-/*
- * Copyright 2006 Internet2
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-/**
- * AbstractPKIXTrustEngine.cpp
- *
- * A trust engine that uses X.509 trust anchors and CRLs associated with a role
- * to perform PKIX validation of signatures and certificates.
- */
-
-#include "internal.h"
-#include "security/AbstractPKIXTrustEngine.h"
-#include "signature/SignatureProfileValidator.h"
-
-#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include <xmltooling/security/OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL.h>
-#include <xmltooling/signature/SignatureValidator.h>
-#include <xmltooling/util/NDC.h>
-#include <xsec/enc/OpenSSL/OpenSSLCryptoX509.hpp>
-#include <log4cpp/Category.hh>
-
-using namespace opensaml::saml2md;
-using namespace opensaml;
-using namespace xmlsignature;
-using namespace xmltooling;
-using namespace log4cpp;
-using namespace std;
-
-AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::AbstractPKIXTrustEngine(const DOMElement* e) : X509TrustEngine(e), m_inlineResolver(NULL)
-{
- m_inlineResolver = XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().KeyResolverManager.newPlugin(INLINE_KEY_RESOLVER,NULL);
-}
-
-AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::~AbstractPKIXTrustEngine()
-{
- delete m_inlineResolver;
-}
-
-namespace {
- static int SAML_DLLLOCAL error_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX* ctx)
- {
- if (!ok)
- Category::getInstance("OpenSSL").error("path validation failure: %s", X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx->error));
- return ok;
- }
-
- static bool SAML_DLLLOCAL validate(
- X509* EE, STACK_OF(X509)* untrusted, AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::PKIXValidationInfoIterator* pkixInfo
- )
- {
- Category& log=Category::getInstance(SAML_LOGCAT".TrustEngine");
-
- // First we build a stack of CA certs. These objects are all referenced in place.
- log.debug("building CA list from PKIX Validation information");
-
- // We need this for CRL support.
- X509_STORE* store=X509_STORE_new();
- if (!store) {
- log_openssl();
- return false;
- }
- #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
- X509_STORE_set_flags(store,X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
- #endif
-
- STACK_OF(X509)* CAstack = sk_X509_new_null();
-
- // This contains the state of the validate operation.
- X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
-
- const vector<XSECCryptoX509*>& CAcerts = pkixInfo->getTrustAnchors();
- for (vector<XSECCryptoX509*>::const_iterator i=CAcerts.begin(); i!=CAcerts.end(); ++i) {
- if ((*i)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL) {
- sk_X509_push(CAstack,static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509*>(*i)->getOpenSSLX509());
- }
- }
-
- const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>& crls = pkixInfo->getCRLs();
- for (vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>::const_iterator j=crls.begin(); j!=crls.end(); ++j) {
- if ((*j)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL) {
- // owned by store
- X509_STORE_add_crl(
- store,
- X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL())
- );
- }
- }
-
- // AFAICT, EE and untrusted are passed in but not owned by the ctx.
- #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
- if (X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,store,EE,untrusted)!=1) {
- log_openssl();
- log.error("unable to initialize X509_STORE_CTX");
- sk_X509_free(CAstack);
- X509_STORE_free(store);
- return false;
- }
- #else
- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,store,EE,untrusted);
- #endif
-
- // Seems to be most efficient to just pass in the CA stack.
- X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&ctx,CAstack);
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx,100); // we check the depth down below
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx,error_callback);
-
- int ret=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
- if (ret==1) {
- // Now see if the depth was acceptable by counting the number of intermediates.
- int depth=sk_X509_num(ctx.chain)-2;
- if (pkixInfo->getVerificationDepth() < depth) {
- log.error(
- "certificate chain was too long (%d intermediates, only %d allowed)",
- (depth==-1) ? 0 : depth,
- pkixInfo->getVerificationDepth()
- );
- ret=0;
- }
- }
-
- // Clean up...
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- X509_STORE_free(store);
- sk_X509_free(CAstack);
-
- if (ret==1) {
- log.info("successfully validated certificate chain");
- return true;
- }
-
- return false;
- }
-};
-
-bool AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::checkEntityNames(XSECCryptoX509* certEE, const RoleDescriptor& role) const
-{
- Category& log=Category::getInstance(SAML_LOGCAT".TrustEngine");
-
- // Build a list of acceptable names. Transcode the possible key "names" to UTF-8.
- // For some simple cases, this should handle UTF-8 encoded DNs in certificates.
