6e6a04e086f62d17c50c976096cbae23843c7803
[shibboleth/cpp-sp.git] / xmlproviders / XMLTrust.cpp
1 /*
2  *  Copyright 2001-2005 Internet2
3  * 
4  * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
5  * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
6  * You may obtain a copy of the License at
7  *
8  *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
9  *
10  * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
11  * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
12  * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
13  * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
14  * limitations under the License.
15  */
16
17 /* XMLTrust.cpp - a trust implementation that uses an XML file
18
19    Scott Cantor
20    9/27/02
21
22    $History:$
23 */
24
25 #include "internal.h"
26
27 #include <sys/types.h>
28 #include <sys/stat.h>
29
30 #include <openssl/err.h>
31 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
32 #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
33
34 #include <xercesc/framework/URLInputSource.hpp>
35 #include <xercesc/util/regx/RegularExpression.hpp>
36 #include <xsec/enc/XSECCryptoException.hpp>
37 #include <xsec/enc/XSECKeyInfoResolverDefault.hpp>
38
39 using namespace xmlproviders::logging;
40 using namespace shibboleth;
41 using namespace saml;
42 using namespace std;
43
44 namespace {
45     class XMLTrustImpl : public ReloadableXMLFileImpl
46     {
47     public:
48         XMLTrustImpl(const char* pathname) : ReloadableXMLFileImpl(pathname), m_wildcard(NULL) { init(); }
49         XMLTrustImpl(const DOMElement* e) : ReloadableXMLFileImpl(e), m_wildcard(NULL) { init(); }
50         void init();
51         ~XMLTrustImpl();
52         
53         struct KeyAuthority
54         {
55             KeyAuthority() : m_depth(1) {}
56             ~KeyAuthority();
57             X509_STORE* getX509Store();
58             
59 #ifndef HAVE_GOOD_STL
60             vector<const XMLCh*> m_subjects;
61 #endif
62             vector<X509*> m_certs;
63             vector<X509_CRL*> m_crls;
64             unsigned short m_depth;
65         };
66         
67         vector<DSIGKeyInfoList*> m_keybinds;
68         vector<KeyAuthority*> m_keyauths;
69         KeyAuthority* m_wildcard;
70 #ifdef HAVE_GOOD_STL
71         typedef map<xstring,KeyAuthority*> AuthMap;
72         typedef map<xstring,DSIGKeyInfoList*> BindMap;
73         AuthMap m_authMap;
74         BindMap m_bindMap;
75 #endif
76     };
77
78     class XMLTrust : public ITrust, public ReloadableXMLFile
79     {
80     public:
81         XMLTrust(const DOMElement* e);
82         ~XMLTrust();
83
84     bool validate(void* certEE, const Iterator<void*>& certChain, const IRoleDescriptor* role, bool checkName=true);
85     bool validate(const saml::SAMLSignedObject& token, const IRoleDescriptor* role, ITrust* certValidator=NULL);
86
87     protected:
88         virtual ReloadableXMLFileImpl* newImplementation(const char* pathname, bool first=true) const;
89         virtual ReloadableXMLFileImpl* newImplementation(const DOMElement* e, bool first=true) const;
90
91         vector<KeyInfoResolver*> m_resolvers;
92         ITrust* m_delegate;
93     };
94 }
95
96 IPlugIn* XMLTrustFactory(const DOMElement* e)
97 {
98     auto_ptr<XMLTrust> t(new XMLTrust(e));
99     t->getImplementation();
100     return t.release();
101 }
102
103
104 ReloadableXMLFileImpl* XMLTrust::newImplementation(const char* pathname, bool first) const
105 {
106     return new XMLTrustImpl(pathname);
107 }
108
109 ReloadableXMLFileImpl* XMLTrust::newImplementation(const DOMElement* e, bool first) const
110 {
111     return new XMLTrustImpl(e);
112 }
113
114 X509_STORE* XMLTrustImpl::KeyAuthority::getX509Store()
115 {
116 #ifdef _DEBUG
117     NDC ndc("getX509Store");
118 #endif
119     Category& log=Category::getInstance(XMLPROVIDERS_LOGCAT".Trust");
120
121     // Load the cert vector into a store.
