shib/ShibbolethTrust.cpp

   1 /*
   2  *  Copyright 2001-2005 Internet2
   3  *
   4  * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
   5  * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
   6  * You may obtain a copy of the License at
   7  *
   8  *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
   9  *
  10  * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
  11  * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
  12  * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
  13  * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
  14  * limitations under the License.
  15  */
  16
  17 /* ShibbolethTrust.cpp - a trust implementation that relies solely on standard SAML metadata
  18
  19    Scott Cantor
  20    4/10/05
  21
  22    $History:$
  23 */
  24
  25 #include "internal.h"
  26
  27 #include <openssl/err.h>
  28 #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
  29 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
  30 #include <xsec/dsig/DSIGKeyInfoX509.hpp>
  31 #include <xsec/enc/OpenSSL/OpenSSLCryptoX509.hpp>
  32
  33 using namespace shibboleth;
  34 using namespace saml;
  35 using namespace log4cpp;
  36 using namespace std;
  37
  38 namespace {
  39     void log_openssl()
  40     {
  41         const char* file;
  42         const char* data;
  43         int flags,line;
  44
  45         unsigned long code=ERR_get_error_line_data(&file,&line,&data,&flags);
  46         while (code) {
  47             Category& log=Category::getInstance("OpenSSL");
  48             log.errorStream() << "error code: " << code << " in " << file << ", line " << line << CategoryStream::ENDLINE;
  49             if (data && (flags & ERR_TXT_STRING))
  50                 log.errorStream() << "error data: " << data << CategoryStream::ENDLINE;
  51             code=ERR_get_error_line_data(&file,&line,&data,&flags);
  52         }
  53     }
  54
  55     X509* B64_to_X509(const char* buf)
  56     {
  57         BIO* bmem = BIO_new_mem_buf((void*)buf,-1);
  58         BIO* b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64());
  59         b64 = BIO_push(b64, bmem);
  60         X509* x=NULL;
  61         d2i_X509_bio(b64,&x);
  62         if (!x)
  63             log_openssl();
  64         BIO_free_all(b64);
  65         return x;
  66     }
  67
  68     X509_CRL* B64_to_CRL(const char* buf)
  69     {
  70         BIO* bmem = BIO_new_mem_buf((void*)buf,-1);
  71         BIO* b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64());
  72         b64 = BIO_push(b64, bmem);
  73         X509_CRL* x=NULL;
  74         d2i_X509_CRL_bio(b64,&x);
  75         if (!x)
  76             log_openssl();
  77         BIO_free_all(b64);
  78         return x;
  79     }
  80
  81     class ShibbolethTrust : public BasicTrust
  82     {
  83     public:
  84         ShibbolethTrust(const DOMElement* e);
  85         ~ShibbolethTrust();
  86
  87         bool validate(void* certEE, const Iterator<void*>& certChain, const IRoleDescriptor* role, bool checkName=true);
  88         bool validate(const saml::SAMLSignedObject& token, const IRoleDescriptor* role, ITrust* certValidator=NULL);
  89
  90     private:
  91         bool validate(X509* EE, STACK_OF(X509)* untrusted, const IKeyAuthority* rule);
  92
  93         vector<IMetadata*> m_metas;
  94     };
  95 }
  96
  97 IPlugIn* ShibbolethTrustFactory(const DOMElement* e)
  98 {
  99     return new ShibbolethTrust(e);
 100 }
 101
 102 ShibbolethTrust::ShibbolethTrust(const DOMElement* e) : BasicTrust(e)
 103 {
 104     static const XMLCh MetadataProvider[] =
 105     { chLatin_M, chLatin_e, chLatin_t, chLatin_a, chLatin_d, chLatin_a, chLatin_t, chLatin_a,
 106       chLatin_P, chLatin_r, chLatin_o, chLatin_v, chLatin_i, chLatin_d, chLatin_e, chLatin_r, chNull
 107     };
 108     static const XMLCh _type[] = { chLatin_t, chLatin_y, chLatin_p, chLatin_e, chNull };
 109
 110 #ifdef _DEBUG
 111     saml::NDC ndc("ShibbolethTrust");
 112 #endif
 113     Category& log=Category::getInstance(SHIB_LOGCAT".Trust.Shibboleth");
 114
 115     // Check for embedded trust metadata.