- vector<string> keynames;
- const vector<KeyDescriptor*>& keydescs=role.getKeyDescriptors();
- for (vector<KeyDescriptor*>::const_iterator kd_i=keydescs.begin(); kd_i!=keydescs.end(); ++kd_i) {
- const XMLCh* use=(*kd_i)->getUse();
- const KeyInfo* keyInfo = (*kd_i)->getKeyInfo();
- if (keyInfo && use && XMLString::equals(use,KeyDescriptor::KEYTYPE_ENCRYPTION))
- continue;
- const vector<KeyName*>& knames=keyInfo->getKeyNames();
- for (vector<KeyName*>::const_iterator kn_i=knames.begin(); kn_i!=knames.end(); ++kn_i) {
- const XMLCh* n=(*kn_i)->getName();
- if (n && *n) {
- char* kn=toUTF8(n);
- keynames.push_back(kn);
- delete[] kn;
- }
- }
- }
-
- EntityDescriptor* parent=dynamic_cast<EntityDescriptor*>(role.getParent());
- if (parent) {
- const XMLCh* eid=parent->getEntityID();
- if (eid && *eid) {
- char* kn=toUTF8(eid);
- keynames.push_back(kn);
- delete[] kn;
- }
- }
-
- char buf[256];
- X509* x=static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509*>(certEE)->getOpenSSLX509();
- X509_NAME* subject=X509_get_subject_name(x);
- if (subject) {
- // One way is a direct match to the subject DN.
- // Seems that the way to do the compare is to write the X509_NAME into a BIO.
- BIO* b = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- BIO* b2 = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- BIO_set_mem_eof_return(b, 0);
- BIO_set_mem_eof_return(b2, 0);
- // The flags give us LDAP order instead of X.500, with a comma separator.
- int len=X509_NAME_print_ex(b,subject,0,XN_FLAG_RFC2253);
- string subjectstr,subjectstr2;
- BIO_flush(b);
- while ((len = BIO_read(b, buf, 255)) > 0) {
- buf[len] = '\0';
- subjectstr+=buf;
- }
- log.infoStream() << "certificate subject: " << subjectstr << CategoryStream::ENDLINE;
- // The flags give us LDAP order instead of X.500, with a comma plus space separator.
- len=X509_NAME_print_ex(b2,subject,0,XN_FLAG_RFC2253 + XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC - XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS);
- BIO_flush(b2);
- while ((len = BIO_read(b2, buf, 255)) > 0) {
- buf[len] = '\0';
- subjectstr2+=buf;
- }
-
- // Check each keyname.
- for (vector<string>::const_iterator n=keynames.begin(); n!=keynames.end(); n++) {
-#ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
- if (!strcasecmp(n->c_str(),subjectstr.c_str()) || !strcasecmp(n->c_str(),subjectstr2.c_str())) {
-#else
- if (!stricmp(n->c_str(),subjectstr.c_str()) || !stricmp(n->c_str(),subjectstr2.c_str())) {
-#endif
- log.info("matched full subject DN to a key name (%s)", n->c_str());
- BIO_free(b);
- BIO_free(b2);
- return true;
- }
- }
- BIO_free(b);
- BIO_free(b2);
-
- log.debug("unable to match DN, trying TLS subjectAltName match");
- STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME)* altnames=(STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME)*)X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
- if (altnames) {
- int numalts = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames);
- for (int an=0; an<numalts; an++) {
- const GENERAL_NAME* check = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altnames, an);
- if (check->type==GEN_DNS || check->type==GEN_URI) {
- const char* altptr = (char*)ASN1_STRING_data(check->d.ia5);
- const int altlen = ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
-
- for (vector<string>::const_iterator n=keynames.begin(); n!=keynames.end(); n++) {
-#ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
- if ((check->type==GEN_DNS && !strncasecmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen))
-#else
- if ((check->type==GEN_DNS && !strnicmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen))
-#endif
- || (check->type==GEN_URI && !strncmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen))) {
- log.info("matched DNS/URI subjectAltName to a key name (%s)", n->c_str());
- GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
- return true;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
-
- log.debug("unable to match subjectAltName, trying TLS CN match");
- memset(buf,0,sizeof(buf));
- if (X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subject,NID_commonName,buf,255)>0) {
- for (vector<string>::const_iterator n=keynames.begin(); n!=keynames.end(); n++) {
-#ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
- if (!strcasecmp(buf,n->c_str())) {
-#else
- if (!stricmp(buf,n->c_str())) {
-#endif
- log.info("matched subject CN to a key name (%s)", n->c_str());
- return true;
- }
- }
- }
- else
- log.warn("no common name in certificate subject");
- }
- else
- log.error("certificate has no subject?!");
-
- return false;
-}
-
-bool AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::validate(