122     X509_STORE* store=X509_STORE_new();
123     if (!store) {
124         log_openssl();
125         return NULL;
126     }
127 #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
128     X509_STORE_set_flags(store,X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
129 #endif
130
131     for (vector<X509*>::iterator j=m_certs.begin(); j!=m_certs.end(); j++) {
132         if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(store,*j)) {
133             log_openssl();
134             log.warn("failed to add cert: %s", (*j)->name);
135             continue;
136         }
137     }
138
139     for (vector<X509_CRL*>::iterator k=m_crls.begin(); k!=m_crls.end(); k++) {
140         if (!X509_STORE_add_crl(store,*k)) {
141             log_openssl();
142             log.warn("failed to add CRL");
143             continue;
144         }
145     }
146
147     return store;
148 }
149
150 XMLTrustImpl::KeyAuthority::~KeyAuthority()
151 {
152     for (vector<X509*>::iterator i=m_certs.begin(); i!=m_certs.end(); i++)
153         X509_free(*i);
154     for (vector<X509_CRL*>::iterator j=m_crls.begin(); j!=m_crls.end(); j++)
155         X509_CRL_free(*j);
156 }
157
158 class KeyInfoNodeFilter : public DOMNodeFilter
159 {
160 public:
161     short acceptNode(const DOMNode* node) const
162     {
163         // Our filter just skips any trees not rooted by ds:KeyInfo.
164         if (node->getNodeType()==DOMNode::ELEMENT_NODE) {
165             if (saml::XML::isElementNamed(static_cast<const DOMElement*>(node),saml::XML::XMLSIG_NS,L(KeyInfo)))
166                 return FILTER_ACCEPT;
167         }
168         return FILTER_REJECT;
169     }
170 };
171
172 void XMLTrustImpl::init()
173 {
174 #ifdef _DEBUG
175     saml::NDC ndc("init");
176 #endif
177     Category& log=Category::getInstance(XMLPROVIDERS_LOGCAT".Trust");
178
179     try {
180         if (!saml::XML::isElementNamed(m_root,::XML::TRUST_NS,SHIB_L(Trust))) {
181             log.error("Construction requires a valid trust file: (trust:Trust as root element)");
182             throw TrustException("Construction requires a valid trust file: (trust:Trust as root element)");
183         }
184
185         // Loop over the KeyAuthority elements.
186         DOMNodeList* nlist=m_root->getElementsByTagNameNS(::XML::TRUST_NS,SHIB_L(KeyAuthority));
187         for (XMLSize_t i=0; nlist && i<nlist->getLength(); i++) {
188             auto_ptr<KeyAuthority> ka(new KeyAuthority());
189             
190             const DOMElement* e=static_cast<DOMElement*>(nlist->item(i));
191             const XMLCh* depth=e->getAttributeNS(NULL,SHIB_L(VerifyDepth));
192             if (depth && *depth)
193                 ka->m_depth=XMLString::parseInt(depth);
194             
195             const DOMElement* k_child=saml::XML::getLastChildElement(e,saml::XML::XMLSIG_NS,L(KeyInfo));
196             if (!k_child) {
197                 log.error("ignoring KeyAuthority element with no ds:KeyInfo");
198                 continue;
199             }
200             const DOMElement* badkeyname=saml::XML::getFirstChildElement(k_child,saml::XML::XMLSIG_NS,SHIB_L(KeyName));
201             if (badkeyname) {
202                 log.error("ignoring KeyAuthority element with embedded ds:KeyName, these must appear only outside of ds:KeyInfo");
203                 continue;
204             }
205             
206             // Very rudimentary, grab up all the in-band X509Certificate elements, and flatten into one list.