 116     e=saml::XML::getFirstChildElement(e);
 117     while (e) {
 118         if (!XMLString::compareString(e->getLocalName(),MetadataProvider) && e->hasAttributeNS(NULL,_type)) {
 119             auto_ptr_char type(e->getAttributeNS(NULL,_type));
 120             log.info("trust provider building embedded metadata provider of type %s...",type.get());
 121             try {
 122                 IPlugIn* plugin=SAMLConfig::getConfig().getPlugMgr().newPlugin(type.get(),e);
 123                 IMetadata* md=dynamic_cast<IMetadata*>(plugin);
 124                 if (md)
 125                     m_metas.push_back(md);
 126                 else {
 127                     delete plugin;
 128                     log.error("plugin was not a metadata provider");
 129                 }
 130             }
 131             catch (SAMLException& ex) {
 132                 log.error("caught SAML exception building embedded metadata provider: %s", ex.what());
 133             }
 134 #ifndef _DEBUG
 135             catch (...) {
 136                 log.error("caught unknown exception building embedded metadata provider");
 137             }
 138 #endif
 139         }
 140         e=saml::XML::getNextSiblingElement(e);
 141     }
 142 }
 143
 144 ShibbolethTrust::~ShibbolethTrust()
 145 {
 146     for (vector<IMetadata*>::iterator i=m_metas.begin(); i!=m_metas.end(); i++)
 147         delete *i;
 148 }
 149
 150 static int error_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX* ctx)
 151 {
 152     if (!ok)
 153         Category::getInstance("OpenSSL").error("path validation failure: %s", X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx->error));
 154     return ok;
 155 }
 156
 157 bool ShibbolethTrust::validate(X509* EE, STACK_OF(X509)* untrusted, const IKeyAuthority* rule)
 158 {
 159     Category& log=Category::getInstance(SHIB_LOGCAT".Trust.Shibboleth");
 160
 161     // First we build a stack of CA certs. These objects are all referenced in place.
 162     log.debug("building CA list from KeyAuthority extension");
 163
 164     // We need this for CRL support.
 165     X509_STORE* store=X509_STORE_new();
 166     if (!store) {
 167         log_openssl();
 168         return false;
 169     }
 170 #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
 171     X509_STORE_set_flags(store,X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
 172 #endif
 173
 174     STACK_OF(X509)* CAstack = sk_X509_new_null();
 175
 176     // This contains the state of the validate operation.
 177     X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
 178
 179     Iterator<DSIGKeyInfoList*> iKIL=rule->getKeyInfos();
 180     while (iKIL.hasNext()) {
 181         DSIGKeyInfoList* KIL=iKIL.next();
 182
 183         // Try and locate a certificate.
 184         Iterator<KeyInfoResolver*> resolvers(m_resolvers);
 185         while (resolvers.hasNext()) {
 186             XSECCryptoX509* cert=resolvers.next()->resolveCert(KIL);
 187             if (cert && cert->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL) {
 188                 sk_X509_push(CAstack,static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509*>(cert)->getOpenSSLX509());
 189                 break;
 190             }
 191         }
 192
 193         // Try and locate one or more CRLs.
 194         for (size_t s=0; s<KIL->getSize(); s++) {
 195             DSIGKeyInfo* KI=KIL->item(s);
 196             if (KI->getKeyInfoType()==DSIGKeyInfo::KEYINFO_X509) {
 197                 const XMLCh* raw=static_cast<DSIGKeyInfoX509*>(KI)->getX509CRL();
 198                 if (raw) {
 199                     auto_ptr_char blob(raw);
 200                     X509_CRL* crl=B64_to_CRL(blob.get());
 201                     if (crl)
 202                         X509_STORE_add_crl(store,crl);  // owned by store
 203                     else
 204                         log.error("unable to create CRL from X509CRL data");
 205                 }
 206             }
 207         }
 208     }
 209
 210     // AFAICT, EE and untrusted are passed in but not owned by the ctx.
 211 #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
 212     if (X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,store,EE,untrusted)!=1) {
 213         log_openssl();
 214         log.error("unable to initialize X509_STORE_CTX");
 215         sk_X509_free(CAstack);
 216         X509_STORE_free(store);
 217         return false;
 218     }
 219 #else
 220     X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,store,EE,untrusted);
 221 #endif
 222
 223     // Seems to be most efficient to just pass in the CA stack.
