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34 * Establish a security context on the acceptor (server). These functions
35 * wrap around libradsec and (thus) talk to a RADIUS server or proxy.
38 #include "gssapiP_eap.h"
40 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
42 eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
49 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
50 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
51 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
56 * Mark an acceptor context as ready for cryptographic operations
59 acceptReadyEap(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred)
61 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
63 gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
65 /* Cache encryption type derived from selected mechanism OID */
66 major = gssEapOidToEnctype(minor, ctx->mechanismUsed,
67 &ctx->encryptionType);
71 gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName);
73 major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.vps,
74 PW_USER_NAME, 0, &vp);
75 if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
76 nameBuf.length = vp->length;
77 nameBuf.value = vp->vp_strvalue;
79 ctx->gssFlags |= GSS_C_ANON_FLAG;
82 major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf,
83 (ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_ANON_FLAG) ?
84 GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS : GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
89 major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.vps,
90 PW_MS_MPPE_SEND_KEY, VENDORPEC_MS, &vp);
91 if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
92 *minor = GSSEAP_KEY_UNAVAILABLE;
93 return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
96 major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor,
101 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
104 major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
106 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
109 major = sequenceInit(minor,
110 &ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq,
111 ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) != 0),
112 ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG) != 0),
114 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
117 major = gssEapCreateAttrContext(minor, cred, ctx,
118 &ctx->initiatorName->attrCtx,
120 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
124 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
128 gssEapSupportedInitiatorExts[] = {
131 static struct gss_eap_itok_map
132 gssEapAcceptorExtsFlagMap[] = {
133 { ITOK_TYPE_REAUTH_CREDS, CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH_SUPPORTED },
137 eapGssSmAcceptExts(OM_uint32 *minor,
144 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
145 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
146 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
151 major = gssEapProcessSupportedExts(minor, inputToken,
152 gssEapAcceptorExtsFlagMap,
153 sizeof(gssEapAcceptorExtsFlagMap) /
154 sizeof(gssEapAcceptorExtsFlagMap[0]),
156 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
159 major = gssEapEncodeSupportedExts(minor,
160 gssEapSupportedInitiatorExts,
161 sizeof(gssEapSupportedInitiatorExts) /
162 sizeof(gssEapSupportedInitiatorExts[0]),
164 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
167 return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
171 eapGssSmAcceptAcceptorName(OM_uint32 *minor,
178 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
179 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
180 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
185 /* XXX TODO import and validate name from inputToken */
187 if (ctx->acceptorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
188 /* Send desired target name to acceptor */
189 major = gssEapDisplayName(minor, ctx->acceptorName,
191 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
195 return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
200 eapGssSmAcceptVendorInfo(OM_uint32 *minor,
207 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
208 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
209 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
212 fprintf(stderr, "GSS-EAP: vendor: %.*s\n",
213 (int)inputToken->length, (char *)inputToken->value);
215 return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
221 * Emit a identity EAP request to force the initiator (peer) to identify
225 eapGssSmAcceptIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
232 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
233 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
234 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
238 struct wpabuf *reqData;
239 gss_buffer_desc pktBuffer;
241 if (!gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed)) {
242 *minor = GSSEAP_CRED_MECH_MISMATCH;
243 return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
246 if (inputToken != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER && inputToken->length != 0) {
247 *minor = GSSEAP_WRONG_SIZE;
248 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
251 reqData = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY, 0,
252 EAP_CODE_REQUEST, 0);
253 if (reqData == NULL) {
255 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
258 pktBuffer.length = wpabuf_len(reqData);
259 pktBuffer.value = (void *)wpabuf_head(reqData);
261 major = duplicateBuffer(minor, &pktBuffer, outputToken);
262 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
265 wpabuf_free(reqData);
267 GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION_NEXT(ctx);
270 *smFlags |= SM_FLAG_SEND_TOKEN | SM_FLAG_OUTPUT_TOKEN_CRITICAL;
272 return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
276 * Returns TRUE if the input token contains an EAP identity response.