207             DOMNodeList* certlist=k_child->getElementsByTagNameNS(saml::XML::XMLSIG_NS,L(X509Certificate));
208             for (XMLSize_t j=0; certlist && j<certlist->getLength(); j++) {
209                 auto_ptr_char blob(certlist->item(j)->getFirstChild()->getNodeValue());
210                 X509* x=B64_to_X509(blob.get());
211                 if (x)
212                     ka->m_certs.push_back(x);
213                 else
214                     log.error("unable to create certificate from inline X509Certificate data");
215             }
216
217             // Now look for externally referenced objects.
218             certlist=k_child->getElementsByTagNameNS(saml::XML::XMLSIG_NS,SHIB_L(RetrievalMethod));
219             for (XMLSize_t k=0; certlist && k<certlist->getLength(); k++) {
220                 DOMElement* cert=static_cast<DOMElement*>(certlist->item(k));
221                 if (!XMLString::compareString(cert->getAttributeNS(NULL,SHIB_L(Type)),::XML::XMLSIG_RETMETHOD_RAWX509)) {
222                     // DER format
223                     auto_ptr_char fname(cert->getAttributeNS(NULL,SHIB_L(URI)));
224                     FILE* f=fopen(fname.get(),"r");
225                     if (f) {
226                         X509* x=NULL;
227                         d2i_X509_fp(f,&x);
228                         if (x) {
229                             ka->m_certs.push_back(x);
230                             continue;
231                         }
232                         else
233                             log_openssl();
234                     }
235                     log.error("unable to create certificate from externally referenced file");
236                 }
237             }
238
239             // Very rudimentary, grab up all the in-band X509CRL elements, and flatten into one list.
240             certlist=k_child->getElementsByTagNameNS(saml::XML::XMLSIG_NS,SHIB_L(X509CRL));
241             for (XMLSize_t r=0; certlist && r<certlist->getLength(); r++) {
242                 auto_ptr_char blob(certlist->item(r)->getFirstChild()->getNodeValue());
243                 X509_CRL* x=B64_to_CRL(blob.get());
244                 if (x)
245                     ka->m_crls.push_back(x);
246                 else
247                     log.warn("unable to create CRL from inline X509CRL data");
248             }
249
250             KeyAuthority* ka2=ka.release();
251             m_keyauths.push_back(ka2);
252             
253             // Now map the ds:KeyName values to the list of certs.
254             bool wildcard=true;
255             DOMElement* sub=saml::XML::getFirstChildElement(e,saml::XML::XMLSIG_NS,SHIB_L(KeyName));
256             while (sub) {
257                 const XMLCh* name=sub->getFirstChild()->getNodeValue();
258                 if (name && *name) {
259                     wildcard=false;
260 #ifdef HAVE_GOOD_STL
261                     m_authMap[name]=ka2;
262 #else
263                     ka2->m_subjects.push_back(name);
264 #endif
265                 }
266                 sub=saml::XML::getNextSiblingElement(sub,saml::XML::XMLSIG_NS,SHIB_L(KeyName));
267             }
268             
269             // If no Subjects, this is a catch-all binding.
270             if (wildcard) {
271                 if (!m_wildcard) {
272                     log.warn("found a wildcard KeyAuthority element, make sure this is what you intend");
273                     m_wildcard=ka2;
274                 }
275                 else
276                     log.warn("found multiple wildcard KeyAuthority elements, ignoring all but the first");
277             }
278         }
279
280         // Now traverse the outer ds:KeyInfo elements. Supposedly this cast just works...
281         int count=0;
282         KeyInfoNodeFilter filter;
283         XSECKeyInfoResolverDefault resolver;
284         DOMTreeWalker* walker=
285             static_cast<DOMDocumentTraversal*>(m_doc)->createTreeWalker(const_cast<DOMElement*>(m_root),DOMNodeFilter::SHOW_ELEMENT,&filter,false);
286         DOMElement* kidom=static_cast<DOMElement*>(walker->firstChild());
287         while (kidom) {
288             count++;
289             DSIGKeyInfoList* KIL = new DSIGKeyInfoList(NULL);
290             // We let XMLSec hack through anything it can. This should evolve over time, or we can
291             // plug in our own KeyResolver later...