 224     X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&ctx,CAstack);
 225     X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx,100);    // we check the depth down below
 226     X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx,error_callback);
 227
 228     int ret=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
 229     if (ret==1) {
 230         // Now see if the depth was acceptable by counting the number of intermediates.
 231         int depth=sk_X509_num(ctx.chain)-2;
 232         if (rule->getVerifyDepth() < depth) {
 233             log.error(
 234                 "certificate chain was too long (%d intermediates, only %d allowed)",
 235                 (depth==-1) ? 0 : depth,
 236                 rule->getVerifyDepth()
 237                 );
 238             ret=0;
 239         }
 240     }
 241
 242     // Clean up...
 243     X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 244     X509_STORE_free(store);
 245     sk_X509_free(CAstack);
 246
 247     if (ret==1) {
 248         log.info("successfully validated certificate chain");
 249         return true;
 250     }
 251
 252     return false;
 253 }
 254
 255 bool ShibbolethTrust::validate(void* certEE, const Iterator<void*>& certChain, const IRoleDescriptor* role, bool checkName)
 256 {
 257     if (BasicTrust::validate(certEE,certChain,role))
 258         return true;
 259
 260 #ifdef _DEBUG
 261     saml::NDC ndc("validate");
 262 #endif
 263     Category& log=Category::getInstance(SHIB_LOGCAT".Trust.Shibboleth");
 264
 265     if (!certEE)
 266         return false;
 267
 268     // The extended trust implementation supports metadata extensions to validate
 269     // signing certificates found inside the signature.
 270
 271     if (checkName) {
 272         // Before we do the cryptogprahy, check that the EE certificate "name" matches
 273         // one of the acceptable key "names" for the signer.
 274         vector<string> keynames;
 275
 276         // Build a list of acceptable names. Transcode the possible key "names" to UTF-8.
 277         // For some simple cases, this should handle UTF-8 encoded DNs in certificates.
 278         Iterator<const IKeyDescriptor*> kd_i=role->getKeyDescriptors();
 279         while (kd_i.hasNext()) {
 280             const IKeyDescriptor* kd=kd_i.next();
 281             if (kd->getUse()!=IKeyDescriptor::signing)
 282                 continue;
 283             DSIGKeyInfoList* KIL=kd->getKeyInfo();
 284             if (!KIL)
 285                 continue;
 286             for (size_t s=0; s<KIL->getSize(); s++) {
 287                 const XMLCh* n=KIL->item(s)->getKeyName();
 288                 if (n) {
 289                     auto_ptr<char> kn(toUTF8(n));
 290                     keynames.push_back(kn.get());
 291                 }
 292             }
 293         }
 294         auto_ptr<char> kn(toUTF8(role->getEntityDescriptor()->getId()));
 295         keynames.push_back(kn.get());
 296
 297         char buf[256];
 298         X509* x=(X509*)certEE;
 299         X509_NAME* subject=X509_get_subject_name(x);
 300         if (subject) {
 301             // One way is a direct match to the subject DN.
 302             // Seems that the way to do the compare is to write the X509_NAME into a BIO.
 303             BIO* b = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
 304             BIO* b2 = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
 305             BIO_set_mem_eof_return(b, 0);
 306             BIO_set_mem_eof_return(b2, 0);
 307             // The flags give us LDAP order instead of X.500, with a comma separator.
 308             int len=X509_NAME_print_ex(b,subject,0,XN_FLAG_RFC2253);
 309             string subjectstr,subjectstr2;
 310             BIO_flush(b);
 311             while ((len = BIO_read(b, buf, 255)) > 0) {
 312                 buf[len] = '\0';
 313                 subjectstr+=buf;
 314             }
 315             log.infoStream() << "certificate subject: " << subjectstr << CategoryStream::ENDLINE;
 316             // The flags give us LDAP order instead of X.500, with a comma plus space separator.
 317             len=X509_NAME_print_ex(b2,subject,0,XN_FLAG_RFC2253 + XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC - XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS);
 318             BIO_flush(b2);
 319             while ((len = BIO_read(b2, buf, 255)) > 0) {
 320                 buf[len] = '\0';
 321                 subjectstr2+=buf;
 322             }
 323
 324             // Check each keyname.