279 isIdentityResponseP(gss_buffer_t inputToken)
281 struct wpabuf respData;
283 wpabuf_set(&respData, inputToken->value, inputToken->length);
285 return (eap_get_type(&respData) == EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY);
289 * Save the asserted initiator identity from the EAP identity response.
292 importInitiatorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
294 gss_buffer_t inputToken)
297 struct wpabuf respData;
298 const unsigned char *pos;
300 gss_buffer_desc nameBuf;
302 wpabuf_set(&respData, inputToken->value, inputToken->length);
304 pos = eap_hdr_validate(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY,
307 *minor = GSSEAP_PEER_BAD_MESSAGE;
308 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
311 nameBuf.value = (void *)pos;
312 nameBuf.length = len;
314 gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName);
316 return gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
317 &ctx->initiatorName);
321 * Pass the asserted initiator identity to the authentication server.
324 setInitiatorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
328 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
329 gss_buffer_desc nameBuf;
332 * We should have got an EAP identity response, but if we didn't, then
333 * we will just avoid sending User-Name. Note that radsecproxy requires
334 * User-Name to be sent on every request (presumably so it can remain
337 if (ctx->initiatorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
338 major = gssEapDisplayName(minor, ctx->initiatorName, &nameBuf, NULL);
339 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
342 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps, PW_USER_NAME, 0, &nameBuf);
343 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
346 gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &nameBuf);
350 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
354 * Pass the asserted acceptor identity to the authentication server.
357 setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
362 gss_buffer_desc nameBuf;
363 krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
364 krb5_principal krbPrinc;
365 struct rs_context *rc = ctx->acceptorCtx.radContext;
369 if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
371 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
374 if ((ctx->acceptorName->flags & NAME_FLAG_SERVICE) == 0) {
375 *minor = GSSEAP_BAD_SERVICE_NAME;
376 return GSS_S_BAD_NAME;
379 GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
381 krbPrinc = ctx->acceptorName->krbPrincipal;
382 assert(krbPrinc != NULL);
383 assert(KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(krbPrinc) >= 2);
385 /* Acceptor-Service-Name */
386 krbPrincComponentToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, 0, &nameBuf);
388 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
389 PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_NAME,
392 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
395 /* Acceptor-Host-Name */
396 krbPrincComponentToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, 1, &nameBuf);
398 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
399 PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_HOST_NAME,
402 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
405 if (KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(krbPrinc) > 2) {
406 /* Acceptor-Service-Specific */
407 krb5_principal_data ssiPrinc = *krbPrinc;
410 KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(&ssiPrinc) -= 2;
411 KRB_PRINC_NAME(&ssiPrinc) += 2;
413 *minor = krb5_unparse_name_flags(krbContext, &ssiPrinc,
414 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &ssi);
416 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
419 nameBuf.length = strlen(ssi);
421 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
422 PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_SPECIFIC,
426 if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
427 krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi);
430 krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi);
433 krbPrincRealmToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, &nameBuf);
434 if (nameBuf.length != 0) {
435 /* Acceptor-Realm-Name */
436 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
437 PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_REALM_NAME,
440 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
445 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
449 * Allocate a RadSec handle
452 createRadiusHandle(OM_uint32 *minor,
456 struct gss_eap_acceptor_ctx *actx = &ctx->acceptorCtx;
457 const char *configFile = RS_CONFIG_FILE;
458 const char *configStanza = "gss-eap";
459 struct rs_alloc_scheme ralloc;
460 struct rs_error *err;
462 assert(actx->radContext == NULL);
463 assert(actx->radConn == NULL);
465 if (rs_context_create(&actx->radContext, RS_DICT_FILE) != 0) {
466 *minor = GSSEAP_RADSEC_CONTEXT_FAILURE;
467 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
470 if (cred->radiusConfigFile != NULL)
471 configFile = cred->radiusConfigFile;
472 if (cred->radiusConfigStanza != NULL)
473 configStanza = cred->radiusConfigStanza;
475 ralloc.calloc = GSSEAP_CALLOC;
476 ralloc.malloc = GSSEAP_MALLOC;
477 ralloc.free = GSSEAP_FREE;
478 ralloc.realloc = GSSEAP_REALLOC;
480 rs_context_set_alloc_scheme(actx->radContext, &ralloc);
482 if (rs_context_read_config(actx->radContext, configFile) != 0) {
483 err = rs_err_ctx_pop(actx->radContext);
487 if (rs_conn_create(actx->radContext, &actx->radConn, configStanza) != 0) {
488 err = rs_err_conn_pop(actx->radConn);
492 if (actx->radServer != NULL) {
493 if (rs_conn_select_peer(actx->radConn, actx->radServer) != 0) {
494 err = rs_err_conn_pop(actx->radConn);
500 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
503 return gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, err);
507 * Process a EAP response from the initiator.