292             try {
293                 if (!KIL->loadListFromXML(kidom))
294                     log.error("skipping ds:KeyInfo element (%d) containing unsupported children",count);
295             }
296             catch (XSECCryptoException& xe) {
297                 log.error("unable to process ds:KeyInfo element (%d): %s",count,xe.getMsg());
298             }
299             
300             // Dry run...can we resolve to a key?
301             XSECCryptoKey* key=resolver.resolveKey(KIL);
302             if (key) {
303                 // So far so good, now look for the name binding(s).
304                 delete key;
305                 bool named=false;
306                 for (size_t index=0; index<KIL->getSize(); index++) {
307                     DSIGKeyInfo* info=KIL->item(index);
308                     const XMLCh* name=info->getKeyName();
309                     if (name && *name) {
310                         if (!named)
311                             m_keybinds.push_back(KIL);
312                         named=true;
313 #ifdef HAVE_GOOD_STL
314                         m_bindMap[name]=KIL;
315 #endif
316                     }
317                 }
318                 if (!named) {
319                     log.warn("skipping ds:KeyInfo binding (%d) that does not contain a usable key name",count);
320                     delete KIL;
321                 }
322             }
323             else {
324                 log.warn("skipping ds:KeyInfo binding (%d) that does not resolve to a key",count);
325                 delete KIL;
326             }
327             kidom=static_cast<DOMElement*>(walker->nextSibling());
328         }
329         walker->release();    // This just cleans up aggressively, but there's no leak if we don't.
330     }
331     catch (SAMLException& e) {
332         log.errorStream() << "Error while parsing trust configuration: " << e.what() << xmlproviders::logging::eol;
333         this->~XMLTrustImpl();
334         throw;
335     }
336 #ifndef _DEBUG
337     catch (...) {
338         log.error("Unexpected error while parsing trust configuration");
339         this->~XMLTrustImpl();
340         throw;
341     }
342 #endif
343 }
344
345 XMLTrustImpl::~XMLTrustImpl()
346 {
347     for (vector<KeyAuthority*>::iterator i=m_keyauths.begin(); i!=m_keyauths.end(); i++)
348         delete (*i);
349     for (vector<DSIGKeyInfoList*>::iterator j=m_keybinds.begin(); j!=m_keybinds.end(); j++)
350         delete (*j);
351 }
352
353 XMLTrust::XMLTrust(const DOMElement* e) : ReloadableXMLFile(e), m_delegate(NULL)
354 {
355     static const XMLCh resolver[] =
356     { chLatin_K, chLatin_e, chLatin_y, chLatin_I, chLatin_n, chLatin_f, chLatin_o,
357       chLatin_R, chLatin_e, chLatin_s, chLatin_o, chLatin_l, chLatin_v, chLatin_e, chLatin_r, chNull
358     };
359
360     static const XMLCh _type[] =
361     { chLatin_t, chLatin_y, chLatin_p, chLatin_e, chNull };
362
363     Category& log=Category::getInstance(XMLPROVIDERS_LOGCAT".Trust");
364
365     // Find any KeyResolver plugins.
