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34 * Establish a security context on the acceptor (server). These functions
35 * wrap around libradsec and (thus) talk to a RADIUS server or proxy.
38 #include "gssapiP_eap.h"
40 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
42 eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
45 gss_name_t target __attribute__((__unused__)),
46 gss_OID mech __attribute__((__unused__)),
47 OM_uint32 reqFlags __attribute__((__unused__)),
48 OM_uint32 timeReq __attribute__((__unused__)),
49 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
50 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
51 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
56 * Mark an acceptor context as ready for cryptographic operations
59 acceptReadyEap(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred)
61 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
63 gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
65 /* Cache encryption type derived from selected mechanism OID */
66 major = gssEapOidToEnctype(minor, ctx->mechanismUsed,
67 &ctx->encryptionType);
71 gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName);
73 major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.vps,
74 PW_USER_NAME, 0, &vp);
75 if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
76 nameBuf.length = vp->length;
77 nameBuf.value = vp->vp_strvalue;
79 ctx->gssFlags |= GSS_C_ANON_FLAG;
82 major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf,
83 (ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_ANON_FLAG) ?
84 GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS : GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
89 major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.vps,
90 PW_MS_MPPE_SEND_KEY, VENDORPEC_MS, &vp);
91 if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
92 *minor = GSSEAP_KEY_UNAVAILABLE;
93 return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
96 major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor,
101 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
104 major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
106 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
109 major = sequenceInit(minor,
110 &ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq,
111 ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) != 0),
112 ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG) != 0),
114 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
117 major = gssEapCreateAttrContext(minor, cred, ctx,
118 &ctx->initiatorName->attrCtx,
120 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
124 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
128 * Emit a identity EAP request to force the initiator (peer) to identify
132 eapGssSmAcceptIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
135 gss_name_t target __attribute__((__unused__)),
136 gss_OID mech __attribute__((__unused__)),
137 OM_uint32 reqFlags __attribute__((__unused__)),
138 OM_uint32 timeReq __attribute__((__unused__)),
139 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings __attribute__((__unused__)),
140 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
141 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
145 struct wpabuf *reqData;
146 gss_buffer_desc pktBuffer;
148 if (!gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed)) {
149 *minor = GSSEAP_CRED_MECH_MISMATCH;
150 return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
153 if (inputToken != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER && inputToken->length != 0) {
154 *minor = GSSEAP_WRONG_SIZE;
155 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
158 assert(ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME);
160 if (cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
161 major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
162 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
166 reqData = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY, 0,
167 EAP_CODE_REQUEST, 0);
168 if (reqData == NULL) {
170 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
173 pktBuffer.length = wpabuf_len(reqData);
174 pktBuffer.value = (void *)wpabuf_head(reqData);
176 major = duplicateBuffer(minor, &pktBuffer, outputToken);
177 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
180 wpabuf_free(reqData);
183 *smFlags |= SM_FLAG_TRANSITION;
185 return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
189 * Returns TRUE if the input token contains an EAP identity response.
192 isIdentityResponseP(gss_buffer_t inputToken)
194 struct wpabuf respData;
196 wpabuf_set(&respData, inputToken->value, inputToken->length);
198 return (eap_get_type(&respData) == EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY);
202 * Save the asserted initiator identity from the EAP identity response.
205 importInitiatorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
207 gss_buffer_t inputToken)
210 struct wpabuf respData;
211 const unsigned char *pos;
213 gss_buffer_desc nameBuf;
215 wpabuf_set(&respData, inputToken->value, inputToken->length);
217 pos = eap_hdr_validate(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY,
220 *minor = GSSEAP_PEER_BAD_MESSAGE;
221 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
224 nameBuf.value = (void *)pos;
225 nameBuf.length = len;
227 gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName);
229 return gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
230 &ctx->initiatorName);
234 * Pass the asserted initiator identity to the authentication server.
237 setInitiatorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
241 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
242 gss_buffer_desc nameBuf;
245 * We should have got an EAP identity response, but if we didn't, then
246 * we will just avoid sending User-Name. Note that radsecproxy requires
247 * User-Name to be sent on every request (presumably so it can remain
250 if (ctx->initiatorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
251 major = gssEapDisplayName(minor, ctx->initiatorName, &nameBuf, NULL);
252 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
255 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps, PW_USER_NAME, 0, &nameBuf);
256 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
259 gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &nameBuf);
263 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
267 * Pass the asserted acceptor identity to the authentication server.