510 eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate(OM_uint32 *minor,
517 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
518 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
519 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
522 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
523 struct rs_connection *rconn;
524 struct rs_request *request = NULL;
525 struct rs_packet *req = NULL, *resp = NULL;
526 struct radius_packet *frreq, *frresp;
528 if (ctx->acceptorCtx.radContext == NULL) {
529 /* May be NULL from an imported partial context */
530 major = createRadiusHandle(minor, cred, ctx);
531 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
535 if (isIdentityResponseP(inputToken)) {
536 major = importInitiatorIdentity(minor, ctx, inputToken);
537 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
541 rconn = ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn;
543 if (rs_packet_create_authn_request(rconn, &req, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
544 major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
547 frreq = rs_packet_frpkt(req);
549 major = setInitiatorIdentity(minor, ctx, &frreq->vps);
550 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
553 major = setAcceptorIdentity(minor, ctx, &frreq->vps);
554 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
557 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, &frreq->vps,
558 PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, inputToken);
559 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
562 if (ctx->acceptorCtx.state.length != 0) {
563 major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, &frreq->vps, PW_STATE, 0,
564 &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
565 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
568 gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
571 if (rs_request_create(rconn, &request) != 0) {
572 major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
576 rs_request_add_reqpkt(request, req);
579 if (rs_request_send(request, &resp) != 0) {
580 major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
584 assert(resp != NULL);
586 frresp = rs_packet_frpkt(resp);
587 switch (frresp->code) {
588 case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
589 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
591 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
592 *minor = GSSEAP_RADIUS_AUTH_FAILURE;
593 major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL;
597 *minor = GSSEAP_UNKNOWN_RADIUS_CODE;
598 major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
603 major = gssEapRadiusGetAvp(minor, frresp->vps, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0,
605 if (major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && frresp->code == PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) {
606 *minor = GSSEAP_MISSING_EAP_REQUEST;
607 major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
609 } else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
612 if (frresp->code == PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) {
613 major = gssEapRadiusGetAvp(minor, frresp->vps, PW_STATE, 0,
614 &ctx->acceptorCtx.state, TRUE);
615 if (GSS_ERROR(major) && *minor != GSSEAP_NO_SUCH_ATTR)
618 ctx->acceptorCtx.vps = frresp->vps;
621 major = acceptReadyEap(minor, ctx, cred);
622 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
625 GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION_NEXT(ctx);
628 major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
630 *smFlags |= SM_FLAG_SEND_TOKEN | SM_FLAG_OUTPUT_TOKEN_CRITICAL;
634 rs_request_destroy(request);
636 rs_packet_destroy(req);
638 rs_packet_destroy(resp);
639 if (GSSEAP_SM_STATE(ctx) == GSSEAP_STATE_INITIATOR_EXTS) {
640 assert(major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
642 rs_conn_destroy(ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn);
643 ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn = NULL;
650 eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings(OM_uint32 *minor,
657 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
658 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
659 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
662 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
663 gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[2];
665 if (ctx->flags & CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH)
666 return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
668 iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA | GSS_IOV_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE;
669 iov[0].buffer.length = 0;
670 iov[0].buffer.value = NULL;
672 iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_STREAM;
673 iov[1].buffer = *inputToken;
675 major = gssEapUnwrapOrVerifyMIC(minor, ctx, NULL, NULL,
676 iov, 2, TOK_TYPE_WRAP);
677 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
680 if (chanBindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS &&
681 !bufferEqual(&iov[0].buffer, &chanBindings->application_data)) {
682 major = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS;
683 *minor = GSSEAP_BINDINGS_MISMATCH;
685 major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
689 gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &iov[0].buffer);
694 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
696 eapGssSmAcceptReauthCreds(OM_uint32 *minor,
703 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
704 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
705 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
711 * If we're built with fast reauthentication enabled, then
712 * fabricate a ticket from the initiator to ourselves.