366     DOMElement* child=saml::XML::getFirstChildElement(e);
367     while (child) {
368         if (!XMLString::compareString(resolver,child->getLocalName()) && child->hasAttributeNS(NULL,_type)) {
369             try {
370                 auto_ptr_char temp(child->getAttributeNS(NULL,_type));
371                 m_resolvers.push_back(KeyInfoResolver::getInstance(temp.get(),child));
372             }
373             catch (SAMLException& ex) {
374                 log.error("caught SAML exception building KeyInfoResolver plugin: %s",ex.what());
375             }
376 #ifndef _DEBUG
377             catch (...) {
378                 log.error("caught unknown exception building KeyInfoResolver plugin");
379             }
380 #endif
381         }
382         child=saml::XML::getNextSiblingElement(child);
383     }
384     m_resolvers.push_back(KeyInfoResolver::getInstance(e));
385
386     try {
387         IPlugIn* plugin=SAMLConfig::getConfig().getPlugMgr().newPlugin(
388             "edu.internet2.middleware.shibboleth.common.provider.ShibbolethTrust",e
389             );
390         m_delegate=dynamic_cast<ITrust*>(plugin);
391         if (!m_delegate) {
392             delete plugin;
393             log.error("plugin was not a trust provider");
394             throw UnsupportedExtensionException("Legacy trust provider requires Shibboleth trust provider in order to function.");
395         }
396     }
397     catch (SAMLException& ex) {
398         log.error("caught SAML exception building embedded trust provider: %s", ex.what());
399         throw;
400     }
401 }
402
403 XMLTrust::~XMLTrust()
404 {
405     delete m_delegate;
406     for (vector<KeyInfoResolver*>::iterator i=m_resolvers.begin(); i!=m_resolvers.end(); i++)
407         delete *i;
408 }
409
410 static int error_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX* ctx)
411 {
412     if (!ok)
413         Category::getInstance("OpenSSL").error("path validation failure: %s", X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx->error));
414     return ok;
415 }
416
417 bool XMLTrust::validate(void* certEE, const Iterator<void*>& certChain, const IRoleDescriptor* role, bool checkName)
418 {
419     // The delegated trust plugin handles path validation with metadata extensions.
420     // We only take over if the legacy format has to kick in.
421     if (m_delegate->validate(certEE,certChain,role,checkName))
422         return true;
423
424 #ifdef _DEBUG
425     saml::NDC ndc("validate");
426 #endif
427     Category& log=Category::getInstance(XMLPROVIDERS_LOGCAT".Trust");
428
429     if (checkName) {
430         // Before we do the cryptogprahy, check that the EE certificate "name" matches
431         // one of the acceptable key "names" for the signer.
432         vector<string> keynames;
433         
434         // Build a list of acceptable names. Transcode the possible key "names" to UTF-8.
435         // For some simple cases, this should handle UTF-8 encoded DNs in certificates.
436         Iterator<const IKeyDescriptor*> kd_i=role->getKeyDescriptors();
437         while (kd_i.hasNext()) {
438             const IKeyDescriptor* kd=kd_i.next();
439             if (kd->getUse()!=IKeyDescriptor::signing)
440                 continue;
441             DSIGKeyInfoList* KIL=kd->getKeyInfo();
442             if (!KIL)
443                 continue;
444             for (size_t s=0; s<KIL->getSize(); s++) {
445                 const XMLCh* n=KIL->item(s)->getKeyName();
446                 if (n) {
447                     auto_ptr<char> kn(toUTF8(n));
448                     keynames.push_back(kn.get());
449                 }
450             }
451         }
452         auto_ptr<char> kn(toUTF8(role->getEntityDescriptor()->getId()));
453         keynames.push_back(kn.get());
454         
455         char buf[256];
456         X509* x=(X509*)certEE;
457         X509_NAME* subject=X509_get_subject_name(x);
458         if (subject) {
459             // One way is a direct match to the subject DN.
460             // Seems that the way to do the compare is to write the X509_NAME into a BIO.
461             BIO* b = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
462             BIO* b2 = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
463             BIO_set_mem_eof_return(b, 0);
464             BIO_set_mem_eof_return(b2, 0);
465             // The flags give us LDAP order instead of X.500, with a comma separator.
466             int len=X509_NAME_print_ex(b,subject,0,XN_FLAG_RFC2253);
467             string subjectstr,subjectstr2;
468             BIO_flush(b);
469             while ((len = BIO_read(b, buf, 255)) > 0) {
470                 buf[len] = '\0';
471                 subjectstr+=buf;
472             }
473             log.infoStream() << "certificate subject: " << subjectstr << xmlproviders::logging::eol;
474             // The flags give us LDAP order instead of X.500, with a comma plus space separator.