 325             for (vector<string>::const_iterator n=keynames.begin(); n!=keynames.end(); n++) {
 326 #ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
 327                 if (!strcasecmp(n->c_str(),subjectstr.c_str()) || !strcasecmp(n->c_str(),subjectstr2.c_str())) {
 328 #else
 329                 if (!stricmp(n->c_str(),subjectstr.c_str()) || !stricmp(n->c_str(),subjectstr2.c_str())) {
 330 #endif
 331                     log.info("matched full subject DN to a key name (%s)", n->c_str());
 332                     checkName=false;
 333                     break;
 334                 }
 335             }
 336             BIO_free(b);
 337             BIO_free(b2);
 338
 339             if (checkName) {
 340                 log.debug("unable to match DN, trying TLS subjectAltName match");
 341                 STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME)* altnames=(STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME)*)X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
 342                 if (altnames) {
 343                     int numalts = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames);
 344                     for (int an=0; checkName && an<numalts; an++) {
 345                         const GENERAL_NAME* check = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altnames, an);
 346                         if (check->type==GEN_DNS || check->type==GEN_URI) {
 347                             const char* altptr = (char*)ASN1_STRING_data(check->d.ia5);
 348                             const int altlen = ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
 349
 350                             for (vector<string>::const_iterator n=keynames.begin(); n!=keynames.end(); n++) {
 351 #ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
 352                                 if ((check->type==GEN_DNS && !strncasecmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen))
 353 #else
 354                                 if ((check->type==GEN_DNS && !strnicmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen))
 355 #endif
 356                                         || (check->type==GEN_URI && !strncmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen))) {
 357                                     log.info("matched DNS/URI subjectAltName to a key name (%s)", n->c_str());
 358                                     checkName=false;
 359                                     break;
 360                                 }
 361                             }
 362                         }
 363                     }
 364                     GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
 365                 }
 366
 367                 if (checkName) {
 368                     log.debug("unable to match subjectAltName, trying TLS CN match");
 369                     memset(buf,0,sizeof(buf));
 370                     if (X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subject,NID_commonName,buf,255)>0) {
 371                         for (vector<string>::const_iterator n=keynames.begin(); n!=keynames.end(); n++) {
 372 #ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
 373                             if (!strcasecmp(buf,n->c_str())) {
 374 #else
 375                             if (!stricmp(buf,n->c_str())) {
 376 #endif
 377                                 log.info("matched subject CN to a key name (%s)", n->c_str());
 378                                 checkName=false;
 379                                 break;
 380                             }
 381                         }
 382                     }
 383                     else
 384                         log.warn("no common name in certificate subject");
 385                 }
 386             }
 387         }
 388         else
 389             log.error("certificate has no subject?!");
 390     }
 391
 392     if (checkName) {
 393         log.error("cannot match certificate subject against acceptable key names based on KeyDescriptors");
 394         return false;
 395     }
 396
 397     log.debug("performing certificate path validation...");
 398
 399     STACK_OF(X509)* untrusted=sk_X509_new_null();
 400     certChain.reset();
 401     while (certChain.hasNext())
 402         sk_X509_push(untrusted,(X509*)certChain.next());
 403
 404     // Check for entity-level KeyAuthorities.
 405     const IExtendedEntityDescriptor* entity=dynamic_cast<const IExtendedEntityDescriptor*>(role->getEntityDescriptor());
 406     if (entity) {
 407         Iterator<const IKeyAuthority*> kauths=entity->getKeyAuthorities();
 408         while (kauths.hasNext())
 409             if (validate((X509*)certEE,untrusted,kauths.next())) {
 410                 sk_X509_free(untrusted);
 411                 return true;
 412             }
 413     }
 414
 415     // Now repeat using any embedded metadata.
 416     Iterator<IMetadata*> metas(m_metas);
 417     while (metas.hasNext()) {
 418         IMetadata* m=metas.next();
 419         Locker locker(m);
 420         const IEntityDescriptor* ed=m->lookup(role->getEntityDescriptor()->getId());
 421         if (!ed)
 422             continue;
 423
 424         // Check for entity-level KeyAuthorities.