714 if (ctx->flags & CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH_SUPPORTED)
715 major = gssEapMakeReauthCreds(minor, ctx, cred, outputToken);
717 major = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
719 if (major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE)
720 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
722 return GSS_ERROR(major) ? major : GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
727 eapGssSmAcceptInitiatorMIC(OM_uint32 *minor,
734 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
735 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
736 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
741 major = gssEapVerifyConversationMIC(minor, ctx, inputToken);
742 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
745 GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION_NEXT(ctx);
749 return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
753 eapGssSmAcceptAcceptorMIC(OM_uint32 *minor,
760 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
761 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
762 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
767 major = gssEapGetConversationMIC(minor, ctx, outputToken);
768 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
771 GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION(ctx, GSSEAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED);
774 *smFlags |= SM_FLAG_SEND_TOKEN | SM_FLAG_OUTPUT_TOKEN_CRITICAL;
776 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
780 * Acceptor state machine.
782 static struct gss_eap_sm eapGssAcceptorSm[] = {
783 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
785 ITOK_TYPE_REAUTH_REQ,
786 ITOK_TYPE_REAUTH_RESP,
787 GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL | GSSEAP_STATE_REAUTHENTICATE,
789 eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth,
793 ITOK_TYPE_ACCEPTOR_NAME_REQ,
794 ITOK_TYPE_ACCEPTOR_NAME_RESP,
795 GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL,
797 eapGssSmAcceptAcceptorName
800 ITOK_TYPE_SUPPORTED_ACCEPTOR_EXTS,
801 ITOK_TYPE_SUPPORTED_INITIATOR_EXTS,
802 GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL,
808 ITOK_TYPE_VENDOR_INFO,
810 GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL,
812 eapGssSmAcceptVendorInfo,
818 GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL,
819 SM_ITOK_FLAG_REQUIRED,
820 eapGssSmAcceptIdentity,
825 GSSEAP_STATE_AUTHENTICATE,
826 SM_ITOK_FLAG_REQUIRED,
827 eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate
830 ITOK_TYPE_GSS_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
832 GSSEAP_STATE_INITIATOR_EXTS,
834 eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings,
837 ITOK_TYPE_INITIATOR_MIC,
839 GSSEAP_STATE_INITIATOR_EXTS,
840 SM_ITOK_FLAG_REQUIRED,
841 eapGssSmAcceptInitiatorMIC,
843 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
846 ITOK_TYPE_REAUTH_CREDS,
847 GSSEAP_STATE_ACCEPTOR_EXTS,
849 eapGssSmAcceptReauthCreds,
854 ITOK_TYPE_ACCEPTOR_MIC,
855 GSSEAP_STATE_ACCEPTOR_EXTS,
857 eapGssSmAcceptAcceptorMIC
862 gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor,
863 gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
865 gss_buffer_t input_token,
866 gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
867 gss_name_t *src_name,
869 gss_buffer_t output_token,
870 OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
872 gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle)
874 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
875 gss_ctx_id_t ctx = *context_handle;
879 output_token->length = 0;
880 output_token->value = NULL;
882 if (src_name != NULL)
883 *src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
885 if (input_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER || input_token->length == 0) {
886 *minor = GSSEAP_TOK_TRUNC;
887 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
890 if (ctx == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
891 major = gssEapAllocContext(minor, &ctx);
892 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
895 *context_handle = ctx;
898 GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&ctx->mutex);
900 if (cred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
901 if (ctx->defaultCred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
902 major = gssEapAcquireCred(minor,
911 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
915 cred = ctx->defaultCred;
918 GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&cred->mutex);