475             len=X509_NAME_print_ex(b2,subject,0,XN_FLAG_RFC2253 + XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC - XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS);
476             BIO_flush(b2);
477             while ((len = BIO_read(b2, buf, 255)) > 0) {
478                 buf[len] = '\0';
479                 subjectstr2+=buf;
480             }
481             
482             // Check each keyname.
483             for (vector<string>::const_iterator n=keynames.begin(); n!=keynames.end(); n++) {
484 #ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
485                 if (!strcasecmp(n->c_str(),subjectstr.c_str()) || !strcasecmp(n->c_str(),subjectstr2.c_str())) {
486 #else
487                 if (!stricmp(n->c_str(),subjectstr.c_str()) || !stricmp(n->c_str(),subjectstr2.c_str())) {
488 #endif
489                     log.info("matched full subject DN to a key name (%s)", n->c_str());
490                     checkName=false;
491                     break;
492                 }
493             }
494             BIO_free(b);
495             BIO_free(b2);
496
497             if (checkName) {
498                 log.debug("unable to match DN, trying TLS subjectAltName match");
499                 STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME)* altnames=(STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME)*)X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
500                 if (altnames) {
501                     int numalts = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames);
502                     for (int an=0; !checkName && an<numalts; an++) {
503                         const GENERAL_NAME* check = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altnames, an);
504                         if (check->type==GEN_DNS || check->type==GEN_URI) {
505                             const char* altptr = (char*)ASN1_STRING_data(check->d.ia5);
506                             const int altlen = ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
507                             
508                             for (vector<string>::const_iterator n=keynames.begin(); n!=keynames.end(); n++) {
509 #ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
510                                 if (!strncasecmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen)) {
511 #else
512                                 if (!strnicmp(altptr,n->c_str(),altlen)) {
513 #endif
514                                     log.info("matched DNS/URI subjectAltName to a key name (%s)", n->c_str());
515                                     checkName=false;
516                                     break;
517                                 }
518                             }
519                         }
520                     }
521                     GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
522                 }
523                 
524                 if (checkName) {
525                     log.debug("unable to match subjectAltName, trying TLS CN match");
526                     memset(buf,0,sizeof(buf));
527                     if (X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subject,NID_commonName,buf,255)>0) {
528                         for (vector<string>::const_iterator n=keynames.begin(); n!=keynames.end(); n++) {
529 #ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
530                             if (!strcasecmp(buf,n->c_str())) {
531 #else
532                             if (!stricmp(buf,n->c_str())) {
533 #endif
534                                 log.info("matched subject CN to a key name (%s)", n->c_str());
535                                 checkName=false;
536                                 break;
537                             }
538                         }
539                     }
540                     else
541                         log.warn("no common name in certificate subject");
542                 }
543             }
544         }
545         else
546             log.error("certificate has no subject?!");
547     }
548
549     if (checkName) {
550         log.error("cannot match certificate subject against acceptable key names based on KeyDescriptors");
551         return false;
552     }
553
554     lock();
555     try {
556         XMLTrustImpl* impl=dynamic_cast<XMLTrustImpl*>(getImplementation());
557     
558         // Build a list of the names to match. We include any named KeyDescriptors, and the provider ID and its groups.
559         vector<const XMLCh*> names;
560         Iterator<const IKeyDescriptor*> kdlist=role->getKeyDescriptors();
561         while (kdlist.hasNext()) {
562             const IKeyDescriptor* kd=kdlist.next();
563             if (kd->getUse()==IKeyDescriptor::encryption)
564                 continue;
565             DSIGKeyInfoList* kilist=kd->getKeyInfo();
566             for (size_t s=0; kilist && s<kilist->getSize(); s++) {
567                 const XMLCh* n=kilist->item(s)->getKeyName();
568                 if (n)
569                     names.push_back(n);
570             }
571         }
572         names.push_back(role->getEntityDescriptor()->getId());
573         const IEntitiesDescriptor* group=role->getEntityDescriptor()->getEntitiesDescriptor();
574         while (group) {
575             if (group->getName())
576                 names.push_back(group->getName());
577             group=group->getEntitiesDescriptor();
578         }
579     
580         // Now check each name.