 425         entity=dynamic_cast<const IExtendedEntityDescriptor*>(ed);
 426         if (entity) {
 427             Iterator<const IKeyAuthority*> kauths=entity->getKeyAuthorities();
 428             while (kauths.hasNext())
 429                 if (validate((X509*)certEE,untrusted,kauths.next())) {
 430                     sk_X509_free(untrusted);
 431                     return true;
 432                 }
 433         }
 434     }
 435
 436     const IEntitiesDescriptor* group=role->getEntityDescriptor()->getEntitiesDescriptor();
 437     while (group) {
 438         const IExtendedEntitiesDescriptor* egroup=dynamic_cast<const IExtendedEntitiesDescriptor*>(group);
 439         if (egroup) {
 440             Iterator<const IKeyAuthority*> kauths=egroup->getKeyAuthorities();
 441             while (kauths.hasNext())
 442                 if (validate((X509*)certEE,untrusted,kauths.next())) {
 443                     sk_X509_free(untrusted);
 444                     return true;
 445                 }
 446         }
 447
 448         // Now repeat using any embedded metadata.
 449         Iterator<IMetadata*> metas(m_metas);
 450         while (metas.hasNext()) {
 451             IMetadata* m=metas.next();
 452             Locker locker(m);
 453             const IEntitiesDescriptor* g=m->lookupGroup(group->getName());
 454             if (!g)
 455                 continue;
 456
 457             // Check for group-level KeyAuthorities.
 458             egroup=dynamic_cast<const IExtendedEntitiesDescriptor*>(g);
 459             if (egroup) {
 460                 Iterator<const IKeyAuthority*> kauths=egroup->getKeyAuthorities();
 461                 while (kauths.hasNext())
 462                     if (validate((X509*)certEE,untrusted,kauths.next())) {
 463                         sk_X509_free(untrusted);
 464                         return true;
 465                     }
 466             }
 467         }
 468
 469         group=group->getEntitiesDescriptor();
 470     }
 471
 472     log.debug("failed to validate certificate chain using KeyAuthority extensions");
 473     return false;
 474 }
 475
 476 bool ShibbolethTrust::validate(const saml::SAMLSignedObject& token, const IRoleDescriptor* role, ITrust* certValidator)
 477 {
 478     if (BasicTrust::validate(token,role))
 479         return true;
 480
 481 #ifdef _DEBUG
 482     saml::NDC ndc("validate");
 483 #endif
 484     Category& log=Category::getInstance(SHIB_LOGCAT".Trust.Shibboleth");
 485
 486     // The extended trust implementation supports metadata extensions to validate
 487     // signing certificates found inside the signature.
 488
 489     // Get the certificate chain out of the object in portable form.
 490     vector<XSECCryptoX509*> certs;
 491     for (unsigned int i=0; i<token.getX509CertificateCount(); i++) {
 492         auto_ptr_char cert(token.getX509Certificate(i));
 493         auto_ptr<XSECCryptoX509> x(XSECPlatformUtils::g_cryptoProvider->X509());
 494         try {
 495             x->loadX509Base64Bin(cert.get(),strlen(cert.get()));
 496             certs.push_back(x.release());
 497         }
 498         catch (...) {
 499             log.error("unable to load certificate from signature, skipping it");
 500         }
 501     }
 502
 503     log.debug("validating signature using certificate from within the signature");
 504
 505     // Native representations.
 506     X509* certEE=NULL;
 507     vector<void*> chain;
 508
 509     // Find and save off a pointer to the certificate that unlocks the object.
 510     // Most of the time, this will be the first one anyway.
 511     Iterator<XSECCryptoX509*> iter(certs);
 512     while (iter.hasNext()) {
 513         try {
 514             XSECCryptoX509* c=iter.next();
 515             chain.push_back(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509*>(c)->getOpenSSLX509());
 516             if (!certEE) {
 517                 token.verify(*c);
 518                 log.info("signature verified with key inside signature, attempting certificate validation...");
 519                 certEE=static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509*>(c)->getOpenSSLX509();
 520             }
 521         }
 522         catch (...) {
 523             // trap failures
 524         }
 525     }
 526
 527     bool ret=false;
 528     if (certEE)
 529         ret=(certValidator) ? certValidator->validate(certEE,chain,role) : this->validate(certEE,chain,role);
 530     else
 531         log.debug("failed to verify signature with embedded certificates");
 532
 533     for (vector<XSECCryptoX509*>::iterator j=certs.begin(); j!=certs.end(); j++)
 534         delete *j;
 535
 536     return ret;
 537 }