);
+ dhcomp = pos;
+ pos += data->sess.dhcomp_len;
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: CBValue", pos, end - pos);
+
+ /*
+ * temp = prf(0+, password)
+ * key = prf+(temp, ID_S | ID_P)
+ */
+ if (eap_eke_derive_key(&data->sess, password, password_len,
+ data->serverid, data->serverid_len,
+ data->peerid, data->peerid_len, key) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Failed to derive key");
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PRIVATE_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * y_p = g ^ x_p (mod p)
+ * x_p = random number 2 .. p-1
+ */
+ if (eap_eke_dh_init(data->sess.dhgroup, data->dh_priv, pub) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Failed to initialize DH");
+ os_memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PRIVATE_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ if (eap_eke_shared_secret(&data->sess, key, data->dh_priv, dhcomp) < 0)
+ {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Failed to derive shared secret");
+ os_memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PRIVATE_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ if (eap_eke_derive_ke_ki(&data->sess,
+ data->serverid, data->serverid_len,
+ data->peerid, data->peerid_len) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Failed to derive Ke/Ki");
+ os_memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PRIVATE_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Sending EAP-EKE-Commit/Response");
+
+ resp = eap_eke_build_msg(data, eap_get_id(reqData),
+ data->sess.dhcomp_len + data->sess.pnonce_len,
+ EAP_EKE_COMMIT);
+ if (resp == NULL) {
+ os_memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PRIVATE_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ /* DHComponent_P = Encr(key, y_p) */
+ rpos = wpabuf_put(resp, data->sess.dhcomp_len);
+ if (eap_eke_dhcomp(&data->sess, key, pub, rpos) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Failed to build DHComponent_S");
+ os_memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PRIVATE_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+ os_memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: DHComponent_P",
+ rpos, data->sess.dhcomp_len);
+
+ if (random_get_bytes(data->nonce_p, data->sess.nonce_len)) {
+ wpabuf_free(resp);
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PRIVATE_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Nonce_P",
+ data->nonce_p, data->sess.nonce_len);
+ prot_len = wpabuf_tailroom(resp);
+ if (eap_eke_prot(&data->sess, data->nonce_p, data->sess.nonce_len,
+ wpabuf_put(resp, 0), &prot_len) < 0) {
+ wpabuf_free(resp);
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PRIVATE_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: PNonce_P",
+ wpabuf_put(resp, 0), prot_len);
+ wpabuf_put(resp, prot_len);
+
+ /* TODO: CBValue */
+
+ if (wpabuf_resize(&data->msgs, wpabuf_len(reqData) + wpabuf_len(resp))
+ < 0) {
+ wpabuf_free(resp);
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PRIVATE_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+ wpabuf_put_buf(data->msgs, reqData);
+ wpabuf_put_buf(data->msgs, resp);
+
+ eap_eke_state(data, CONFIRM);
+
+ return resp;
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_eke_process_confirm(struct eap_eke_data *data,
+ struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+ const struct wpabuf *reqData,
+ const u8 *payload,
+ size_t payload_len)
+{
+ struct wpabuf *resp;
+ const u8 *pos, *end;
+ size_t prot_len;
+ u8 nonces[2 * EAP_EKE_MAX_NONCE_LEN];
+ u8 auth_s[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
+ size_t decrypt_len;
+ u8 *auth;
+
+ if (data->state != CONFIRM) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: EAP-EKE-Confirm/Request received in unexpected state (%d)",
+ data->state);
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PROTO_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Received EAP-EKE-Confirm/Request");
+
+ pos = payload;
+ end = payload + payload_len;
+
+ if (pos + data->sess.pnonce_ps_len + data->sess.prf_len > end) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Too short EAP-EKE-Commit");
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PROTO_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ decrypt_len = sizeof(nonces);
+ if (eap_eke_decrypt_prot(&data->sess, pos, data->sess.pnonce_ps_len,
+ nonces, &decrypt_len) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Failed to decrypt PNonce_PS");
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_AUTHENTICATION_FAIL);
+ }
+ if (decrypt_len != (size_t) 2 * data->sess.nonce_len) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: PNonce_PS protected data length does not match length of Nonce_P and Nonce_S");
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_AUTHENTICATION_FAIL);
+ }
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Received Nonce_P | Nonce_S",
+ nonces, 2 * data->sess.nonce_len);
+ if (os_memcmp(data->nonce_p, nonces, data->sess.nonce_len) != 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Received Nonce_P does not match trnsmitted Nonce_P");
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_AUTHENTICATION_FAIL);
+ }
+
+ os_memcpy(data->nonce_s, nonces + data->sess.nonce_len,
+ data->sess.nonce_len);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Nonce_S",
+ data->nonce_s, data->sess.nonce_len);
+
+ if (eap_eke_derive_ka(&data->sess, data->serverid, data->serverid_len,
+ data->peerid, data->peerid_len,
+ data->nonce_p, data->nonce_s) < 0) {
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PRIVATE_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ if (eap_eke_auth(&data->sess, "EAP-EKE server", data->msgs, auth_s) < 0)
+ {
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PRIVATE_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Auth_S", auth_s, data->sess.prf_len);
+ if (os_memcmp(auth_s, pos + data->sess.pnonce_ps_len,
+ data->sess.prf_len) != 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Auth_S does not match");
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_AUTHENTICATION_FAIL);
+ }
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Sending EAP-EKE-Confirm/Response");
+
+ resp = eap_eke_build_msg(data, eap_get_id(reqData),
+ data->sess.pnonce_len + data->sess.prf_len,
+ EAP_EKE_CONFIRM);
+ if (resp == NULL) {
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PRIVATE_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ prot_len = wpabuf_tailroom(resp);
+ if (eap_eke_prot(&data->sess, data->nonce_s, data->sess.nonce_len,
+ wpabuf_put(resp, 0), &prot_len) < 0) {
+ wpabuf_free(resp);
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PRIVATE_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+ wpabuf_put(resp, prot_len);
+
+ auth = wpabuf_put(resp, data->sess.prf_len);
+ if (eap_eke_auth(&data->sess, "EAP-EKE peer", data->msgs, auth) < 0) {
+ wpabuf_free(resp);
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PRIVATE_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Auth_P", auth, data->sess.prf_len);
+
+ if (eap_eke_derive_msk(&data->sess, data->serverid, data->serverid_len,
+ data->peerid, data->peerid_len,
+ data->nonce_s, data->nonce_p,
+ data->msk, data->emsk) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Failed to derive MSK/EMSK");
+ wpabuf_free(resp);
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData,
+ EAP_EKE_FAIL_PRIVATE_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ os_memset(data->dh_priv, 0, sizeof(data->dh_priv));
+ eap_eke_session_clean(&data->sess);
+
+ eap_eke_state(data, SUCCESS);
+ ret->methodState = METHOD_MAY_CONT;
+ ret->decision = DECISION_COND_SUCC;
+ ret->allowNotifications = FALSE;
+
+ return resp;
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_eke_process_failure(struct eap_eke_data *data,
+ struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+ const struct wpabuf *reqData,
+ const u8 *payload,
+ size_t payload_len)
+{
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Received EAP-EKE-Failure/Request");
+
+ if (payload_len < 4) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Too short EAP-EKE-Failure");
+ } else {
+ u32 code;
+ code = WPA_GET_BE32(payload);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Failure-Code 0x%x", code);
+ }
+
+ return eap_eke_build_fail(data, ret, reqData, EAP_EKE_FAIL_NO_ERROR);
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_eke_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+ struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+ const struct wpabuf *reqData)
+{
+ struct eap_eke_data *data = priv;
+ struct wpabuf *resp;
+ const u8 *pos, *end;
+ size_t len;
+ u8 eke_exch;
+
+ pos = eap_hdr_validate(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_EKE, reqData, &len);
+ if (pos == NULL || len < 1) {
+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ end = pos + len;
+ eke_exch = *pos++;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Received frame: exch %d", eke_exch);
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Received Data", pos, end - pos);
+
+ ret->ignore = FALSE;
+ ret->methodState = METHOD_MAY_CONT;
+ ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
+ ret->allowNotifications = TRUE;
+
+ switch (eke_exch) {
+ case EAP_EKE_ID:
+ resp = eap_eke_process_id(data, ret, reqData, pos, end - pos);
+ break;
+ case EAP_EKE_COMMIT:
+ resp = eap_eke_process_commit(sm, data, ret, reqData,
+ pos, end - pos);
+ break;
+ case EAP_EKE_CONFIRM:
+ resp = eap_eke_process_confirm(data, ret, reqData,
+ pos, end - pos);
+ break;
+ case EAP_EKE_FAILURE:
+ resp = eap_eke_process_failure(data, ret, reqData,
+ pos, end - pos);
+ break;
+ default:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ignoring message with unknown EKE-Exch %d", eke_exch);
+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (ret->methodState == METHOD_DONE)
+ ret->allowNotifications = FALSE;
+
+ return resp;
+}
+
+
+static Boolean eap_eke_isKeyAvailable(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
+{
+ struct eap_eke_data *data = priv;
+ return data->state == SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+static u8 * eap_eke_getKey(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, size_t *len)
+{
+ struct eap_eke_data *data = priv;
+ u8 *key;
+
+ if (data->state != SUCCESS)
+ return NULL;
+
+ key = os_malloc(EAP_MSK_LEN);
+ if (key == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ os_memcpy(key, data->msk, EAP_MSK_LEN);
+ *len = EAP_MSK_LEN;
+
+ return key;
+}
+
+
+static u8 * eap_eke_get_emsk(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, size_t *len)
+{
+ struct eap_eke_data *data = priv;
+ u8 *key;
+
+ if (data->state != SUCCESS)
+ return NULL;
+
+ key = os_malloc(EAP_EMSK_LEN);
+ if (key == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ os_memcpy(key, data->emsk, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
+ *len = EAP_EMSK_LEN;
+
+ return key;
+}
+
+
+int eap_peer_eke_register(void)
+{
+ struct eap_method *eap;
+ int ret;
+
+ eap = eap_peer_method_alloc(EAP_PEER_METHOD_INTERFACE_VERSION,
+ EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_EKE, "EKE");
+ if (eap == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ eap->init = eap_eke_init;
+ eap->deinit = eap_eke_deinit;
+ eap->process = eap_eke_process;
+ eap->isKeyAvailable = eap_eke_isKeyAvailable;
+ eap->getKey = eap_eke_getKey;
+ eap->get_emsk = eap_eke_get_emsk;
+
+ ret = eap_peer_method_register(eap);
+ if (ret)
+ eap_peer_method_free(eap);
+ return ret;
+}
int eap_peer_vendor_test_register(void);
int eap_peer_tnc_register(void);
int eap_peer_pwd_register(void);
+int eap_peer_eke_register(void);
#endif /* EAP_METHODS_H */
NEED_SHA256=y
endif
+ifdef CONFIG_EAP_EKE
+# EAP-EKE
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_EAP_EKE), dyn)
+L_CFLAGS += -DEAP_EKE_DYNAMIC
+EAPDYN += src/eap_peer/eap_eke.so
+else
+L_CFLAGS += -DEAP_EKE
+OBJS += src/eap_peer/eap_eke.c src/eap_common/eap_eke_common.c
+OBJS_h += src/eap_server/eap_server_eke.c
+endif
+CONFIG_IEEE8021X_EAPOL=y
+NEED_DH_GROUPS=y
+NEED_DH_GROUPS_ALL=y
+NEED_SHA256=y
+endif
+
ifdef CONFIG_WPS
ifdef CONFIG_WPS2
L_CFLAGS += -DCONFIG_WPS2
NEED_SHA256=y
endif
+ifdef CONFIG_EAP_EKE
+# EAP-EKE
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_EAP_EKE), dyn)
+CFLAGS += -DEAP_EKE_DYNAMIC
+EAPDYN += ../src/eap_peer/eap_eke.so
+else
+CFLAGS += -DEAP_EKE
+OBJS += ../src/eap_peer/eap_eke.o ../src/eap_common/eap_eke_common.o
+OBJS_h += ../src/eap_server/eap_server_eke.o
+endif
+CONFIG_IEEE8021X_EAPOL=y
+NEED_DH_GROUPS=y
+NEED_DH_GROUPS_ALL=y
+NEED_SHA256=y
+endif
+
ifdef CONFIG_WPS
ifdef CONFIG_WPS2
CFLAGS += -DCONFIG_WPS2
$(CC) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(CFLAGS) -shared -rdynamic -fPIC $^ \
-Deap_peer_ikev2_register=eap_peer_method_dynamic_init
+eap_eke.so: ../src/eap_peer/eap_eke.c ../src/eap_common/eap_eke_common.c
+ $(CC) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(CFLAGS) -shared -rdynamic -fPIC $^ \
+ -Deap_peer_eke_register=eap_peer_method_dynamic_init
+
%.so: %.c
$(CC) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $(CFLAGS) -shared -rdynamic -fPIC $< \
-D$(*F:eap_%=eap_peer_%)_register=eap_peer_method_dynamic_init
# EAP-IKEv2
#CONFIG_EAP_IKEV2=y
+# EAP-EKE
+#CONFIG_EAP_EKE=y
+
# PKCS#12 (PFX) support (used to read private key and certificate file from
# a file that usually has extension .p12 or .pfx)
CONFIG_PKCS12=y
ret = eap_peer_pwd_register();
#endif /* EAP_PWD */
+#ifdef EAP_EKE
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = eap_peer_eke_register();
+#endif /* EAP_EKE */
+
#ifdef EAP_SERVER_IDENTITY
if (ret == 0)
ret = eap_server_identity_register();
projects / mech_eap.git / commitdiff