581         XMLTrustImpl::KeyAuthority* kauth=NULL;
582         for (vector<const XMLCh*>::const_iterator name=names.begin(); !kauth && name!=names.end(); name++) {
583 #ifdef HAVE_GOOD_STL
584             XMLTrustImpl::AuthMap::const_iterator c=impl->m_authMap.find(*name);
585             if (c!=impl->m_authMap.end()) {
586                 kauth=c->second;
587                 if (log.isInfoEnabled()) {
588                     auto_ptr_char temp(*name);
589                     log.info("KeyAuthority match on %s",temp.get());
590                 }
591             }
592 #else
593             // Without a decent STL, we trade-off the transcoding by doing a linear search.
594             for (vector<XMLTrustImpl::KeyAuthority*>::const_iterator keyauths=impl->m_keyauths.begin(); !kauth && keyauths!=impl->m_keyauths.end(); keyauths++) {
595                 for (vector<const XMLCh*>::const_iterator subs=(*keyauths)->m_subjects.begin(); !kauth && subs!=(*keyauths)->m_subjects.end(); subs++) {
596                     if (!XMLString::compareString(*name,*subs)) {
597                         kauth=*keyauths;
598                         if (log.isInfoEnabled()) {
599                             auto_ptr_char temp(*name);
600                             log.info("KeyAuthority match on %s",temp.get());
601                         }
602                     }
603                 }
604             }
605 #endif
606         }
607     
608         if (!kauth) {
609             if (impl->m_wildcard) {
610                log.warn("applying wildcard KeyAuthority, use with caution!");
611                 kauth=impl->m_wildcard;
612             }
613             else {
614                 unlock();
615                 log.warn("no KeyAuthority found to validate SSL connection, leaving it alone");
616                 return false;
617             }
618         }
619     
620         log.debug("performing certificate path validation...");
621
622         // If we have a match, use the associated keyauth.
623         X509_STORE* store=kauth->getX509Store();
624         if (store) {
625             STACK_OF(X509)* untrusted=sk_X509_new_null();
626             certChain.reset();
627             while (certChain.hasNext())
628                 sk_X509_push(untrusted,(X509*)certChain.next());
629
630             // This contains the state of the validate operation.
631             X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
632
633             // AFAICT, EE and untrusted are passed in but not owned by the ctx.
634 #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
635             if (X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,store,(X509*)certEE,untrusted)!=1) {
636                 log_openssl();
637                 log.error("unable to initialize X509_STORE_CTX");
638                 X509_STORE_free(store);
639                 sk_X509_free(untrusted);
640                 unlock();
641                 return false;
642             }
643 #else
644             X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,store,(X509*)certEE,untrusted);
645 #endif
646             X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx,100);    // handle depth below
647             X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx,error_callback);
648             
649             int ret=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
650             if (ret==1) {
651                 // Now see if the depth was acceptable by counting the number of intermediates.
652                 int depth=sk_X509_num(ctx.chain)-2;
653                 if (kauth->m_depth < depth) {
654                     log.error(
655                         "certificate chain was too long (%d intermediates, only %d allowed)",
656                         (depth==-1) ? 0 : depth,
657                         kauth->m_depth
658                         );
659                     ret=0;
660                 }
661             }
662             
663             // Clean up...
664             X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
665             X509_STORE_free(store);
666
667             if (ret==1) {
668                 log.info("successfully validated certificate chain");
669                 unlock();
670                 return true;
671             }
672         }
673     }
674     catch (...) {
675         unlock();
676         throw;
677     }
678     unlock();
679     return false;
680 }
681
682 bool XMLTrust::validate(const saml::SAMLSignedObject& token, const IRoleDescriptor* role, ITrust* certValidator)
683 {
684     // The delegated trust plugin handles metadata keys and use of metadata extensions.