920 if (cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
921 major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
922 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
926 major = gssEapSmStep(minor,
937 sizeof(eapGssAcceptorSm) / sizeof(eapGssAcceptorSm[0]));
938 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
941 if (mech_type != NULL) {
942 if (!gssEapInternalizeOid(ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type))
943 duplicateOid(&tmpMinor, ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type);
945 if (ret_flags != NULL)
946 *ret_flags = ctx->gssFlags;
947 if (delegated_cred_handle != NULL)
948 *delegated_cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
950 if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
951 if (src_name != NULL && ctx->initiatorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
952 major = gssEapDuplicateName(&tmpMinor, ctx->initiatorName, src_name);
953 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
956 if (time_rec != NULL) {
957 major = gssEapContextTime(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec);
958 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
963 assert(CTX_IS_ESTABLISHED(ctx) || major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
966 if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
967 GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&cred->mutex);
968 GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ctx->mutex);
970 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
971 gssEapReleaseContext(&tmpMinor, context_handle);
976 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
978 acceptReadyKrb(OM_uint32 *minor,
981 const gss_name_t initiator,
987 major = gssEapGlueToMechName(minor, ctx, initiator, &ctx->initiatorName);
988 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
991 major = gssEapReauthComplete(minor, ctx, cred, mech, timeRec);
992 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
996 return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
1000 eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
1007 gss_channel_bindings_t userChanBindings,
1008 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
1009 gss_buffer_t outputToken,
1012 OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
1013 gss_name_t krbInitiator = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
1014 OM_uint32 gssFlags, timeRec = GSS_C_INDEFINITE;
1015 struct gss_channel_bindings_struct wireChanBindings = { 0 };
1018 * If we're built with fast reauthentication support, it's valid
1019 * for an initiator to send a GSS reauthentication token as its
1020 * initial context token, causing us to short-circuit the state
1021 * machine and process Kerberos GSS messages instead.
1024 ctx->flags |= CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH;
1027 * To avoid an additional round trip, we use GSS channel bindings
1028 * to integrity protect the rest of the initiator exchange. This
1029 * does have the disadvantage of making it impossible for the
1030 * acceptor to ignore application channel bindings, behaviour
1031 * which differs from normal Kerberos and GSS-EAP itself.
1033 major = gssEapMakeTokenChannelBindings(minor, ctx,
1037 if (GSS_ERROR(major))
1040 major = gssAcceptSecContext(minor,
1051 if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1052 major = acceptReadyKrb(minor, ctx, cred,
1053 krbInitiator, mech, timeRec);
1054 if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1055 /* Generate acceptor MIC */
1056 GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION(ctx, GSSEAP_STATE_ACCEPTOR_EXTS);
1058 ctx->gssFlags = gssFlags;
1059 } else if (GSS_ERROR(major) &&
1060 (*smFlags & SM_FLAG_INPUT_TOKEN_CRITICAL) == 0) {
1061 /* Fall back to EAP */
1062 gssDeleteSecContext(&tmpMinor, &ctx->kerberosCtx, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
1063 ctx->flags &= ~(CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH);
1064 GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION(ctx, GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL);
1066 GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION(ctx, GSSEAP_STATE_REAUTHENTICATE);
1069 major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
1071 gssReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &krbInitiator);
1072 gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &wireChanBindings.application_data);
1076 #endif /* GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH */