--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2007 Internet2
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * SAML2Consumer.cpp
+ *
+ * SAML 2.0 assertion consumer service
+ */
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "Application.h"
+#include "exceptions.h"
+#include "ServiceProvider.h"
+#include "SessionCache.h"
+#include "attribute/resolver/ResolutionContext.h"
+#include "handler/AssertionConsumerService.h"
+
+#include <saml/saml2/core/Protocols.h>
+#include <saml/saml2/profile/BrowserSSOProfileValidator.h>
+#include <saml/saml2/metadata/Metadata.h>
+
+using namespace shibsp;
+using namespace opensaml::saml2;
+using namespace opensaml::saml2p;
+using namespace opensaml;
+using namespace xmltooling;
+using namespace log4cpp;
+using namespace std;
+using saml2md::EntityDescriptor;
+
+namespace shibsp {
+
+#if defined (_MSC_VER)
+ #pragma warning( push )
+ #pragma warning( disable : 4250 )
+#endif
+
+ class SHIBSP_DLLLOCAL SAML2Consumer : public AssertionConsumerService
+ {
+ public:
+ SAML2Consumer(const DOMElement* e, const char* appId)
+ : AssertionConsumerService(e, appId, Category::getInstance(SHIBSP_LOGCAT".SAML2")) {
+ }
+ virtual ~SAML2Consumer() {}
+
+ private:
+ string implementProtocol(
+ const Application& application,
+ const HTTPRequest& httpRequest,
+ SecurityPolicy& policy,
+ const PropertySet* settings,
+ const XMLObject& xmlObject
+ ) const;
+ };
+
+#if defined (_MSC_VER)
+ #pragma warning( pop )
+#endif
+
+ Handler* SHIBSP_DLLLOCAL SAML2ConsumerFactory(const pair<const DOMElement*,const char*>& p)
+ {
+ return new SAML2Consumer(p.first, p.second);
+ }
+
+};
+
+string SAML2Consumer::implementProtocol(
+ const Application& application,
+ const HTTPRequest& httpRequest,
+ SecurityPolicy& policy,
+ const PropertySet* settings,
+ const XMLObject& xmlObject
+ ) const
+{
+ // Implementation of SAML 2.0 SSO profile(s).
+ m_log.debug("processing message against SAML 2.0 SSO profile");
+
+ // Remember whether we already established trust.
+ // None of the SAML 2 bindings require security at the protocol layer.
+ bool alreadySecured = policy.isSecure();
+
+ // Check for errors...this will throw if it's not a successful message.
+ checkError(&xmlObject);
+
+ const Response* response = dynamic_cast<const Response*>(&xmlObject);
+ if (!response)
+ throw FatalProfileException("Incoming message was not a samlp:Response.");
+
+ const vector<saml2::Assertion*>& assertions = response->getAssertions();
+ const vector<saml2::EncryptedAssertion*>& encassertions = response->getEncryptedAssertions();
+ if (assertions.empty() && encassertions.empty())
+ throw FatalProfileException("Incoming message contained no SAML assertions.");
+
+ // Maintain list of "legit" tokens to feed to SP subsystems.
+ const Subject* ssoSubject=NULL;
+ const AuthnStatement* ssoStatement=NULL;
+ vector<const opensaml::Assertion*> tokens;
+
+ // Also track "bad" tokens that we'll cache but not use.
+ // This is necessary because there may be valid tokens not aimed at us.
+ vector<const opensaml::Assertion*> badtokens;
+
+ // And also track "owned" tokens that we decrypt here.
+ vector<saml2::Assertion*> ownedtokens;
+
+ // Profile validator.
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ string dest = httpRequest.getRequestURL();
+ BrowserSSOProfileValidator ssoValidator(application.getAudiences(), now, dest.substr(0,dest.find('?')).c_str());
+
+ // With this flag on, we ignore any unsigned assertions.
+ pair<bool,bool> flag = settings->getBool("signedAssertions");
+
+ // Saves off IP-mismatch error message because it's potentially helpful for users.
+ string addressMismatch;
+
+ for (vector<saml2::Assertion*>::const_iterator a = assertions.begin(); a!=assertions.end(); ++a) {
+ // Skip unsigned assertion?
+ if (!(*a)->getSignature() && flag.first && flag.second) {
+ m_log.warn("found unsigned assertion in SAML response, ignoring it per signedAssertions policy");
+ badtokens.push_back(*a);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ try {
+ // We clear the security flag, so we can tell whether the token was secured on its own.
+ policy.setSecure(false);
+
+ // Run the policy over the assertion. Handles issuer consistency, replay, freshness,
+ // and signature verification, assuming the relevant rules are configured.
+ policy.evaluate(*(*a));
+
+ // If no security is in place now, we kick it.
+ if (!alreadySecured && !policy.isSecure()) {
+ m_log.warn("unable to establish security of assertion");
+ badtokens.push_back(*a);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ // Now do profile and core semantic validation to ensure we can use it for SSO.
+ ssoValidator.validateAssertion(*(*a));
+
+ // Address checking.
+ try {
+ if (ssoValidator.getAddress())
+ checkAddress(application, httpRequest, ssoValidator.getAddress());
+ }
+ catch (exception& ex) {
+ // We save off the message if there's no SSO statement yet.
+ if (!ssoStatement)
+ addressMismatch = ex.what();
+ throw;
+ }
+
+ // Track it as a valid token.
+ tokens.push_back(*a);
+
+ // Save off the first valid SSO statement, but favor the "soonest" session expiration.
+ const vector<AuthnStatement*>& statements = const_cast<const saml2::Assertion*>(*a)->getAuthnStatements();
+ for (vector<AuthnStatement*>::const_iterator s = statements.begin(); s!=statements.end(); ++s) {
+ if (!ssoStatement || (*s)->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() < ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch())
+ ssoStatement = *s;
+ }
+
+ // Save off the first valid Subject, but favor an unencrypted NameID over anything else.
+ if (!ssoSubject || (!ssoSubject->getNameID() && (*a)->getSubject()->getNameID()))
+ ssoSubject = (*a)->getSubject();
+ }
+ catch (exception& ex) {
+ m_log.warn("detected a problem with assertion: %s", ex.what());
+ badtokens.push_back(*a);
+ }
+ }
+\r
+ CredentialResolver* cr=NULL;\r
+ const PropertySet* credUse = application.getCredentialUse(\r
+ policy.getIssuerMetadata() ? dynamic_cast<const EntityDescriptor*>(policy.getIssuerMetadata()->getParent()) : NULL\r
+ );\r
+ if (credUse)\r
+ cr = application.getServiceProvider().getCredentialResolver(credUse->getString("Encryption").second);
+ if (!cr && !encassertions.empty())
+ m_log.warn("found encrypted assertions, but no decryption credential was available");
+
+ for (vector<saml2::EncryptedAssertion*>::const_iterator ea = encassertions.begin(); cr && ea!=encassertions.end(); ++ea) {
+ // Attempt to decrypt it.
+ saml2::Assertion* decrypted=NULL;
+ try {
+ Locker credlocker(cr);
+ auto_ptr<XMLObject> wrapper((*ea)->decrypt(cr, application.getXMLString("providerId").second));
+ decrypted = dynamic_cast<saml2::Assertion*>(wrapper.get());
+ if (decrypted) {
+ wrapper.release();
+ ownedtokens.push_back(decrypted);
+ }
+ }
+ catch (exception& ex) {
+ m_log.error(ex.what());
+ }
+ if (!decrypted)
+ continue;
+
+ // Skip unsigned assertion?
+ if (!decrypted->getSignature() && flag.first && flag.second) {
+ m_log.warn("found unsigned assertion in SAML response, ignoring it per signedAssertions policy");
+ badtokens.push_back(decrypted);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ try {
+ // We clear the security flag, so we can tell whether the token was secured on its own.
+ policy.setSecure(false);
+
+ // Run the policy over the assertion. Handles issuer consistency, replay, freshness,
+ // and signature verification, assuming the relevant rules are configured.
+ // We have to marshall the object first to ensure signatures can be checked.
+ decrypted->marshall();
+ policy.evaluate(*decrypted);
+
+ // If no security is in place now, we kick it.
+ if (!alreadySecured && !policy.isSecure()) {
+ m_log.warn("unable to establish security of assertion");
+ badtokens.push_back(decrypted);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ // Now do profile and core semantic validation to ensure we can use it for SSO.
+ ssoValidator.validateAssertion(*decrypted);
+
+ // Address checking.
+ try {
+ if (ssoValidator.getAddress())
+ checkAddress(application, httpRequest, ssoValidator.getAddress());
+ }
+ catch (exception& ex) {
+ // We save off the message if there's no SSO statement yet.
+ if (!ssoStatement)
+ addressMismatch = ex.what();
+ throw;
+ }
+
+ // Track it as a valid token.
+ tokens.push_back(decrypted);
+
+ // Save off the first valid SSO statement, but favor the "soonest" session expiration.
+ const vector<AuthnStatement*>& statements = const_cast<const saml2::Assertion*>(decrypted)->getAuthnStatements();
+ for (vector<AuthnStatement*>::const_iterator s = statements.begin(); s!=statements.end(); ++s) {
+ if (!ssoStatement || (*s)->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() < ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch())
+ ssoStatement = *s;
+ }
+
+ // Save off the first valid Subject, but favor an unencrypted NameID over anything else.
+ if (!ssoSubject || (!ssoSubject->getNameID() && decrypted->getSubject()->getNameID()))
+ ssoSubject = decrypted->getSubject();
+ }
+ catch (exception& ex) {
+ m_log.warn("detected a problem with assertion: %s", ex.what());
+ badtokens.push_back(decrypted);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ssoStatement) {
+ for_each(ownedtokens.begin(), ownedtokens.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<saml2::Assertion>());
+ if (addressMismatch.empty())
+ throw FatalProfileException("A valid authentication statement was not found in the incoming message.");
+ throw FatalProfileException(addressMismatch.c_str());
+ }
+
+ // May need to decrypt NameID.
+ bool ownedName = false;
+ NameID* ssoName = ssoSubject->getNameID();
+ if (!ssoName) {
+ EncryptedID* encname = ssoSubject->getEncryptedID();
+ if (encname) {
+ if (!cr)
+ m_log.warn("found encrypted NameID, but no decryption credential was available");
+ else {
+ Locker credlocker(cr);
+ try {
+ auto_ptr<XMLObject> decryptedID(encname->decrypt(cr,application.getXMLString("providerId").second));
+ ssoName = dynamic_cast<NameID*>(decryptedID.get());
+ if (ssoName) {
+ ownedName = true;
+ decryptedID.release();
+ }
+ }
+ catch (exception& ex) {
+ m_log.error(ex.what());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ m_log.debug("SSO profile processing completed successfully");
+
+ // We've successfully "accepted" at least one SSO token, along with any additional valid tokens.
+ // To complete processing, we need to resolve attributes and then create the session.
+
+ try {
+ const EntityDescriptor* issuerMetadata = dynamic_cast<const EntityDescriptor*>(policy.getIssuerMetadata()->getParent());
+ auto_ptr<ResolutionContext> ctx(
+ resolveAttributes(application, httpRequest, issuerMetadata, ssoName, &tokens)
+ );
+
+ // Copy over any new tokens, but leave them in the context for cleanup.
+ tokens.insert(tokens.end(), ctx->getResolvedAssertions().begin(), ctx->getResolvedAssertions().end());
+
+ // Now merge in bad tokens for caching.
+ tokens.insert(tokens.end(), badtokens.begin(), badtokens.end());
+
+ // Now we have to extract the authentication details for session setup.
+
+ // Session expiration for SAML 2.0 is jointly IdP- and SP-driven.
+ time_t sessionExp = ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfter() ? ssoStatement->getSessionNotOnOrAfterEpoch() : 0;
+ const PropertySet* sessionProps = application.getPropertySet("Sessions");
+ pair<bool,unsigned int> lifetime = sessionProps ? sessionProps->getUnsignedInt("lifetime") : make_pair(true,28800);
+ if (!lifetime.first)
+ lifetime.second = 28800;
+ if (lifetime.second != 0) {
+ if (sessionExp == 0)
+ sessionExp = now + lifetime.second; // IdP says nothing, calulate based on SP.
+ else
+ sessionExp = min(sessionExp, now + lifetime.second); // Use the lowest.
+ }
+
+ // Other details...
+ const AuthnContext* authnContext = ssoStatement->getAuthnContext();
+ auto_ptr_char authnClass((authnContext && authnContext->getAuthnContextClassRef()) ? authnContext->getAuthnContextClassRef()->getReference() : NULL);
+ auto_ptr_char authnDecl((authnContext && authnContext->getAuthnContextDeclRef()) ? authnContext->getAuthnContextDeclRef()->getReference() : NULL);
+ auto_ptr_char index(ssoStatement->getSessionIndex());
+ auto_ptr_char authnInstant(ssoStatement->getAuthnInstant() ? ssoStatement->getAuthnInstant()->getRawData() : NULL);
+
+ vector<shibsp::Attribute*>& attrs = ctx->getResolvedAttributes();
+ string key = application.getServiceProvider().getSessionCache()->insert(
+ sessionExp,
+ application,
+ httpRequest.getRemoteAddr().c_str(),
+ issuerMetadata,
+ ssoName,
+ authnInstant.get(),
+ index.get(),
+ authnClass.get(),
+ authnDecl.get(),
+ &tokens,
+ &attrs
+ );
+ attrs.clear(); // Attributes are owned by cache now.
+
+ if (ownedName)
+ delete ssoName;
+ for_each(ownedtokens.begin(), ownedtokens.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<saml2::Assertion>());
+
+ return key;
+ }
+ catch (exception&) {
+ if (ownedName)
+ delete ssoName;
+ for_each(ownedtokens.begin(), ownedtokens.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<saml2::Assertion>());
+ throw;
+ }
+}
projects / shibboleth / sp.git / commitdiff