685     // If it fails to find an inline key in metadata, then it will branch off to the
686     // extended version and verify the token using the certificates inside it. At that
687     // point, control will pass to the other virtual function above and we can handle
688     // legacy KeyAuthority rules that way.
689     if (m_delegate->validate(token,role,certValidator ? certValidator : this))
690         return true;
691
692 #ifdef _DEBUG
693     saml::NDC ndc("validate");
694 #endif
695     Category& log=Category::getInstance(XMLPROVIDERS_LOGCAT".Trust");
696
697     lock();
698     try {
699         XMLTrustImpl* impl=dynamic_cast<XMLTrustImpl*>(getImplementation());
700
701         // If we actually make it this far, the only case we're handling directly
702         // is an inline key in the old trust file format. Build a list of key names
703         // which will be used to find matching rules.
704         vector<const XMLCh*> names;
705         
706         // Build a list of acceptable names. Transcode the possible key "names" to UTF-8.
707         // For some simple cases, this should handle UTF-8 encoded DNs in certificates.
708         Iterator<const IKeyDescriptor*> kd_i=role->getKeyDescriptors();
709         while (kd_i.hasNext()) {
710             const IKeyDescriptor* kd=kd_i.next();
711             if (kd->getUse()!=IKeyDescriptor::signing)
712                 continue;
713             DSIGKeyInfoList* KIL=kd->getKeyInfo();
714             if (!KIL)
715                 continue;
716             for (size_t s=0; s<KIL->getSize(); s++) {
717                 const XMLCh* n=KIL->item(s)->getKeyName();
718                 if (n)
719                     names.push_back(n);
720             }
721         }
722         names.push_back(role->getEntityDescriptor()->getId());
723
724         log.debug("checking for keys in trust file");
725         DSIGKeyInfoList* KIL=NULL;
726         for (vector<const XMLCh*>::const_iterator name=names.begin(); !KIL && name!=names.end(); name++) {
727 #ifdef HAVE_GOOD_STL
728             XMLTrustImpl::BindMap::const_iterator c=impl->m_bindMap.find(*name);
729             if (c!=impl->m_bindMap.end()) {
730                 KIL=c->second;
731                 if (log.isInfoEnabled()) {
732                     auto_ptr_char temp(*name);
733                     log.info("KeyInfo match on %s",temp.get());
734                 }
735             }
736 #else
737             // Without a decent STL, we trade-off the transcoding by doing a linear search.
738             for (vector<DSIGKeyInfoList*>::const_iterator keybinds=impl->m_keybinds.begin(); !KIL && keybinds!=impl->m_keybinds.end(); keybinds++) {
739                 for (size_t s=0; !KIL && s<(*keybinds)->getSize(); s++) {
740                     if (!XMLString::compareString(*name,(*keybinds)->item(s)->getKeyName())) {
741                         KIL=*keybinds;
742                         if (log.isInfoEnabled()) {
743                             auto_ptr_char temp(*name);
744                             log.info("KeyInfo match on %s",temp.get());
745                         }
746                     }
747                 }
748             }
749 #endif
750         }
751         
752         if (KIL) {
753             // Any inline KeyInfo should ostensibly resolve to a key we can try.
754             Iterator<KeyInfoResolver*> resolvers(m_resolvers);
755             while (resolvers.hasNext()) {
756                 XSECCryptoKey* key=((XSECKeyInfoResolver*)*resolvers.next())->resolveKey(KIL);
757                 if (key) {
758                     log.debug("resolved key, trying it...");
759                     try {
760                         token.verify(key);
761                         unlock();
762                         log.info("token verified with KeyInfo, nothing more to verify");
763                         return true;
764                     }
765                     catch (SAMLException& e) {
766                         unlock();
767                         log.warn("verification with inline key failed: %s", e.what());
768                         return false;
769                     }
770                 }
771             }
772             log.warn("KeyInfo in trust provider did not resolve to a key");
773         }
774     }
775     catch (...) {
776         unlock();
777         throw;
778     }       
779
780     unlock();
781     return false;
782 }