270 setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
275 gss_buffer_desc nameBuf;
276 krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
277 krb5_principal krbPrinc;
278 struct rs_context *rc = ctx->acceptorCtx.radContext;
282 if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
284 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
287 if ((ctx->acceptorName->flags & NAME_FLAG_SERVICE) == 0) {
288 *minor = GSSEAP_BAD_SERVICE_NAME;
289 return GSS_S_BAD_NAME;
292 GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
294 krbPrinc = ctx->acceptorName->krbPrincipal;
295 assert(krbPrinc != NULL);
296 assert(KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(krbPrinc) >= 2);
298 /* Acceptor-Service-Name */
299 krbPrincComponentToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, 0, &nameBuf);
301 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
302 PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_NAME,
305 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
308 /* Acceptor-Host-Name */
309 krbPrincComponentToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, 1, &nameBuf);
311 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
312 PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_HOST_NAME,
315 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
318 if (KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(krbPrinc) > 2) {
319 /* Acceptor-Service-Specific */
320 krb5_principal_data ssiPrinc = *krbPrinc;
323 KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(&ssiPrinc) -= 2;
324 KRB_PRINC_NAME(&ssiPrinc) += 2;
326 *minor = krb5_unparse_name_flags(krbContext, &ssiPrinc,
327 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &ssi);
329 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
332 nameBuf.length = strlen(ssi);
334 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
335 PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_SPECIFIC,
339 if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
340 krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi);
343 krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi);
346 krbPrincRealmToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, &nameBuf);
347 if (nameBuf.length != 0) {
348 /* Acceptor-Realm-Name */
349 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
350 PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_REALM_NAME,
353 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
358 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
362 * Allocate a RadSec handle
365 createRadiusHandle(OM_uint32 *minor,
369 struct gss_eap_acceptor_ctx *actx = &ctx->acceptorCtx;
370 const char *configFile = RS_CONFIG_FILE;
371 const char *configStanza = "gss-eap";
372 struct rs_alloc_scheme ralloc;
373 struct rs_error *err;
375 assert(actx->radContext == NULL);
376 assert(actx->radConn == NULL);
378 if (rs_context_create(&actx->radContext, RS_DICT_FILE) != 0) {
379 *minor = GSSEAP_RADSEC_CONTEXT_FAILURE;
380 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
383 if (cred->radiusConfigFile != NULL)
384 configFile = cred->radiusConfigFile;
385 if (cred->radiusConfigStanza != NULL)
386 configStanza = cred->radiusConfigStanza;
388 ralloc.calloc = GSSEAP_CALLOC;
389 ralloc.malloc = GSSEAP_MALLOC;
390 ralloc.free = GSSEAP_FREE;
391 ralloc.realloc = GSSEAP_REALLOC;
393 rs_context_set_alloc_scheme(actx->radContext, &ralloc);
395 if (rs_context_read_config(actx->radContext, configFile) != 0) {
396 err = rs_err_ctx_pop(actx->radContext);
400 if (rs_conn_create(actx->radContext, &actx->radConn, configStanza) != 0) {
401 err = rs_err_conn_pop(actx->radConn);
405 if (actx->radServer != NULL) {
406 if (rs_conn_select_peer(actx->radConn, actx->radServer) != 0) {
407 err = rs_err_conn_pop(actx->radConn);
413 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
416 return gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, err);
420 * Process a EAP response from the initiator.