- XSECCryptoX509* certEE,
- const vector<XSECCryptoX509*>& certChain,
- const RoleDescriptor& role,
- bool checkName,
- const KeyResolver* keyResolver
- ) const
-{
-#ifdef _DEBUG
- NDC ndc("validate");
-#endif
- Category& log=Category::getInstance(SAML_LOGCAT".TrustEngine");
-
- if (!certEE) {
- log.error("X.509 credential was NULL, unable to perform validation");
- return false;
- }
-
- if (checkName) {
- log.debug("checking that the entity certificate name is acceptable");
- if (!checkEntityNames(certEE,role)) {
- log.error("entity certificate name was not acceptable");
- return false;
- }
- }
-
- log.debug("performing certificate path validation...");
-
- STACK_OF(X509)* untrusted=sk_X509_new_null();
- for (vector<XSECCryptoX509*>::const_iterator i=certChain.begin(); i!=certChain.end(); ++i) {
- sk_X509_push(untrusted,static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509*>(*i)->getOpenSSLX509());
- }
-
- auto_ptr<PKIXValidationInfoIterator> pkix(getPKIXValidationInfoIterator(role));
- while (pkix->next()) {
- if (::validate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509*>(certEE)->getOpenSSLX509(),untrusted,pkix.get())) {
- sk_X509_free(untrusted);
- return true;
- }
- }
-
- sk_X509_free(untrusted);
- log.error("failed to validate certificate chain using supplied PKIX information");
- return false;
-}
-
-bool AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::validate(Signature& sig, const RoleDescriptor& role, const KeyResolver* keyResolver) const
-{
-#ifdef _DEBUG
- NDC ndc("validate");
-#endif
- Category& log=Category::getInstance(SAML_LOGCAT".TrustEngine");
-
- log.debug("attempting to validate signature profile");
- SignatureProfileValidator sigValidator;
- try {
- sigValidator.validate(&sig);
- log.debug("signature profile validated");
- }
- catch (ValidationException& e) {
- if (log.isDebugEnabled()) {
- log.debug("signature profile failed to validate: %s", e.what());
- }
- return false;
- }
-
- // Pull the certificate chain out of the signature using an inline KeyResolver.
- KeyResolver::ResolvedCertificates certs;
- if (0==m_inlineResolver->resolveCertificates(&sig, certs)) {
- log.error("unable to perform PKIX validation, signature does not contain any certificates");
- return false;
- }
-
- log.debug("validating signature using certificate from within the signature");
-
- // Find and save off a pointer to the certificate that unlocks the object.
- // Most of the time, this will be the first one anyway.
- XSECCryptoX509* certEE=NULL;
- SignatureValidator keyValidator;
- for (vector<XSECCryptoX509*>::const_iterator i=certs.v().begin(); !certEE && i!=certs.v().end(); ++i) {
- try {
- keyValidator.setKey((*i)->clonePublicKey());
- keyValidator.validate(&sig);
- log.info("signature verified with key inside signature, attempting certificate validation...");
- certEE=(*i);
- }
- catch (ValidationException&) {
- // trap failures
- }
- }
-
- if (certEE)
- return validate(certEE,certs.v(),role,true,keyResolver);
-
- log.error("failed to verify signature with embedded certificates");
- return false;
-}
-
-bool AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::validate(
- const XMLCh* sigAlgorithm,
- const char* sig,
- KeyInfo* keyInfo,
- const char* in,
- unsigned int in_len,
- const RoleDescriptor& role,
- const KeyResolver* keyResolver
- ) const
-{
-#ifdef _DEBUG
- NDC ndc("validate");
-#endif
- Category& log=Category::getInstance(SAML_LOGCAT".TrustEngine");
-
- // Pull the certificate chain out of the KeyInfo using an inline KeyResolver.
- KeyResolver::ResolvedCertificates certs;
- if (!keyInfo || 0==m_inlineResolver->resolveCertificates(keyInfo, certs)) {
- log.error("unable to perform PKIX validation, KeyInfo does not contain any certificates");
- return false;
- }
-
- log.debug("validating signature using certificate from within KeyInfo");
-
- // Find and save off a pointer to the certificate that unlocks the object.
- // Most of the time, this will be the first one anyway.
- XSECCryptoX509* certEE=NULL;
- SignatureValidator keyValidator;
- for (vector<XSECCryptoX509*>::const_iterator i=certs.v().begin(); !certEE && i!=certs.v().end(); ++i) {
- try {
- auto_ptr<XSECCryptoKey> key((*i)->clonePublicKey());
- if (Signature::verifyRawSignature(key.get(), sigAlgorithm, sig, in, in_len)) {
- log.info("signature verified with key inside signature, attempting certificate validation...");
- certEE=(*i);
- }
- }
- catch (SignatureException&) {
- // trap failures
- }
- }
-
- if (certEE)
- return validate(certEE,certs.v(),role,true,keyResolver);
-
- log.error("failed to verify signature with embedded certificates");
- return false;
-}