423 eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate(OM_uint32 *minor,
426 gss_name_t target __attribute__((__unused__)),
427 gss_OID mech __attribute__((__unused__)),
428 OM_uint32 reqFlags __attribute__((__unused__)),
429 OM_uint32 timeReq __attribute__((__unused__)),
430 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
431 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
432 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
435 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
436 struct rs_connection *rconn;
437 struct rs_request *request = NULL;
438 struct rs_packet *req = NULL, *resp = NULL;
439 struct radius_packet *frreq, *frresp;
441 if (ctx->acceptorCtx.radContext == NULL) {
442 /* May be NULL from an imported partial context */
443 major = createRadiusHandle(minor, cred, ctx);
444 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
448 if (isIdentityResponseP(inputToken)) {
449 major = importInitiatorIdentity(minor, ctx, inputToken);
450 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
454 rconn = ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn;
456 if (rs_packet_create_authn_request(rconn, &req, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
457 major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
460 frreq = rs_packet_frpkt(req);
462 major = setInitiatorIdentity(minor, ctx, &frreq->vps);
463 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
466 major = setAcceptorIdentity(minor, ctx, &frreq->vps);
467 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
470 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, &frreq->vps,
471 PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, inputToken);
472 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
475 if (ctx->acceptorCtx.state.length != 0) {
476 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, &frreq->vps, PW_STATE, 0,
477 &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
478 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
481 gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
484 if (rs_request_create(rconn, &request) != 0) {
485 major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
489 rs_request_add_reqpkt(request, req);
492 if (rs_request_send(request, &resp) != 0) {
493 major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
497 assert(resp != NULL);
499 frresp = rs_packet_frpkt(resp);
500 switch (frresp->code) {
501 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
502 case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
504 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
505 *minor = GSSEAP_RADIUS_AUTH_FAILURE;
506 major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL;
510 *minor = GSSEAP_UNKNOWN_RADIUS_CODE;
511 major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
516 major = gssEapRadiusGetAvp(minor, frresp->vps, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0,
518 if (major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && frresp->code == PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) {
519 *minor = GSSEAP_MISSING_EAP_REQUEST;
520 major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
522 } else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
525 if (frresp->code == PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) {
526 major = gssEapRadiusGetAvp(minor, frresp->vps, PW_STATE, 0,
527 &ctx->acceptorCtx.state, TRUE);
528 if (GSS_ERROR(major) && *minor != GSSEAP_NO_SUCH_ATTR)
531 ctx->acceptorCtx.vps = frresp->vps;
534 rs_conn_destroy(ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn);
535 ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn = NULL;
537 major = acceptReadyEap(minor, ctx, cred);
538 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
541 *smFlags |= SM_FLAG_TRANSITION;
544 major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
549 rs_request_destroy(request);
551 rs_packet_destroy(req);
557 eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings(OM_uint32 *minor,
560 gss_name_t target __attribute__((__unused__)),
561 gss_OID mech __attribute__((__unused__)),
562 OM_uint32 reqFlags __attribute__((__unused__)),
563 OM_uint32 timeReq __attribute__((__unused__)),
564 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
565 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
566 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
569 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
570 gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[2];
572 iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA | GSS_IOV_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE;
573 iov[0].buffer.length = 0;
574 iov[0].buffer.value = NULL;
576 iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_STREAM;
577 iov[1].buffer = *inputToken;
579 major = gssEapUnwrapOrVerifyMIC(minor, ctx, NULL, NULL,
580 iov, 2, TOK_TYPE_WRAP);
581 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
582 return GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS;
584 if (chanBindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS &&
585 !bufferEqual(&iov[0].buffer, &chanBindings->application_data)) {
586 major = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS;
587 *minor = GSSEAP_BINDINGS_MISMATCH;
589 major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
593 gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &iov[0].buffer);
598 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
600 eapGssSmAcceptReauthCreds(OM_uint32 *minor,
603 gss_name_t target __attribute__((__unused__)),
604 gss_OID mech __attribute__((__unused__)),
605 OM_uint32 reqFlags __attribute__((__unused__)),
606 OM_uint32 timeReq __attribute__((__unused__)),
607 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings __attribute__((__unused__)),
608 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
609 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
615 * If we're built with fast reauthentication enabled, then
616 * fabricate a ticket from the initiator to ourselves.
618 major = gssEapMakeReauthCreds(minor, ctx, cred, outputToken);
619 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
627 eapGssSmAcceptCompleteExts(OM_uint32 *minor,
634 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
635 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
636 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
640 *smFlags |= SM_FLAG_TRANSITION | SM_FLAG_STOP_EVAL;
641 return (ctx->state == GSSEAP_STATE_INITIATOR_EXTS) ?
642 GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
645 static struct gss_eap_sm eapGssAcceptorSm[] = {
646 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
648 ITOK_TYPE_REAUTH_REQ,
649 ITOK_TYPE_REAUTH_RESP,
650 GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL,
652 eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth,
658 GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL,
659 SM_ITOK_FLAG_CRITICAL | SM_ITOK_FLAG_REQUIRED,
660 eapGssSmAcceptIdentity,
665 GSSEAP_STATE_AUTHENTICATE,
666 SM_ITOK_FLAG_CRITICAL | SM_ITOK_FLAG_REQUIRED,
667 eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate
670 ITOK_TYPE_GSS_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
672 GSSEAP_STATE_INITIATOR_EXTS,
673 SM_ITOK_FLAG_CRITICAL | SM_ITOK_FLAG_REQUIRED,
674 eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings,
679 GSSEAP_STATE_INITIATOR_EXTS,
681 eapGssSmAcceptCompleteExts,
683 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
686 ITOK_TYPE_REAUTH_CREDS,
687 GSSEAP_STATE_ACCEPTOR_EXTS,
689 eapGssSmAcceptReauthCreds,
695 GSSEAP_STATE_ACCEPTOR_EXTS,
697 eapGssSmAcceptCompleteExts
702 gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor,
703 gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
705 gss_buffer_t input_token,
706 gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
707 gss_name_t *src_name,
709 gss_buffer_t output_token,
710 OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
712 gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle)
714 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
715 gss_ctx_id_t ctx = *context_handle;
719 output_token->length = 0;
720 output_token->value = NULL;
722 if (src_name != NULL)
723 *src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
725 if (input_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER || input_token->length == 0) {
726 *minor = GSSEAP_TOK_TRUNC;
727 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
730 if (ctx == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
731 major = gssEapAllocContext(minor, &ctx);
732 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
735 *context_handle = ctx;
738 GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&ctx->mutex);
740 if (cred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
741 if (ctx->defaultCred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
742 major = gssEapAcquireCred(minor,
751 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
755 cred = ctx->defaultCred;
758 GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&cred->mutex);
760 major = gssEapSmStep(minor,
771 sizeof(eapGssAcceptorSm) / sizeof(eapGssAcceptorSm[0]));
772 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
775 if (mech_type != NULL) {
776 if (!gssEapInternalizeOid(ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type))
777 duplicateOid(&tmpMinor, ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type);
779 if (ret_flags != NULL)
780 *ret_flags = ctx->gssFlags;
781 if (delegated_cred_handle != NULL)
782 *delegated_cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
784 if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
785 if (src_name != NULL && ctx->initiatorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
786 major = gssEapDuplicateName(&tmpMinor, ctx->initiatorName, src_name);
787 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
790 if (time_rec != NULL) {
791 major = gssEapContextTime(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec);
792 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
797 assert(ctx->state == GSSEAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED || major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
800 if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
801 GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&cred->mutex);
802 GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ctx->mutex);
804 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
805 gssEapReleaseContext(&tmpMinor, context_handle);
810 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
812 acceptReadyKrb(OM_uint32 *minor,
815 const gss_name_t initiator,
821 major = gssEapGlueToMechName(minor, ctx, initiator, &ctx->initiatorName);
822 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
825 if (cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
826 major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
827 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
831 major = gssEapReauthComplete(minor, ctx, cred, mech, timeRec);
832 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
836 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
840 eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
843 gss_name_t target __attribute__((__unused__)),
845 OM_uint32 reqFlags __attribute__((__unused__)),
846 OM_uint32 timeReq __attribute__((__unused__)),
847 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
848 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
849 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
852 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
853 gss_name_t krbInitiator = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
854 OM_uint32 gssFlags, timeRec = GSS_C_INDEFINITE;
857 * If we're built with fast reauthentication support, it's valid
858 * for an initiator to send a GSS reauthentication token as its
859 * initial context token, causing us to short-circuit the state
860 * machine and process Kerberos GSS messages instead.
863 ctx->flags |= CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH;
865 major = gssAcceptSecContext(minor,
876 if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
877 major = acceptReadyKrb(minor, ctx, cred,
878 krbInitiator, mech, timeRec);
879 if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
880 ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
881 *smFlags |= SM_FLAG_STOP_EVAL;
885 ctx->gssFlags = gssFlags;
887 gssReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &krbInitiator);
891 #endif /* GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH */